Higher-level process theory motors of Strategic Information Systems (SIS) alignment: an exploratory study by McCarthy, John
McCarthy, John (2013) Higher-level process theory 
motors of Strategic Information Systems (SIS) 
alignment: an exploratory study. PhD thesis, University 
of Nottingham. 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/28977/1/604886_Vol1.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
· Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to 
the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.
· To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in Nottingham 
ePrints has been checked for eligibility before being made available.
· Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-
for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge provided that the authors, title 
and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the 
original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.
· Quotations or similar reproductions must be sufficiently acknowledged.
Please see our full end user licence at: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of 
record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please 
see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription.
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
Higher-level process theory motors of 
Strategic Information Systems (SIS) alignment: 
an exploratory study. 
JOHN MCCARTHY, asc, MBS (Research). 
Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
JULY 2013 
IMAGING SERVICES NORTH 
Boston Spa, Wetherby 
West Yorkshire, lS23 7BQ 
www.bl,uk 
BEST COpy AVAILABLE. 
VARIABLE PRI NT QUALITY 
IMAGING SERVICES NORTH 
Boston Spa, Wetherby 
West Yorkshire, LS23 7BO 
www.bl,uk 
ORIGINAL COpy TIGHTLY 
BOUND 
IMAGING SERVICES NORTH 
Boston Spa, Wetherby 
West Yorkshire, lS23 7BQ 
www.bl,uk 
PAGE NUMBERS ARE 
CLOSE TO THE EDGE OF 
THE PAGE. 
IMAGING SERVICES NORTH 
Boston Spa, Wetherby 
West Yorkshire, LS23 7BO 
www.bl,uk . 
PAGE NUMBERING AS 
ORIGINAL 
"Higher-level process theory motors of Strategic Information Systems (SIS) alignment: an 
exploratory study" 
ABSTRACT: 
The need for IS Strategies to be optimally aligned with business strategies in order to maximize 
both value for the business and usability of technology has lead to an understandable emphases: 
on strategic IS alignment for both academics and practitioners (Henderson and Venkatraman,i 
1999; Galliers and Newell, 2003). However, on review of both the IS strategy and alignment 
literatures, important limits in current understanding were identified. Although there has bee 
an increasing acceptance of IS strategy as more likely to have an emergent (Avgerou, Ciborr 
and Land, 2004) rather than a planned rational nature (apropos the seminal work of Mintzberg 
and Waters (1985», descriptive and theoretical understanding of this emergent nature waSl 
lacking. Further gaps in the IS alignment literature were identified. The predominant emphases" 
of alignment research were on the outcomes and causes of alignment with insufficient 
consideration given to the ongoing processes of alignment. Very strikingly, the roles of the 
informal organisation in alignment had been hitherto underexplored and although process (and 
indeed strategic process) theory had attained a level of maturity; application in alignment 
process research was conspicuously absent. In essence, literature evaluation had identified that 
there was an insufficient understanding of IS alignment as an emerging strategic process, from 
both theory and practitioner perspectives. The following research question could therefore he 
derived: What process theory motors and relationships characterise SIS alignment process? 
The most apposite perspective on process for this research was to frame alignment as a 
developing sequence of events, rather than the alternative approach of a set of concepts of 
categories (VanDeVen, 2007) necessitating a longitudinal approach to data collection. TIl 'I 
principal motivation of the research question was a nascent attempt to explore and understan ,I 
rather than measure alignment, so a subjective qualitative approach was most appropriate 
Alignment process data was collected at multiple organisational levels and from both prim ' 
(i.e. semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders in the alignment process) and second 
sources (i.e. formal strategy documents and planning schedules). The process of alignment Wa 
presented in the form of a case narrative. SIS alignment process events were identified and the' 
progression visually expressed by applying techniques from process research literatur 
(Langley, 1999; Pentland, 1999). Applying the well-established relationship between even 
progression, generative mechanisms and motors (Pettigrew, 1990; VanDeVen and Poole, 1995 
enabled Strategic IS alignment process to be conceptualised in the form of high-level proces 
theory motors. The contributions of this research are as follows. A process theory perspectiv 
on Strategic IS alignment process is offered which addresses the identified literature ga 
Methodological contributions also arise due to the structured and explicit application of proces 
research analyses techniques, still relatively rare in IS research. Recommendations fo 
managerial practice also arise from the detailed explication of the alignment process and th 
causes and outcomes of key process events and their progression. 
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Glossary of terms and acronyms used in the Thesis. 
• ACCELERATOR: an add-on to Microsoft EXCEL used in NOVOCORP to generate reports from 
AGRESSO. 
• ACCESS: Microsoft Access, a commercially available relational database. 
• AGRESSO: A predominantly financial accounting IT system used extensively within NOVOCORP. 
• AP: Accounts Payable. 
• AR: Accounts Receivable. 
• ASSET: Physical infrastructure which forms part of a network. 
• AUTOPIPE: a specialised technical design software package used in NOVOCORP. 
• BCS: Business Consolidation System; a SHAREPOINT system allowing pooling of multiple data 
sources within predicated data templates for extra-organisational and intra-organisational 
delivery. Used within AGOCORP to pool financial data from subsidiaries. 
• BLUEPRINT Phase: the second phase in a standard SAP implementation, analogous to the 
requirements gathering phase in generic IT system implementation, where critically, BPIDs are 
used to model and drive consensus on existing business processes in their current pre-SAP ("as-
is") and proposed within-SAP ("to-be") forms, in order to guide the subsequent design phase. 
• BPID: Blueprint Phase Implementation Directive; a document used in the BLUEPRINT phase of 
SAP implementation whereby existing business processes are modelled and explained in their 
current pre-SAP ("as-is") and proposed within-SAP ("to-be") forms. 
• BRT: Business Readiness Testing; the usually penultimate phase in a system testing process 
where representatives of the intended population engage in system testing to ensure that the 
system can be accessed and utilised in the expected fashion (with different users likely having 
different levels of access and natures of system usage). 
• CAD: Computer Aided Design; a technology utilised within AGOCORP and the wider group for 
infrastructure and process design. 
• CAPEX: abbreviation for Capital Expenditure. 
• CAPTIVATE: an interactive environment (produced by Adobe) and used by NOVOCORP to 
simulate the SAP system portal at the training stage of the implementation. 
• CITRIX: a proprietary system utilised by NOVOCORP for online collaboration. 
• CODA: an accounting IT system utilised by NOVOCORP prior to the introduction of AGRESSO. 
• CORE: proprietary enterprise HR systems developed by Core International which offer solutions 
for payroll, billing and attendance. 
• CRM: Customer Relationship Management. 
• CTO: Chief Technology Officer. 
• DASHBOARDING: the use of desktop IT systems that display desired performance/financial data 
on a user interface. 
• DIRECT HIRE: an NOVOCORP employee hired directly rather than transferring from AGOCORP 
Corporate or some other AGOCORP subsidiary and therefore subject to different employment 
terms and conditions. 
• DFIS: Distribution Facility Information System; a system implemented in AGOCORP for the 
purposes of monitoring and optimising distribution operations. 
• DWMS: Distribution Work Management System: a system implemented by AGOCORP for the 
purposes of managing work undertaken at facilities. 
• Enterprise Model: use of business process modelling in SAP to represent a new system or 
process. 
• ERP System: Enterprise Resource Planning System; an IT system spanning the organisation 
intended to enable greater control and allocation of resources. 
• EXCEL: Microsoft Excel, a commercially available spreadsheet package. 
• FALCON: An off-the-shelf project management and technical document repository IT system 
utilised within NOVOCORP. 
• FC: Financial Controller. 
• Fixed Cost: where a customer is billed an agreed ceiling cost that had been agreed upfront, 
regardless of the ongoing or final cost of labour, materials and any other miscellaneous 
overheads. 
• FX: Foreign (Currency) Exchange. 
• GL: General Ledger. 
• GREENFIELD SITE: the point of origin of any IT or infrastructural project. 
• GUI: Graphical User Interface; a screen display that accepts inputs into an integrated or separate 
system. 
• ICT Group: AGOCORP Corporate Information and Communication Technology division which 
provides project and desktop IT and software support and services to the entire AGOCORP 
Group (also known as ITS). 
• IP: Invoice Processing. 
• IR: Industrial Relations. 
• ITS: See ICT Group above. 
• JIT: Just in Time: a supply-chain approach where raw materials are sourced on the basis of 
operations demand and not bought in advance to be stored and used, which should lead to less 
waste. 
• JV: Joint Venture: a strategic partnership with a defined legal basis, agreed timeframe and 
sharing of any profitable outcomes. 
• LOS: Learning and Development Solution; a new SAP module being developed for the entire 
AGOCORP organisation and led by NOVOCORP, that formed an important part of the SAP 
implementation researched. 
• KAM: Key Account Manager; a manager with more intensive customer-facing responsibilities. 
• MACRO: In Microsoft Office packages, a piece of abstracted Visual Basic Code that automates 
data manipulation (used by many NOVOCORP employees in managing data from within 
AGRESSO and onto EXCEL). 
• MERIDIAN: An off-the-shelf project and facilities management IT system utilised within 
NOVOCORP as a replacement for FALCON. 
• ORACLE: a commercially available database and server utility package. 
• OUTLOOK: Microsoft Outlook; commercially available electronic-mail software. 
• P & L: Profit and Loss Account. 
• PID: Project Initiation Document: a project scoping document used in the PRINCE2 methodology 
as the initiating document for a new project. 
• PM: Project Management. 
• PM Module: Performance Management module within SAP which enables integration of 
employee performance management assessment and measurement across the business. 
• PO: Purchase Order. 
• PRINCE2: a defined project management methodology used by AGOCORP and subsidiaries in 
delivering projects of a certain scale. 
• QA: Quality Assurance; internal AGOCORP group projects undergo externally-led quality 
assurance reviews at regular intervals in the lifetime of the project (note: the AGRESSO to SAP 
implementation researched underwent three). 
• R/3: the most recent version of the SAP ERP Platform; R stands for real-time, whereas the 
number 3 represents the component three-tier platform architecture (Database, Client Interface 
and Application Server). 
• RAG Reporting: Red, Amber and Green reporting; a form of scheduled reporting which classifies 
ongoing project/work tasks depending on their current state of control with red for urgent 
attention or unsatisfactory progress, amber to indicate special attention may be necessary to 
ensure progress and green for controlled or satisfactory progress. 
• SANDBOX: a testing environment that allows for specific system code to be tested in isolation 
from a production environment or a repository of system code. 
• SAP: Systemanalyse und Programmentwicklung (Eng: "System Analysis and Program 
development"); an ERP developed in Germany and utilised by AGOCORP Group. 
• SCADA: Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system; an IT system used to help manage 
industrial environments. 
• SHAREPOINT: a Microsoft package that allows hosting and sharing of documents for access by 
multiple users in an organisation. 
• SMT: Senior Management Team. 
• SQL: Structured Query Language: a computing language used to control and manage data in 
(typically relational) databases. 
• SUPER-USER: a member of the user population who receives early intensive training on a new 
system in order to provide on-the-job ad-hoc advice and training to their colleagues. 
• TB: Trial Balance. 
• TBE: To Be Expected; used as a prefix, e.g. TBE Balance Sheet would be the To Be Expected 
Balance Sheet at the end of some financial interval. 
• TNA: Training Needs Analyses; a process undertaken by a training consultant or department to 
identify gaps in user training and to enumerate and plan the actions required to close those 
gaps. 
• TNM: Time and Materials costing; where a customer is billed the actual cost of labour (at some 
agreed contractual rate), actual cost of utilised materials and an additional fixed cost to cover 
overheads (which could include IT). 
• TRANSPORT: a data package that transfers data from one SAP system to another (i.e. data 
associated with fully tested processes moving from a SAP Test client to the real system as per 
this project). 
• 
• 
UAT: User Acceptance Testing: a testing phase usually last in a system testing process where the 
intended user engages in system testing to ensure that mutually agreed system functionality is 
present and operationally satisfactory. 
VAX: Virtual Address Extension, an older form of IT memory and architecture used by AGOCORP 
group to manage materials prior to replacement by AAPS. 
• VISIO: Microsoft Vision, a commercially available software package used in diagramming 
business processes (and utilised in BLUEPRINTING to graphically illustrate business processes in 
the BPID documents). 
• WALKER: a legacy enterprise accountancy and finance mainframe system formerly operational 
in AGOCORP. 
• WINDOWS: Microsoft Windows, a commercially available operating system. 
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Chapter 1: Thesis Introduction. 
1.1 Introduction. 
This chapter will introduce the research, initially focusing on the motivation of the researcher. 
The four theoretical concepts underpinning the research are then introduced and briefly 
discussed, namely: strategic and Strategic IS (SIS) alignment, the process dimension of strategy, 
process theory and the process model research approach. The proposed research contributions 
with respect to methods, theory and managerial practice are then briefly considered. The chapter 
concludes with a description of the thesis structure and individual chapter content. 
1.2 Researcher'S motivation. 
The motivations of this researcher in engaging in this research are multi-faceted and necessitate 
explanation. Interest in this research topic had been ignited by the researcher's professional 
experiences in the software industry. This interest than evolved, through both teaching and 
research exposure and experiences, into a more theoretically grounded topic, amenable to 
research. Initially as an IS professional involved in systems development, implementation and 
management, the researcher experienced directly and thus became interested in the misalignment 
that can often arise between the needs of a business and the functionality of a designed system. 
This was an ongoing (but still more of a background) interest that the researcher carried over to 
an academic career. Executive delivery of IS modules to managers, helped keep the interest 
current, as they would often comment and lament on the said same issue. As the researcher 
began to teach and research more in the discipline of strategy, an increased understanding of 
business and Information systems strategy was obtained. Specific teaching exposure to the 
strategic dimension of process in particular (as initially defined by Pettigrew and Whipp) 
facilitated a hitherto unknown understanding of how strategy implementation could be theorised 
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and understood. In pedagogical situations, the researcher had often felt that from the student 
perspective, the notion of strategy as a process was the most challenging of the three strategic 
dimensions to teach and understand, prompting a deeper interest in strategy process theory and 
research. This introduced the researcher to process theory and methods of process research, 
particularly the contrasting variance and process model approaches explored and instantiated by 
Mohr, VanDeVen, Scott Poole and others. At this point the researcher had gained some 
reasonable exposure, albeit in a reactive organic fashion, to the process dimension of strategy, 
process theory and process research methods. 
In tandem with this pedagogically driven path, the researcher on completing a Masters Research 
thesis in Knowledge Management was looking for a possible doctoral research topic. The 
starting parameters were naturally vague but the researcher was keen to pursue a topic in IS 
strategy research. Returning to the original issue of business and IS disconnects, the researcher 
began to read in the strategic alignment literature and specifically in the area of strategic IS 
alignment. As the researcher began to explore this literature further, one continuous issue began 
to emerge: research in and the understanding of SIS alignment as a process was relatively 
unexplored. This leitmotif of process brought the researcher consistently back to the earlier 
tentative attempts to personally explore strategy process research, process theory and process 
research methods. This in effect closed the theoretical loop that the researcher had been 
traversing from different perspectives. The review of the theoretical and methodological 
literatures associated with SIS alignment, strategy process research, process theory and process 
research methods began in earnest. The research topic, sparked by legacy professional 
experiences, had evolved to a cogent research topic that could be investigated. 
3 
1.3 Theoretical overview. 
This research is built on four theoretical pillars, namely strategic and Strategic IS (SIS) 
alignment, strategy process, process theory and the process model approach to process research, 
which will now be succinctly introduced. 
1.3.1 The concepts of Strategic and Strategic IS (SIS) alignment. 
Organisations striving both to align their functional (i.e. IS, Marketing, HR) and overall business 
strategies and to best ''fit'' the external environment has been the subject of ongoing research 
indirectly since the 1970s and arguably even earlier if one takes the view (as this researcher 
does) that the contingency "school" of management (i.e. Drazen and VanDeVen, 1985) is 
effectively the theoretical wellspring. Contingency theory is an offshoot of systems theory. 
Systems theory (i.e. Katz and Khan, 1978) was intended to address some of the clear limitations 
of then current management theories such as the Human Relations and Scientific schools, which 
were seen to neither address the importance of an organisations' external environment or the 
important social uses and effects of technology (amongst other salient criticisms). Optimal 
behaviours and outcomes in systems theory were attributed to managers and organisations who 
could best cope with environmental uncertainty; in other words, those who could achieve the 
greatest contingency or fit (e.g. Bums and Stalker, 1961). This notion of organisational fit was 
further explored from a strategic perspective, giving rise to the ideal of organisations that were 
more aligned internally, in terms of business and functional strategies and externally in terms of 
the business strategy fitting the demands of a competitive turbulent environment (i.e. 
Venkatraman and Prescott. 1990). As an important organisational function and strategy, IS 
began to attract some initial researcher attention in terms of alignment with an organisations' 
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overall business strategy (i.e. Henderson and Venkatraman, 1999), with an emphasis on concepts 
of fit and integration. Unsurprisingly, the costs associated with IS prompted much practitioner 
and researcher interest in "sweating" IS as an asset as much as possible: in other words, aligning 
Business and IS strategy to the greatest possible degree (i.e. (Luftman, 1996). Initial research in 
Strategic IS alignment was focused on creating SIS alignment models or framework (Le. 
Henderson and Venkatraman, Scott Morton and Baets), defining alignment and creating a 
vocabulary of equivalence (Le. fit, bricolage etc as enumerated by Avison et al; 2004). There was 
then a shift to deconstructing alignment (Le. Ciborra, 1997) into component concepts or 
dimensions (Sabherwal and Hirschheim, 2001). SIS alignment research then began to diverge 
into contrasting measuring and understanding streams. The quantitative stream (instantiated by 
Oh and Pinsonneault, 2007, and others) emphasizes quantification of SIS alignment in terms of 
inputs and outputs and determining alignment success factors. The more qualitative research 
stream (e.g. Baets model (1996» places more of an emphasis on the social, cultural and informal 
dimensions of alignment, aiming to understand rather than measure. On reviewing the SIS 
alignment literature, it was possible to identify a clear literature gap; namely the lack of a 
theoretical understanding of SIS alignment process. Further exploring this gap implied that a 
robust theoretically valid definition of process needed to be identified, and also that the process 
of SIS alignment must be striven to be understood at multiple organisational levels. The concept 
of process was then explored from specific strategic and theoretical perspectives. 
1.3.2 Strategy as a process. 
Strategy process, content and context have been described as the three key dimensions of 
strategy (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991). There is an innate interdependence between process, the 
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environment within which a strategy exists (context) and the formal articulated intentions 
(content) of the strategy (Fredrickson, 1983). Strategy process is concerned with events and 
actions which are effected politically, culturally and environmentally by strategy context and 
content and in tum affect content and context (Pettigrew, 1987). Strategic process research 
focuses on the issues pertaining to the creation and implementation of a strategy (Chakravarthy 
and Doz, 1992) and strives to capture how strategy changes as implementation unfolds 
(Mintzberg and Lampel, 1999). Increased emphasis on strategy as a process can be considered as 
a reaction to the limitations of the previously dominant prescriptive and rational school 
(Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). 
These approaches to strategy had become discredited in both theory and practice which indicated 
the key role of middle-management in strategic sense-making (Weick, 1979) and entrepreneurial 
activity (Burgelman, 1983). This view reflected not only what was broadly termed the processual 
approach (Whittington, 1993) but also indicative of the entrepreneurial, learning and culture 
schools of strategy (Mintzberg and Lampel, 1999). Such perspectives support the view of 
strategy as an emergent phenomenon (Stacey, 2010). ISlBusiness strategy from an emergent 
perspective in this research offers a realistic view of strategy implementation (Chakravarthy, 
Mueller-Stewens, Lorange and Lechner, 2003) with the emergent nature of ISlBusiness strategy 
having been emphasised in the IS strategy literature: "de-facto bricolage" (Ciborra, 1997: 69). 
Strategy process stresses the actions of actors at different organisational levels (Regner, 2003). 
The organisational centre focuses more on strategy exploitation and the periphery more on 
strategy exploration and experimentation (after March, 1991). The behaviour of organisational 
actors in strategy process (Salvato, 2003) has been investigated in depth and they are shown to 
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compete for resources (Pettigrew, 1972) and to control the flow of information through 
deliberate action (i.e. Mintzberg, 1983) and in some cases, inaction (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970). 
Having reviewed the strategy process literature, process research and models were then reviewed 
to derive a more specific research question and associated set of objectives. 
1.3.3 Process: research models and theory. 
An approach to understanding process and undertaking process research had to be identified. 
VanDerVen (1992; 169) recommended a two-step approach: firstly, define what is meant by a 
process both from generic and epistemological perspectives and secondly, design the process 
research (which will be discussed in section 1.4). A process under investigation can be 
characterized and researched using a variance or process model (Mohr, 1982). The variance 
model is concerned with approaching and measuring a process on the basis of efficient causality 
whereas the process model focuses on greater understanding of a process through final, formal 
and efficient causality (Poole et al; 2000). Variance models conceive of process as a set of 
measured variables whereas the process model sees process as a coupled series of dependant 
events (Pentland, 1999). The temporal ordering and sequence of process events is fundamental to 
the process model (Langley, 1999), whereas the variance model deems such factors irrelevant 
(VanDeVen, 2007). Three differing process research perspectives on time are typically 
considered: past (Tracing Back), ongoing into the future (Following Forward) and reconstituting 
the evolving present (Langley, 2009). Process research can entail any combination of these three 
perspectives, and typically caters for all three (Peterson, 1998). Given that the initial research 
gap lay in the lack of understanding of SIS alignment process, the process model was the most 
apposite epistemological and research approach. Although process models emphasise event 
sequence, the relationship to process theory is predicated on patterns in how these events 
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progress, rather than just their order. Such patterns can arise in a plethora of alternate ways: 
Langley (2009) enumerates a list that includes phases, paths, combinations, cycles and points at 
which processes converge and diverge. Uncovered patterns alone do not directly predicate 
explanatory theories. It is necessary to uncover the driving force of the process: the generative 
mechanism or motor (VanDeVen and Poole, 1995; Tsoukas, 1989 cited in VanDeVen, 
2002: 177). Processes can be theorised as having a dual generative motor of organisational 
process (Cule and Robey, 2004) and can also reflect mutH-level perspectives motors in three 
distinct ways: nested, entangled and aggregated (Poole and VanDeVen, 2004). Moving from 
identifying process events to mechanisms to motors has enabled identification of the theory or 
theories of process that provide meaning to the process under investigation (VanDeVen, 2007). 
Apposite theories including structuration theory (Giddens, 1979), actor-network theory 
(Pozzebon, 2004) and strategy-as-practice (Jarzabkow ski , 2003) were briefly reviewed with 
greater consideration given to the more nonnative process theories characterized by Poole and 
VanDeVen (2004) and infonned by the work of Tushman, Moore, Romanelli and others. 
1.4 Research design, implementation and analyses. 
Although a process model was the overriding research approach, in tenns of a classic research 
stance, an interpretivist research philosophy, an objective view of epistemology and an abductive 
reasoning approach was taken. Viewing process model research through an abductive reasoning 
lens (Peirce, 1955) will enable multiple theoretical explanations of the process to be generated in 
addition to being reflective of the key criteria of efficient, final and fonnal causality. Process 
research should be undertaken longitudinally and involve qualitative and/or quantitative data 
collection at multiple organisational levels (Langley, 1999). As this research attempted to enable 
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greater understanding rather than measurement of SIS alignment, the use of qualitative methods 
would be most apposite. Again, given the research question and objectives, the process 
researcher would ideally be in a position to follow a process ab initio, with optimal data access 
over the duration of the process, which has some preordained point or measure of finality 
(Pentland, 1999). The data collected should not only be collected longitudinally but be primary 
and secondary in nature reflecting the need to both attain purchase of the process context and the 
views of process participants at multiple levels of the organisation. The collected primary and 
secondary process data will be presented as a case study providing organisational context and the 
SIS alignment process narrative. Narrative analyses will enable methodological, theoretical and 
managerial practice contributions which will now be discussed. 
1.5 Proposed research contributions. 
The principal contributions of the research will be methodological and theoretical with an 
additional contribution proposed to managerial practices in SIS alignment and are now described 
in more detail. 
1.5.1 Proposed methodological and theoretical contributions. 
The key gap in SIS alignment understanding is in the domain of process; hence, this is the 
principal focus of research contributions. The first proposed contribution will be methodological, 
namely the use of process research concepts and techniques. Although there has been some SIS 
alignment process research, how the actual process has been conceptualised has not drawn 
specifically from the definitions and concepts of process as described in the process theory and 
process research literature. Drawing initially on the process research literature, the alignment 
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process will be characterised using the process model (as opposed to variance model) approach. 
The process model will characterise SIS alignment process as a progression of events, providing 
a more valid process theory supported conceptualisation of SIS alignment process. Identifying 
SIS alignment process events and their progression from multiple stakeholder and organisational 
perspectives will enable a richer and more conceptually supported narrative of SIS alignment. 
This resulting narrative in detailing an SIS alignment process will be distinct from prior and 
contemporary research in using the process model and the explication of process event 
progression. This rich and multi-level narrative though of value will only provide a description 
rather than an analysis of relationships or causal effects within the process. The use of available 
process research analyses methods will facilitate a deeper consideration of the event narrative. 
The next proposed contribution that arises from narrative analyses will be to show the 
interdependencies and sequences of process event progression. Deconstructing the process by 
temporal phase (known as temporal bracketing) will not only make the overall process more 
amenable to understanding, but also enable initial managerial implications to be identified. 
Showing the process in graphical form (in the form of visual maps) as a sequence of event 
progressions that have different interdependencies and inter-relationships adds an important layer 
of process meaning and is a viable contribution. 
However, process causality needs to be discussed and this will entail the key theoretical 
contributions of the research. Using the process event progressions and inter-relationships 
identified in the visual maps, process theory will be utilised to characterise and discuss the 
generative mechanisms that characterise how the event progressions inter-relate within each 
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phase, adding a layer of theoretical understanding and offering a theory contribution. Although 
the mechanisms that characterise these relationships are important, they only indicate the nature 
of integration rather than the causes of integration. To enable this core causal understanding, the 
motors that drive these mechanisms need to be identified and discussed. Again, drawing from 
process theory, the motors (Le. life-cycle, teleological, dialectic and evolutionary) will be 
identified for each phase: known as low-level motors. Though a useful perspective, how these 
low-level motors relate to each other across different temporal phases will be fundamental to 
theorising the entire process. These high-level motor relationships (i.e. nested, entangled or 
aggregate) provide a theoretical explanation for the entire alignment process, which is the core 
contribution that will be further discussed. 
1.5.2 Proposed managerial practice contribution. 
Given the nature of the research to be undertaken and the resulting identification of key 
alignment process event progressions, generative mechanisms and motors, the following 
contributions are proposed to SIS alignment management practice. Insights should be obtained 
into the staffing and preparation of the project delivery team and supporting board. The 
application and scope of project roles and responsibilities over the duration of a project should 
give indications as to skill-sets, formal and informal to enable the process. The resulting need to 
identify external actors in terms of roles and involvement due to an assessment of organisational 
capability in the skills required. 
How the organisation articulates the need for the process and markets and communicates the 
process will be instructive as will the roles of different project and organisational stakeholders in 
enabling these activities. In any alignment process, there is likely to be conflict and competing 
demands; how the organisation addresses such conflict and the perspectives of the business and 
the project delivery group with respect to this conflict will also offer insights. Over a longer-term 
project, issues may arise with morale and decoupling of the business and project: how this will 
be addressed will be instructive to explore. As the process will have a degree of an emergent 
nature, some unexpected positive (and negative) outcomes in terms of organisational structure 
and efficiency will arise. How these outcomes are identified, defused or exploited will also be of 
value to explore and capture. 
1.6 Thesis content and chapter structure. 
The main body of this thesis continues with two distinct literature chapters: in the first literature 
chapter (Chapter 2), the theoretical basis for alignment and strategic IS alignment and cognate 
research is comprehensively reviewed, culminating in the identification of a theoretical gap in 
the lack of SIS alignment process understanding. However, in order to acquire a more rigorous 
understanding of strategy process and process theory, the relevant literatures were reviewed in a 
second literature chapter (Chapter 3). This enabled the earlier identified gap to be formalised as a 
process-orientated research question with associated objectives and potential contributions. 
The methodology used to address the identified research question is then comprehensively 
examined in the next two thesis chapters. The ontological, epistemological and philosophical 
positions of the researcher, the justification for a longitudinal qualitative process study to 
research SIS alignment process and the qualitative methods deployed are discussed in depth in 
the initial methodology chapter (Chapter 4). The second methodology chapter (Chapter 5) 
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describes the design and implementation of the process study, using a process model as opposed 
to a variance model approach. The outcomes of the data collection are presented in a two-part 
case study (Chapters 6 and 7). In the first case study chapter, the case context is emphasised, 
describing the organisational history, business and strategy and IS implementation. In the second 
case chapter, the implementation of an ERP system intended to strategically align a formerly 
independent sub-division with a parent organisation is then presented as an alignment process 
narrative. This narrative is then analysed in the next chapter (Chapter 8), drawing on both 
process research analyses techniques and theories to identify and visually represent event 
progressions, mechanisms and both lower and higher-order process theory motor relationships. 
The final thesis chapter (Chapter 9) discusses and reflects on the outcomes of the analyses, 
paying particular attention to research value and contributions in terms of theory, methods and 
managerial practice. Research limitations as well as recommendations for future research and 
investigation are also identified and discussed. In addition to a bibliography, an appendix is 
included at the end of the thesis. This appendix or research audit file as recommended for 
longitudinal enquiry (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) includes full transcripts of all fifty three semi-
structured interviews undertaken and in addition, detailed images of the relevant process motor 
diagrams analysed in Chapter 8. Secondary data, though referred to within the thesis, is not 
included for reasons of confidentiality. 
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Chapter 2: 
Review of the Strategic IS (SIS) alignment literature. 
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2.1 Chapter introduction. 
This, the first of two literature chapters, offers a critique of the Strategic IS (SIS) alignment 
literature, culminating in the identification of a theoretical gap in SIS alignment process 
understanding. This chapter begins with an introduction to the concept of strategic alignment 
emphasising its origins in both contingency theory and the concept of strategic fit. Various 
perspectives on and definitions of SIS alignment are then discussed, followed by a consideration 
of the relationship and power-dynamic between business and IS strategy. The current level of 
theoretical and practical understanding in SIS alignment research is then considered in depth 
with an accompanying critique of existing SIS alignment frameworks. A discussion and critique 
of the ongoing arguments against alignment as being either an unnecessary or unachievable 
organisational and research objective is then considered. The differing motivations associated 
with alignment research (i.e. measuring alignment as opposed to striving to understand the 
process of alignment) are also then evaluated. The synthesis of the extant SIS alignment 
literature and empirical research leads to the derivation of a clear knowledge gap and principal 
research question in the form of a lack of theoretical understanding of SIS alignment process. In 
the next chapter, process theory is then explored and synthesised, culminating in the initial 
research question being empirically formalized with accompanying objectives. 
2.2 The theoretical and conceptual origins of Strategic IS alignment. 
The notion that organisations strive to optimally couple or align functional (e.g. marketing, 
information systems, human resources) and business strategies, has long been an area of strong 
engagement for both researchers and practitioners. Strategic alignment has an empirical and 
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theoretical grounding in both contingency theory (Drazen and Van DeVen, 1985) and the 
subsequent concept of strategic fit, both of which are now discussed. 
2.2.1 Contingency theory and the concept of Strategic Fit. 
The history of management thought is one of dominant paradigms or "schools" disrupted by new 
theoretical advances which purport to address the limitations of the prevailing orthodoxy. 
Contingency theory is another stage in the evolution of management thought, a process which 
began with the schools of administrative (Fayol, 1916) and scientific management (Taylor, 
1911). Observed excesses arising from the implementation of pure scientific management 
principles (such as increasing industrial unrest and worker dissatisfaction due to a lack of 
developmental opportunities, unchanging routines and individualised incentives and a mono-
focus on measurable outputs), created a theoretical and practical space for a more worker-
focused theory of management, namely the human relations school of management. 
However, the human relations school did not fully resolve these observed managerial and 
organisational difficulties (Perrow, 1972). Even the application of its softer more humane tenets 
in concert with the harder bottom-line rationale of scientific management did not offer a panacea 
(Daft, 1993). It became clear that both schools had an overly internal bias, did not sufficiently 
consider the roles and effects of technology, lacked a coherent overall strategic view and in 
particular, offered minimal theoretical consideration of how to manage environmental 
uncertainty (Katz and Khan, 1978). Systems theory was then presented as a feasible theoretical 
alternative, that addressed the roles and social effects of technology, in addition to engaging with 
the external environment in the form of direct inputs and outputs (Katz and Khan, 1978). As a 
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corollary to systems theory, contingency theory proposed (Woodward, 1958) to conceptualise 
and manage turbulent higher-velocity environments. Contingency theory focuses mainly on the 
need to utilise technology effectively and the adaption of organisational structures in order to 
stay productive, agile and reactive. Key contributions to contingency theory were made with 
respect to the social fit of technology (after Trist and Bamforth, 1951), the interrelationship 
between technology, structure and technology (Woodward, 1958) and the need for both 
internally (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) and externally driven structural flexibility (Bums and 
Stalker, 1961). The work of Bums and Stalker in particular emphasised the need for an 
organisation's broad structural configuration to change in order to best fit the external 
environment, with predictable environments allowing for a formalised mechanical structure 
whereas fluid varying environments necessitate a more agile organismic structure (Bums and 
Stalker, 1961). 
The emphases in contingency theory on structural fit to the external environment evolved to a 
broader organizational consideration of strategic fit with the external environment (Drazen and 
Van De Ven, 1985), reflecting the design school of strategy (Mintzberg and Lampel, 1999). This, 
in tum, led to the development and promulgation of important strategic toolkits, beginning with 
the broad internaVexternal fit proposed in SWOT analyses and TOWS matrices (Andrews, 
1971). The fit between the internal and more specific external environments such as an industry 
or international environment (Le. five forces and diamond frameworks proposed by Porter in 
1980 and 1998 respectively) then became the focus. The research and practice conversation in 
strategic fit at that particular point in time, was situated within the dominant paradigm of pure 
positioning, with external environmental factors considered to be the key drivers of strategic fit. 
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In other words. practitioners and academics saw strategic fit as the organisation having to 
manage and adapt their internal environment to fit to the key factors for strategic success dictated 
by the external environment. rather than the reverse (Porter. 1980; Venkatraman and Prescott. 
1990). 
However. such an emphasis presumed industry and environmental factors were the principal 
predicates of competition. an assumption which theoretically and practically began to pose some 
difficulties (Barney. 1991). Organisations and academics were clearly able to discern why 
individual industries were more or less profitable or competitive than others; however, it was far 
more nebulous to identify why individual firms performed more or less successfully than their 
competitors (Wemerfelt. 1984). This practical and theoretical counter-argument against the 
external environment as the driver of strategic fit led to the formal re-expression of the theory of 
the resource-based view of the firm or RBV (Barney. 1991). The external environment was not 
discarded or trivialised in terms of strategic fit importance, but the pendulum had fundamentally 
shifted towards the internal environment as being the driver of strategic fit. Organisations that 
could create and sustain strategic capabilities based on a fusion of their resources could manage 
strategic fit pressures imposed by the external environment. In some cases. organisations could 
conlrol such pressures to some degree by leading their external environment or in extremis, 
induce novel competitive environments (Lippman and Rumelt. 1982). 
The importance of technology as a resource in this theoretical view was well-enunciated with 
clear distinctions drawn between the tangibility of the technology and the intangible value that 
could arise through leveraging the information content strategically (Levy, 2000). This view 
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intrinsically supposes that the information contained is relevant and critical to the operation of 
the overall business strategy. In specific terms, the information system or technology deployed 
and managed reflects some higher order IS strategy coupled inherently to the business strategy. 
Information systems advances, whether internally or externally, may indicate a need for formal 
IS strategy changes and as a result may require the overarching business strategy to adapt. In 
reciprocal terms, business strategy changes may indicate a need for IS strategy adaptation. 
Regardless of whether business or technology acts as the strategic driver, the requirement for 
business and IS strategy to ostensibly remain as closely coupled or as aligned as possible is clear 
(Henderson and Venkatraman, 1999). (Note: the necessity for strategic alignment both in 
practice and as a research undertaking has been strongly critiqued and these arguments will be 
discussed in section 2.4). However, it should be emphasised that considering the criteria for a 
probable strategic resource (Le. valuable, rare, non-substitutable and not open to imitation) as 
outlined by Barney (1991), technology itself does not meet such criteria whereas the information 
contained within a system may do so. Therefore, as Levy (2000) indicates, an IT system can 
gave an impression of being strategically aligned, but the alignment may be more technology 
than content based, thus actually limiting the effective strategic value of the technology. 
The degree of organizational strategic alignment has been proffered as a possible indicator of 
strategic value (Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984) and a dynamic capability (Teece, Pisano and 
Shuen, 1997). Dynamic capabilities refer to an organisation's strategic capability to do one or 
more of the following in a manner that creates or sustains competitive advantage: profoundly 
learn, integrate novel externally acquired assets or reconfigure existing assets (Teece, Pisano and 
Shuen, 1997). Organisations displaying longer-term capability to manage and integrate business 
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and IS strategic change, whilst still retaining overall strategic coherence, could lay claim to a 
dynamic strategic alignment capability. The alignment of business and information strategies is 
informed by extensive prior theoretical and practical research in the domains of information 
systems (Weill and Broadbent, 1998), Strategy (Henderson and Venkatraman, 1999; Pettigrew 
and Whipp, 1991) and germane strategy process methodology (Pettigrew 1992, VanDeVen, 
1992, Huber and VanDeVen, 1995). BusinessnS Strategy Alignment has been identified by both 
academics (Galliers and Newell, 2003) and practitioners (Luftman, Kempaiah and Nash, 2005) 
as a critical enabler of increased business and IT effectiveness. 
2.2.2 Defining and deconstructing Strategic IS alignment 
The greater the concert between the supporting strategic processes of an organisation (such as 
those involving or enabled by technology) and the business strategy. the greater the theoretical 
degree of strategic alignment; implying more effective deployment of strategic resources and 
hence improved contingency (Henderson and Venkatraman, 1999). Strategic Information 
Systems (SIS) alignment has been variously defined as organisational bricolage (an ongoing 
strategic endeavour shaped by experiential learning) or linkage, fusion or fit of IS and business 
strategies (see list enumerated by Avison et al. 2004: 224-225). In essence, the terms used in the 
literature are highly synonymous, in viewing alignment as the formal and informal processes, 
which underpin the coupling of business and IS strategies (Luftman, 1996). In terms of differing 
components and research themes, SIS alignment has been deconstructed into the following six 
broad dimensions: strategic, intellectual, structural social, cultural and informal (Sabherwal and 
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Hirschheim, 200 1). These different dimensions are now briefly discussed and will be revisited 
later in this chapter. 
The strategic dimension of SIS alignment is concerned with the how strategists plan, measure 
and benchmark IS strategy (Henderson and Venkatraman, 1999). Research in the strategic 
dimension of SIS alignment has tended to focus on the strategy professional and/or senior 
management (e.g. the CEO as in Keams and Lederer, 2000) and also investigating alignment 
success at both project (Jenkin and Chan 2006) and financial performance levels (Floyd and 
Woodridge, 1990). There has been a "tum" in researching the strategic dimension of SIS 
alignment more in mathematical modelling terms I (e.g. Chan, Huff, Barclay and Copeland, 
1997) which has attracted many adherents (e.g. Allen and Varga, 2006). As with many 
traditional empirical investigations of both strategy planning and measurement, this dimension of 
SIS alignment is predominantly viewed through an upper echelon lens (Hambrick. 2(05). 
The intellectual dimension of SIS alignment is typically seen as a corollary of the strategic 
dimension. focusing on the understanding that organisational stakeholders have of SIS 
alignment, both as an organisational concept and as a phenomenon in action (Reich and 
Benbaset, 2000). Attempts have been made to use cognitive theories to explore the 
conceptualisation of SIS alignment (i.e. using Personal Construct Theory (Tan and Gallupe, 
2(06). Such an attempt at alignment understanding resonates with the enactment stage in sense-
making (Weick, 1995) and is redolent of the cognitive school of strategy, traditionally 
I The derivations of the mathematical models used to express aHgnment involve techniques such as synergy 
and profile deviation (Chan and Reicb, lOO7) wbleb are considered beyond the scope of the research, and are 
tberefore not discussed. 
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underrepresented in research (Mintzberg and Lampel, 1999). As a companion research stream to 
the intellectual dimension of alignment, the different ways in which SIS alignment is interpreted 
and operationalised at different levels of the organisation is an important domain of alignment 
research, exemplified by the key work of Floyd and Woodridge (1990) and others. Although the 
intellectual dimension of alignment strives to take a more democratic, multi-level view of 
alignment, the use of cognitive theories which are mostly derived from variance models, is likely 
to impose a constraint on the nature and degree of understanding possible. 
The structural dimension of SIS alignment is concerned with how IS fits structurally with other 
strategies and processes already embedded in the organisation (Smaczny, 2001). The need to 
consider the structural dimension of SIS alignment is concerned with optimising system 
integration and cohesion; in other words, how a IS strategy supports the implementation and 
maintenance of IT systems that configure best with existing systems and processes (Chan, 2002). 
The principal outputs of this research stream are contrasting structural IS configurations which 
(it is proposed) can be selected to most appropriately reflect the competitive orientation of the 
organisation (Bergeron, Raymond and Rivard, 2001; Ward and Peppard, 2002). Both the 
strategic and structural dimensions of SIS alignment, although offering different perspectives 
have an important similarity in emphasising the formal aspects of strategic formulation and 
implementation; high-level strategic objectives and a bias towards the activities of strategic 
elites. The intellectual dimension is inherently biased towards prescribed cognitive models and 
theories which seem to constrain as much as explain. There therefore seems to be a greater need 
to consider and explore the more social, cultural and informal dimensions of SIS alignment. 
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The prominence of the informal and reciprocally, the reduced importance of the formal in 
understanding strategy are now considered virtually axiomatic in the relevant literature (apropos 
Burgelman, Mintzberg, Stacey and others). However, prima facie, there has been less in-depth 
consideration of the informal and the emergent characteristics of strategy in extant SIS alignment 
research. An overview of the social and cultural dimensions of SIS alignment seems to indicate 
an examination of ground already well-trodden, specifically in strategic change research, and 
more broadly in the change management literature. This can be seen by the following indicative 
analogies. 
The need to undertake cultural analyses as a prelude to the alignment process in the form of an 
in-depth cultural audit (Bums, 1993) is akin to the insights offered by valid application of the 
cultural web technique (Johnson, 1992) and the need to identify and assuage alignment 
stakeholders (i.e. Tallon, 2008) is reflective of the purpose and implementation of stakeholder 
management (Freeman, 1984). The value inherent in identifying and overcoming causes of 
alignment resistance (D'Souza and Mukherjee, 2003) is reminiscent of the various models of 
change that have proliferated from as far back as Lewin (1943) to more topical writers such as 
Kotter (1996). Finally, the identification of an appropriate change agent or agents who can 
overcome structural and communication barriers that act as an obstacle to SIS alignment 
(Edwards, 2000) is adjacent to the substantial change literature on change style and 
communication (Le. Graetz and Smith, 2005). 
This initial high-level overview of the SIS alignment literature gave the author two initial 
impressions that warranted further investigation. Firstly, research in SIS alignment as evidenced 
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in the dimensions introduced, was strongly predicated on belief in the classical or rational school 
of strategy (Whittington, 1996; Mintzberg and Lampel, 1999), where formal planning and 
implementation was the reality of organisational strategy, which remained under the control of 
the senior management layer. Such tenets have largely been shown to be flawed and unreflective 
of real strategic behaviour (i.e. Mintzberg and Waters, 1995). Secondly, not enough novel 
exploratory research seemed to have been undertaken in the informal or social dimension of SIS 
alignment, which seemed largely dependent on transplanting insights from the more broadly-
based literatures of culture, strategic change and change management. These impressions 
predicated further in-depth consideration of the SIS alignment literature, beginning with a look at 
the canonical frameworks. 
2.3 SIS Alignment Frameworks. 
Various Models and approaches describe the relationship between IT and Business strategy 
(Earl, 1996; Galliers and Sutherland, 1989; Nolan. 1979), with the concept of alignment as the 
basis of the relationship articulated most canonically in the following key frameworks, which 
will now be discussed and critiqued individually: Henderson and Venkatraman Strategic 
Alignment Model (originally proposed in 1989 and adapted further in 1992 and 1999), Scott 
Morton MIT 90s Model (1991) and the Baets model (1992). (It should be noted that a myriad of 
SIS alignment frameworks exist but are invariably are adaptations of these three key models; 
hence, they are the focus of this discussion). 
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2.3.1 Henderson and Venkatraman Strategic Alignment Model. 
The Henderson and Venkatraman Strategic Alignment Model (henceforth abbre iated as the HW 
framework), originally propo ed in 1989, i aid to be the mo t cited repre entation of alignment 
in the germane literature (Avison, Jone , Powell and Wil on, 2004). 
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Figure 2.1 : The Henderson and Venkatrarnan framework linking Bu ine and I Strategy 
(Henderson and Venkatraman, 1999:476). 
The strategic fit describes the degree of alignment that exi t between the externally focu ed 
business strategy and the upporting organizational proce e. The greater the correlation 
between the supporting strategic proces e of an organi ation and it bu ine trategy, the 
greater the postulated degree of trategic IS2 alignment. The greater the degree of trategic IS 
alignment, the more effective the IS infrastructure/proce e are in reflecting the overall IS 
2 The original Henderson and Venkatraman model uses IT as opposed to I . It bouJd be noted tbat tbe autbor considers 
IS and IT to be synonymous. 
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Strategy of the organisation. A horizontal relationship can also be deduced from the framework 
between both the OrganisationallIS infrastructure and processes and BusinesslIS strategies 
respectively. This relationship is described in tenns of integration. For strategic effectiveness, it 
would be essential that the Business and IT strategies strategically integrate. For operational 
effectiveness, it would be essential that the Business and IS processes/infrastructure 
operationally integrate (Henderson and Venkatraman, 1999). 
The HW framework has been criticized as not empirically validated (Avison et al; 2004), 
although given the nature of the variables in the model, there is a justifiable counter-argument 
that it may not be possible empirically to do so. Initial critiques of the HW framework focused 
on the need to give more explicit consideration to the external environment and the lack of 
internal stakeholder understanding of the organisational strategy (Maes, 1999). A further 
environmental critique was made on the need for the model to reflect that environments vary by 
degrees of turbulence (McDonald, 1991), a delineation clear since Trist and Emery's 
classification of environments, much earlier in the strategic conversation (1965). Reassessing 
Henderson and Venkatraman's explanation of the HW framework, it is this author's view that 
they do recognise the importance of both the external environment and the need for wide 
organisational understanding of strategy. However, criticism on these issues can be justified from 
the perspective that both strategic understanding and the external environment are implicitly 
rather than explicitly considered within the framework. Given the importance of environmental 
analyses and the often devastating consequence of failing to consider or detect weak 
environmental signals (Shoemaker and Day, 2(09), this aspect of the model is particularly 
problematic. Critical observations on the treatment of strategy understanding were further 
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compounded by the omission from the model of effective communication ao; an enabler of 
alignment (Maes, 1999). Such comments reflect the "borrowing" from the change management 
literature discussed earlier apropos the cultural dimension of alignment. The HW framework was 
also identified (Avison et al; 2004) as characterising alignment as a linear and linked process 
with clear points of origin and termination. Such an approach countermanded the organisational 
experience of alignment as a constant iterative process rather than a prescribed and linear cause 
and effect undertaking. Although the HW framework was important in expressing the possible 
business-IS strategy dynamic and went through two additional iterations. it was clear that it 
lacked a sufficient engagement with the external environment and furthermore. did not engage 
with the reality of alignment as an ongoing set of activities. Virtually in parallel with the 
development and further refinement of the HW framework. the MIT90s model was proposed by 
Scott Morton (1991). 
2.3.2 Scott-Morton MIT90s Model. 
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Figure 2.2: The MIT 90s Model (adapted from Morton. 1991 :20). 
27 
The MIT 90s model offered a different interpretation on alignment to that articulated in the HW 
framework. In some respects, it also seemed to be (unintentionally) addressing some of the 
aforementioned criticisms of the HW framework. As can be seen from the diagram, explicit 
attention is given to the external environment and the cyclical, iterative nature of alignment. The 
external environment is bifurcated into socio-economic and technical factors and achieving the 
goal of alignment is predicated on balancing the delicate calculus of strategy, structure, 
technology, management processes, individuals and their roles (Scott Morton, 1991). 
Notwithstanding the consideration of the external environment and the iterative nature of 
alignment, stringent criticism has been directed at this model; it has even been described as a 
"rudimentary framework" (Ciborra, 1997: 67). In some respects, the model can be easily 
criticised given the advances in technology that have occurred since its original inception (even 
more so given the fact that the model was an output from a research project that was principally 
carried out in the I 980s). Even so, looking at the environment simply through social-economic 
and technical lens is insufficient. A consideration of the classic macro-environment factors 
enumerated in the I-PESTEL technique indicates that there are substantive examples of political, 
legal and cultural factors that have (and continue to) drive technological and strategic adaptation, 
and as a result, must have important alignment implications. Although the model gainfully 
considers the external environment, a holistic overview is lacking. 
Furthermore, considering social-economic and technical environmental factors separately is not 
reflective of the critical interdependence that exists. For example, the relatively recent emergence 
of technologies based on social interaction and communities (i.e. Facebook) only emphasises the 
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interdependence of the technical, cultural and the ocial. The u e of the e ocial technologie as 
marketing, distribution and user-enabled innovation channels indicate the complexity of 
environmental interaction and the lack of organi ational currency of thi model. Thi author 
would also have strong reservation as to the neat clear divi ion of managerial proce e and the 
actions and roles of individuals, which i problematic given what i ugge ted by tbe 
organisational behaviour literature. The model i al 0 open to a ugge tion that tbe trategy-
structure relationship is independent of tbe relation hip between trategy and managerial 
proce se , which in this author's view is open to the accu ation of being theoretically and 
practicaJly incoherent. 
2.3.3 The Baets Model. 
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Figure 2.3: The Baets Model (screen capture from Baet , 1996: 207). 
The final canonkal model to be considered is the Baets model, which in marked contrast to the 
other two main models discussed, explicitly label alignment a a proce and ba been in some 
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respects empirically validated (through a variance/quantitative component in data collection). 
Reassessing this model, this author would feel that the assertion of a process perspective needs 
clarification. In considering alignment as a process, Baets seems to be describing the routines 
within alignment rather than characterising alignment as a process in the purest strategic sense 
(as per Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991). In addition, although there is merit in a validated model, 
there could be a counter-argument that as this research is based solely on a single sector 
(banking), shown in retrospect to be strategically problematic, there may then be attendant 
concerns as to external validity. 
2.3.4 Summary of model critiques. 
In synthesising (this author and others') critiques of the key models of alignment and 
acknowledging that efforts to extend and adapt the models have been made, the following critical 
conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, that there is a lack of sophistication, but more critically 
completeness, in how the majority of the models account for the external environment. 
Unexpected developments and trends in technology and a heightening of macro-environmental 
risks due to globalisation, have starkly impacted organisations' attempts to strategically align. 
However, the generally accepted observation that environmental scanning is bounded by 
individuals' cognitive limitations (Simon, 1957) raises an important question: can an alignment 
or any other organisational model ever fully manage the effects of the environment? In this 
author's view, the paradoxical nature of environmental analyses (i.e. the greater the significance 
of external events, the more complex they are to manage) poses an empirical and practical 
limitation on modelling alignment at an organisational level. 
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Although theoretical models by definition are more likely to focus on the supra-organisational 
level, there is minimal evidence within the main alignment models that varying multiple level 
perspectives on alignment have been accounted for. There is some consideration of the 
involvement of different individuals in organisational alignment (as per both the Baets and MIT 
90s Model), but a lack of clear consideration how different views at these levels, shape or mould 
organisational alignment. Strikingly, there is much ambiguity a ~ ~ to the mechanics of alignment, 
particularly in the attempts of the latter models to emphasise alignment as an ongoing process. 
There is a clear realisation that alignment is continuous and iterative rather than a means-end 
phenomenon, but how? Labelling alignment as a recursive process does not predicate any 
additional insights. It is not clear what the model creators mean by a process as is it not formally 
defined and described. 
Reflecting on both the high-level overview of SIS alignment literature and the critique of the 
main alignment models, two important initial conclusions arise. Firstly, intra-organisational 
perceptions and understandings of SIS alignment do not seem to have been given enough 
attention. Secondly, the emphasis on formal high-level views on strategy and alignment seem to 
have precluded a granular engagement with alignment as a social informal process. Both of these 
initial conclusions will be explored further in a more in-depth critique of the SIS alignment 
literature. However, before this is undertaken, it is important to reflect briefly on alignment as a 
research endeavour for the sakes of both research conciseness and legitimacy. 
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2.4 Criddsrm or alignment as an organisational concept and research topic. 
Many commentators have critiqued the concept of SIS alignment and by extension research in 
the area, based on the following broad and encompassing arguments, which will now be briefly 
discussed: 
2.4.1 SIS AUgnment is a redundant, unachievable and even damaging organisational 
objective. 
Some commentators (i.e. Carr, 2004) have asserted that the importance of IS as a competitive 
advantage has diminished and that it should be considered as a utility resource with marginal 
strategic value (Carr, 2(08); hence, the very notion of SIS alignment is oxymoronic. 
Unquestionably, IS without a business impact or function has little strategic value but there are 
additional counter-arguments. In this author's view there is conflation of competitive advantage 
and strategic value in these assertions of Carr and others. IS can be possessed and utilised by 
competitors, therefore not offering competitive advantage, yet still offer strategic value in 
business process construction and delivery. A substantive counter-argument also arises when 
assessing IS from a resource-based view perspective (Levy, 2000): IS is typically a threshold 
resource (Barney, 1991), whereas the capability to infer informed decisions based on the data 
contained within the IS system is the fundamental advantage (Davenport and Harris, 2007). IS 
possession confers a resource on an organisation, but not the capability to mine and meaningfully 
interpret the contained data. Even when the importance of IS strategy is recognised, there is a 
tendency within the alignment literature to portray business strategy as being the controlling 
driver of IS strategy and not vice-versa (ref. HW framework). The often demonstrated capacity 
of IS (and IS strategy) to be a fundamental driver of business change (i.e. reducing industry entry 
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barriers (Galliers and Newell, 2(03) is not starkly reflected in any of the principal alignment 
frameworks. In this author's view, this observation is reminiscent of the long -running "chicken 
and egg" debate regarding the relationship between strategy and structure, and whither of the two 
should be the pre-eminent driver (i.e. Chandler, 1962). The pre-eminence of the business or IS 
strategy is contingency dependent. It is the level of integration, rather than the locus of control 
that is the fundamental aspect of the relationship between IS and business strategies. Without this 
integration (as per the canonical alignment frameworks discussed), it is difficult to leverage 
strategic benefit (though not necessarily competitive advantage) from the information system. 
The organisational need for SIS alignment is therefore fundamentally legitimate. 
Achieving strategic alignment is intrinsically difficult however, due to the evolving nature of the 
concept: described in practice as akin to "shooting at a moving target" (Kochan and Useem, 
1992; Ill). An organisational fixation on aligned strategies has justifiably been critiqued for 
multiple reasons. Organisational IS strategy is (and certainly must be) subject to considerable 
change particularly in environments with high degrees of competitive turbulence (Ansoff and 
Sullivan, 1993), an observation that resonates with the origins of alignment in contingency 
theory. The unpredictability of IS effects in organisations (Robey and Boudreau, 1999), can reset 
the success parameters for alignment, adding an additional layer of complexity to judging 
alignment achievement. The common system and social issues associated with IS 
implementation (Burn, 1993; Luftman, Papp and Brier, 1999) often exacerbated by time delays, 
further effects the notion of alignment as a discernible destination. Even, when overcoming these 
common obstacles, the organisations' requirements from their IS strategy may evolve: e.g. 
Orlikowski's concept of technology tinkering (1996». Considering these predictable, well-
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understood issues; there is a clear implication that the achievement of SIS alignment is inherently 
problematic. It additionally raises the issue of whether a robust alignment metric is actually 
attainable. 
However, even if organisations are judged as successful in their alignment endeavours, is 
alignment a necessary and worthy alignment objective? There are risks associated with any 
strategy deemed to be successful, particularly if it inculcates a mindset that leads to 
organisational drift (Handy, 1999). In such an organisational scenario, alignment becomes 
essentially a stability strategy (Daft and Weick, 1984) a stationary as opposed to moving target 
(as described earlier). Notwithstanding the appropriateness in some cases of a stability strategy, 
there is still likely to be an increased risk of the organisation decoupling from its environment, 
which may eventually lead to a state of chronic misalignment. To guard against such an 
outcome, organisations should treat SIS alignment as a continuously moving strategic target best 
informed and understood in a longitudinal temporal context (Galliers, 2004). 
It has also been argued that organisations that promulgate the view of alignment as having a 
defined ending can create pathologies (Sauer and Bum, 1997). The desire of senior management 
to justify strategic investments and/or to post-rationalize alignment can lead to force-fitting of 
business and IS strategies, resulting in a plethora of malign outcomes. A shift in organisational 
thinking is required, to view alignment as an ongoing journey, rather than invariably having 
some clearly defined end-point. These observations indicate something profound about SIS 
alignment research (which will be revisited at a later point in this chapter), namely that 
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understanding the journey organisations undertake to align is arguably a more salient strategic 
research objective than attempting to measure alignment. 
2.4.2 SIS Alignment cannot be measured or understood as stakeholders do not have 
sufficient strategic understanding and the same strategy will have different 
meanings at different levels. 
The lack of organisational consensus as to what constitutes strategy has been identified as a 
factor in making alignment measurement and understanding inherently difficult (Reich and 
Benbasat, 2000). This argument has however a singular flaw: the assumption that there is one 
clear strategic "truth" and a lack of strategic consensus is somehow inimical to strategic 
alignment or strategic success (Smaczny, 200 I). This assumption that organisational 
stakeholders must all subscribe to a singular strategic understanding is again reflective of an 
outdated view of strategy as a rational top-down process. There is no consideration of the (now 
accepted as) axiomatic observation that organisational stakeholders will (and need to) attain their 
own understanding of strategy through a sense-making process (Weick, 1999). Sense-making 
may differ in process and outcome at different organisational levels. Rather than a threat to 
alignment, this may be necessary to contextualise the strategy appropriately given the varying 
functional priorities and experiences of stakeholders at different levels. 
Expecting and imposing a uniform strategic understanding additionally excludes the possibility 
of "accidental" strategic alignment, i.e. alignment without some overarching strategic design 
(Chi a and Holt, 2009). It further disregards the possibility that alignment as an action-generation 
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activity (Starbuck (1983»; an "act, then do" rather than a "plan, than do" strategy. Such 
arguments and observations again reinforce the earlier indication that SIS alignment research is 
still straitjacketed within a rational view of strategy, and that it has fundamentally failed to 
embrace the entrepreneurial and cultural schools of strategy (Mintzberg and Lampel, 1999). 
2.5 The contrasting approaches to SIS Alignment research. 
In reviewing the SIS alignment literature, two broad contrasting approaches can be identified. 
One approach emphasises a variance view of SIS alignment (Mohr, 1982); in other words, 
alignment as a quantitative construct with an emphasis on capturing direct causation. (Note: 
variance and process models of research will be discussed in greater depth in the next chapter). 
The alternative approach reflects the (already discussed) view of alignment as an ongoing 
process or journey; a process view of alignment premised on increased understanding rather than 
measurement. Both of these approaches will now be critiqued, with a view towards identifying a 
clear literature gap in SIS alignment research. 
2.5.1 SIS alignment as a variable to be measured. 
In reference to the earlier discussion, adherents of the measurement "school" implicitly envisage 
alignment as a finite organisational undertaking with clearly demarcated points of origin and 
completion. Such research has tended to focus predominantly on measuring structural and 
strategic alignment dimensions, as these dimensions are empirically accepted to directly relate to 
alignment performance and return on investment (Keams and Lederer, 20(0). Measurement in 
organisational SIS alignment is typically premised on quantifying the inputs and outcomes of 
SIS alignment as independent and dependent variables respectively. Firstly, the outcome of SIS 
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alignment as some clear dependent variable that can be measured in order to create a valid 
success "benchmark", against which the outcomes of future IS strategies can be judged 
(Sabherwal and Kirs, 1994). Doing so can enable a return-on-investment metric for alignment to 
be derived (Day, 1996). In addition, deconstruction of the SIS alignment into discrete 
quantifiable variables has enabled formal complex mathematical models of SIS alignment to be 
constructed (e.g. Oh and Pinsonneault, 2(07). The value of the mathematical modelling of SIS 
alignment is in the enabling of sensitivity analyses. Certain alignment inputs can be numerically 
adjusted and the resultant effect on the degree of organisational alignment can be determined (Oh 
and Pinsonneault, 2007). Using the statistical approaches of co-variation, linear correlation, 
regression and factor analyses (and even more elementary approaches such as mean and standard 
deviation in comparing the operationalisation of business and IS strategy across different 
divisions of the same organisation i.e. Oh and Pinsonneault, 2007:251). In many respects, moves 
towards a mathematical model of alignment are a throwback to the frameworks approach (i.e. 
MIT90s model) discussed earlier. Such trends are indicative of the emphasis on the strategic 
dimension of alignment, concerned with higher-level strategic alignment issues, comparing 
different projects undertaken (Jenkin and Chan 2006) or the effect of alignment undertakings on 
the performance levels of certain organisational systems or processes (i.e. financial systems as 
per Floyd and Woodridge, 1990). Such an approach has also enabled the key alignment inputs to 
be identified and further enumerated as critical alignment success factors (Teo and Ang, 1999). 
The approach of attaching weightings to SIS alignment inputs so that their direct effect on and 
relationship with the strategic implementation can be quantified is not confined to exploring the 
strategic dimension of alignment. It can also be utilised to consider the more granular structural 
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dimension and attendant inputs (e.g. Reich and Benbaset, 2000). The most important structural 
inputs identified have included the communication processes evident in the alignment 
undertaking (Campbell, Avison and Kay, 2005), the levels of IT project knowledge, experience 
and past success (Reich and Benbaset, 2000; Chan, Huff, Barclay and Copeland, 1997).). There 
has also been research interest in the relationship between key alignment stakeholders as an 
important SIS alignment input. The relationship between the CIa (Chief Information officer) and 
CEO (e.g. Kearns and Lederer, 2000) and that between the general employee population and the 
project team managing SIS alignment (Luftman, 1996) have both been measured in some depth. 
The key stakeholders' perceptions of alignment and the alignment undertaking have also been 
considered, utilising personal construct theory (Tan and Gallupe, 2006). 
2.5.2 Critiquing SIS alignment measurement research. 
The most immediate criticism of the measurement of SIS alignment is that measurement is 
largely confined to the higher-level strategic and arguably more concrete structural dimensions 
of alignment. There are some (growing yet inchoate) attempts to consider the intellectual 
dimension (e.g. Tan and Gallupe, 2006) but those whose conceptualisations are important is 
seemingly confined to key organisational stakeholders. Considering the structural and strategic 
preoccupations of SIS alignment research, the impression that arose earlier, of a predominant 
focus on the strategic executive (e.g. CEO, CIa, Project leaders etc) is reinforced. There is some 
attention given to the need to communicate effectively with the operating core and to take on 
board the historical context of IS strategy. Both of these considerations are welcome and 
positive, but again this is considered from the perspective of the organisational apex, rather than 
a more holistic representation of the views held by stakeholders at multiple-levels of the 
38 
organisation. Although there is a mandate to measure, the organisational scope of measurement 
is seemingly capturing only the views and activities of a limited few. 
The implicit basis of SIS alignment measurement is that alignment can be treated as a construct 
that can be temporally delimited. The view that alignment has a defined origin and end point has 
already been identified as problematic at best and not reflective of the organisational reality of 
alignment as an emergent ongoing phenomenon. The variance approaches described are 
fundamentally treating alignment as a black box, emphasising the inputs and outputs whilst 
failing to engage with the differing social and cultural dimensions of alignment that substantiate 
the reality of alignment. Measuring the views and activities of the key strategic players is not 
without merit but they are often actual prisoners rather than controllers of this metaphorical 
alignment black box (after Mintzberg, 1989). The mediating sense-making and entrepreneurial 
actions known to occur at multiple levels of the organisation are neither measured directly nor 
incorporated as a variable construct. The initial suspicion of this author, that attempts to measure 
alignment are wedded to an overly rational view of strategy, which does not reflect the socio-
cultural complexity of organisations, has been confirmed. 
To summarise, attempts to measure alignment, though often driven by an admirable agenda to 
aid practitioners, have failed to sufficiently neither consider or measure the social and cultural 
dimensions of alignment, nor reflect the advances in understanding of strategic implementation. 
The alternative SIS alignment research track which considers alignment, as an ongoing process 
that needs to be understood rather than measured, is now considered. 
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2.5.3 SIS alignment as an ongoing process to be understood. 
Taking a surface and pragmatic outlook. the outcomes of alignment should be the obvious 
research priority. However, as in the critique above and additional arguments made by others 
(e.g. Reich and Benbasat. 1996; Chan, 2(02). it has been strongly argued that the informal social 
and cultural processes implicit in organisations are a key factor in understanding and achieving 
IS alignment success. Recent qualitative research (Sledgianowski and Luftman, 2005) has 
strongly suggested that IS alignment performance and maturity can be enhanced by greater 
understanding of organisational social processes. Indeed, the critical role of social process in 
achieving and sustaining consensus as to the importance of strategy and in driving successful 
strategy implementation has been empiricalJy established (Floyd and Woodridge, 1992) 
Researching IS alignment as a variance construct (the "scientific approach" decried by 
qualitative proponents of IS alignment research (i.e. Ciborra. 1997) is unlikely to illuminate these 
important social processes, indicating the necessity and value of utilising a process research 
perspective to explore alignment. 
The social, cultural and informal dimensions of alignment are the predominant objectives of 
process research; in other words, striving to turn the alignment "black box" into more of a 
metaphorical "white box". alJ the while embracing alignment as a continuous process as opposed 
to a temporally defined undertaking. Ostensibly, a process approach to SIS alignment research 
should therefore be more reflective of a modern understanding of strategy, embracing the 
emergent and entrepreneurial strategic behaviours of more recent understanding. 
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Key contributions to the understanding of SIS alignment as a process include the Baets model 
(1996) already discussed, which is differentiated from other alternative alignment frameworks by 
framing and defining SIS alignment as a process, that is in effect an synthesis of the differing 
framework components (i.e. business and IT strategy, structure and organisation). Despite having 
an empirically supported component, and asserting to consider the views of multiple 
stakeholders, there is a important justifiable criticism that can be made of this model. The 
definition of process as some combination of key alignment factors is not a valid and robust 
definition of process as understood by the classic definition of strategy process (i.e. Pettigrew, 
1985) or indeed possible alternatives to researching process (i .e. Mohr, 1982). Although there 
has been some empirical work undertaken in the spirit of strategic process (e.g. Rondinelli, 
Rosen and Drori, 20Ot), the principal conclusion seems to be that the alignment process is 
turbulent and unpredictable in both action and outcome. Such observations though of sense-
making value to the practitioner, can be accused of triviality, given the level of understanding of 
strategic process already available in the broader strategy literature. 
The unsatisfactory definitions and incoherent understandings of process in extant alignment 
research have been identified by many commentators: 'The processes by which alignment is 
accomplished in organizations needs to be better understood' (Sabherwal and Chan, 2001: 27); 
'There remains a need for research into processes associated with alignment' (Hussein, King and 
Cragg, 2002: 119) and 'The process view of alignment has been underrepresented in research to 
date' (Chan and Reich, 2007: 310). However, further consideration of alignment process 
research indicates quite clearly (particularly in the work of Luftman in tandem with both Brier 
(1999) and Sledgianowski (2005» that there is (as with variance alignment research) a pre-
occupation with the executive level of the organisation: the CIa, the CEO, the implementation 
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team and what they can and should do to manage alignment better. There is some 
acknowledgement of broader employer input in formal ongoing and retrospective 
implementation reviews (i.e. Sledgianowski and Luftman, 2005). However the involvement of 
non-executive stakeholders has been typically as more passive context-setters as opposed to 
powerful influential stakeholders (as per Freeman, 1984). More recent IS project alignment 
research (Jenkin and Chan, 2010) emphasises the key roles actors can play at different levels to 
better align IS projects with the overall organisational strategy, particularly in how they can work 
together to fashion alternative and often superior process outcomes: engaging in "heedful 
interrelating" (Weick and Roberts, 1993: 361). 
As process research of any phenomenon should emphasise temporal characteristics, there is also 
engagement with the changes discernible in the alignment process over a period of time. The key 
contributions to the temporal understanding of alignment process has been through the work of 
Bum (1993, 1996) who has deconstructed the process of SIS alignment into differing patterns 
and distinct stages, though interestingly without applying either process theories or an 
evolutionary perspective on strategy (Barnett and Burgel man , 1996). The notion of SIS 
alignment having distinct life-cycle phases is broadly to be expected, as in many cases SIS 
alignment is a parallel phenomenon to an ISIIT implementation, typically characterised by 
separate and gate-controlled stages. This is the only stream of alignment process research where 
there is clear incorporation of a related process theory (e.g. Sabherwal and Chan. 2001), in the 
form of punctuated equilibrium3 (as per Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). The concept of 
punctuated equilibrium, originally conceived in evolutionary biology (Gould and Eldredge, 
3 ~ : : punctuated equilibrium and other process theories win be discussed in the next thesis chapter. 
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1977), characterises evolution as stages of species stability followed by short. sudden and 
dramatic evolutionary change, which is then followed by another stable period and so on. 
Applying this mechanism to a process of SIS alignment. essentially implies (SabherwaJ and 
Chan. 200 I) that organisations in order to align must be able to recognise and cope with 
unexpected phases of strategic change, which creates difficulties for keeping strategies aligned. 
Revisiting the original evolutionary explanation, sudden change is necessary and at times a boon 
for the species, because in some cases; the species can lag behind others in tenns of the 
necessary survival traits, and can through evolution surpa'is the prevailing environmental nonns. 
Species can therefore at times, lead or lag the environment; this lead-lag model (Bums, 1993) 
can be applied to the process of SIS alignment. 
Although environmental/strategic change is often sudden and dramatic in outcome, Sabherwal 
and Chan (2001) emphasise the low-key nature of the alignment shifts that can result. However, 
the granular nature of these alignment shifts is not explored, preventing a clear insight into how 
the punctuated equilibrium process occurs. Furthennore, despite an empha'iis on the temporal 
characteristics of alignment process, the methodological tools available to temporally analyse 
process, such as temporal bracketing (Langley, 1999) are not utilised. 
2.6 A summary critique or the SIS alignment literature and identifying the literature 
gap. 
Looking at SIS alignment research both in tenns of measurement and process understanding, the 
following key criticisms can be identified: 
1) Measuring or understanding SIS alignment is principally focused on the executive 
function within the studied organisations: reviewing the literature strongly indicated 
that inordinate attention has been given to the views and involvement of the upper 
strategic echelons to the detriment of the broader mass of organisational stakeholders. In 
addition, not only is there an executive focus, there has been a lack of consideration of 
alignment at different levels of the organisation. Such a view is strategically incoherent 
given the understanding and insights offered by the emergent and entrepreneurial schools 
of strategy. 
2) Measuring imposes a variance perspective on SIS alignment, which intrinsically 
constrains the dimensions of alignment that can be considered: treating alignment as 
a phenomenon to be modelled, a linear cause-effect phenomenon; an organisational black 
box, fundamentally ignores the social and cultural dimensions of alignment. As a result, 
there can be little appreciation of the different sense-making and informal behaviours that 
instantiate alignment at different levels of the organisation. Given the objective of 
determining the causative variables of SIS alignment, it is anomalous to disregard the 
social and cultural activities that will occur. 
3) Efforts made to explore SIS alignment as a process has failed to sufficiently utilise 
either the methodological and theoretical frames offered by process theory: although 
there has been proposed engagement with alignment as a temporal process, a review of 
that particular literature has shown this to be more as artifice than rigour. There is no 
clear lucid and valid description of what constitutes a process when applied in the sense 
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of alignment process research. With the limited exception of punctuated equilibrium, 
there has been scant application of process theory to the understanding of alignment 
process. Stepping back into alignment process data analyses, there has been no real 
utilisation of the many methodological techniques that could greatly inform process data 
presentation and understanding. 
Synthesising these discrete critiques, it is possible to identify a clear literature gap and 
initial broad research question; namely the lack of a theoretical understanding of the social 
and cultural dimensions of SIS alignment process. Further exploring this gap implies that a 
robust theoretically valid definition of process will need to be identified, and also that the process 
of SIS alignment must be striven to be understood at multiple organisational levels. 
2.7 Chapter summary. 
This, the first of two literature chapters was concerned with synthesizing the strategic alignment 
and (particularly) the strategic IS alignment literature with a view to identifying a clear gap in 
theoretical understanding. The initial theoretical basis of strategic alignment in contingency 
theory and strategic fit were considered. The contrasting definitions of strategic alignment and 
the critique of the value and need for alignment research was also considered. The limited ability 
of organisational stakeholders to describe and understand their organisational strategy and the 
resulting implications for researching alignment is considered. A strong counter argument was 
discussed that emphasized the importance of emergent and entrepreneurial strategy in real-life 
strategy implementation. Formal planned strategy is typically adopted (and indeed adapted) in 
implementation through stakeholder sense-making implying that understanding of organisational 
strategy is necessarily evolving and non-static. In addition, the power dynamic between IS and 
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Business strategy was also discussed, with consideration given to the view that IS should be 
strategically more of a driver than a partner (or) servant of business strategy. 
The remainder of the chapter was concerned with an evaluation of the topical state of strategic IS 
research. The dimensional constructs (Le. structural, strategic and intellectual, social, informal 
and cultural) were discussed. The canonical models and frameworks of SIS alignment (i.e. 
HendersonlVenkatraman, Morton and Baets models) had already been critically evaluated. The 
contrasting "schools" of alignment research were then considered, emphasing the ongoing divide 
between (variance models of) alignment measures and (process models of) ongoing alignment 
understanding. Limitations of measuring alignment were elucidated, leading to an in-depth 
synthesis of alignment process research. The mainly temporal focus of such research was starkly 
identified with a critical evaluation of Bum's stages of (alignment) growth and lead-lag models 
and an assessment of the use of punctuated equilibrium theory in understanding the alignment 
process. The synthesis of the collective SIS alignment literature identified three clear criticisms: 
an over-emphasis on the alignment roles and involvement of the strategic apex; a neglect of the 
social and cultural dimensions of SIS alignment and lack of real engagement with process 
theories and methodologies. A clear gap and initial starting research question could then be 
derived in terms of the lack of theoretical understanding of the social and cultural dimensions of 
SIS alignment process at multiple-levels of the organisation. 
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The initial research question generated the following additional questions: what is meant by a 
process and what constitutes process theory 4? The next literature chapter addresses these 
questions through a synthesis of process theory, deriving a more formalized empirical research 
question and set of objectives. A review of process research approaches will identify that an 
event-driven Process Model (rather than the alternative variance perspective) will be most 
appropriate in addressing the initial research question identified in this chapter. Process theory 
and event literature are further reviewed, highlighting the importance of process concepts, 
incident and events, patterns of event progression and connections to theoretical views of 
process. A formal research question and five research objectives will be enumerated with clear 
respective contributions to SIS alignment theory, practice and method identified. 
4 Note: Process Methodology is discussed in depth in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 3: 
Review of the Strategy process and process theory literatures. 
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3.1 Chapter introduction. 
In the previous literature review chapter, an important theoretical gap in SIS alignment process 
understanding was identified. However, in order to acquire a more rigorous understanding of 
process theory, relevant literature will now be reviewed. This will enable the identified gap to be 
formalised as a process-orientated research question with associated objectives. Process as a 
strategic dimension is specifically defined and discussed. The alternate variance and process 
models of process research are then compared and contrasted with the process model justified as 
the most appropriate approach for this research. The characteristics of the process model 
approach are then explored, i.e. the role of time and narrative, the need to capture organisational 
context and multiple levels of analyses and in particular the perspective on process as being a 
developmental event sequence. As a consequence, the organisational event literature is then 
reviewed with an emphasis on classifying/categorising process events, the varied patterns in 
event progression and the notion of generative mechanisms or motors that have been identified. 
Process theories are then considered with particular emphases on the theories most appropriate 
for explaining an emergent strategy process The gap identified in the preceding chapter is 
reappraised in light of the outcomes of the process theory review to create a more robust research 
question with five associated objectives. The chapter concludes with a content summary. 
3.2 A review of Strategy Process Theory. 
Strategy process, content and context are considered the key dimensions of strategy (Chaffee, 
1985; Pettigrew, 1992). Although process can be treated to some degree as an independent 
strategic dimension (Pettigrew, 1992), there is an innate interdependence between process, the 
environment within which a strategy exists (context) and the formal articulated intentions 
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(content) of the strategy (Fredrickson, 1983). Strategy process looks at the "interconnectedness 
of events and actions overtime" (Walsham and Waema, 1994:154), events and actions which are 
effected politically, culturally and environmentally by strategy context and content (Pettigrew, 
1987; VanDerVen, 2(07). The critical roles of process in firstly helping to achieve and sustain 
strategy consensus and secondly, in driving successful strategy implementation has been 
empirically established (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991; Aoyd and Woodridge, 1992). Strategic 
process research has been characterised as understanding the issues pertaining to the creation and 
implementation of a strategy (Chakravarthy and Doz, 1992), offering a more dynamic 
organisational research lens (Weick, 1979). Effective strategy process understanding captures the 
changes that typically accrue to the planned strategy during implementation (Mintzberg and 
Lampel, 1999). 
Changing views on the importance of the strategy process arose mainly from the critique of 
prescriptive and rational approaches to strategy formulation and implementation (Mintzberg and 
Waters, 1985). The economically efficient and rational view of strategy as sequential and 
logical, designed to reflect environmental analyses has been variously described as a classical 
approach (Whittington, 1993) and belonging to prescriptive design, planning and positioning 
schools (Mintzberg and Lampel, 1999). Such a prescriptive approach provides internal and 
external stakeholders with a sense of control and direction in addition to seemingly providing 
clear benchmarks for strategic success (Ansoff, 1965). Strategic plans are essentially outputs 
formulated from in in-depth internal and external environmental analyses (Andrews, 1971; Porter 
1980). The essential objective is to position an organisations' portfolio in the particular industry 
and/or market (segment/region) where they can maximise economic rents (Henderson, 1979). 
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This classical approach to strategy is anchored in the rational view of decision-making, 
presummg optimal option generation, selection and outcomes (Becker, 1976). However, a 
rational formulation of an organisations' strategy necessitates the availability of complete 
environmental information, adequate cognitive ability to process this information and inherently 
sufficient time to derive precise outcomes. Such criteria were shown to be inherently lacking in 
organisational actors and that an actors' ability to be consistently rational was bounded as a 
result (Simon, 1945); strategy like other managerial activities was more reflective of a 
behavioural as opposed to a rational view of decision-making (eyert and March, 1963). 
Furthermore, predicating a strategy on a predominantly front-loaded cross-sectional analysis of 
an environment faces a strong risk of becoming invalidated by unforeseen events (Quinn, 1980). 
The original strategic goals and objectives as envisaged may not reflect the optimal outcome for 
the organisation and in some cases may prove to be entirely redundant (Mintzberg, 1990). Any 
organisational learning occurs too late (typica])y post-implementation) for the organisation to 
take a more appropriate strategic path (Argyris and Schoen, 1978). In certain cases, organisations 
become action-generators (Starbuck, 1983), creating a formal strategy plan in search of a reason 
for implementation, rather than being motivated to implement for salient strategic reasons. Once 
a reason for implementation is identified, this is utilised to post-rationalise the value of the 
formal approach (Starbucks, 1983), further deepening a rational path dependency (Nelson and 
Winters, 1982). 
The rational approach to strategy was strongly discredited by rich qualitative insights that 
indicated that management (in particular, middle-management) engage in strategic sense-making 
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(Weick, ]979) and entrepreneurial activity (Burgelman, ]983) that departs "on the ground" from 
the rational approach envisaged at more senior levels of the organisation. This more embedded 
process view reflects what has been termed the processual approach (Whittington, ] 993) and the 
more descriptive entrepreneurial, learning and culture schools of strategy (Mintzberg and 
Lampel, ] 999). This perspective rejects a deliberate approach to formulation and implementation 
and proposes strategy as being an emergent phenomenon (Mintzberg, ] 978; Mintzberg and 
Waters, 1985; Stacey, 2010), rather than something prescribed and unchanging that occurs in a 
predictable, regulated fashion. The organisation proceeds, adjusting strategic goals and pathways 
to reflect external and internal environmental changes; described as logical incrementalism 
(Quinn, ] 980). The greater utility of an emergent strategic perspective is supported by the 
opportunities for enhanced effective learning and the reduced likelihood of the implementing 
organisation becoming decoupled from environments (Quinn, 1980). 
IS/Business strategy from an emergent and practice-based perspective in this research offers a 
more realistic view of strategy implementation in practice (Chakravarthy, Mueller-Stewens, 
Lorange and Lechner, 2(03), defusing the common (already discussed in the previous chapter) 
criticism of alignment research predicated on a view of strategy as planned and directed. The 
emergent nature of IS/Business strategy has been emphasised in the IS strategy literature, with 
the relationship between technology and strategy being described as "de-facto bricolage" 
(Ciborra, 1997: 69). Emergent strategy also considers the other non-traditional stakeholders in 
strategy process, the "actors inside and outside the boardroom" (Pettigrew, Thomas and 
Whittington, 2002: 12), reflecting the likely interviewees of interest in the field work for this 
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research as well as representing the likely patterns of process events (Garud and VanDeVen, 
2(02). 
3.3 Research models in Process Theory. 
Before undertaking process research, the following steps are recommended. (VanDerVen, 1992; 
169): firstly, define what is meant by a process both from generic and epistemological 
perspectives and secondly, design the process research (this step will be addressed in detail in 
Chapter 5). Although there are multiple process definitions (e.g. Chakravarthy and White, 2(01) 
and dimensions (Monge, 1990), an accepted approach (VanDerVen, 2(07) is to characterise and 
approach the process under investigation using either a variance or process model (Mohr, 1982). 
3.3.1 The variance model. 
A variance model is concerned with formulating a general explanation of a process by addressing 
the issue of efficient causality (Mohr, 1982). Dependent and independent process variables are 
identified, constructed and quantified. Dependent variables in this approach reflect the process 
outcomes, whereas independent variables reflect certain key attributes in the unfolding process 
(VanDerVen, 2007). A push-type causality, where altering the values of certain independent 
variables changes the process outcome is indicative of this approach (Mohr, 1982). Independent 
variables are often segregated, i.e. across the dimensions of environment or decision processes 
(Mohr, 1982; Langley, 1999) but their definitional basis does not alter over the course of the 
process (Poole et al; 2(00). Regardless of the dimensions chosen, it is neither necessary nor 
relevant to consider time as an independent variable or quantify any independent variables at 
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some set time intervals (Mohr, 1982). The order and sequence in which independent variables 
become apparent and are quantified is also irrelevant (VanDeVen, 2007). Quantitative 
methodologies are typically utilised in the variance model as variable construction and 
quantification is fundamental (Pentland, 1999). The variance approach reflects a view of process 
as a set of attributes or concepts of varying attribution and value (VanDeVen, 2007). 
3.3.2 The process model. 
A process model, although also focused on generalisable process explanations has wider 
causality criteria than the variance model (Langley, 2008). Whereas a variance model is 
concerned with efficient causality only (i.e. some change in independent process variable X 
driving a change in dependent process variable V), process models strive for causality that is 
final, formal and efficient (Pentland, 1999; Poole et al; 2000). Furthermore, a process model 
reflects pull-type causality, where outcomes can be explained by the sequence of events (Mohr, 
1982). Rather than deterministic causation, the process model is concerned with immediate 
causation (Abbott, 1990), striving to understand the "generative mechanisms" (VanDeVen, 
2007; 154) of process. Process is therefore considered as a coupled series of dependant events 
rather than a set of measured variables as per the Variance Model approach (Mohr, 1982). The 
necessity for investigating generative mechanisms or motors inherent to a process model drives 
the deconstruction of the process into discrete time intervals or events (Abbott, 1990; Barley, 
1990; Peterson, 1998). The events of the unfolding process can vary in meaning, dependant on 
the perspectives of different actors and the organisational level of analysis (Poole et aI, 2000). In 
a further contrast to the variance model, temporal issues are of paramount importance 
(VanDeVen, 2007). The relative order and sequence of different process events is critical to fully 
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comprehend the unfolding of the process (Langley, 1999). Aggregating a process from a series of 
immediate events can be structured accessibly in the form of a narrative (Pentland, 1999). The 
process is essentially recounted as a story with a clear sequence of identified events, interpreted 
in varying ways at different organisational levels and by different organisational actors, ending 
with some final formalised outcomes that have a generalisable application (Pentland, 1999). In 
such a fashion, final, formal and efficient causality can be achieved as "Process models provide 
the story that explains the degree of association between predictors and outcomes" (Newman and 
Robey, 1992: 250). In order to empirically sustain a process model approach, research should be 
undertaken longitudinally and involve qualitative and/or quantitative data collection at varying 
organisational levels (Langley, 1999). Process model research is typically viewed through an 
abductive reasoning lens (Peirce, 1955), reflective of causality criteria I. 
3.3.3 Selecting an appropriate model. 
Choosing the most appropriate model of process is considered the penultimate stage of process 
research planning, prior to research design (VanDerVen, 2007). The literature gap identified in 
the previous chapter ("A lack of theoretical understanding of SIS Alignment Process") justifies 
an exploratory and explanatory process research focus. Exploration will explicitly entail 
examining the alignment process in depth, chronicling the unfolding of the process and clearly 
illuminating the immediate sequence of events. The temporal nature of the process must be 
considered in terms of the flow and coupling of process events. Longitudinal data collection will 
be necessary to enable process sequence and immediate causation to be understood. A variance 
approach relegates temporal concerns and as a result can lead to "truncated observation" 
1 Chapter 5 contains an in-depth discussion on process model research methods and design. 
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(MacKenzie, 2007:6), which would limit the exploratory value of this research. Furthermore, a 
variance approach can impose artificial limits on the temporal and organisational boundaries of a 
process (Sminia, 2009). A process approach must also consider boundaries, but the greater 
immersion of the researcher can enable a more informed decision on the point of process closure 
(DeCock and Sharp, 2007). As a result of not incorporating temporal variables or the influence 
of time on data collection, variance models implicitly assume organisations enact without 
deliberation or structured foresight (Rescher, 1996). Although Strategy process, (apropos 
Mintzberg and Burgelman) often exhibits emergent and entrepreneurial tendencies, it is never 
entirely random or loosely-coupled (Weick, 1976; Stacey, 2010) and is therefore not best studied 
using a variance approach. From an explanatory perspective, the causes of alignment process 
outcomes are not overly material to the identified gap. Addressing the outcomes of the process 
would however be important in indicating the final links in the chain of causation. In essence, 
closing the identified gap would be more aptly facilitated by the process model approach that 
could elucidate final, formal and efficient causality. 
3.4 Exploring the process model approach. 
The process model approach is now explored in more detail with an emphasis on the critical 
issues that must be considering in viewing process as a developmental event sequence 
(VanDeVen, 2007). These key issues will be revisited in greater depth in the methodology and 
process research design chapter. 
3.4.1 The importance or time and context. 
Process model research critically emphasises the temporal order and sequencing of events 
(Abbott, 2(01). However, the temporal orientation and concentration of process research can 
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vary according to the objectives of the research question (VanDeVen, 2(07). Three differing 
process research perspectives on time have been identified: past (Tracing Back), ongoing into the 
future (Following Forward) and reconstituting the evolving present (Langley, 2009). Process 
research may encompass any combination of these temporal perspectives and there is a 
sufficiently strong argment for catering for all three (Peterson, 1998). Process Models address 
final and formal causality so the research must engage with a future temporal orientation. No 
strategic process is initiated at a strategic "Year Zero" and indeed the horizons and objectives of 
an ongoing process may be largely contingent on prior events or strategic antecedents (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982; Kleindienst and Hutzschenreuter, 2006). Strategic diagnoses or shifts 
particularly with respect to organisational environments (DeWit and Meyer, 2010), often 
motivate new strategic processes (i.e. strategic change). 
Gaining some clear insights into the process rationale justifies looking closely at the 
organisation's past. Secondary data collection is likely to be useful here in terms of the 
organisation's history, structures and key strategic initiatives (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill. 
2(09). However, important primary data of a more retrospective nature can also be collected 
from process participants with longer organisational careers and/or direct involvement in 
strategic origination and planning (Pentland, 1999). The different intervals at which key 
organisational actors are involved in a specific process emphasises the fact that research into an 
unfolding process is in essence an interweaving of the organisations' past, present and future 
(Langley, 2009). In process research, the stories of the past inform the stories of the present 
(after Buchanan and Dawson, 2007:670). Determining the end of a strategy process is inherently 
difficult due to the varying views of process participants (VanDeVen, 2(07). However, 
57 
identifying and researching a process time-bound by a budget or deadline or the achievement of 
some predetermined success measures may be more conducive in this regard. The most 
important outcome of process model research is to satisfy the need for immediate causality; the 
"evolving present" (Langley, 2009: 415) will therefore be the principal temporal perspective 
taken in this research. The unfolding process and temporal ordering and sequence of events will 
need to be fully "captured" by the research approach taken. The demands of satisfying 
immediate causality place considerable pressures on a process researcher in terms of data access, 
length of the data collection process and the need to reflect differing event perspectives at 
multiple organisational levels (Pentland, 1999). Ideally, the researcher would be in a position to 
follow a process ab initio, with optimal data access over the duration of the process, which has 
some preordained point or measure of finality (Langley, 2009). 
3.4.2 The need to capture process perspectives at multiple organisational levels. 
In elementary terms, processes are never the property of a sole individual (Pentland, 1999), but 
rather emerge from the contributions of many organisational stakeholders operating with 
different priorities at different levels of the organisation. It is therefore crucial to approach a 
process as multi-layered and subjective with the goal of capturing and appreciating the sense-
making (Weick, 1979) process stakeholders are likely to engage in. Capturing how the same 
broad process event can be interpreted at differing organisational levels may also illustrate 
strategy execution disconnects (Raynor, 2007). As stated by Pettigrew (1992: 8): "the tension 
between actions and structures is the ultimate moving force of the process"; therefore the 
structural variation in event understanding is necessary to capture. 
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The different strategy process roles have been well-identified, in particular through the 
entrepreneurial school of Burgelman (1983) and others; however the lack of alignment 
understanding identified in the previous chapter further legitimises the necessity of a multi-level 
process approach. Indeed, it has been argued that the strategy process innately involves multiple 
actors dealing with multiple contexts (Regner, 2003). Regner (2003) uses the concepts of 
exploitation and exploration as developed by March (1991) and others to differentiate the centre 
from the periphery in strategy process, with the centre being concerned more with strategy 
exploitation and the peripherary more with strategy exploration and furtive experimentation. 
Salvato (2003) also clearly differentiates strategy process on the basis of the organisational-level 
and the more micro-level with managers developing strategies that depart from the organisations' 
view and the reaction of the organisation to strive for greater control. The behaviour of certain 
managers in strategy process has been investigated in depth and they are shown to compete for 
resources (i.e. Pettigrew's (1972) concept of a "gatekeeper") and control the flow of information 
through deliberate action (i.e. Mintzberg's (1983) concept of "budgeting games") and in some 
cases, inaction (Bachrach and Baratz (1970». Explicating process at multiple levels not only 
adds empirical value in enriching understanding of causality; it also offers an opportunity for the 
research to make a valid contribution to increased practitioner understanding. Using narratives as 
a medium for disseminating the sequence of and interrelationship of process events is an 
established approach (Scholes, 1981). Indeed, the more dynamic the process, the more profound 
the effect on varied stakeholders; representing the pluralism of both process effects and views is 
a key advantage of using a narrative frame (Barry and Elmes, 1997). Tentatively accepting the 
event based definition of process, it is also important to clearly consider and understand both 
what is meant by an event and their different mechanisms and modes of progression. 
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3.5 Events in organisational research. 
Organisations can be seen as entities engaged in ongoing processes which can be studied by 
process deconstruction (Daft and Weick, 1984). The axiomatic role of human agency in 
organisational processes has long been an established tenet of organisational theory (Rescher, 
1996). Individual actors are exposed to organisational phenomena in a mode that can be captured 
and expressed as events evident to themselves and to external observers (Morgan, 1986; Rescher, 
1996). Isolating such human agency has been a primary concern of process theory philosophers 
and researchers (Mohr, 1982). Their key question has been: what would be a suitable unit of 
analysis in conceptualising organisational process (VanDeVen 2007)? The principal unit of 
organisational analyses in process research is invariably the event (Pettigrew, 1990), observed 
within an ongoing progression but with some pattern discernible (Garud and VanDeVen, 2002). 
Indeed, the process of information systems development has been modelled as a social 
developmental event sequence (Newman and Robey, 1992). Organisational processes can be 
viewed from a contextualist perspective (Srninia, 2009), where events are bounded by the 
organisation's interactions with the environment and indicative of path dependencies in decision-
making and resource allocation. Such a research approach would strongly attend to a past 
temporal perspective in order to clarify the strategic context (Langley, 2009). The particular 
emphasis on process context can be problematic for empirical reasons: it is clearly necessary for 
internal validity but can affect research generalisibility (MacKenzie, 2007). The sequence and 
ordering of events is fundamental to process understanding so collecting and accounting for 
process event data chronologically is essential (Poole et al; 2000). Accepting the paradigm of 
process as a developmental event sequence, fundamental questions arise. How can a process 
event be defined and identified? What is a process event composed of? 
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There has been much comment in both the process and wider organisational science literature as 
to how events can be deconstructed and categorised (Monge, 1990). Indeed, there is a strongly 
held view that a priori process event definition runs counter to the emergent nature of strategy 
process (Mintzberg, 1991). However, this approach, if taken to an extreme, essentially turns 
process data collection into a Grounded Theory exercise (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), which in the 
view of this researcher would not support final and formal causality outcomes. However, on the 
opposite end of the spectrum, process events that are overly pre-structured and pre-formatted run 
a risk of excluding unforeseen events that could be critical to process understanding. The 
intention in this research is to initially define high level alignment process event categories to 
guide data collection but also to allow for creation of more detailed or different events as the 
research proceeds. Given the nature of the IS alignment process to be studied (an AGRESSO to 
ERP changeover imposed by a parent on a formerly independent subsidiary), high-level event 
categories would need to be broadly and initially described (Refer to Chapter 5). An inductive 
approach to event taxonomy will be utilised; event categories will not drive process 
understanding but rather the unfolding process will lead the researcher to craft and adapt event 
taxonomies (DeCock and Sharp, 20{)?). As process events are being analysed, some further 
reclassification is therefore likely to occur. 
In terms of classifying or categorising events, different approaches have been applied. Some 
researchers have borrowed from the natural sciences to conceptualise events, in particular, taking 
the fact that a physical entity can exist in multiple forms dependent on the environmental 
circumstances and position of the observer. Petersen (1998) describes events as waves, particles 
occurring within a wider field of perception, differing actor perspectives and having varying 
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explanatory potential. Each event form prioritises certain characteristics: an event as a wave 
emphasises the confluence of events leading to a crest or key event; an event as a particle focuses 
more on the innate unique properties of the event in question whereas an event within a wider 
field addresses the embedded nature of the event within the greater organisation (Petersen, 
1998). In addition, the fact that a phenomenon in natural sciences can hold multiple forms 
simultaneously offers an original and relevant lens to apply to event analyses, analogous to 
different actor perspectives on the same event (VanDeVen, 2(07). It is the researcher's view that 
such analogies can only enrich data outcomes and will be utilised in data analyses and 
discussion. Others have emphasised a more a priori theoretical approach (Langley, 1999). High 
level theoretical event descriptors are derived prior to process data collection and then used in 
analyses to provide contrasting explanations of the same event, known as the alternate templates 
approach (Langley, 1999). This approach is redolent in many respects of deductive reasoning 
and is rejected in its purest form as it may constrain the range of theoretical explanations that can 
be utilised. 
3.6 Describing process event progressions. 
The analogy of a sausage machine (Mohr, 1982: 57) has been used to broadly define process 
event progression, a chain of immediate events formally expressed in the form of an accessible 
outcome. Regardless of the nature of the process being investigated, simply identifying and 
chronicling the sequence of such events is insufficient for process understanding or explanation 
(Pettigrew, 1997; Garud and VanDeVen, 2(02). Some greater understanding must be derived 
from the events elucidated. The canonical next step in process research is to look for some 
overarching patterns of inter-relationships in the progression of events (Yin, 2003; Sminia, 
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2(09), with an emphases on event phases, paths, combinations, cycles, points of convergence 
and divergence (Langley, 2(09). The ultimate goals are to identify the "generative mechanism" 
(Tsoukas, 1989 cited in VanDeVen, 2002: 177) and theoretical motors of the process. 
In order to characterise and discuss process event progressions, different approaches have been 
mooted. Graphic descriptions of process event flows (known as Visual Mapping) allows for 
paths and interdependencies to be clearly delineated, increasing process understanding (Miles 
and Huberman, 2(02) and have strong illustrative and explanatory power (e.g. Newman and 
Robey, 1992). However, such an approach emphao;ises relationships as opposed to mechanisms 
and theoretical motors (Langley, 1999) and requires additional interventions. Similarly, the use 
of temporal bracketing which breaks a given process into clear distinct phases (VanDeVen, 
2(07) has a visual and comprehension value. However, it may be difficult to subdivide processes 
into distinct time phases due to the coupled immediacy of events. But in some processes (such as 
an IS implementation), natural "breaks" occur which may conveniently enable temporal 
bracketing to be deployed. It is this author's view that both visual mapping and temporal 
bracketing should be utilised as they provide useful process event representations that aid 
researcher sense-making. Process understanding has now moved from temporally sequenced 
events to certain defined inter-related event progressions. What actually can be used to 
characterise the nature of these inter-relationships (immediate causality) and at a more process 
theory level, the overall cause-effect (final, formal and efficient causality) of these modes of 
progression? In other words, what respectively are the generative mechanisms and theoretical 
motors (VanDeVen, 2(07) of the process? 
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3.7 Process event progressions: generative mechanisms. 
Alternative approaches have been proposed drawing on developmental sequences in other forms 
of events, rather than just those observed in organisations. VanDeVen and Poole (1995) adapted 
developmental mechanisms from child psychology to derive five separate event progression 
mechanisms, which are now briefly described: 
a) Unitary progression: a linear path of distinguishable and consecutive process events. 
b) Multiple progression(s): a sequence of process events that can result in an equivalent 
outcome but can occur in a parallel, convergent or divergent fashion, 
c) Cumulative progression: process events are changed by subsequent events in the 
sequence leading to complex event interaction and less predictable outcomes. Change can 
occur in the form of adding to an event, modifying an existing event or substituting an 
earlier event in the sequence with a latter event. 
d) Conjunctive progression: combination of one or more of a unitary, multiple and 
cumulative progression of events due to chance (probabilistic), direct linkage (mediation) 
and absorption (inclusion). 
e) Recurrent progression: combination of all modes of progression, unitary, mUltiple, 
cumulative and conjunctive in some mode of repetition over time. 
In accepting the strongly emergent nature of strategy process, in the researcher's view there is an 
implicit assumption that unitary linear style progressions as the sole means of event progression 
would not be internally valid. Furthermore, characterising a process as a unitary progression 
would not be reflective of multi-level organisational event perspectives. Although there may be 
some convergence on event perspectives, unitary or unanimous views are unlikely to pertain. A 
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mechanism of progression would need to incorporate divergence and convergence in both event 
perspective and pathways, supporting a multiple event progression model. 
Emergence in strategy implementation emphasises (internally and externally driven) change, 
ongoing learning opportunities and corrective actions and adjustments that can occur (Mintzberg, 
1979; Stacey 2010). Any process studied should reflect same said phenomena. The effects of 
change on future events (and the altered perceptions actors then have of previous events) needs 
to be considered and is reflective of a cumulative progression model. In the view of the 
researcher, the possibility of such altering perceptions is a prime reason for immersed process 
research and is a further rejoinder to use of the variance model. The risks of post-rationalisation 
would one feels, strongly rise if event perceptions are not captured in-vivo. The observation that 
at different levels, the same event sequences could be seen as either arbitrary or requiring 
intervention directly or through some intermediary (Monge, 1990; VanDeVen and Poole, 1995) 
is a substantive argument for utilising conjunctive (and recurrent) progressions to describe 
events. 
3.8 From generative mechanisms to process theory motors. 
Although generative mechanisms provide insights into process event progression inter-
relationships, process theories are necessary to explain causality in terms of the motors driving 
the process (VanDeVen, 2007). The theories typically utilised to speak causative meaning to 
process have been enumerated in many different sources: one perspective (Poole and VanDeVen, 
2004: 338) offers 16 potential process theory combinations, based on (already discussed) specific 
mechanisms determined in event progression. An alternative view (Sminia, 2009) suggests that 
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due to the two different strategy implementation "camps", there is in tum only two high-level 
process theory choices. From this viewpoint, proponents of the emergent strategy approach must 
utilise theories of punctuated eqUilibrium (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). This theory, not 
unusual in process in having borrowed from the natural sciences (in this case, the work on 
evolution done by the late Stephen Jay Gould and others), describes organisational process as 
being characterised by periods of sustained, almost "calm" events, punctuated by critical but 
discontinuous events that propel the organisation in radical and profound directions. In this 
researcher's view, punctuated equilibrium theories at least on a surface level could ostensibly 
describe any emergent strategic process and as such will not offer sufficient explanatory power. 
Further references to broader organisational theories such as structuration (Giddens, 1979) and 
actor-network theory (Latour, 1987) have been linked to explain process mechanisms 
particularly in the contextualist process view of Pettigrew (as cited in Sminia, 2009). Recalling 
that the initial literature gap was in alignment process and that alignment is an extension of 
contingency and environmental configuration theories, this raises doubts as to the suitability of 
structuration as an explanatory theory. Addressing the research gap is fundamentally about the 
process mechanisms of configuration and contingency, paying due attention to external factors. 
Structuration is more relevant to bounded strategic issues and the strategic processes of social 
construction (Pozzebon, 2004) and as such has less relevance for the initial research gap 
identified. The common criticism of actor-network theory particularly in IS research in imposing 
agency characteristics on technology (Pozzebon, 2004) is strongly relevant here, where 
technology usability and interaction is less of interest, than the social engagement of the human 
actors. 
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Over the past decade there has been an increasing 'practice turn' in strategy research 
(Whittington, 2(06). In the practice approach, strategy is expressed as something interactive that 
the firm, market and actors do. Examples of practices include the "work practices and career 
patterns of strategy practitioners, the ways in which they develop their particular skills, the 
routines in which they engage, the technologies they employ, and the myriad micro activities that 
contribute in one way or another to changes in, or confirmation of, an organization's strategy." 
(Hendry and Seidl, 2003: 175-176). What strategic actors actually do and the kinds of activities 
they get themselves involved in have become a central concern in practice based forms of 
inquiry (Whittington, 1996, 2002; Hendry 2000, larzabkowski 2003). The practice approach is 
therefore seen as a necessary corrective to researching the nitty-gritty details of strategy 
formulation - The routines of budgeting, the expenditure meetings, the reports and presentation -
through an actual focus on 'praxis, practitioners and practices' (Johnson. Melin and Whittington, 
2003; Chia 2004: 29). Strategy undeniably involves discursive practices. artifacts and routines 
and it is a welcome development (in the view of this researcher) that a theoretical approach to 
strategy has a social focus. However, there are certain issues that detract from its relevance and 
utility with respect to this research. There is already strong empirical research in routines, 
decision making, power and sense-making and giving in organizations. The Strategy-as-practice 
movement has also been validly criticized in having vague unbounded definitions of practice 
(Carter, Clegg. and Kornberger, 2(08) with some commentators considering the difference 
between strategy practice and process to be unclear or indistinguishable (Chia and Mackay 
2007). Such observations make it problematic with respect to this research. Finally and most 
critically, the theory emphasizes the practitioners of strategy which in the strategy-as-practice 
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research still emphasizes top management (e.g. Jarzabkowski, 2003). This research deliberately 
views strategy as more socially owned and emergent rather than mainly within the agency of 
senior management, which is more akin to the rational planning school of strategy. Additionally, 
the theory seems to be proposing a new and improved lens to justify the resource-based view of 
the firm, itself a problematic theory open to substantive criticism (Priem and Butler, 2001). 
Four additional theories of process have been identified and supported in the literature, 
differentiated by degree of intent, mode and unit of change (VanDeVen and Poole, 1995): life-
cycle, teleological, dialectic and evolutionary. The life-cycle theory proposes a view of process 
as a planned immanent mechanism on a single organisational entity (i.e. person, team, division 
etc) with defined sequential phases (Tushman and Moore, 1982). Teleological theory on the 
other hand considers process as fundamentally goal driven with the process adapting as 
necessary to achieve the goal, albeit not necessarily in a planned fashion (Poole et al; 2000). The 
dialectic and evolutionary theories of differ in their non-directive view of process or process 
objectives with change emerging from conflict and competition for resources respectively 
(Pettigrew, 1990). Limiting process explanation to four such discrete options has however been 
criticised as overly restrictive and lacking comprehensiveness (Langley, 2009). However, the 
explanatory power of process theories arises from their potential combination and established 
logical relationships with different modes of process event progression (Chakravarthy and Doz, 
1992; VanDeVen and Poole, 2(00). 
3.9 Process Theory motors: lower and higher-order inter- relationships. 
Although process theory motors offer the potential for causative explanation, relationships 
between different process theory motors can enable an overall process to be theoretically 
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characterised from an additional perspective (VanDeVen and Poole, 1995). These relationships 
can be considered from two different perspectives: low-level and high-level. The low-level 
process theory motors when identified, help to describe the causal relationships within each 
temporal phase. However, in order to characterise the causal relationships that exist across the 
entire alignment process (as opposed to individual temporal pha'ies), the relationships between 
different lower-level motors across phases need to be identified and discussed. Most process 
theorists have tended to focus on a dual motor (Cule and Robey, 2004) of organisational process. 
Such motors as they reflect multi-level organisational perspectives and the overall high-level 
alignment process will be combined in three distinct ways: nested, entangled and aggregated 
(Poole and VanDeVen, 2004). 
Nested motors describe a close functional link between some motor at a lower to that of a higher 
level whereas entangled motors suggest an influence rather a function link in terms of 
progressions (Poole and VanDeVen, 2004). An aggregated motor echoes some tenets of 
structuration theory (Le. Giddens, 1979) in that a higher level process emerges from the 
combination of lower order progressions (Poole and VanDeVen, 2004). Higher numbers of 
interconnecting motors are often only attributed to non-process specific theories such as sense-
making (Weick, 1979). Indeed, this very outcome has been identified as an ongoing empirical 
cul-de-sac in process research (DeCock and Sharp, 2007) where theoretical explanations 
decouple from the process theory options available. Whether this particular cul-de-sac is 
avoidable or not is a moot point. In this researcher's view, this points to an inherent irony in 
process research. It is possible and valid to utilise the language of non-specific process theories 
(like sense-making) in describing and understanding process, yet the same theories are somehow 
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not specific enough to provide valid process theory explanations. The social characteristics of 
process and the frames individual actors use to understand process can and are richly informed 
by other disciplines and theories. In the author's view, this critique is more a reflection on the 
hitherto low general utility of process theories rather than the fault of other disciplines. 
The logical relationship elucidated in these theories between generative mechanisms discussed 
earlier and process theory motor relationships offers (in the view of this researcher), a valuable 
option for process explanation. It is patently clear from reviewing the process theory options 
discussed, that no single process theory is sufficient. Indeed, the level of organisational 
complexity implicit in multi-level process research dictates that several different theories would 
need to be considered simultaneously in order to realistically explain process phenomena 
(VanDeVen and Garud, 1993). The principal theories utilised in process explanations were 
discussed and critiqued with an emphases on identifying the theoretical lenses most appropriate 
to an emergent view of strategy process. Characterising SIS alignment process in terms of 
higher-level process theory motor relationships must incorporate multiple process theories. This 
is critical to maximise the explanatory potential of the research outcomes, and in terms of 
internal validity, to show how differing motors inter-operate at varying organisational levels. 
3.10 Flnalised research question and objectives. 
The fundamental dearth of understanding and research in SIS alignment process has been 
identified as the key gap in the preceding SIS alignment literature review chapter. The next step 
was to review and synthesise process theory with a view to deriving a more apposite research 
question and set of objectives. A review of process research approaches has identified that an 
event-driven Process Model (rather than the alternative variance perspective) would be most 
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appropriate in addressing the earlier identified gap. Process theory and event literature were 
further reviewed, which highlighted important content on event progression, patterns of said 
progression and relationships to theoretical views of process. The initial research gap is therefore 
adapted to be more specifically stated as the following research question: 
What process theory motors and relationships characterise SIS alignment process? 
The first stage in answering the research question is to capture SIS alignment process events, 
taking the general definitions of events described in the literature (i.e. Abbott, 1988; Peterson, 
1998) as a very broad starting point. Simply identifying and chronicling the sequence of such 
events is however insufficient for alignment process understanding or explanation (Pettigrew, 
1997). However, a clear cumulative relationship exists between collecting process event data, 
characterising process event progressions and identifying apposite (process) generative 
mechanisms and finally, theoretical motors. Identification of higher-level process theory motor 
inter-relationships will enable the SIS alignment process to be richly characterised in terms of 
process theory, addressing the gap in SIS alignment process understanding. Addressing the 
research question therefore implies addressing the following four research objectives: 
I. Identification and description of the events that constitute SIS alignment process, from 
multi-level organisational perspectives. 
2. Identification and subsequent appraisal of how these events progress, in order to determine 
the generative mechanisms of the alignment process. 
3. Utilising these generative mechanisms to identify possible theory explanations in the form 
of lower-level process theory motors. 
4. Utilising these lower-level motors to abduce higher-level process motor relationships (i.e. 
nested, entangled, aggregated), indicative of the overall SIS alignment process. 
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3.11 Proposed research contributions. 
The following research contributions are tentatively proposed: 
3.11.1 To SIS alignment theory and research methodology. 
Firstly, closing the identified knowledge gap will help address an important lack in 
understanding in providing a process theory based perspective on SIS Alignment process. 
Undertaking such research as this, moving towards "an enlarged notion of alignment within a 
hybrid network of semi-autonomous actors" (Ciborra, 1997:79) has also been emphasised as an 
important contribution to alignment research. On review of the existing literature, there are 
relatively few process studies of IS strategy implementation that could be identified (with fewer 
still at multiple organisational levels) which suggests this research may potentially contribute to 
the general body of IS strategy literature. Secondly, although has been long evidence of an 
intrepretivist tum in IS research (Myers, 1997), there is an ongoing adjunct view that insufficient 
naturalistic IS strategy research has been undertaken (Tallon, 2008). The qualitative research 
approach (outlined in the next chapter) may therefore make a contribution to the hitherto under-
represented body of naturalistic IS research (Silverman, 1998). 
3.11.2 To reftective practice in SIS alignment. 
Although strategy as a discipline is beginning to acquire a greater research focus as a practical 
endeavour, apropos the Strategy as practice school (Johnson, Langley, Melin and Whittington, 
2(07), a discernible gap long since identified, still exists between strategic research and strategic 
practice (Alexander, 1991; Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel, 1998). Furthermore, there 
continues to be extensive consideration of the gap that can exist within strategic practice between 
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plans and outcomes (Mintzberg and Lampel, 1999). A process of longitudinal research based on 
interaction with practitioners as well as immersion in the practitioner environment (through 
examination of secondary and adjunct data sources) produces more relevant and practical 
research outcomes in tandem with an ongoing research process fundamentally informed by 
practice (Rynes, Bartunek and Daft, 2001). Research designed and implemented in a social 
context has an important contribution to make in framing research within the real-world/reality 
as opposed to strict empiricism (Mohrmon, Gibson and Mohrmon, 2001; VanDeVen and 
Johnson, 2006). 
However, the nature of academic/practitioner interaction should be carefully formalized and 
controlled due to issues of research bias that may potentially arise (Hinings, 1997). Although it is 
undeniably important to consider engagement with practice during data research collection and 
analyses, an arguably more critical issue is the presentation of the research outcomes in a 
transferable and accessible form that allows for their practical implementation (March, 2000). 
Indeed, it is strongly felt that it is predominantly the role of the researcher to produce accessible 
research with a practical value: the "engaged scholarship" approach (VanDeVen, 2007). The 
inability of the practitioner to implement research findings has been contrastingly defined as an 
issue of either knowledge (re) production (VanDeVen and Johnson, 2006) or more an issue of 
knowledge translation than deliberate omission (McKelvey, 2006). 
When one considers that this research is attempting to understand strategy alignment as process, 
the relevance of the need to close the gap between business research and practice is profound. 
Comprehensively, the research/practice gap that is to be addressed by this research is that 
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between strategy research (e.g. process theory and research, IS strategy theory and research, 
alignment) and implementation. The organisational and practitioner value in understanding the 
process of strategic alignment has been clearly elucidated in the literature. The most obvious 
value for organisations and practitioners would be garnered from the explication of processes 
that led to increased alignment between IS and business strategy. Obviously, there can be no 
guarantee that such successful processes will occur at the site accessed in this research. Indeed, 
to re-iterate, this research has no explicit objective of understanding processes that lead to 
successful alignment but rather to solely understand alignment processes, with the outcomes of 
IS and Business strategies considered relevant for the sake of both final and formal causality 
(Such an approach reflects the epistemological view of process relevant to this research, i.e. 
process as a developmental event sequence not a cause and effect variance mechanism). The 
direct value of this research for the participating organisation will lie in an in-depth external 
perspective of their strategic alignment processes, originally presented to the Business Process 
and IT Manager from the participating. The report will identify and elaborate on key critical 
events in the strategic implementation. The events will be framed in a detailed yet constructively 
critical fashion leading to some recommendations for the organisation, in terms of improving 
existing practices or the absence of certain capabilities that the organisation should prioritise 
acquiring. In a more general sense, this research could provide insights for IS strategy 
professionals into (for example); best practice in stakeholder involvement; ways of 
preventing/addressing conflict; identification of possible points of strategy emergence and stages 
in either closer BusinessllS strategy alignment or increased decoupling of same. Identified 
higher-level theory motors driving the overall alignment process, could provide a frame for 
discussion amongst practitioners (including those from the researched organisation) in an open 
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forum. This may provide some insights into how the research outcomes could be deductively 
applied in researching alignment processes in further research sites (which is an intention of the 
researcher). 
Another contribution to practice would arise from the use of the research outcomes 
pedagogically. The difficulty in teaching the strategic dimension of process, particularly to 
student cohorts with little organisational experience is a common problem for teachers of 
Strategy (e.g. Clegg, Kornberger and Carter, 2008). This researcher would intend to utilise the 
narrative of the system implementation (Refer to Chapter 7) to illustrate how Strategy Process is 
a social unfolding phenomenon, pervious to both content and context. The roles and involvement 
of the change manager, external consultants and the parent-subsidiary relationship in the 
implementation studied may also provided a seam for the mining of examples in disciplines 
taught by the researcher including Strategy and Change Management. 
3.12 Chapter summary. 
The outcome of the first literature chapter was the identification of an important gap in the 
theoretical understanding of SIS alignment process. The purpose of this second literature chapter 
was to acquire a rigorous understanding of both strategy process and more specifically, process 
theory with a view to formalising this identified gap as a more process research orientated 
question with associated objectives. Process as a strategic dimension was specifically defined 
and discussed. The processual view of strategy which champions descriptive emergent 
explanations of strategy, and rejects prescriptive strategy formulation and implementation, was 
particularly emphasised. The alternate variance and process models of process research were 
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defined and discussed. Key differences between the two approaches emerged in terms of 
adequate criteria for causality explanations, the importance attached to temporal factors and how 
process was concei ved. 
The process model was selected as the most appropriate model for this research. This approach 
(de)constructs process as a developmental event sequence, is concerned with pull-type, final 
formal and efficient causality and prioritises the temporal ordering of process events and data 
collection. The characteristics of the process model approach were then explored drawing on the 
substantive process theory literature to discuss the role of time and narrative, the need to capture 
organisational context and multiple levels of analyses The cogent literature on organisational 
events was then reviewed with an emphasis on the approaches available to define and categorise 
process events and the differing perspectives on characterising the progression of process events. 
A synthesis and critique of process literature was presented, focusing on the theoretical frames 
that purport to explain the generative mechanisms and motors of process event progression. The 
evaluation and synthesis of process research now completed, the original research gap was then 
revisited. The following specific research question could then be derived: 
What process theory motors and relationships characterise SIS alignment process? 
Four supporting research objectives were also defined: 
1. Identification and description of the events that constitute SIS alignment process, from 
multi-level organisational perspectives. 
2. Identification and subsequent appraisal of how these events progress, in order to determine 
the generative mechanisms of the alignment process. 
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3. Utilising these generative mechanisms to identify possible theory explanations in the fonn 
of lower-level process theory motors. 
4. Utilising these lower-level motors to abduce higher-level process motor relationships (Le. 
nested, entangled, aggregated), indicative of the overall SIS alignment process. 
The key research contributions were then identified, focusing on the theoretical. empirical and 
practitioner value of the research. Deriving the higher-level process theory motor relationships 
indicative of the SIS alignment process, would not only contribute to the body of SIS alignment 
literature but also offer insights into the practicalities of IS Strategy process research. known to 
be underrepresented in the cogent literature. Explicating an IS strategy implementation in 
processual event-driven detail will prove beneficial to practitioners. They will have the 
opportunity to consider the sequence and immediate causation of alignment process events from 
multiple organisational perspectives and at different organisational levels. The next chapter will 
discuss general methodological issues. followed by a chapter with a particular emphasis on 
Process Model research methods. design and implementation. 
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Chapter 4: Research Methodology. 
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4.1 Chapter introduction. 
The chapter will discuss and justify the research strategy chosen to address the research question 
identified in the prior chapter. For necessary context, the dominant research designs in the 
relevant empirical domains of strategy process, the process model approach and SIS alignment 
are discussed. This leads to the researcher's selection of a research design that involves 
qualitative data collection, in a triangulated and longitudinal fashion. The researcher's 
epistemological, reasoning and philosophical stances are then considered. 
The qualitative research methodologies to be utilised (data triangulation via semi-structured 
interviewing and secondary data collection) are then described in depth. Case studies are then 
discussed with a particular emphasis on specific SIS alignment process case study issues. 
Validity and reliability concerns associated with the research strategy are then assessed and 
rebutted, with particular attention given to the methods chosen. The chapter concludes with a 
brief summary. 
4.2 Dominant designs in relevant empirical approach. 
Before describing the chosen methodologies, it is recommended to consider the predominant 
research paradigms within the chosen domains of interest (i.e. strategy process, process model 
approach and SIS alignment) and secondly to consider whether these paradigms are an 
appropriate means for answering the identified research question (Gephart, 2004; Edmondson 
and McManus, 2007). The lack of SIS alignment process understanding has been starkly 
identified in the literature as the key research gap to be addressed; therefore it is necessary to 
understand the nature of SIS alignment and strategy process research. 
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4.2.1 In SIS alignment research. 
Researching the other relevant domain of strategic IS alignment has involved qualitative and 
quantitative methods typically utilised in a mutually exclusive fashion, principally due to the 
differing objectives of the research undertaken (Chan and Reich, 2(07).Research in SIS 
alignment has been made in the following dimensions: structural, strategic, cultural, social, 
informal and intellectual (Chan and Reich, 2(07). One could generally argue that quantitative 
strategic IS alignment research is more concerned with measuring outcomes (Le. the alignment 
"destination"), such as technology return on investment and strategy success whereas qualitative 
strategic IS alignment research is more engaged in understanding the process (i.e. the alignment 
''journey''). In other words, a qualitative approach is most appropriate for process understanding, 
whereas quantitative techniques are generally more amenable to a variance perspective on 
process (Van DeVen, 2(07). Although by definition the phenomenon of strategic alignment 
permeates all organisational strata, the unit of analyses in quantitative IS alignment research has 
tended to focus on the strategy professional and/or senior management (e.g. considering 
individual Business and IT professionals' cognitive interpretations of alignment using Personal 
Construct Theory (Tan and Gallupe, 2006), the CEO and alignment (Kearns and Lederer, 2000» 
and investigating alignment success (at project (Jenkin and Chan 2006) and financial system 
performance level (Aoyd and Woodridge, 1990». 
In addition, Quantitative IS alignment research has tended to focus predominantly on measuring 
structural and strategic alignment dimensions, as these dimensions are empirically accepted to 
directly relate to alignment performance and return on investment research (Kearns and Lederer, 
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2000). The strategic dimension of alignment is concerned with the how strategists plan, measure 
and benchmark alignment (Henderson and Venkatraman, 1999). The structural dimension of 
alignment is less concerned with the higher level relevance of the strategic alignment dimensions 
and more with the granular nature of alignment, how it fits structura]]y with other strategies and 
processes extant in the organisation (Smaczny, 200 I). The concepts of structural fit have been 
used in a substantive fashion to implement information systems that advantageously reflect the 
working norms of the organisation (Ward and Peppard, 2002). From a quantitative perspective, 
the strategic dimension of alignment has been researched on the basis of high-level plan 
compatibility (Wang and Tai, 2003) in addition to technology and strategy performance and 
measurement (Oh and Pinsonneault, 2007) and model generation (e.g. Scott Morton 1991).The 
structural alignment dimension on the other hand has been quantitatively researched on the basis 
of individual involvement in (Kearns and Lederer, 2000) and attitudes to alignment (e.g. Tan and 
Ga]]upe, 2006), and moves towards the mathematical mode11ing of atomic alignment activities 
(e.g. Chan, Huff, Barclay and Copeland, 1997). Quantitative IS alignment research is therefore 
typica]]y focused on: firstly, the desire to retrospectively justify information systems investment 
(i.e. a return on investment metric for technology i.e. Day, 1996); secondly, the drive to create a 
numeric benchmark or standard for successful business-IS strategy alignment that can be utilised 
post IS implementation (e.g. Sabherwal and Kirs, 1994) and thirdly, derivation of mathematical 
models that can guide alignment (Oh and Pinsonneault, 2007). 
Qualitative researchers in SIS alignment are typica]]y interested in what might be caned 
"alignment logistics": the social, cultural and informal events driving the strategic processes 
underpinning alignment (Reich and Benbasat, 2000; Campbell, Avison and Kay, 2005; Chan and 
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Reich, 2(07). Qualitative methods are have also proven valuable in aiding understanding of more 
tangible formal alignment processes such as: the level of IS and business strategy plan co-
ordination (Wang and Tei, 2(03), sources of IT investment value and the nature of technology 
application (Tallon, Kraemer and Gurbaxani, 2(00); the hierarchy of formal strategic alignment 
decision making (Yetton and Johnston, 200 1) and enabling future alignment managerial training 
needs to be identified (VanDerZee and Dejong, 1999). 
4.2.2 Within strategy process and the process model approach. 
Strategic process theory (as discussed in depth in Chapter 3 can take two research models, 
divergent in philosophical, epistemological and methodological perspectives (Mohr, 1992; 
VanDeVen, 1992; Poole, VanDeVen, Dooley and Holmes, 2(00). If the researcher is concerned 
with understanding the antecedents of the strategic process or investigating process cause and 
effect, a variance approach is likely to be utilised (Mohr, 1982). 
Variance process epistemology is therefore concerned more with the origins and consequences of 
a process such as the inputs, outputs, dependent and independent variables therein, rather than 
focusing on the understanding the actual process and consequently is predominantly quantitative 
(VanDeVen, 2(07). Alternatively, the researcher may be concerned with understanding the 
events that constitute a strategic process (Tsoukas, 2(05). Such motivation typically arises from 
a desire to capture how events lead to a deeper organisational understanding of some concepts or 
alternatively to capture the sequence, nature and interaction of constituent process events 
(pettigrew, 1985; VanDeVen, 1992; Tsoukas, 2005; VanDeVen, 2(07). 
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4.2.3 Selection of an appropriate research design. 
Following synthesis of the germane SIS alignment and process theory bodies of literature, the 
following research question was derived (and associated with four key supporting objectives): 
What process theory motors and relationships characterise SIS alignment process? 
I. Identification and description of the events that constitute SIS alignment process, from 
multi-level organisational perspectives. 
2. Identification and subsequent appraisal of how these events progress, in order to determine 
the generative mechanisms of the alignment process. 
3. Utilising these generative mechanisms to identify possible theory explanations in the form 
of lower-level process theory motors. 
4. Utilising these lower-level motors to abduce higher-level process motor relationships (i.e. 
nested, entangled, aggregated), indicative of the overall SIS alignment process. 
Considering the central research question at the heart of this thesis, researching SIS alignment 
process as an event sequence with a subjective epistemology offers the most suitable approach. 
Such narrative process research is strongly recommended to be longitudinal in order to capture 
the contextual richness necessary for a valid research outcome (Glesne and Peshkin, 1992; Huber 
and Van DeVen, 1995; Langley, 1999). As stated by Pettigrew (1992; 5-6), "strategic 
management questions posed in the language of becoming I rather than of being demand detailed, 
comparative and longitudinal data covering long periods of time". Furthermore, longitudinal 
process research, based on interaction with practitioners produces more relevant and practical 
research outcomes (Miller and Friesen, 1982; Pettigrew, 1997; Ropo, Eriksson and Hunt, 1998; 
Rynes, Bartunek and Daft, 2001), increases the likelihood of descriptive thickness (Geertz, 
I Author's own italics. 
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1973), richness (Weick, 2007), as well as meeting the well-established management academy 
research mandate for more dynamic strategy explanation (Rumelt, Schendel and Teece, 1991). 
The relevant research design therefore will involves, a subjective epistemology, is temporally 
longitudinal and qualitative. [Note: The possible approaches to implementing event driven 
process research are well elucidated in the literature (Hax and Majluf, 1996; Pettigrew, 1997; 
Langley, 1999; Pentland, 1999 VanDeVen, 2007) and will be discussed in depth in Chapter 5]. 
On the surface, the strongly quantitative variance perspective on alignment process premised on 
the outcomes of alignment seems to have the most immediate organisational value and as a 
result, should be the research priority. However, it has been strongly argued that examining the 
informal social processes implicit in organisations, rather than relying on formal metrics, offer 
the best means for understanding SIS alignment process (Reich and Benbasat, 1996; Chan, 
2(02). Recent qualitative research (Sledgianowski and Luftman, 2005) has strongly suggested 
that IS alignment performance and maturity can be enhanced by greater understanding of 
organisational social processes. Indeed, the critical role of social process in supporting successful 
strategy implementation has been long understood and empirically established (Floyd and 
Woodridge, 1992). Researching IS alignment as a quantitative construct (the variance approach 
decried by qualitative proponents of IS alignment research (i.e. Ciborra, 1997» is unlikely to 
illuminate these important social processes, reinforcing the necessity and value of utilising a 
subjective qualitative approach. 
4.3 Epistemological, reasoning and philosophical stances. 
Business-IS strategy alignment by definition alters and evolves due to environmental and 
individual interactivity and decision making (Hussein, King and Cragg, 2002; A vison, Jones, 
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Powell and Wilson, 2004) and has already been characterised in Chapter 3 as an emergent rather 
than a prescriptive process sequence of strategic events (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). 
Considering even casually, the different motives and comprehensions of IT and business strategy 
stakeholders, leads one to the conclusion that there can be no objective account of how strategy 
happens on a granular level such as a process event; it is this researcher's contention therefore, 
that any epistemological approach to investigating strategic process has to be strongly founded 
on an understanding that the creation of research knowledge can never be objective. There is no 
singular "strategic process event truth"; a subjective epistemology is therefore a justifiable 
position in the case of this research. As discussed, exponents of the narrative process approach 
(Pentland, 1999; Tsoukas, 2005) consider the chronological sequence of process events, varying 
involvement of participants and the ever-changing nature of the process to be fundamental to 
process research understanding. The temporal character of process research has been emphasised 
(Leonard-Barton, 1990), with a focus on (one or more of a) retrospective, current or prospective 
approach. The longitudinal "live" nature of this research reflects a concentration on the 
"evolving present" (Langley, 2009; 415). However, the necessity of general and more specific 
strategic organisational context dictates a retrospective component. When one considers the 
process being followed has a somewhat open-ended point of conclusion, this research reflects all 
temporal process prospectives, with a pronounced emphasis on the present. Investigating process 
events is typically predicated on a desire to (ideally) induce some theoretical or practice based 
outcomes (Pentland, 1999). Such inductive reasoning involves what is often described as a 
"bottom-up" research approach (Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Thagard, 1989). The researcher 
through the application of an appropriate methodology and methods makes certain observations 
that enable them to deduce a series of patterns or trends from which tentative theory/practice 
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hypotheses can be derived (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2000). However, the use of inductive 
reasoning has been characterised as somewhat inadequate for effective process research 
(VanDeVen, 2007) and insufficient in explaining the temporal attributes of process phenomena 
(Langley, 2009). A preferred approach in process research reasoning is to "abduce" (Locke, 
Golden-Biddle and Feldman, 2008) rather than induce; whereby immersion in the data source 
facilitates a more intuitive wide-ranging engagement with multiple theoretical explanations. 
Such an approach holds a strong resonance with process research where multiple theories 
proliferate and enable different interpretations to emerge. The researcher is concerned with 
understanding the interplay of SIS alignment process events that emerge over time in order to 
induce potential theoretical and practical conclusions; therefore the research question can be best 
reasoned from an abductive approach. To conclude, striving to induce new SIS alignment 
process knowledge, whilst considering such knowledge to be subjective, is the most suitable 
approach for this research. If epistemology can be characterised as a belief in how knowledge 
can be sourced and created, a research philosophy is more personal in capturing a researchers' 
belief as to what constitutes reality and the limits of measurement (Johnson and Duberley, 2000; 
Creswell, 2003). The researcher's view of process research knowledge epistemology has already 
been discussed and supported as subjective (Tsoukas, 2005). A scientific research philosophy 
such as positivism, which incorporates data objectivity and impartiality (Neuman, 2(05) would 
not be reflective of the researcher's beliefs as to how knowledge about strategic alignment 
processes can be best captured and interpreted. Traditional positivistic (i.e. quantitative) 
methodologies and methods have already been discussed as unlikely to offer a truly meaningful 
path to understanding process events from social or informal perspectives (Johnson and 
Duberley, 2000) An alternative philosophical approach such as interpretivism, where the 
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researcher typical1y believes that multiple realities can exist, that research outcomes can be 
subjective and that the research phenomenon under consideration may be affected by the very act 
of research (Burrell and Morgan, 1979) provides a palpably superior fit for the research question 
under consideration. Considering the research domain characteristics di scussed, the paradigm 
that is dominant and most appropriate for the research question is a longitudinal qualitative 
study, reasoning abductively with a subjective epistemology and taking an interpretivist 
philosophical perspective. The qualitative methods chosen reflect the dominant paradigms in 
both event driven strategy process and SIS alignment process research and are encapsulated in 
the following diagram: 
Alignment 
Data 
Figure 4.1: Overview of Qualitative methods chosen to research SIS Alignment Process events. 
4.4 Qualitative methods to be utilised. 
The utili sation and value of idiographic qualitative methods (Tsoukas, 1989) such as 
interviewing and case studies are strongly supported in strategy process (Pettigrew, 1992; Poole, 
VanDeVen, Dooley and Holmes, 2000) and IS research (Franz and Robey, 1986; Lee, 1989); 
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suitable for "examining and articulating processes" (Pratt, 2009). As considered earlier in this 
chapter, the strategic IS alignment process event data that would need to be captured to address 
the research question would likely include formal and informal business and IS strategy plans, 
decision making and management (collected using interviewing and secondary data such as 
active current strategic IS plans/timelines etc). A clear understanding of the socio-historic 
context of strategic IS within the organisation will also be necessary (data collection through 
initial interview background questions and reflective remarks/indicative behaviour detected in 
tandem with more archival secondary data collection). 
4.4.1 Semi-structured interviewing. 
Interviews are often typified on the basis of being structured, semi-structured or unstructured 
(Saunders et aI., 2000). The structured interview is one where the questions remain the same 
regardless of the interviewee (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 1991). A semi-structured 
interview approach is typically utilised when the interviewer has certain broad themes or issues 
to discuss (Wass and Wells, 1994), which is most appropriate to this research where the focus 
will be on the interviewee's varying involvement in SIS alignment process events (whether as a 
manager, implementer or subject). Semi-structured interviews of an exploratory nature (Weiss, 
1994) would be most appropriate for investigating strategic IS alignment process as they enable a 
bounded yet sufficiently broad approach to interviewee interaction (Creswell, 2003; Silverman, 
2004) and have been shown to offer significant value of elicitation when well-executed (Myers 
and Newman, 2007). With respect to identifying the most appropriate interviewees, the need to 
create a reliable organisational discourse was key (Barry And Elmes, 1997). Taking the twin 
credibility dimensions of perspective and voice (Hatch, 1999), the focus was on building a 
polyphonic narrative (Bakhtin, 1994 cited in Barry and Elmes, 1997), encompassing as many 
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relevant perspectives and voices as feasible. The semi-structured interview questions are likely 
to be asked around the following broad key themes, which will have slightly varying 
interpretations dependant on the background of the interviewee. 
a) Interviewees' general roles and responsibilities; 
b) Interviewees' perceptions as to what constitutes IS and Business Strategy (e.g. for those with 
a -IT background "Could you describe (in your own words), what you feel to be the IS 
strategy of the organisation?"); 
c) Interviewees' views of organisational ISlBusiness Strategy history (e.g. for those with a 
business/non-IT background: "Would you describe past IS implementations as having been 
successful ?"); 
d) Interviewees' understanding of and views on ISlBusiness Strategy alignment (e.g. for those 
with a business/non-IT background: "Would you describe IS implementation as addressing 
the needs of the business ?"). 
e) Interviewees' involvement in ISlBusiness Strategy implementation; (e.g. for those with an-IT 
background, the generic opening question could be: "When implementing/supporting an IS 
how do you work together with your business development colleagues"). 
4.4.2 Secondary data collection. 
A key methodological bias can arise when undertaking any interview research (Wass and Wells, 
1994; Silverman, 2004) as the interviewees are naturally likely to portray themselves in the most 
positive light and/or proffer a subjective and/or self-serving interpretation of both alignment 
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process and strategic IS history. In order to mitigate interviewee bias and attain additional 
contextual insights, secondary data collection will be undertaken. Contextual understanding 
gleaned by the researcher from secondary data analyses (Silverman, 2004) in addition to 
interviewing respondents involved in strategy will therefore enhance research validity. It will 
also however aid in understanding the strategy process under investigation (Pettigrew, 1992) as 
the critical importance of understanding organisational context in strategy process research has 
been well established (VanDeVen, 1992). The value of context in identifying process 
"indicators" (Pentland, 1999: 713) for narrative construction and the background and causes of 
strategic evolution (Barnett and Burgelman, 1996) has been particularly emphasised. 
The role of the researcher in this research is as an observer of the alignment process events only 
(Punch, 2(05). It is an imperative for this researcher to neither become a recognised or virtual 
stakeholder in the strategic IS alignment process nor offer any input or guidance (DeWalt and 
DeWalt, 2(01). Secondary data collection in process research is strongly recommended as a 
means for better understanding both the context and content of the strategy process under 
consideration (Pentland, 1999). Access to both historic and current data sources would provide a 
more rounded diachronic as opposed to contemporary analyses of events (Barley, 1990), help 
avoid the false choice between researching process or content in strategy research (the 
"intellectual trap" described by Pettigrew (1992:6» and facilitate researcher distance from 
constant direct data immersion (Leonard-Barton, 1990). Although entirely comprehensive 
process data has long been considered neither possible or even desirable (Greiner, 1973) , the 
socio-cultural effects of past SIS implementation will strongly colour any ongoing or future SIS 
process (Robey and Boudreau, 1999) and will provide important content and contextual 
90 
background to bolster validity (Messick, 1989) . Secondary data sources can also provide an 
enhancement of internal validity as they tend to less affected by post-rationalisation (Orton, 
1997). Although secondary data collection need not be exclusively qualitative (Smith, 2000), 
content and context dri ven strategy data sources such as strategy plans, meetings minutes and 
correspondence tend to be amenable to a more qualitative angle of approach (VanDeVen, 2007). 
4.4.3 The Case study method. 
The case study research method can be defined as an exploration of some organisational 
phenomena (such as a strategic process (VanDeVen, 1992; Langley, 1999», bounded by time 
and unit of analyses (Yin, 2003). The principal advantage of the case study method is the 
outcomes of organisational understanding superior to that achievable using an alternative 
methodology (Stake, 1995; Remenyi, Williams, Money and Swartz, 1998). The case study 
research method is the predominant method in qualitative process research: "the longitudinal 
comparative case study method is our primary approach" (Pettigrew (1992; 10). Case study 
research has been at the forefront of the interpretivist turn evident in IS research since the early 
1990s (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991; Walsham, 1993; Myers, 1997). The value of the case 
study method is the potential to grant greater understanding of organisational IS strategy content, 
context (Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead, 1987) process (Pettigrew, 1992; Poole, VanDeVen, 
Dooley and Holmes, 2000) and to facilitate a polyphonic narrative (Quinn, 1992). A process case 
narrative has been described as fundamentally four confluent sub-narratives; the process data 
story, the process theory, the story told as process knowledge and the story of the research 
process (Orton, 1997; 432). Utilising such an idiographic method also enables the gap between 
research and practice to be narrowed; an important objective in strategic and indeed general 
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management research (Galliers and Land, 1987; Mohrmon, Gibson and Mohrmon, 2001; 
VanDeVen and Johnson, 2006). 
4.4.3.1 Nature and types of case study research. 
Two alternative case study method approaches have been described (Gummesson, 2000). The 
multiple case approach involves undertaking a number of discrete cases to enable deduction of 
more "generalizable" conclusions. The alternative specific case approach is usually concerned 
with attempting to explain trends discerned in a prior research phase (often quantitative) and 
normally involves a single in-depth case study. Reviewing past case research in SIS alignment, 
there have been some examples of multi-site case study alignment research in industries such as 
insurance (e.g. Reich and Benbasat, 1996) but the longitudinal single site case study seems to be 
the most common method utilised. The unit of analyses in single site case research has included 
specific private sector industries (such as retailing (Palmer and Markus, 2000), and banking 
(Baets, 1996); management in the public sector (e.g. healthcare provision (Yetton and Johnston, 
2(01) and the roles and behaviours of specific alignment stakeholders (such as the strategy 
planners (Teo and Ang, 1999) and the CEO (Edwards, 2000» and their inter-relationships vis a 
vis alignment (e.g. the CEOI CIO (Feeny, Edwards and Simpson, 1992». Using case studies to 
show alignment process events may also offer additional value in being presented in a form 
accessible to strategy professionals (Myers, 1994, Yin, 2(03), helping to address the research-
practice gap often lamented in the strategy (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel, 1998) and general 
management literature (Rousseau, 2006). The iterative process of crafting the case study 
narratives is accomplished by categorising and codifying key process event categories (Weber, 
1990; Langley, 1999; Pentland, 1999; Neuendorf, 2(02).The case narrative will then be analysed 
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using prescribed process theory approaches (Langley, 1999; Pentland, 1999) to enable valuable 
theory/practice outcomes to be induced 
4.4.3.2 SIS alignment process case study: issues and selection criteria. 
In order to choose suitable research domains, it is necessary to consider case study selection 
criteria and potential issues arising. The strategy and process research literature (e.g. Pettigrew, 
1992; Eisenhardt, 1989; Stake, 1995, 2000) proposes several critical case study research design 
issues and selection criteria that need to be considered. The first issue that arises is the need to 
carefully bound or scope the case study regardless of the chosen domain (Yin, 2003). Although 
any case study by definition captures a bounded phenomena (Ragin, 1992), it is vital that that it 
only bounds the area relevant to the research question under consideration (Stake, 2000). Correct 
case bounding is driven by clarity in data source identification, collection and analyses 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner. 2007). Primary data collection should therefore focus sharply on 
capturing SIS process events through observing and interviewing only those organisational 
stakeholders most directly involved in driving the SIS process from business and IS perspectives, 
without recourse to any other non process relevant individuals or issues. An effective case 
narrative (as already discussed) will incorporate some level of organisational context as deemed 
appropriate and relevant to the presented analyses (Yin, 2003), implying the value of and need 
for effective secondary data collection. After identifying the appropriate case boundaries, the 
next issues to consider relate to the mode and criteria for selecting suitable case organisations. 
The number of cases is the first issue to consider. To order to satisfy the complementary 
objectives of the research question and theoretical saturation, various approaches are possible 
(Pettigrew, 1990; Stake 1995; Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin 2003). Extraneous factors (Eisenhardt, 
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1989: 537), such as case organisations' size and industry and more intrinsic issues such as the 
case organisations' expected competence in the area under investigation all need to be carefully 
considered prior to site selection. Maximising factor variation can be extended to the extreme 
point where deviant cases are deliberately selected (Van Maanen, 1988). This is not the intended 
objective at this point, although unexpected deviancy may arise at the point of data analyses. 
With respect to organisational size and structure, a formal organisational structure with clearly 
defined roles and responsibilities would be preferable as a single defined process event is likely 
to vary in interpretation at different organisational levels (as discussed in Chapter 3); capturing 
such variations is an important attribute of successful process research (Pettigrew, 1995; 
VanDeVen, 2(07). 
4.4.3.3 Justifying a single-site case study approach. 
Multiple justifications exist for undertaking a single site case study (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; 
Stake, 2000; Yin, 2(03). The principal justification is that the phenomenon offers a test case for 
deductive theory testing; this is not applicable to this research which is alternatively concerned 
with abductive theory building. Although the case organisation is not particularly unique, 
deviant, or extreme, there are certain other more relevant justifications that support a single case 
approach. Firstly, the opportunity to research a relevant process longitudinally in order to 
observe changes at subsequent time intervals (Stake, 2000) strongly motivates a single-site 
approach. Secondly, although the organisation is not representative per se in terms of its business 
modeJ or competitive orientation, the alignment process being studied can be argued as being 
broadly representative of SIS alignment. The organisational desire to reflect a strategic business 
change in the existing IS strategy; instantiated through the implementation of a new technology 
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is a canonical example of SIS alignment. Considering both these strong counter-arguments, the 
single-site case approach can be defended and justified. 
4.5 Validity and reliability of the chosen research design. 
Although the limitations of this research will be considered in the conclusions and 
recommendations chapters, it is nonetheless important at this point to discuss the potential 
validity and reliability issues associated with the chosen research strategy. Research reliability is 
a determination of how likely the same research outcomes could be achieved by (a) different 
researcher(s) utilising the same research strategy (Kirk and MiIler, 1986; Kvale, 1989). Validity 
on the other hand can be viewed from multiple perspectives (Mason, 1996), such as that of a 
research population have been discussed in the literature (i.e. Gill and Johnson, 2002), but these 
are considered to be outside the scope of this research. Other commonly considered forms of 
validity such as construct and convergent validity are indicative of a quantitative and/or construct 
approach to data collection and research (Bagozzi and Philips, 1991) and are also not relevant to 
this research, which has a stronger focus on internal (or construct) and external validity. 
Internal validity refers to the degree to which the research conclusions are supportable (De Vaus, 
2001), i.e. "statements about the sample" (Altmann, 1974: 229) whereas external validity is 
defined as the degree to which the research conclusions from the sample/domain under 
consideration can be generalised to the population at large (Maxwell, 2002). For naturalistic 
research (such as to be conducted in this research), more appropriate analogous terms (Lincoln 
and Guba, 1985) can be utilised, such as credibility and authenticity (for internal validity) and 
transferability (for external validity). The components of the research strategy will now be 
discussed on the basis of validity and reliability. 
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4.5.1 With respect to epistemological and philosophical stances taken. 
The interpretivist research philosophy is predicated on a researchers' subjective view of reality 
that can lead to natural bias and as such is often critiqued as lacking in both validity and 
reliability (Schwandt, 1994). Further issues such as difficulty in obtaining sufficient access to 
data, the length of time likely to be necessary for adequate data collection and interpreting the 
volume of data collected have been identified (Easterby-Smith et al; 1991). Revisiting however, 
the research objective of understanding situated SIS alignment process events, interpretivism 
offers a more appropriate philosophical approach than alternatives such as positivism for the 
following key reasons. Firstly, it is the most conducive approach to observing and capturing 
process events enfolding over a period of time (Denzin, 200 1; VanDeVen, 2007) as one can "get 
much closer to the changing phenomena and measure at shorter intervals" (Poole et aI, 2000: 12). 
Secondly; the necessity of collecting large data sets is motivated by the desire for thick process 
event description (Geertz, 1973) and (somewhat ironically) by data triangulation in order to 
minimise bias distortions that can occur by the use of a single qualitative method (Teddlie and 
Tashakkori, 2(03). One can accept that the quantity of data collected and length of time required 
for data collection are valid downsides of an interpretivist approach, but to rebut, such 
approaches are sine quibus non for this research. Thirdly, in order to gain the necessary insights 
into SIS alignment process event interplay and emergence, a naturalistic philosophy of research 
is both justifiable and pertinent (Lincoln and Guba, 1995); an objective detached positivist 
approach would be inappropriate given the focus of the research question. The process research 
strategy being undertaken can be best described as approached from a proximal as opposed to 
distal perspective (Cooper and Law, 1995), with an emphasis on understanding the granular 
nature of the process as opposed to being overly fixated on outcomes. 
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4.5.2 With respect to chosen methodology and methods. 
The research methods to be utilised are qualitative as befits an exploratory research approach 
(Yin, 2003) with the case study method the paradigm of choice (Creswell, 1997). Case narratives 
drawn from thick process data, collected close to source are preferable as: "process explanations 
that draw on narrative data are particularly close to the phenomena they purport to explain" 
(Pentland, 1999: 712). Solely utilising qualitative methods in tandem with an exploratory 
research focus often attracts understandable criticisms of insufficient rigour and a reduced 
likelihood of being able to generalise from the research outcomes obtained (Seale, 1999). 
Limitations in derived theory can often occur as a result, leading to justifiable criticisms of 
summative validity (Lee and Hubona, 2009). To counter such concerns, qualitative data will be 
collected in a triangulated fashion (Patton, 2002; Silverman, 2006) to boost formative validity 
(Lee and Hubona, 2009). 
Research triangulation can be approached from the following perspectives (Denzin, 1978; 
Patton, 2002); using multiple theories, using mixed (qualitative and quantitative) methods, using 
multiple analysts to examine the same data and (most relevant for this research) using different 
sources of data within the same method. As a means of reciprocation to the research organisation 
for granting the necessary level of access, the researcher proposed producing a detailed report to 
be accompanied by a presentation to the senior management team (SMT) on the key 
organisational outcomes in tandem with retrospective interviews with key research participants 
at a post-implementation stage. The detailed report, presentation and interviews not only offer 
some organisational value but also boost internal validity of the collected data by allowing any 
factual errors to be amended. 
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4.6 Overview of the strategy for SIS alignment process research. 
A graphical overview of the process research strategy is illustrated with an emphasis on 
consistency due to replication logic considerations. The following chapter will focus in detail on 
Stage 1 with Stage 2 instantiated in the case study chapter with the discussion and conclusions 
chapters addressing the salient elements of Stage 3. 
STAGE 1: 
Oraanlsatlonal 
Access 
Defining and 
collecting data 
STAGE 2: 
Crafting of Process 
narrative 
STAGE 3: 
Analyses, 
Discussion and 
conclusions 
Galnlnl access to Process data: 
Collected qualitatively via triangulation of qualitative 
Interview and Secondary data 
OrIanlsatlonal process narrative ("fabula"] as case 
study: using collected data 
Identification of events, event PrGIresslons 
(Pettllrew, 1992), leneratlve mechanisms and 
process theory motors. 
Figure 4.2: SIS Alignment Process research: steps in addressing the research question. 
4.7 Chapter Summary. 
This research methodology chapter can be summarised as follows. The possible approaches to 
strategy process, process model approach and SIS alignment research were discussed from the 
perspective of the research question. This was critical in order to justify the research approach in 
tenns of philosophy, epistemology and qualitative methods. The research approach that was 
considered most appropriate for the research question was a longitudinal single-site qualitative 
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study (utilising within-method data triangulation), taking an interpretivist philosophical 
perspective and reasoning abductively with a subjective epistemology. The qualitative methods 
to be utilised (semi-structured interviews, secondary data collection and case studies) were then 
discussed in some depth. The chapter continued with a detailed consideration of the potential 
case study issues and justification of a single-site approach. The principal criticisms of the 
research strategy chosen were then considered and rebutted from validity and reliability 
perspectives. Firstly, an interpretivist research philosophy and an abductive reasoning approach 
were justified respectively by the research prerogative of exploring process events in a natural 
setting and the potential for multiple theoretical explanations. Secondly, the use of qualitative 
data triangulation can help attenuate the risk of both naturally occurring interviewee and 
researcher-subject bias, enhancing internal validity. 
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Chapter 5: 
The SIS alignment process: research design and 
implementation. 
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5.1 Chapter introduction. 
"'A process cannot be understood by stopping It. Understanding must move with the flow of the 
process, must Join It and flow with It" (Frank Herbert, Author) 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the design and implementation of the process study 
undertaken. The strategy involved in obtaining access to the research site is described in some 
detail with particular emphasis on why the particular organisation proved particularly attractive 
(and amenable) to the proposed research. Some background information on the research 
organisation is provided (and will be elaborated on further in Chapter 6). Using the VanDeVen 
process research checklists, the issues associated with planning the research and collecting 
process data will be discussed in depth. Considering the process model approach utilised, it will 
be important to consider initial high level SIS alignment process concepts for the purposes of 
sensitising the researcher to observing relevant process data. The methods for collecting primary 
and secondary process data are then discussed, stressing the chain of process evidence followed 
in data collection and ongoing strenuous efforts made to ensure reliability, construct and internal 
validity. The techniques used in process data presentation and analyses will then be defined and 
described with a view towards identifying suitable approaches for this research. 
5.2 Revisiting the research objectives 
Following synthesis of the germane SIS alignment and process theory bodies of literature, four 
key objectives supporting the research question were identified, namely: 
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1. Identification and description of the events that constitute SIS alignment process, from 
multi-level organisational perspectives. 
2. Identification and subsequent appraisal of how these events progress, in order to determine 
the generative mechanisms of the alignment process. 
3. Utilising these generative mechanisms to identify possible theory explanations in the form 
of lower-level process theory motors. 
4. Utilising these lower-level motors to abduce higher-level process motor relationships (i.e. 
nested, entangled, aggregated), indicative of the overall SIS alignment process. 
Achievement of these objectives will be addressed in depth in the Analyses and discussion 
chapters (Chapters 8 and 9). The focus of this chapter is more on the description of how the 
process research was planned, designed and implemented to achieve the first research objective. 
The approach taken to process research design is focused on enabling key alignment event data 
to be collected, building on the qualitative methodology and methods discussed and justified in 
the preceding chapter. Fundamentally, this research instantiates the process model (refer to 
Chapter 3) and due diligence is undertaken to ensure that data collection and analyses do not 
revert to non-process approaches, an oft-lamented criticism of process research in general 
(DeCock and Sharp, 2007).The first step to be considered in the design is to identify a suitable 
research site. 
S.3 Research site contact and approaches. 
Given the indicative research question and objectives, it was fundamentally important to obtain 
access to a research site with a clearly enunciated business and IT strategy, ideally at some point 
of origin in terms of implementation, whether that is a particular stage in strategy 
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implementation or some ab-initio strategy. In addition, strategy involvement and effect should be 
relevant to multiple levels of the given organisation, not an isolated esoteric strategy only 
relevant to some specific group or business unit. To further bolster the value of access to multi-
level strategic alignment, an organisation more tightly-coupled rather than loosely coupled 
(Perrow, 1999) was preferred, motivated by a desire for greater data richness. Furthermore, to 
support the suitability of the case method (identified as appropriate in the methodology chapter 
(Refer to Chapter 3», a strategy that was bounded by some organisational context and a 
reasonable time-limit was preferable. Armed with these guiding criteria, initial contacts with 
organisations were made, beginning in late 2008; in effect, the approach taken constituted 
purposive sampling (Creswell, 1997). 
The first step in obtaining research access was to tentatively approach potential research 
"gatekeepers" (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 4); contacts, who can often provide the most 
successful route to the access required (Marshall and Rossman, 2006). Due to past professional 
experiences and executive teaching outreach, it was possible to quickly identify potential 
research sites and gatekeepers. Despite the accepted efficiency of initial e-mail contact, the 
researcher felt that due to the nature of this research, initial contact should be done in person via 
phone calls and face to face meetings. In practical terms, the time and resource commitments that 
would be required for a site to engage in this research made it mandatory for the researcher to 
explicitly "sell" the organisational benefits of research participation. Such an approach is 
recommended (Barley, 1990) as a way of scoping and promoting the research to organisations 
that had expressed an interest. To summarise, the organisational benefits were sold as follows: 
external perspective on and detailed account of strategy implementation and associated activities. 
A report, workshop and presentation (at the end of the research) were also offered as benefits of 
access, emphasising reciprocity (Pettigrew, 1990: 13). 
Certain site issues and reservations quickly became apparent. As initially expected, the 
longitudinal and intrusive nature of the research was considered by many organisations to be 
either inappropriate or infeasible, regardless of the benefits that could accrue to the organisation 
in terms of an external perspective. In other instances, organisations expressed a strong practical 
interest but lacked the explicit strategic sophistication to be a suitable site for this research. To 
clarify, they (typically) lacked an IS strategy and viewed this research as a vehicle for developing 
one, or their IS strategy was so ad-hoc that it extended beyond the mere point of emergence. 
Other organisations simply lacked the size and structures to be amenable to multi-level 
perspectives and research. Many multinationals operating in diverse sectors expressed a strong 
interest but in follow-up discussions, it became clear that they had little power and influence over 
their local business and IT strategy, as it was predominantly received from their corporate 
headquarters overseas. Such a remove from strategic decisions and implementation, allied to a 
lack of stakeholder involvement, did not suggest a good fit for the research objectives, and so 
these potential research relationships were not pursued further. 
In June 2009, another organisation with which the researcher was familiar through a prior 
executive teaching experience, tentatively expressed an interest in exploring the proposed 
research. Ostensibly, the organisation seemed an interesting proposition; a division of a tightly-
coupled semi-state company with a strong professional reputation, but beginning to be exposed 
to the chill winds of competition for the first time in their history due to deregulation. The first 
104 
initial meeting was held with the Business/IT process manager who provided high-level 
clarification of the current states of both business and IT strategy. within the organisation and the 
parent company in general. 
The organisation in question, though having a public sector parent. operated in both the private 
and public sectors, offering high knowledge intensive engineering services to customers 
nationally and internationally. They had and cominued to invest substantially in new 
technologies and formal IS strategy development, but it had been felt (especially at the parent or 
corporate level) that IS and Business strategies had become substantively decoupled. Therefore, 
there was a strong sense in the initial conversation with their Business and IT Process manager 
that this research had the potential to offer a significant organisational benefit. The conversations 
then began to accelerate in both number and depth. Senior management then requested a 
proposal overview that would describe the research, the organisational and academic benefits 
and the practical requirements and consequences. Research cost was a considerable issue for the 
organisation, but this fear was addressed by a clarification that the sole cost issue would be to 
grant employee time for interviews, which they felt they could consent to. 
The importance of the researcher understanding the organisational context (both imernal and 
external) wa'i also raised at a further meeting. Executive management responded by granting 
access to their confidential formal business and IS strategy documentation which had been 
drafted by an external third-party just two years previously. In effect, secondary data collection 
could therefore begin. Despite the organisational enthusia'im and interest, there was still a 
fundamental concern for the researcher; how could strategic alignment process be studied in this 
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research site? However, a moment of research epiphany was soon to arrive. In order to 
understand the internal strategic context, an initial interview was undertaken with the head 
financial controller who happened to remark that there were two major IS strategic initiatives 
planned for 2010. The first initiative was the creation and implementation of a bespoke system 
that would support the energy trading activities of the organisation, a business-critical 
development but one that would only really directly affect one operational tier of the 
organisation. 
The second strategic initiative prompted much greater interest. The organisation was just one of 
six subsidiaries under a corporate parent. However, it was from both business and IS strategic 
perspectives a glaring anomaly. It remained the only subsidiary yet to implement the SAP 
enterprise resource planning or ERP system utilised by every other part of the wider 
organisation. It had been decided formally at a parent/corporate level that this would have to 
change and that the subsidiary organisation would have to implement SAP. As the system had a 
critical financial function, it needed to be fully in place for the beginning of 2012 (i.e. 111/2012 
being the beginning of the corporate financial year). The SAP system would replace an existing 
AGRESSO system used by every employee in the subsidiary; albeit for different reasons (e.g. 
financial staff used it for accounting purposes, personnel staff as a HR system and engineers 
mainly but not exclusively for timesheet and expense submission). The SAP implementation 
therefore satisfied two key research site criteria; it affected multiple-levels of the organisation 
(differently) and it was bounded by a fixed time deadline. On further discussion and 
investigation, it became clear that the implementation of the SAP system reflected changing 
business and IS strategies of both the parent and subsidiary and offered a plausible instance of 
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strategic IS alignment. The subsidiary had both external customers but strikingly carried out a lot 
of billable tasks and projects for other subsidiaries (and vice-versa). The subsidiary under 
consideration was essentially one moving part in an extremely tightly-coupled organisation. In 
addition, the level of environmentally driven change the entire organisation wa.s undergoing (and 
hitherto never experienced), offered a richness of research opportunity that the researcher was 
avid to grasp. The importance of the SAP implementation to the future of both the subsidiary and 
the greater organisation was profoundly clear in conversations with different stakeholders, as 
was their interest in having this strategic journey recorded. motivated as they were mainly by a 
desire for organisational learning. It wa.s agreed that this researcher would be given open 
ongoing access to employees and secondary sources as necessary and where practical. In late 
November 2009, a non-disclosure agreement was signed and the 17 month research process 
formally begun. It should be noted at this point that the research opportunity. whilst offering high 
potential for richness and depth resulted in an adjustment to the overarching research plan. 
Initially, the research was intended to be multi-site: however the extent and length of the 
alignment process presented, necessitated in practical terms a single-site approach. [Note: A 
single-site case research approach was briefly explored in Chapter 4 and the limitations of same 
will be revisited in the closing chapter]. The subsidiary was being pushed further back into the 
embrace of the parent through the implementation of various strategic initiatives, one of which, 
the SAP implementation will be the process of interest for this research. 
5.4 Overview of the strategy for SIS alignment process research. 
In framing and designing this process research, formal checklists designed by Andrew Van 
DeVen (2007) were utilised to firstly, formulate a process research plan and secondly, to 
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con ider important i ue in collecting and analy ing proce data. The remainder of this chapter 
i concerned with di cu ing the relevant i ue that aro e in de igning and implementing this 
re earch. 1n term of de igning proce re earch, the foHowing key i ue are germane. 
Con idering the proce re earch plan checkli t that follow , many of the i ues raised have 
already been di cu ed in detail in prior literature and methodological chapter. A Process Model 
approach ha been deemed appropriate for thi re earch, taking the per pective of process a a 
developmental event equence. Abductive rea oning (a di cu ed in the re earch methodology 
chapter, ection 4.3), neither a purely inductive or deductive approach, whereby alternative 
theoretical explanation for ob erved phenomena are con idered, will be utili ed to derive the 
mo t appropriate theoretical framework of SIS Alignment proce . 
Issues Your Process Research Study 
1. State your process 
reseaich question 
What theoretical view(s) of Sirocess provide a framework for 
understanding strategic IS a 'gnment? 
2. Whose viewpoint is 
featured? 
Polyphonic user and managernarrative 
3. How define proces 
- as variable orevent? 
Process as a deve IopmenW event sequence. 
4. What process theories 
do you examine? 
I ~ o t a a deductive study; suitability of process theory will arise at analyses 
stage. 
5. Deductive" inductive 
Or abductive? 
Predominantly abductive. 
6. Real-time or historical 
observations? 
Real time observations with additional historic and contextual insights 
through secondary data analyses. 
7. What units examined 
within & overtime? 
I n d i v i d u a ~ s , ,3roup , departments, business unit and parent overa 15 
monthpeno . 
8. S a m ~ l e e diversity in 
w ha dimensions? 
Organi. ational size and diversity of user and background. 
9. Sample size: 
# of events and cases? 
Single Site Case Study; indeterminate number of events. 
Table 5.1: Process Re earch Plan Checklist (adapted from VanDeVen, 2007:195) 
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A single-site sample will be utilised with a hitherto unknown number of event. Both real-time 
and hi storical observations will be made, reflecting primary and econdary data ource utili ed. 
Additional historical context will also be gleaned from primary data collected: awarene of both 
the intra and extra-organisational context i critical to proces under tanding (Lyytinen and 
Newman, 2008). Identifying appropriate sources of primary and econdary data will be di cussed 
in more detail in Section 5.6. After considering the more high-level proce re earch plan i sues, 
it is also critical to consider issues related to the measurement and analy e of proce data: 
Issues You r Process Research Study 
1. Process Concepts Initial high-level alignment event categories added to overtime 
2. Incidents and events. Engagement with the alignment p,rocess as a user, manager, projedteam 
mem er, external stakeHolder ana corporate parent. 
3. Specifying an incident A qualitative datum within the parameters of the alignment process (and relevant context) 
4. Measuring an incident Use of interviewees to validate others' inteIP.retations of incidents and 
use of research report to verify researcher' Chronicle of events 
5. Identifying events Initial description in a case narrative with t e m ~ o r a 1 1 bracketing and 
visual mappmg to ta bulate and organise even . 
6. Developing process 
Theory 
Abdudive process from events to patterns of progression to theory 
Table 5.2: Process Data Measurement and Analyses Checklist (adapted from VanDeVen, 
2007:195) 
It is essential to consider how process data is conceptuali ed and how proces incident and 
events are bounded, identified and verified (also discus ed in more detail in Section 5.6). The 
importance of process conceptuali ation was rai ed in Chapter 3 and the initial concept of SIS 
alignment process are derived and discu ed. Presentation of proce data in a way that upport 
understanding and enables analyses is described in detail in Section 5.7, focusing on the narrative 
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strategy (in the fonn of a case study) for initial process data presentation, moving onto temporal 
bracketing and visual mapping. Finally, alternative template matching for process data analyses 
is considered. 
5.5 Defining and collecting SIS alignment process data. 
Although longitudinal process data collection (17 months in the case of this research) invariably 
leads to an evolution in process understanding, it is important to have some initial tramlines to 
bound and guide the research. The first step is to clarify the high-level concepts that are deemed 
to initially constitute SIS Alignment process. 
5.5.1 SIS Alignment Process as a set of initial concepts. 
Drawing on the SIS alignment literature, it is possible to fonnulate a list of process concepts for 
initial sense-making. It is critical however to differentiate between process concepts and events. 
How an event can be characterised or described (i.e. communication, conflict, decoupling) is the 
process as prose, indicative of a flow of incidents identified by the researcher. However, 
incidents cannot be clearly identified without a process rubric, making process conceptualisation 
an essential starting step. 
With respect to the SIS alignment literature, alignment is described as having structural, 
strategic, social, infonnal and intellectual dimensions. Understanding the strategic dimension is 
clearly the purpose of the research so conceptualising the high-level research objective as a 
concept is not necessary. As the structural dimension is concerned with understanding how an 
ongoing strategy aligns with other processes or strategies already present in the organisation, a 
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structure concept will be formally utilised. Considering the work of Henderson and Venkatraman 
(1999), structural alignment can occur both internally and externally with respect to internal 
strategies and processes (which they label as fit and integration r e ~ p e c t i v e l y ) . . This enables the 
structure concept to be subdivided into structural fit and ~ t r u c t u r a l l integration concepts to guide 
the research. 
The intellectual dimension considers the cognitive m o d e l ~ ~ of alignment that organisational 
stakeholders develop and apply. As the strategic implementation being researched proceeds, the 
necessity of capturing how interviewees have felt and continue to feel about SIS alignment will 
be important to capture and therefore an intellectual construct will be critical to consider. In any 
strategic implementation, the formal processes (and indeed alignment has a formal strategic 
dimension) must be considered. A formal strategy concept will be a necessity and will need to be 
balanced by an informal strategy concept to reflect the emergent nature of strategy and the 
important roles of the informal organisation. 
Alignment has a social dimension which in the case of this r e ~ e a r c h h should be delineated as 
separate to the informal construct. Alignment process conceptualised socially reflects group 
behaviours and effects. In the case of this research. different interacting groupings can be 
identified in advance of data collection. For example. the different departments within 
NOVOCORP all having alternative rationales and perspectives. the Project Team responsible for 
delivery; the Project Board with a strong overall governance role. the external consultants, the 
corporate parent AGOCORP and other common groups of stakeholder .. to emerge as the research 
unfolds. 
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Concept Descriptor 
Structural Fit Process as alignment between internal 
and external environments. 
Structural Integration Process as alignment between different 
internal strategies and processes 
Intellectual Alignment process as conceptualised by 
internal and external stakeholders 
Formal Strategic Alignment process in a formal and 
prescribed strategic mode. 
Informal Strategic Alignment process in an informal and 
emergent strategic mode. 
Social Alignment process as conceptualised by 
different groupings and through group 
behaviours. 
Table 5.3: SIS Alignment Process: Initial Process Concepts. 
In order to illu trate the e en iti ing concept in action, the following (re earch real) alignment 
proce will be di cus ed. In order to meet external regulatory requirements, the SAP system 
being implemented must capture how NOVOCORP bill AGOCORP Networks for work done. 
Thi development which e entially involves the internal environment aligning to meet the needs 
of the external environment can be initially understood by a re earcher applying the concept of 
alignment as structural fit. In addition this development ha to be implemented in a formal 
planned fa hion and therefore represented in project documentation, deadlines and training 
requirement , reflecting alignment as a formal strategic concept. The changes that will accrue to 
exi sting routine and proce e will have to be thought through and understand by the relevant 
internal takeholder , i.e. alignment a an intellectual concept. Al 0 the po sible different 
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attitudes of both NOVOCORP and AGOCORP ~ e t w o r b b to this change process. indicates the 
social concept of alignment. The need for ... enior management and the project team to explain and 
"sell"' this critical change is most reflective of an informal strategic concept of alignment. 
Invariably. these concepts are interdependent and will be subject to revision as the research 
unfolds. Such changes are not motivated by rea ... on ... of inaccuracy but rather due to event 
granularity and organisational perspective. Taking the perspective of a process model (as 
discussed in Chapter 3. Section 3.2.2). satisfying efficient causality implie ... insights into micro-
processes that typically only come into focus as the re ... earch unfold .... In addition. the need to 
consider multi-level organi ... ational perspective... will entail accommodating different 
understandings of the same event. Therefore. what i ... under,to(xi and defined by an initial 
process concept will organically change to reflect ongoing research. 
5.5.2 Demarcating between SIS Alignment P r o c e s . ~ ~ Incidents and Events. 
Describing starting constructs impo"e ... "orne nece",ary top-down bound ... on the process under 
investigation. It is also mandatory to consider some empirical "bottom-up" constraints in 
designing process research. Taking process a ... a developmental event sequence. there needs to be 
clear demarcation between what constitutes a proces" incident and a procev .. e\'ent (Poole et a1; 
1997). The natural sequence of process data collection is incident to datum (or data) to event 
(Abbott. 1984). In this research. process data will be qualitative: in essence a textual description 
of an incident. Incidents are deemed by the researcher to be relevant to the alignment process 
through resonance with the original process constructs and are typically captured "in vivo" 
whereas events on the other hand accrue from a flow of connected incidents and often acquire 
greater coherence "ex vivo" (VanDeVen. 2(07). Events can be more readily identified through 
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temporal and vi ual repre entation of proce incidents (a di cu sed in Section 5.7). In terms of 
proce " torie ' (Orton, 1997), incident de cribe a linear narrative whereas events denote the 
basi of a theoretical narrative. 
ResI!archer ob5ervations 
Initial arlgfl ment 
Pro cess co ncep ts. 
Sensitisirg 
Textual description of process incidents 
Figure 5.1: Moving from researcher observation(s) to textual description of incidents. 
It is important to note that although initial proces concept frame incident identification; these 
concept will invariably evolve in line with the unfolding proces . Changing concepts do not 
Ie sen the integrity of incident already identified but rather enable different interpretations that 
lead to enhanced en e-making and cau alityexplanation (Poole et al; 1997). The importance of 
multiple-level organi ational per pective is empha ised by the differing interpretations that 
could be inferred from the arne incident and al 0 that an incident need to be completely 
described before it can be par ed. Taking the example of a strategic plan update as an alignment 
process event; e entially it is an accrual of different incidents perceived differently at multiple 
levels of the organi arion. The initial incident for thi event may be an individual specialist from 
Finance working on a y tern te t who detect an anomaly in the current system design. This is 
brought to the attention of the Project Manager who then inform the Busines Implementation 
Note: In effect, the approach undertaken in thi chapter i another process story: "the story 
about the re earch proce e" (Orton, 1997: 432). 
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Manager who acts as an important conduit back to the Finance team in head office. Various 
contacts and meetings ensue formally and informally to consider the next step. Eventually a 
decision is made to request a project delay which then goes to the project team. The project 
manager gets approval for the delay at the next project board meeting. All relevant project 
documentation is updated and the anomaly is corrected. As can be seen in this example, a single 
event is a fusion of immediate incidents which resonate and effect process participants in a 
myriad of ways. Important implications for the collection of primary process data ensue as a 
result. 
5.5.3 Collecting primary process data from SIS alignment process stakeholders. 
Given the nature of the alignment process under investigation (i.e. a SAP implementation 
directly affecting over a thousand employees and indirectly affecting additional numbers 
externally), it was critical to identify those most involved and representative of the affected 
internal and external population. The principal motivations were construct and internal validity, 
in essence the account of the process journey needed to consider as many of the relevant voices 
as possible. Quite early in interactions with the research site. organisational charts were provided 
(Refer to Research Audit File B in the appendices), which proved helpful in orientating both the 
identification and sequence of interviewee. (It should be noted at this point that the initial 
gatekeeper contact (Business and IT process manager. NOVOCORP) provided introductions to 
some initial key senior staff (in particular the CIO from the corporate parent and senior Finance 
staff in NOVOCORP) but encouraged (after a short initial period) independent contact and 
arrangements to be made with potential interviewees. In terms of project structures, a project 
team with ultimate responsibility for system delivery had been established supported by a project 
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board which provided control and governance mechanisms (following a PRINCE2 
methodology). The project team had a core group of members. including a project manager. 
change manager and (appointed at a later date) a business implementation manager who were 
located at a separate working site. Over time. it acquired representatives of the different 
organisational functions affected by the implementation. in particular HR and Finance. These 
additional team members represented their function through design. testing and training phases 
and played important roles in system delivery and were assigned by senior members in the 
department back in NOVOCORP head office. The project team also acquired some external 
membership later on in the implementation through the appointment of external consultants for 
project management and training. 
With respect to the project board. members were drawn from both NOVOCORP and the 
corporate parent AGOCORP; fulfilling roles of senior users (from Finance, Engineering and 
HR), senior suppliers (of IT expertise, provided by the parent) and project champion (Head 
Financial Controller, NOVOCORP) and the board also included the project manager. The 
involvement of the corporate parent was directly in the form of providing the project manager, IT 
expertise (represented by but not just limited to the senior supplier on the project board) and 
higher-level strategic planning and implementation (Chief Information Officer). 
In tenns of the affected user population, three major groupings were targeted, in the form of HR, 
Finance and Engineering. Senior HR and Finance employees were identified along with 
department representatives working directly with the project team. At a strategic level, the 
implementation was championed by the head financial controller (project board champion) and 
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was critical for the financial performance of the business (managed by a team whose head 
reports to the head financial controller). Identifying representative interviewees from the 
Engineering function proved to be a more complex undertaking. The engineering function was 
re-organised as part of a wider NOVOCORP reorganisation and rebranding exercise, 
approximately six weeks into data collection which further complicated matters. The project 
change manager was part of the engineering "gene pool" and this proved extremely useful in 
vouching for the researcher's independence and for clarifying structural issues. Engineering 
departments differed drastically by both function and size (from 70 in the pure consultancy 
business to 450/500 in the Operations and Maintenance and Engineering functions).The (then) 
overall head of engineering was also a senior user on the project board. 
The impact of the implementation also differed dramatically by engineering department. In some 
cases, engineers and managers would only need to reconfigure timesheet and expense entry. In 
other departments, they were also concerned with project costing and billing and/or purchase 
orders all of which would now also be driven through the SAP system. Project costing and 
billing, in particular became a key strategic issue (for both the affected NOVOCORP staff and 
the researcher). 
As already discussed, NOVOCORP as a consultancy business serves the outside world but the 
organisation also undertakes projects of varying natures and sizes for sister business units and the 
corporate parent. Both the outside world and sister business units in particular impose varying 
costing and billing requirements on the engineering functions. requirements which are the 
responsibility of nine different key account managers. The proposed new system in effect will 
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impose (by necessity) that all these varying requirements are adapted to meet the new strategic 
environment of optimal financial integration. In many cases, the older AGRESSO system had 
been adapted in ad-hoc ways to meet these different requirements. As this was no longer to be 
the case, the researcher suspected (and was proven to be correct) that this particular aspect of the 
alignment process would prove to be data and incident rich. In total, 53 interviews were 
undertaken inclusive of all the key respondents identified, all recorded digitally and ranging in 
length from predominantly 30mins to 2.5 hours (full transcriptions of all interviews can be found 
in Research Audit File A in the appendices). A graphic description of anonymous interviews is 
provided and their respective lengths are tabulated overleaf: 
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In te r viewee a nd R o le I n t ~ r r l s s w w Ls:nSlh 
Tom m y W a l ... h . NOVOCORP H ead Financial Controller 4 3 m inutes 
Thom a, Mulcahy. S AP Impleme n tation Project M anager 3 0 m inutes 
Lorna Doone. NOVOCORP B u ~ ~ n e , , ... and IT proce ..... manager 3 3 m inutes 
A oi fe Burge ....... N OVOCORP Engi neering Financial Controller 38 m inutes 
C hri , ty R yan. Head o f E ngi neeri ng. NOV OCOR P ... olutlon.. ... 4 9 m inutes 
R yan E n g li ' h . M anager of Operat ion ... and M aintenance. NOVOCORP Engoneenng 44 m inutes 
[Fergal Fl y nn . Change M a nager. SAP implementation project team 5 4 m inutes 
W arren G a tl ing. F inancia l Performance M anager. NOVOCORP 39 m inutes 
R o na ld S eaton . C IO. A G O CORP Corporate 36 m inutes 
C hri , to pher Lloyd . NO VOC ORP Engineering M anager 20 m inutes 
Liam M c H a le. NOVOCORP O vera ll Head of Engineering 53 m inutes 
Fe rgaJ Fl y nn . Change M anager . SA P implementation project team 80 m in u tes 
Tho m as Mulcahy. SA P Imple m entat ion Project M anager 28 m inutes 
P a ul M c Gra th . M anager of Civi l and Structural. NOVOCORP Englneenng 7 2 m inutes 
S imo n L yons. M anager of B ui ld ing Con ... ultancy ServIce .... NOVOCORP En/loneenng 4 3 m inutes. 
A o ife Burge ... ~ . . NOV OCO RP E ngi neering Financia l Controller 3 7 m inutes 
W arren G a tling. F inancial P e rformance M anager. NOVOCORP 3 7 m inutes 
M argare t Blai r . HR M a n ager . N OVOCORP 5 7 m inutes 
P a tric ia C la rk ... o n . HR M anager . NO V OCORP 23 m inutes 
Fre ddie J a me,on . A ccount M anager. N OVOCO R P Engineenng 52 minutes 
Con a l Bo nd . M anager . NOVOCORP E n gineer ing 59 minutes 
F io na M c Gregor . Bu ... ine ... , Imple m e nta t ion M anager. SAP implementallon project team 64 m inutes 
C hri,tophe r Lloyd . NOVOCORP Engineering M anager 25 m inutes 
M ario Rubin . M anager o f P owerPlant. NOVOCORP Engineenng 4 6 m inutes 
Pe te r J ac k 'on . M anager . NOV OCORP Engineering 4 6 m inutes 
M ari ... "a W a l ... h . NO V OCORP HR and HR member of SAP Implementallon Project Team 39 m inutes 
F ranc is Lom ax. H ead of Inte rna t ional Generat Ion. NOVOCORP /:'nglneerong Con,ulllng 60 m inute s 
Martha June. NOVOC ORP HR and HR member of SAP Implementallon Project Team 4 6 m inute s 
Leo M oriarty. M anager o f A ...... e t M anagement. NOVOCORP Engineering 52 m inutes 
M argare t Blair. HR M a nager . N OVOCORP 39 m inutes 
R o ry H arri ng to n . Ex te rna l Con ... ulta.n t in P rojec t M anagement. SAP I mplement II n Project 46 m inutes 
T eam 
Tho m as Mu lcahy. SA P Implementation P roject M anager 47 m inutes 
Ferg u ,.. F l y nn . C hange M anager . SAP im p leme nta t ion project team 90 m inutes 
M ill R yan . M anager o f P ower Techno logy and Emerging Bu,"n ... -.e .... NuvV\..uRP Engineering 4 5 m inutes 
A o ife B u rge ....... N OVOCORP Engineering Financial Controller 3 1 m inutes 
Leona Mile .... NOVOC ORP Fi nance and Finance me m ber of SAP Implement II n Project Team 4 2 m inutes 
W arren Gatling. F ina ncial Performance M a nage r . NOVOCO R P 48 m inutes 
R ita Cantillo n . Head of Account ... Payable. NOVOCO R P Finance 5 0 m inutes 
J o hn J ake' mi th . C h ief S AP a rc h itec t . AGOCO R P Corporate 6 1 m inutes 
Sean ie M c M urry. Software M anager . AGOCO R P Corporate 40 m inutes 
[F io na M cGregor . Bu ... ine .... Im plemen ta t ion M anager. SAP Implementallon project team 41 m inutes 
R o bert Hoffman. Ex te rna l Con ... ultan t i n Training. SA P Implementallon Project Team 3 9 m inutes 
C hri"o phe r Lloyd. NOVOCORP E ngi neering M anager 48 m inutes 
Tina Murray. NOVOC ORP F in anc ia l P e rfo r mance 3 0 m inutes 
W a rre n Gatling. F inancia l P e rfo r mance M anage r . NOVOCORP 35 m inutes 
C h arlie C h a m be ..... M anager o f S u , tai nabi lity -.ervice,. NOVOCORP Engineering 4 3 m inutes 
Ferg us F ly nn . C h ange M anager . SA P imp lement.. . tion project team 6 5 m inutes 
Thoma,.. Mu lcahy. SA P Implemen ta t ion Project M anager 2 9 m inutes 
Rory H arring to n . Ex te rna l Con ... ul tan t in P rojec t M anagem n t. SAP I mplementatl n P Je t 46 m inut .. s 
T eam 
R e n a Carmody. NOVOC ORP Fi n a nce and Finance member of SAP 1m lementall n Project 34 m inut .. s 
Team 
Table 5.4: Interviewee, role and interview length 
A can be een in the interview table, orne interviewee were interviewed n e ral 
at key intervaJ in the y tern implementation. It hould al 0 be n ted that the r ar her aJ had 
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many off-the-record conversations during the course of primary data collection. On these 
occasions, the researcher made very brief personal notes but they are not incorporated in the 
thesis body or appendices for reasons of confidentiality. In certain cases, these off-the-record 
conversations directed the researcher to another interviewee or contextualised ongoing incidents 
in a manner that informed both the crafting of the case study narrative and analyses. 
5.5.4 Process data from secondary sources. 
The importance of secondary sources as process data has already been discussed in the 
Methodology Chapter 3. For the purposes of this research, secondary sources can be sub-divided 
into two distinct categories; I) broadly contextual and 2) directly project-related. The 
competitive environments, within which the organisation studied operated, needed to be 
understood in some depth for the purposes of context but also as a way of establishing researcher 
legitimacy when conversing with interviewees. The greater corporate picture was acquired 
through accessing and reading past annual reports and published interviews and articles in both 
company and national media publications. The researcher also gained access to an organisational 
history that had been published and which proved to be useful in gaining a perspective on the 
corporate evolution of the parent. Organisational context was also critical to acquire due to the 
complexity of organisational structure and to identify likely interviewees. As mentioned earlier, 
updated organisational assignments and charts were provided which provided clarification and 
also indicated potential interviewee details. Due to reasons of financial confidentiality, access to 
the business plan for the SAP implementation was not possible. In terms of direct project-related 
data, the researcher requested and was granted access to the detailed project plan both initially 
and any updates as they arose over the project duration. This proved critical in the data 
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presentation and analyses phases of this research in enabling greater effectiveness in both visual 
mapping and temporal bounding. As project deadlines changed and issues arose, it also helped 
drive the researcher to the more problematic formal alignment issues. When returning to 
interviewees after a period of time. it also proved helpful in structuring the interview themes. It 
also aided in improving the currency of observations and thus the capturing of ongoing incidents, 
making the flow into events more discernible in the analyses phase. As the implementation 
entered the training pha<;e, it wa<; possible to obtain a copy of the presentations made by trainers 
to users which helped clarify some functional and operational issues for the researcher. In 
summary, the secondary data provided critical initial context and valuable research direction and 
clarification as the process unfolded. 
5.5.5 Verifying SIS Alignment Process data. 
The qualitative methods of process data collection. although appropriate for the research 
question and objectives. raised important issues with regards to verification. Some triangulation 
within method was possible with respect to some primary and secondary data sources. 
Considering that the researcher was focused on parsing observations as process incidents, the 
principal ongoing mode of verification was to gain as many observations of the same incident 
which not only enriched the incident narrative but also verified interviewees' experiences. It was 
fundamental to differentiate between the actual incident and the interviewees' perception. As 
interviewees often had different perceptions of the same incident. their accounts provided 
verification chiefly on the basis of occurrence and sequence. On completion of the research, a 
confidential report was provided to NOVOCORP. describing key incidents and events. 
Furthermore, closing conversations were held with key interviewees. Feedback on the report and 
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outcomes from the conversations indicated some errors. They were predominantly around the 
description of departmental and individual functions as opposed to inaccurate interpretation of 
interviewee comments or sequencing of events, and were immediately rectified. 
5.6 Presentation and analyses of collected Alignment process data. 
Process event data collected qualitatively, poses enormous challenges for analysis in terms of 
both the high volume and levels of interdependence of data. Process researchers often feel 
overwhelmed which can lead to a feeling of "death by data asphyxiation" (Pettigrew, 1990: 281). 
Several approaches have been prescribed for both presenting and analysing process data (e.g. 
Abbott, 1990; VanDeVen, 1992, Langley, 1999; Pentland, 1999; Poole et ai, 2000) but given the 
variation in data sources relevant to this research, a combination of approaches is likely to be the 
most effective for sense-making (Wolcott, 1994). With respect to this research, two broad 
approaches will be taken. Firstly; the process data will be presented as a two-part case study: 
organisational context (Chapter 6) and the SIS alignment narrative in Chapter 7 (i.e. the narrative 
strategy to be discussed in 5.7.1). Chapter 8 will incorporate the techniques of temporal 
bracketing, visual mapping and alternative template matching in process data analyses (to be 
discussed in 5.7.2) to enable analyses and discussion of the process narrative. 
Process data analysis methods can be roughly divided on the basis of taking either a 
quantification approach (often instantiated in computationaVsimulation models (e.g. Dooley and 
VanDeVen, 1999) or opting for more of a grounded theory perspective (e.g. VanDeVen, 2007). 
The limitations of quantification approaches have been clearly stated: ''they skim the surface of 
processes rather than plunging into them directly" (Langley, 1999: 705). As the objective of the 
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research is to induce understanding of alignment proce" motor, in a naturalist setting. a 
quantification approach is unlikely to lead to the de,ired outcome,. ~ o r e e 'iuitable qualitative 
approaches to proce,s data sense-making are typically u,ing narrative. alternate template. 
grounded theory. visual mapping. temporal bracketing and 'ynthetic 'trategie'i (Langley, 1999; 
Pentland. 1999). The synthetic strategy attempts to predict future proce .... events and is typically 
associated with a variance approach to proce.,s (VanDeVen and Poole. :!(X):!). Such an approach 
reflects neither the researcher per'pective or objective... and "'0 can be disregarded. 
Methodologically. the principal intended output of thi ... re.,earch i., a coherent narrative of the SIS 
alignment process in the form of a case study. Initially. therefore. proce ..... data will be presented 
using a narrative strategy. 
5.6.1 The narrative strategy: telling the process ··story". 
An overarching narrative strategy is conducive to an interpretivi.,t and .,ubjective research 
position by giving full rein to multiple view., and per"'pective., (Orton. 19(7). The narrative 
strategy as proposed for process data analy.,e., (a., e"pou ... ed hy Langley (1999. 2010) and 
enriched by Pentland (1999» was utilised in thi., re.,earch. Regardle ..... of the approach taken, the 
objectives of narrative plausibility. reali.,m and veracity were alway" paramount concerns 
(Martin. 1986 as cited in Orton. 1997) .. The narrative .,trategy aim., to analyse the data for 
inclusion in a process "story" (Pettigrew. 1990). which provide., a complete view of the nature, 
levels and sequence of process incidents. with a .,trong empha.,i., on context. akin to the generic 
case research method (Creswell. 1997). Proce.,s narrative., with key organisational actors 
identified. in particular the main or "focal actor"' (Pentland. 199<J: 714) wi II provide superior 
insights. The grounded theory .,trategy (Gla.,er and Strau ....... 1967, may o ... tcn'iibly reflect the 
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overall research trategy. but in terms of process data analyses. stresses textual incidents and 
categorie of events rather than treating process as a developmental event sequence (Langley. 
1999). The narrative trategy will therefore be the principal driver for crafting the process 
narrative. Determining the different process events will be a critical leap in process theory 
generation; only telling the proce story or event sequence is overly thin description and will 
lack research ufficiency (Pentland, 1999). 
5.6.2 From incidents to events to theory. 
Polyphonic 
Case 
Niln'iltwe: 
process 
contextand 
inddents 
• 
Temporal 
Bradreting: 
By SAP 
implementation 
phase 
Visual 
Happing: 
Flow of 
incidents 
and event 
descnption 
Lower and Higher-Jevel 
Process rheOl)' matoa 
• 
P r o c ~ s s s Event 
Generatille 
MeclJanisms 
Figure 5.3: Steps in determining process events and analyses. 
Visual approaches to pre enting process data aids in both data organisation and classification 
(Golden-Biddle and Locke, 2007). Recent trends in qualitative best practice (Pratt, 2009) have 
additionally emphasised the importance of visual techniques for initial process understanding. 
The initial narrative outcome of this research details the organisational context and the stream of 
process incident that con titute the SAP system implementation. The next stage is the initiation 
of data analyse which begin with presenting incidents without losing the important threads of 
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time and causality. The SAP implementation in que tion follow a tandard AP implementation 
process with six di stinct phase: project preparation and mobili ation, bu ine proces 
blueprinting, reali sation , final preparation, go-live and upport and continuou improvement. 
Such clear breaks in the implementation will allow for incident to be differentiated as to their 
order of occurrence within the proce ; uch an approach i termed temporal bounding (Langley, 
1999). Temporal bounding is useful for organi ing and compartmentali ing proce data 
(VanDeVen, 2007) but bearing in mind that event are in effect the accrual of inciden , temporal 
bounding would need to be utili sed in conjunction with a technique that empha i e cau ality. 
Such an approach is termed visual mapping (Langley, 2009), a exemplified in the followi ng 
high-level example: 
Note: 
Project 
MobiJiSltion Ih...eprintinc Railligtjon 
Incident denoted by red 
phere . 
Figure 5.4: SIS alignment process: temporal bounding in conjunction with vi uaJ mapping. 
The conjunction of technique de cribed i fundamental to achieving under tanding of final, 
formal and efficient causality and facilitate the temporal mode (i .e. "tracing back", "foll owi ng 
forward" (Langley, 2009» fundamental to the proce model approach, di cu ed in chapter 3. A 
combined graphical and descriptive approach enable mode of even t progre ion (a al 0 
di scussed in chapter 3) to be identified (lame and Wooten, 1996). The alternate template 
approach (Langley, 1999) attempt to fit analy e of proce to explanatory theorie through 
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hypotheses testing (in the case of quantitative methods) and more exploratory analyses and 
discussion in the case of qualitative data (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). 
5.7 Chapter summary. 
The purpose of this chapter was to describe the design of the process study undertaken. The 
strategy involved in obtaining access to the research site is described in some detail with 
particular emphasis on why the particular organisation proved particularly attractive (and 
amenable) to the proposed research. Some background information on the research organisation 
was provided (and will be elaborated on further in the following chapter). The critical issues in 
planning and designing the process research were considered with particular emphases on 
identifying initial process concepts and process data source identification, collection and 
verification. Considering the process model of research utilised, it is necessary to initially 
consider high level process concepts, which will expand and become refined as the research 
proceeds. The techniques used in process data presentation and analyses were then defined and 
described in application, drawing on the canonical work of Langley (1999), Pentland (1999) and 
others (i.e. VanDeVen, 2(07). The process data will be initially presented in the form of a two 
part case study: organisational context will be discussed in Chapter 6 and the SIS alignment 
narrative in the following chapter, later to be analysed and discussed (Chapters 8 and 9) initially 
using temporal bracketing and visual mapping with generative mechanisms and process theory 
motors then identified and discussed. The initial stage in process data presentation, the first part 
of the process narrative (the organisational context) now follows. 
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Chapter 6: 
Moving from AGRESSO to SAP in NOVOCORP: Overview of 
the organisational context. 
6.1 Introduction. 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the organisational context. Background information 
on NOVOCORP and its corporate parent AGOCORP is initially provided followed by a 
consideration of market factors. NOVOCORP as an organisation is then considered in some 
depth with a particular focus on the creation, content and implementation of business and IS 
strategy. IS history and implementation and the critical importance of IS and IS project 
governance within both AGOCORP and NOVOCORP is then discussed. The history and 
utilisations of the AGRESSO system, the motivators for changeover to a new SAP ERP 
system and the proposed implementation and management of the changeover are then 
considered. 
The principal sources of case data were semi-structured interviews and secondary data 
sources, the former being present in their entirety in a research audit file (or RAF) as the 
thesis appendix, as recommended for qualitative data (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Where and 
when appropriate, interview quotes will be utilised directly. Direct interview allusions or 
quotes will be referenced as (RAF, Interview X, V), where X is the number of the interview 
and Y the interview page number(s). Individuals were commonly discussed by interviewees 
and included in the source transcripts; however, in this chapter for reasons of confidentiality, 
the name of the individual is replaced by their project role or job title. 
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6.2 AGOCORP's new strategic and structural initiatives. 
"Who knows what decisions are coming later?" (Senior Executive, AGOCORP Corporate) 
(RAF, Interview 9, 8) 
As the data collection stage of this research was undertaken, AGOCORP corporate launched 
two independent initiatives which will now be briefly described due to their broad research 
relevance. Although, the Financial Efficiency project formally launched as the AGRESSO-
SAP implementation was coming to an end, some of the outstanding business process issues 
that remained post implementation fell under its purview (as will be discussed). As already 
mentioned, the structural and operational changes that have resulted for NOVOCORP due to 
AGOCORP's adoption of the GTS model will need to be understood, due to the important 
consequences of the addition of GENCOM to NOVOCORP during the AGRESSO-SAP 
implementation. 
6.2.1 The Financial Efficiency Project: AGOCORP's long-term financial strategy. 
The purpose of the Financial Efficiency project was to identify further opportunities within 
AGOCORP Corporate to streamline business processes and leverage cost efficiencies. The 
key emphasis is on financial processes with a clear agenda to centralise financial back-office 
functions in the fonn of shared services hosted and managed by a centre based in corporate 
headquarters. As will become clear in the process to be discussed, the degree and extent of 
internal trading within AGOCORP is complex and multi-faceted but in essence involves 
AGOCORP money literally playing financial musical chairs across many different business 
units; this has led to extraneous layers of reporting and administration chasing these so-called 
"wooden dollars". These additional layers which have built up over time and administrative 
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costs corporate is keen to reduce and eventually eliminate particularly in the new era of 
deregulated competition (RAF, Interview 51, 8). As the alignment process being researched 
had a strong financial dimension, the outcomes of the implementation became an important 
(unintended!) input into the ongoing Financial Efficiency Project. 
6.2.2 GTS: AGOCORP's new operational structure. 
In 2010, AGOCORP decided to formally adopt a GTS organisational configuration structure. 
GTS which is an acronym for Generation, Trade and Supply has been described as a "best 
practice" organisational structure for utilities. This structural reorganization began was 
completed partially in parallel with the AGRESSO to SAP implementation, which 
necessitates its explanation. 
In essence, a GTS structure for a utility like AGOCORP with mUltiple business units implies 
aggregating parts of the business with similar operational rationales. Adopting the structure 
involves three essential steps which give the structure its name. Firstly, all parts of the 
business involved in Generation are brought together under one structure but must be 
operated separately. This entailed bringing together components of AGOCORP (known as 
GENCOM) and NOVOCORP which both supplied commercial customers. Although these 
operators were brought under one structure, they had to be operated separately for 
competitive reasons (as directed by the regulatory authorities). GENCOM were essentially an 
AGOCORP Corporate business so all their business processes were different to those in 
NOVOCORP. In other words, GENCOM were already on SAP and joined NOVOCORP 
1 There was ambiguity and uncertainty in both AGOCORP Corporate and NOVOCORP whether the AGRESSO to 
SAP implementation and the process changes delivered were incidental to the Financial Efficiency Project or 
whether they were part of the long-term AGOCORP corporate business strategy. 
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before the AGRESSO to SAP implementation was completed (RAF. Interview 7, 12), which 
will be discussed. Similarly. all parts of the business involved in the Trading of utilities were 
brought under one structure; again they had to be operated separately for competitive reasons 
as dictated by regulations. Finally the different parts of the utility engaged in Supply were 
also merged. 
6.2.3 Summary. 
"There is a lot of uncertainty. a lot of unknowns. In tenn.'i oj where the organisation 
(AGOCORP) is going" (RAF. Interview 7. 8) 
The current state of both the retail and wholesale utility markets for AGOCORP is highly 
challenging. In terms of the retail utility market. deregulation and market forces have resulted 
in the following; 
1. AGOCORP will face a struggle to hold onto domestic consumers (a .. of December, 
2011 ). 
2. Their share of the high volume commercial consumer market is less than 50% and 
falling (as of September. 2010) 
3. Organisational reconfiguration and restructuring had to occur as an immediate 
strategic imperative. 
4. Rebranding of business units will be necessary to met regulatory requirements. 
Also, utility market changes have led to the following: 
I. Heightened cost sensitivities. 
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2. Necessity for more efficient collation of operational information for regulatory 
authorities in order to insure revenue stream. 
3. Increased competitive threat from international suppliers. 
The organisation also has other issues that were and may be problematic. Other competitors 
have different ownership and worker arrangements and may prove more agile. On a more 
positive note, full market deregulation has occurred. AGOCORP are now able to compete on 
a level pricing "playing field" providing an opportunity to exploit their still substantial 
market shares and extensive customer and technical knowledge base. 
AGOCORP continues to negotiate a period of substantial environmental turbulence, both 
internal and external. Looking at the external environment, one common trend is clear; the 
once reliable sources of revenue are no longer reliable. The changing competitive landscape 
has led AGOCORP to pay particular attention to NOVOCORP which always had to operate 
with a competitive mindset, is established in international markets and has a revenue stream 
that is somewhat out of the firing line of the increasingly rivalrous retail and wholesale utility 
markets (albeit that the level of international income is falling). As one AGOCORP group 
interviewee remarked: "This is our (AGOCORP's) hope ... Any growth we (AGOCORP) will 
have as a company will come out of NOVOCORP" (RAF, Interview 3, 7). 
The effect of organisational change has already been felt in NOVOCORP in terms of 
reorganisation and the need to absorb the formerly independent business unit responsible for 
Generation (known as GENCOM), which had no prior direct strategic connection to 
NOVOCORP or its business model. NOVOCORP is now perceived differently by the overall 
group (RAF, Interview 4, 10) and is under increasing pressure to produce a greater dividend 
132 
for a parent struggling on many competitive fronts (RAF. Interview l. 6). In addition, 
NOVOCORP which for so long had a high level of strategic and systems independence must 
and has become even more integrated with its parent. The need for the parent to have more 
effective cost and information control in an era of high regulatory oversight and increased 
competition has crystallised the non-integrated nature of NOVOCORP. In addition, 
AGOCORP is a substantial customer for NOVOCORP in terms of specialised consultancy 
which is a further catalyst for integration (RAF. Interview 46. 2). The conclusion for the 
parent is clear: NOVOCORP can no longer be different and must be like the rest of the 
family (RAF 4. Interview 40. 2). A critical step towards greater integration is the adoption of 
SAP and this is the story that will be told. 
6.3 NOVOCORP: a brief organisational history. 
AGOCORP group hali had an international arm for a number of years which was formally 
established as a wholly owned subsidiary. AGOCORP International (NOVOCORP) has a 
current annual turnover of €800 million (ali of end of financial year 2009) and staff of 1200, 
approximately one sixth of the total AGOCORP group employee cohort. At the point of 
creating NOVOCORP. senior management had been actively considering how to generate 
additional revenues for the purposes of offsetting the labour and opportunity costs of 
employing highly-skilled staff. particularly between projects Although AGOCORP had an 
international department per se. it had not been instantiated as an independent entity. The 
impetus for this was completion of large-scale projects in the mid 1980s after which a large 
number of experienced employees were without long-term work (RAF. Interview 27. 1). The 
initial cohort of NOVOCORP employees (approximately 125-150) were drawn from the 
civil. project and transmission divisions of the AGOCORP. From the corporate perspective. 
this was done with a view towards maintaining the employment and skills of these 
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engineering cohorts, given that it was expected that larger projects had concluded for the 
foreseeable future (RAF, Interview 27, 1). 
At any given moment, more than 20 overseas projects are underway, entailing the 
secondment of 400-450 staff (RAF, Interview 5, 1). AGOCORP were attractive to 
international customers seeking consultancy in electrical utilities as they were considered to 
have built a strong independent infrastructure with relatively little external assistance, thus 
possessing a deep reservoir of the appropriate knowledge and skills. Originally, NOVOCORP 
were deterred from competing as a national rather than an international consultancy due to 
concerns regarding the impact on existing consultancies in a time of national recession and 
also governmental resistance to structural changes. As these concerns have been addressed 
over time, NOVOCORP have begun to operate substantially in the domestic market, in 
particular the provision of corporate (i.e. non-domestic) supply and the design, construction 
and management of alternative energy sources (RAF, Interview 21, 1). 
6.4 NOVOCORP: Organisational Structure and business Strategy. 
Since its incorporation, NOVOCORP has established multiple business models, evolving 
from a purely international consultancy to having a strong presence as a national consultancy 
and service provider to the parent. The sub-divisions of NOVOCORP are largely focused on 
distinct (but somewhat interdependent) markets and these different business strategies are 
now discussed. The key component of NOVOCORP employs 800 plus staff (over 2/3 of the 
total headcount) and performs substantial strategic activities, supporting other NOVOCORP 
sub-units and AGOCORP Group in addition to having an international dimension (RAF, 
Interview 12, 2). 
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The sub-divisions are typically led by an key account manager or KAM. Typically, managers 
are rotated into new roles every five years (RAF, Interview 29, 1) and often even earlier if an 
organisational need arises. Utility design and construction constitute the activities at which 
AGOCORP Group has the longest experience. Designing. constructing facilities and in 
addition undertaking ongoing reviews of their functionality can be undertaken for customers 
who typically are either the parent group or some other national or international clients (RAF, 
Interview 23, I). 
The structure of NOVOCORP entails a multi-faceted business strategy, and is indicative of a 
tightly-coupled organisation (Perrow, 1999). Defining what constitutes a business customer 
for NOVOCORP is also non-trivial and ranges from internal (other NOVOCORP sub-
divisions and the parent AGOCORP Group) to external (commercial consumers and 
competitors). Considering the level of commercial interaction and the variations in customer 
requirements, fulfilling both the business and IS strategy imposes stark needs for efficiency 
and effectiveness. 
6.5 The historical relationship and attendant differences between AGOCORP and 
NOVOCORP. 
When NOVOCORP was founded, many of the departing engineers viewed this as a final 
break with the parent ("we were never coming back and that was that" (RAF. Interview 46, 
5» and that a decision had been made at a corporate level to push these divisions and 
functions out of the parent business completely (RAF, Interview 27. 3). The view within 
NOVOCORP initially. was that they as an organisation still felt part of the overall corporate 
structure. but that those feelings were not reciprocated ("we did call AGOCORP the mother-
ship but we didn't really exclude them - they more excluded us I think ... " (RAF, Interview 38, 
8». The feeling within the parent at a senior management level was that NOVOCORP 
occupied a very different strategic and commercial space and that independence was 
warranted ("There was a degree of acceptance within the business (AGOCORP Group) that 
separation was useful and a good thing for NOVOCORP ... ", (RAF, Interview 9, 4». 
However, as many off the record comments by senior stakeholders in NOVOCORP 
indicated, the decoupling of NOVOCORP from the parent was considered to have been more 
abrupt than strategically ideal, leading to a lack of clarity and direction in the relationship. As 
a senior manager in AGOCORP commented: "In fairness, AGOCORP has probably not been 
as clear with NOVOCORP as to how it should have been with respect to say the overall 
business model, the relationship between AGOCORP and NOVOCORP and how different it 
is" (RAF, Interview 9, 5). The markedly different commercial orientation of NOVOCORP 
had important cultural and process implications. 
6.5.1 Cultural Differences. 
NOVOCORP employees developed a cost-sensitivity operating in a competitive consulting 
environment that was substantially different to the different mindset common in the parent, a 
cultural difference identified by employees in both NOVOCORP (" (It was) always the 
objective of NOVOCORP to be extremely commercially aware and as such to really focus on 
costs" (RAF, Interview 2, 1) and the parent ("Well, the business strategy of NOVOCORP is 
markedly different from the rest of the company; it's markedly different in the culture of the 
place, the people in the place .. " (RAF, Interview 3, 7». 
The differing commercial attitudes became a common part of social and business interaction 
between the parent and subsidiary ("you do sometimes get an attitude of "oh, those mavericks 
over there in NOVOCORP ... " though they usually only say that to me when they're retired! 
.. " (RAF, Interview 27, 2); "You'd rock-over to AGOCORP HQfor a meeting and you'd get 
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the (reaction) ... " What do ye do again; oh go on, you're 0 ommer iall ' aware and 0 
commercially driven .... " (RAF, Interview 1 ,6) which in ariabl entailed orne re entment 
on the part of OVOCORP ("we'd sa back to them, 'we're bringing in the mon , we're 
keeping you going" but it doe wear you down... , R Interview 1 ,7 nior managers 
who moved to OVO ORP from the parent bemoaned what th y perc i ed to a la k of 
tructure and control ("There wa no reaL accountability in the or ani ation. There wa a 
consuLtancy wing, (a lso) a rna of engineer doing different thin without 0 erall ontrol.. . 
(RAF, Interview II 2). OVO ORP employee on the other hand, were n to embrace 
their different approach to work, feeling that their approa h w a legitirnat ~ ~ r a on ulting 
bu ine that had to be agile and flexible (RAF, Interview I , 12 . 
6.5.2 Proce and operational differenc 2. 
"I suppose if you're becoming eparate that other thin like IT or HR will b orne more 
separate to reflect proce differences an way ... Like a natural decollpling ... Ye and orne of 
that decoupLing .... 1 uppo e there have been pill e and minuse with it. " 
(RAF Interview 6, 3 
Thi independent mind et dro e the creation of bu ine e that ref! t d the clifferent 
operational D A of OVO ORP. From a functional per pecti e, OV ORP wer able to 
initiate and manage their own pecific financial operational, marketing human r urc and 
information technology (which will be di cu ed in detail in ection 6. One 
interviewee rather uccinctly de cribed the proce difference between r . . ~ ~ L . . R P P and 
OVO ORP as "thinking like a utility a oppo ed to thinking like a eon IIllaney (RAF 
Interview 46, 7). 
2 At this stage, a brief overview of process differences is provided; far greater detail is to follow. 
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From a financial perspective, the first key difference with respect to the parent lay in the area 
of billing. All AGOCORP's billing systems were dedicated to supporting the billing of 
national commercial and domestic customers on the basis of utility consumption, as these 
types of customers was their only customers of interest (RAF, Interview 30, 1). In the case of 
NOVOCORP, managing and invoicing commercial consulting customers required different 
processes and systems that would reflect the varying needs and requirements of the 
customers, many of whom were international (RAP, Interview 6, 1). However, some of the 
more elaborate billing/invoice detail requirements are typically made by internal customers, 
particularly AGOCORP Networks (RAF, Interview 20, 1). In order to fulfil these varying 
requirements, NOVOCORP decided to implement a different accounting structure to their 
parent, with distinct and separate Accounts Payable and Receivable (AP and AR) functions 
which were then reconciled with the accounts of the parent on a rolling basis (RAF, Interview 
39,4). 
In addition, whereas AGOCORP operates more on a continuous service supply basis, 
NOVOCORP operates on a project basis with multiple projects underway at different times, 
controlled on the basis of specific job numbers. As one NOVOCORP employee remarked: 
"in AGOCORP you might work on one job number a year, here you might need 4 different 
job numbers a day ... " (RAP, Interview 27, 3). Each job number has a meaning inherent to the 
customer in question, and could be further broken down in greater granular detail by activity 
code with descriptive respect to the nature and cost of work undertaken (RAP, Interview 14, 
3). At any given time in NOVOCORP, there could be upwards of 600 live projects (each 
with their own unique job numbers and entailing a myriad of activities) with an additional 
400 projects being newly commissioned annually, across the organisation (RAP, Interview 
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29, 7). Different divisions of NOVOCORP deal with different volumes of projects and hence, 
have contrasting billing and invoicing volumes, with for example. the AERGEN key account 
managing and invoicing 20 projects a month, in stark contrast with the 200 projects being 
Invoiced monthly by the NETWORKS key account (RAF. Interview 2 I. 9). Invariably 
customers would typically request to be invoiced in one of three ways: fixed cost for a given 
project, time and materials charged to the project a ~ ~ consumed. or periodic charging at 
different project intervals (RAF. Interview 25. 2). In order to ensure that the customer is 
charged appropriately any project time worked by an employee is recorded on an electronic 
timesheet on the current AGRESSO system wherea'i any project expenses accrued by an 
employee are recorded manually (RAF. Interview 28. 4). Any time entered must be recorded 
against an existing job number so the right charge can be invoiced to the right customer, 
which is the collating responsibility of the finance function within NOVOCORP (RAF. 
Interview 5, 1). However. timesheets in NOVOCORP are not approved by an employee's 
manager formally per se unlike in AGOCORP where all timesheets <though non job-
numbered and typical1y more generic) must be approved by an employee's direct line 
manager (RAF, Interview 28, 5). 
All expenses incurred by NOVOCORP staff are paid from the parent so al1 expense claims 
are currently entered manually by staff in the HR department of NOVOCORP into the 
parent's existing SAP system. whereupon NOVOCORP staff are reimbursed after a given 
transaction period (RAF, Interview 18. 2). In AGOCORP. all expenses are entered 
electronically and directly by employees into the SAP system with employees reimbursed far 
more promptly (RAF, Interview 29. 10). From a broad human resource perspective. employee 
grades and terms and conditions within NOVOCORP are different to that of the parent. with 
NOVOCORP employees being termed "direct hires" (RAF. Interview 27. 3). NOVOCORP 
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employees do not have the right to request a transfer to another business unit unlike corporate 
AGOCORP employees who can move back and forth as requested or required between 
different business units (RAF, Interview 7, 13). In essence, NOVOCORP saw themselves as 
profoundly different from their corporate parent, strategically, operationally and culturally. 
This both enabled and necessitated NOVOCORP to develop and maintain their own distinct 
and appropriate commercial and control processes. 
6.5.3 A cbanging relationship. 
"The business strategy of NOVOCORP has changed anyway. When AGRESSO came in, the 
business strategy was really about commercial business. That's no longer the driver for it; 
the core strategy is now about driving the expenise back into AGOCORP (corporate) but at a 
commercial rate. It's not to make money ... " 
(RAF, Interview 4,5) 
But as the cold winds of change blew through the utility markets, nationally and 
internationally, the operational and strategic sands began to shift (RAF, Interview 15, 8). 
NOVOCORP's ongoing operational and process independence began to be questioned with 
AGOCORP beginning to identify the strategic potential within the business unit: 
"AGOCORP sees NOVOCORP as pan of its big platform for growth" (RAF, Interview 9, 5-
6). Although NOVOCORP's initial strategic mandate was to be independently viable through 
competing in a consulting environment, it did not initially return a substantial financial 
divided to the parent, (RAF, Interview 4, 8). As the original founding divisions of 
NOVOCORP were the civil, project and transmission divisions of the parent, these skills 
were still required by the parent and initially the share of parent/consulting work was 
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considered to be about 50150 (RAF, Interview 15, 1). Although having a commercial 
mentality, there was an organizational realisation that their cost base although comparing 
favourably with the parent was relatively high when contrasted with their direct consulting 
competition (RAF, Interview 18, 7). NOVOCORP found it difficult to compete for a 
dwindling number of consulting opportunities as the global economic recession took a severe 
toll on public and private sector infralitructural investment; a" one interviewee remarked "We 
have been told on umpteen projects (by potential customers) that 'we want you to do the job 
but you 're just too expensive .. '," (RAF, Interview 7. 14). 
The share of the work undertaken for the parent as a proportion of NOVOCORP revenue 
began to increase dramatically and hali now got to the point where 80-90lk of NOVOCORP 
project work entails support of the parent (RAF. Interview 15. 1); a" one experienced 
NOVOCORP interviewee stated: "We're now more of an internal prOl'ider of services then 
an independent ... that part of our business has declined considerably ..... (RAF. Interview 46. 
2). The increase in work undertaken for the parent coincided with the filling of many senior 
positions within NOVOCORP (i.e. Management, BP-IT manager and financial controllers) 
by AGOCORP Corporate employees. 
The structural re-organisation known as GTS (Generation, Trade and Supply) initiated in 
2010 and due to be completed in 2012 has also altered the dynamic of the AGOCORP-
NOVOCORP relationship. For the first time in its history. NOVOCORP ha" a clearly defined 
and controlled utility generation function partially co-opted through the absorption of 
AGOCORP Generation (known ali GENCOM). This has engendered a new perception of the 
role of NOVOCORP within the parent. In the view of senior management in the parent. this 
restructuring hali reduced the operational distance between the parent and NOVOCORP 
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(RAF, Interview 9, 4) and as one NOVOCORP interviewee commented on this changing 
perception: "The merging of GENCOM has brought us closer - the fact that there is 
generation (of utility) here makes us seem to them to (be) more like them ... " (RAP, Interview 
38, 8). Due to structural changes, changes in senior management personnel and the ongoing 
increase in work undertaken for the parent, the interdependence of NOVOCORP had began 
to be diluted and an oblique path of integration was now being followed. 
6.6 IS in NOVOCORP. 
In this section, the history and user views on IS implementation in NOVOCORP will be 
discussed. In light of the alignment process researched, particular attention will be paid to the 
background and uses of the AGRESSO system. 
6.6.1 IS implementation: history and user views. 
"I suppose ... (REFLECTING) (IT success) has been more patchy but it's been patchy 
everywhere, not just AGOCORP. I think sometimes we lag other companies. looking at 
other consultancy companies now ... " (RAF, Interview 4, 7) 
Reflecting on the history of IS implementation in NOVOCORP, the vast majority of 
interviewees questioned had mixed feelings as to the success and usability of the systems 
implemented (e.g. (RAF, Interview 14, 1; RAP, Interview 15, 2; RAP, Interview 20, 4). 
There was considerable disquiet at what was felt to be have been a lack of support and 
momentum behind IS investment (RAF, Interview 6, 6) with one interviewee remarking: "In 
my view, I don't really think that senior management in the company (NOVOCORP) have put 
enough emphasis or here have had enough belief in IT; they have paid lip service to it ... " 
142 
(RAF, Interview 6, 5). IS implementation seemed to be the core issue rather than the rationale 
for the systems themselves: "At a high level. the IS planning seems fine. but the 
implementation does not reflect that" (RAF, Interview 15, 2). Interviewees were effusive as 
to the value of the existing SOLAS intranet (e.g. RAF, Interview 4, 2; RAF, Interview 5, 2) 
but had mixed views on the other commonly used systems such ali AGRESSO (which will be 
discussed in detail) and SHAREPOINT. The perceived relative failure of a prior CRM system 
implementation was lamented by several interviewees (e.g. RAF, Interview 4, 11), with one 
interviewee remarking that " ... six months after it went in, it stopped being used. I mean three 
years after it went in, it's only being used very partially so something like that is interesting. I 
mean, why did it fail?" (RAF, Interview 6, 10) and another comparing it to the proposed SAP 
system: "People just veered away from it (the CRM system) but they won't be able to veer 
away from SAP ... " (RAF, Interview 23, 11). 
The view in the parent tended to be that NOVOCORP "see themselves as being separate and 
independent on an IT level... .. (RAF, Interview 40, 2). In NOVOCORP, systems were seen 
by the parent to be have been typically developed in an ad-hoc fashion, designed to meet 
certain specific stakeholder demands in the business. In several off-the-record conversations, 
NOVOCORP was often referred to by parent employees as an organisation of "IT islands", 
seemingly replete with systems that had little in common and had been developed without 
any concerted strategic or operational objective. Some of this perception could likely be 
attributable to the different business processes (as discussed) within NOVOCORP, which led 
to the development of tailored systems like AGRESSO. 
Interestingly, this parental perception contrasted strongly with the views of NOVOCORP 
senior management who had been seconded from AGOCORP; in the views of one 
individual: "When I first came over here (from A GOCORP ) and began to look through 
things, I began to realise that it wasn't a case of that they didn't adhere to the IT strategy; it 
was just that the investment in IT had been so little ... ". (RAF, Interview 2, 1). Interviewees 
who had worked elsewhere outside the AGOCORP group also identified this under-
investment with the lack of investment in and sophistication of HR IS systems (RAF, 
Interview 19, 1) drawing particular criticism: "There was no HR system in the business really 
before SAP which to me is astonishing ... " (RAF, Interview 19,4). This under-investment in 
NOVOCORP was a stark dichotomy to the level of IS systems spending in AGOCORP 
which had been substantial since the late 1990s (RAF, Interview 1, 5), driven by strategic 
decisions and regulatory compulsion. 
The reasons for this under-investment seemed to have three clear causes. Firstly, the cost-
sensitive nature of the consulting industry created an aversion to substantial investments in 
systems with one interviewee even remarking that: "/ would say we did lag in IT spending 
around business processes. Maybe, that might have been a good thing as we could have been 
getting rid of systems now that we could have spent a lot on . .. " (RAF, Interview 4, 10). 
[Note: this cultural cost-sensitivity with respect to IS investment proved to be problematic in 
terms of justifying the need for changing from AGRESSO to SAP and will be discussed 
further at a latter point]. Secondly there was a great deal of frustration in configuring new 
systems with the extant AGOCORP IS infrastructure (RAF, Interview 4, 2). The source of 
this frustration was the fact that the infrastructure for any system is the same as those used to 
control and support the supply infrastructure (RAF, Interview 29, 2). This (understandably) 
entailed additional security layers and risk management protocols, which often acted to 
dissuade NOVOCORP from embarking on more elaborate system investment. Infrastructural 
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considerations and a culture of cost-sensitivity could be described as longer-tenn "legacy" 
causes but the final cause has a more current progeny. 
The final cause of under-investment could be attributed to the changing IS procurement 
policies that were introduced into NOVOCORP. in tandem with the new group-wide 
emphao;is on IS governance (which will be discussed in detail at a later point) from 2005 
onwards. Although NOVOCORP employees often felt constrained by cost and infrastructure 
when it came to system choice and implementation. they did have rea'ionable scope in opting 
for systems (RAF, Interview 14, 2) and tailoring them to met their own specific needs (for 
example, different divisions within NOVOCORP invested in different content management 
systems such as FALCON and MERIDIEN. dependant on whatever system they deemed 
most appropriate). [Note: unsurprisingly. the standard content management system 
(SHAREPOINT) implemented by the parent across the entire group attracted negative 
comments from certain NOVOCORP users. who felt more bespoke systems like FALCON 
and MERIDIEN would be more appropriate (i.e. RAF. Interview 27. 3)]. Such scope and 
choices also likely contributed to engendering the "IT islands" perception held by many in 
the parent. As will be discussed shortly. IS governance practices now prevalent across the 
whole group. require a rigorous business case for any system purchase and implementation 
and in the views of some NOVOCORP employees have further mitigated against IS 
investment; i.e. .. ... the problem we had all the time was huying specialised software ... the 
procurement and governance systems make it difficult for us 10 huy the specialised software 
we need ... " (RAF, Interview. 46. 1). 
6.6.2 AGRESSO in NOVOCORP. 
The AGRESSO system. fonnerly used by every NOVOCORP employee and the subject of 
the strategic changeover process. IS now discussed 10 some detail. 
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6.6.2.1 Organisational history of AGRESSO. 
Financial and accounting systems have been in use in NOVOCORP since its foundation in 
1989, with the original DOS based system CODA being used until 1999 (RAF, Interview 38, 
1). In 1998, AGOCORP Corporate made a fundamental and transformative IS strategy and 
systems decision; they chose to replace their utility system (W ALKER) with the ERP system 
SAP [Note: a fuller account of AGOCORP'S SAP history will follow in Section 6.10]. At 
that time, NOVOCORP were given the opportunity to adopt SAP and participate fully in the 
implementation, but instead opted for AGRESSO as a more suitable alternative (RAF, 
Interview 38, 2). The rationale for this decision has nuanced differences when explained from 
NOVOCORP and AGOCORP viewpoints. 
The commonly held view by NOVOCORP interviewees was that the decision was made on 
three different criteria: firstly, that the proposed SAP implementation would be too costly for 
a cost conscious consultancy (RAF, Interview 27, 2) and secondly that a rigid system like 
SAP would not be appropriate for NOVOCORP who had very distinct and often customer-
dictated business process requirements around timesheet entry and billing in particular (RAF, 
Interview 4, 12). Very clear process differences had already been embedded in NOVOCORP 
to reflect this (e.g. the different accounting system approach as discussed). Thirdly, at the 
time this system decision was made, ERP systems were not as common or as proven as they 
are today, whereas AGRESSO was being adopted freely, by many substantially sized 
organisations and seen to be working and being supported successfully (RAF, Interview 38, 
2). The AGOCORP views canvassed, echoed these opinions, but added some additional 
insights. The SAP system being introduced in AGOCORP was replacing WALKER, a legacy 
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system, which did not exist in NOVOCORP, so the dependencies and issues that were 
fundamental to the AGOCORP implementation did not apply in the case of NOVOCORP 
(RAF, Interview 39, 2). Although the lack of dependencies may have made for a smoother 
transition onto SAP for NOVOCORP, there wao;; the possible view (identified retrospectively) 
that adding NOVOCORP to the vast implementation already underway in AGOCORP would 
have created additional risk 3 (RAF, Interview 39, 2). Allied to this, the then held view that 
NOVOCORP was likely to be permanently independent may have further legitimised the 
decision of NOVOCORP to opt for an alternate system. The attitudes and agendas of senior 
management in both organisations in the making of this momentous decision in 1999 are 
open to multiple post-rational interpretations, though as one interviewee remarked: 'The 
decision to go down the AGRESSO route was probably taken within NOVOCORP and I'm 
not sure how well it was challenged to be honest .... " (RAF, Interview 9, 4). As shall be seen, 
whatever the rationale, it proved to be a fateful decision that hao;; (and continues to) prove 
enormously challenging and costly to undo. 
6.6.2.2 Uses of the AGRESSO system. 
Although the AGRESSO system was utilised4 by every one of the 1,100 or so employees in 
NOVOCORP, the nature and level of use varied dramatically. For a typical employee, their 
only interaction with the system was to enter their weekly timesheets (RAF, Interview 4, 13). 
For the main employee cohort, it was critical to associate time worked with appropriate job 
numbers that they had worked on in the given period. Within these AGRESSO timesheets, 
employees have to also detail the work done on each project by activity, with multiple 
activity codes available for selection. Without accurate timesheet entry, the invoicing and 
3 Unfortunately the project manager for the original AGOCORP SAP implementation had long retired and was 
not available for interview. 
4 Legally, NOVOCORP is composed of approximately seventy different statutory entities which were 90% 
serviced by AGRESSO (RAF A, Interview 8,1) 
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billing processes could not work either efficiently or accurately. Team leaders and 
managers and members of the finance and HR functions, in addition to having to also enter 
timesheets, had additional motivations and expectations in terms of using the system. In 
some cases, their system uses overlapped, but the focus would be different: an example given 
(RAF, Interview 38, 4) and expanded upon below was how AGRESSO might be used to help 
manage certain projects underway in NOVOCORP on behalf of NETWORKS. 
For these hypothetical projects (say PI and P2), all the employees on a certain Friday input 
the time worked for these projects (which have their own intelligent job numbers) into 
AGRESSO. In addition, they also manually fill out claim forms for any expenses undertaken 
whilst working on these projects. All NOVOCORP staff are paid and have their expenses 
reimbursed from AGOCORP Corporate and therefore the entered timesheets and claim forms 
have to be processed somehow by the parent who operate on SAP and not AGRESSO. In 
NOVOCORP's HR department, dedicated administrators input these AGRESSO time sheets 
and claim forms manually into the AGOCORP SAP system (RAF, Interview 7, 15). A team 
leader responsible for these specific projects could use AGRESSO to find out how much was 
owed for each of these projects through using specific relevant job numbers which can be 
matched to the timesheets already entered by the employees. A key account manager would 
need to be able to ascertain how much was owed across their particular responsibility. These 
invoices are then routed to the requesting customer via the AP function in NOVOCORP 
Finance and are checked on receipt by NETWORKS who when satisfied reimburse 
NOVOCORP through the NOVOCORP AR finance function. This happens on a weekly 
basis until month-end. At this point, NOVOCORP's finance department which has a different 
accounting structure to the parent has to reconcile accounts in AGRESSO with those of the 
parent which are on SAP and once all the financial information is captured from AGRESSO 
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particular manner preferred by certain customers (RAF, Interview 34, 9). These ad-hoc 
systems were developed in isolation reflecting the different needs of NOVOCORP's 
divisions; i.e. certain divisions developed their own databases independently, and often 
entailed substantial investment (refer: RAF, Interview 20, 4). Despite the opportunity and 
development costs associated with these add-ons, there was neglible emotional attachment to 
these add-ons with one manager clearly stating that "For us, it was a necessary evil and we 
had no great desire to do it. We're painfUlly aware that for us the ACCESS database is a 
large risk.." (RAP, Interview 20, 5). Given the level of intervention and manipulation 
required to use AGRESSO on a day-to-day basis, user views on the system were unlikely to 
be overly supportive. 
6.6.2.3 User Views on AGRESSO. 
"/ can remember a colleague of mine years ago talking about AGRESSO and he had a great 
phase; it's not user seductive, never mind user friendliness!" (RAP, Interview 20, 3). 
Although AGRESSO was initially accepted well when first implemented in the late 1990s, 
problems quickly began to emerge when NOVOCORP's level of business began to grow. 
The level of manual intervention and control rose exponentially in parallel with one 
interviewee commenting: "The problems staned to emerge as the business grew - we had 4 
in Finance when I staned, now there's 32 ... The volume of transactions just grew and the 
system wasn't able to cope and the suppon wasn't there ... " (RAP, Interview 38, 3). 
AGRESSO seemed to work well with smaller volumes of data and transactions and had 
certain flexibility but lacked scalability and robustness; one interviewee used the following 
appropriate analogy: "AGRESSO ;s like a little speedboat out in Dun Laoghire harbour, you 
know. The users love it, you can up and running and into it quickly, you can zip around the 
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harbour but as soon as you go oW a hit further ... The minute AGRESSO gets outside the 
harbour walls and is hit hy a big nm'e it flips m·er .. .. (RAF. Interview 5. 3). 
The manager users seemed to find the system particularly fru·;trating with one commenting 
that: "/ mean for an occasional user like me. AGRESSO is a nightmare hut for a more 
professional user it prohahly offers more in tenTl.'i of extracting data and report generation ... " 
(RAE Interview 20. 2).The issue of support and technical maintenance was an ongoing issue 
although NOVOCORP hired full-time AGRESSO support (one individual) to provide some 
helpdesk functionality for staff. Although the system could he adapted to allow for some 
user-driven functionality (ref: RAE Interview .3X). system upgrades were unavailable that 
would have alleviated the back-end intervention required: "/ mea/l we ahHlYs just had 
AGRESSO 2./7 - n'e ne\'er got an AGRESSO 3 or .J.O which lHH needed .m in that sense, )'oU 
had an issue as to upgrades .. " (RAE Interview 21. .3). In addition. there was ongoing 
uncertainty as to the stability of the system platform: "/ heliere that the platform that 
AGRESSO is huilt on is not stahle. and if it went dmnl. rou could fose all the data ... / don't 
understand it but I'm led to helie\'e that's the case ..... (RAF. Interview 23 . .3). 
The overall attitude to the system was uniformly negative ("No one would say it's 
(AGRESSO) easy to use" (RAF. Interview 15.4» with some interviewees openly hostile to 
the system: i.e. "/ certainly hope within the organi.mtion that nohody is arguing that it be 
retained as it's a cumhersome system. pretty user hostile .\·yHem" (RAF. Interview 6. 12). By 
far the biggest concern for users regardless of their business function was the lack of veracity 
of data outputs which affected the quality of reporting and the overall reliability of the 
system: "AGRESSO is not always accurate and as a m£l1lager looking at reports, .wme of the 
timesheet and expense data might not always he there ... " (RAF. Interview B . .3). 
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Repeatability of output wa al 0 an i ue with interviewee often commenting that the same 
report run by different people or with identical parameter would output or detail different 
and even conflicting data: ' ... You'd get the report back but the figure might not make sense 
or what I'm looking for ... omeone else on the team could do the same thing and get a 
differentfigure ... " (RAF, Interview 38, 3). To ummarise, there was little love for AGRESSO 
and the u er population were open to a replacement system ("/ was delighted (to hear it 
would be replaced) ... ", (RAF, Interview 29, 3» but a the following conversation indicates, 
there was a certain amount of u er apprehen ion: "Would there be much emotional 
attachment to ACRE SO ? More emotional detachment - most people want to see the back of 
it to be hone t but SAP might not be much better ... " (RAF, Interview 34, 2). 
6.7 AGO CORP and OVOcORP: The IS relationship. 
The IS relation hip between AGOCORP and NOVOCORP has three core components, and is 
a relation hip common to all other bu ine unit within the group. Firstly, AGOCORP acts 
as the provider of an IS trategy framework for NOVOCORP (which will be discussed more 
at a later point)· the AGOCORP ICT Group a a provider of IT skills and competence in the 
undertaking of y tern implementation (RAF, Interview 9, 1) and fmally AGOCORP ICT 
Group a the provider of oftware and AGOCORP IT Operations as the provider of IT 
hardware (RAF, Interview 40, 1). With re pect to AGRESSO, the ICT group provide and 
support the BCS interface that enable account con olidation with AGOCORP's Financial 
SAP y tern; that i the urn total of their involvement and awareness of AGRESSO (RAF, 
Interview 40 2). The ICT group contain approximately 200 staff (RAF, Interview 48,5) and 
incorporate a dedicated SAP competency centre. A can be een in the following table, the 
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IS ervice provided centrally to (and paid for by) OVOCORP amount to a relati ely mall 
proportion of AGOCORP lCT Group' overall workJoad and revenue generation: 
Unit of AGOCORP Group Contribution to ICf Group R venue/workload 
Customer Billing Systems SO 
AGOCORP Networks 30 
Generation 10 ( nlil rompt IrOt' ('t nln du\ In Ihr numht r (If hie p< kt ~ ~ Itm ) 
NOVOCORP ' 10 
Table 6.1: AGOCORP ICT Group: estimated workload/revenue contribution by 
business unit. 
(Adapted from RAF, Interview 40, 1 and additional follow-up clarification) 
NOVOCORP have moved from a po ition of having their own IT department in-hou e and 
having the ability to electively out- ource as they aw fit to IT as a hared ervice (RAF, 
Interview 2, 2). Senior management who moved from AGOCORP to OVO ORP percer ed 
a preference for the former mode of operation di agreeing with the commonly-held view that 
external provider were uperior to centrally provided ervice: "hi toricaLly NOVOCORP 
would have alway wanted to do their own thing and would have con ide red external 
providers to be far more efficient and far-reaching than the internal (corporate) provider. I 
wouldn't really see it that way. I would see that the internal provider onl ha NOVOCORP's 
interests at heart if you know what I mean ... " (RAF, Interview 2, 5). 
However, interviewee were critical of the central ICT ervice provided (' "/ wouldn't feel 
that (the service is good) to be honest but the people who provide the support eem to think 
6 Note: with the absorption of Generation into NOVOCORP, NOVOCORP's workload and revenue contribution 
to AGOCORP ICT Group has effectively doubled. 
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that it has" (RAF, Interview 15, 8», which often echoed the cultural and process differences 
between AGOCORP and NOVOCORP already discussed. For example, the cost of the 
service provided was often raised as an issue, i.e. "we've been paying for all supporting and 
other AGOCORP (IT) systems for years and there's a feeling that we've been paying too 
much and we could streamline our overheads and charge-out costs ... " (RAF, Interview 7, 
15). The understandable focus for the ICT group to support the utility and utility supply 
systems, relegated the importance of the more specialist bespoke systems utilised by 
NOVOCORP (RAP, Interview 46, 2). The IS procurement and governance procedures 
inherited by all the business units from the parent were also criticised with some interviewees 
feeling that IS was the thin end of the wedge in terms of the changing relationship between 
AGOCORP and NOVOCORP; "People resented it - there were other systems and 
procedures and approval systems apart from fT altogether ... fT was just one in a series of new 
systems and changes ... " (RAF, Interview 46, 2). 
However, there was a reasonable consensus at all levels within NOVOCORP that the service 
'levels had improved (RAF, Interview 46, 2) and that they had been a more serious issue in 
the recent past: "They were giving out about the fT services and in that scenario, you need to 
spend time talking about these issues ... " (RAF, Interview 11, 4). Service levels had been a 
serious issue for managers; as one senior employee commented: "loud voices were shouting 
and it was confusing and colouring our real strategic (IS) objectives ... " (RAF, Interview 1, 
2). Issues with the service provided was not limited to just NOVOCORP and prompted the 
creation and appointment of a Business Process lIT Manager role across all the business 
units. In the case of NOVOCORP, she was a former parent employee who took on the service 
issue as a priority to be resolved with her ability to leverage prior connections instrumental in 
alleviating service concerns: "I suppose that bringing people over from the corporate ICT 
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function to work here has helped and that was an argument made (jar their moving over) at 
the time. The relationship that they have (with former colleagues) and so on has helped and it 
has certainly improved (the relationship) ... " (RAF. Interview 6. 16). 
Although AGOCORP leT group also provide direct staff and support for IS implementation, 
NOVOCORP had been relatively implementation independent up to this point. However, as 
many of their customers were internal and operated on systems the ICT group had helped 
implement. there were some views on how implementations were managed (i.e. RAF, 
Interview 2. II). Managers. a key constituency in the alignment process. had been exposed to 
some problematic implementations (the XYZ SAP system in particular). which would prove 
to be a serious issue to overcome during the system changeover. As one interviewee 
commented: "They (the managers) would definitely have issues with how AGRESSO is used, 
how usable it is but they also hear the horror stories surrounding SAP implementation in 
AGOCORP in the past ..... (RAF. Interview 7. 5). 
6.8 History of SAP Implementation in AGOCORP. 
Once the AGOCORP group had made the decision to move over from WALKER to SAP in 
1998, it was the beginning of a decade (and more) of large-scale SAP development to the 
point where in 2010, the AGOCORP ICT group had responsibility for 18 different SAP 
systems (RAF, Interview 39, 2). The initial SAP system was designed to be enterprise-wide 
but with a sole focus on the financial processes within the organisation. As the 
implementation was being scoped. the importance and logic of adding materials processes to 
the system become clear, with the realisation that for example. the procurement of materials 
had financial consequences (RAF, Interview 39. 2). 
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The resulting SAP system known as the Financials and Materials Information System (or 
ABeD) went live in late 19991 and retrospectively has acquired almost mythical status in the 
history of AGOCORP systems; as one interviewee remarked: ''''I worked on the original SAP 
implementation back in 2000 and that was one of the best projects ever not only in 
AGOCORP but also internationally in terms of the outcomes, the resources, the caliber of 
people involved was second to none ..... (RAF, Interview 16, 5). The impact on day-to-day 
business that was tolerated was unlikely to be ever again replicated, e.g. no accounts were 
filed for three months during a critical phase in the implementation (RAF, Interview 5, 8). 
With utility market deregulation was initiated in the early 2000s, AGOCORP faced another 
important strategic IS decision. Deregulation (or Market opening) fundamentally would have 
one long-term consequence: domestic customers who formerly had no choice but to be a 
customer of AGOCORP would be free to move to another supplier. However, AGOCORP 
Networks would still be responsible for maintaining the utility network: a system 
configuration would have to be developed that would facilitate this mass movement of 
customers, whilst still facilitating the roles of AGOCORP Networks. AGOCORP decided to 
implement a new additional SAP system that would split their existing customer systems into 
two - one system would retain the customer billing data whereas another would retain a list 
of all the customer addresses and the respective network points. If a customer wanted to leave 
the AGOCORP to move to another provider, all the customer had to do was supply their 
account details and both the customer and Networks systems could be changed to reflect this 
(RAF, Interview 40, 4). This system split went live in 2004 and was known as the Market 
7 Timing of implementation was strongly influenced by Y2K concerns (ref: RAF A, 
Interview 39, 3). 
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Opening Information Systems Project (or XXYY) and as of 2012, is one of the largest IT 
project ever undertaken nationally (RAF, Interview 39,4). 
In 2007, as SAP has a modular structure, a decision was made to implement a HR solution 
(RAF, Interview 40, 4) which after a delay became the Payroll and HR project (or P and 
HR). As part of this implementation, NOVOCORP's HR Department moved over to SAP 
and until the absorption of GENCOM in March 2010, were the only part of NOVOCORP 
fully integrated into SAP (RAF, Interview 18, 1). There was a consensus that this 
implementation was not considered to have been that successful and there was some concern 
that the forthcoming AGRESSO to SAP changeover could be perceptually affected by the 
outcomes of the P and HR implementation; "Now the question might be (jor this project) 
might be, how do we not become P and HR ... (?)" (RAF, Interview 5, 12). After a long 
planning phase, it was then AGOCORP Networks's tum to acquire two critical systems 
which would also be SAP implementations. 
AGOCORP Networks are responsible for managing the utility supply infrastructure and had 
two pressing system requirements, systems that would be complimentary and interdependent. 
They required a system that would enable them to manage the purchase of raw materials for 
the construction and maintenance of utility assets nationally, essentially a work management 
system. This system would have to have to be able to integrate with ABCD and also with 
another system that could store the details for all the utility assets around the country 
managed by Networks (RAF, Interview 40, 4). This latter Asset Repository and Maintenance 
SAP System (or NUG) was implemented first and then followed by the XYZ SAP system. 
The XYZ implementation proved to be enormously problematic: "What a disaster (XYZ 
was} ... lt was an experience ... we don't seem to be able to learn from these projects at all ... " 
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(RAF, Interview 29, 5). It run wildly over budget (the budget actually doubled due to the 
number of issues that arose (RAF, Interview 7, 5» and it was delayed by six months8 (RAF, 
Interview 3, 8). This resulted in the AGRESSO to SAP implementation (planned to be next) 
being delayed by a year. The implementation issues did not just impact Networks; 
NOVOCORP as a provider of asset support and maintenance services to Networks were also 
exposed to these issues. Bearing in mind that most NOVOCORP had never experienced SAP 
as users or been party to an implementation, it proved to be a troubling experience. Many 
managers interviewed, remarked on how it had coloured their views and feelings on SAP, 
with many being forced to assign staff to manually interact with XYZ in order to support 
their service for Networks; "It's increased our administrative workload by a lot and we've 
probably had to recruit two additional people - so we've seen the administrative burden that 
SAP places .... " (RAF, Interview 20, 10). 
Some NOVOCORP managers were forced to engage with XYZ in highly elaborate ways. For 
example, the system did not allow users to requisition any materials without precise details of 
an assets' location. In many cases, this was unknown but in order to use the system, managers 
had to enter fictional asset locations (even in the Irish Sea!) in order to get materials ordered 
(RAF, Interview 29, 6). The causes of the XYZ implementation issues were broadly 
attributed to insufficient project governance and engagement (RAF, Interview 4, 17) and the 
inability to get consensus on a system design (RAF, Interview 40, 5). To summarise, despite 
a decade of mostly strong SAP implementation success, the last two SAP implementations 
that affected NOVOCORP, P and HR and XYZ, were not considered successes (particularly 
the latter) neither from financial or functional control perspectives. In addition, despite the 
8 Without evidence of the network being managed and maintained, the Regulator can impose flnes on 
AGOCORP, hence the importance of this system. 
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levels of SAP experience and expertise, there was a concern as to whether the experience had 
been retained within the organisation either through lessons learnt reports post-project or as 
key staff retired: "OK you might write the key things down but .... ·ou do it in such a generic 
way that it probably reflects how you do things anyway ... " (RAF. Interview 5, 11). The 
spectre of XYZ (and also P and HR but to a far lesser degree) would loom over the 
AGRESSO to SAP implementation process that was to follow. 
SystemlProject Year Unit !Function Impacted System Rationale 
ABCD 1999 All AGOCORP Group (except Legacy system replacement 
NOVOCORP) with SAP ERP. 
XXYY 2004 AGOCORP Customer BillinglNetworks Satisfy Market 
Openi nglRegulatory 
Requirements. 
PandHR 2007 ALL AGOCORP Group and !'iOV(X::ORP Implementation of SAP HR 
HR Module 
NUG 2008 AGOCORP Networks A ~ ' > C t t Management 
XYZ 2008-9 AGOCORP Networb As'>Ct Work-f-low management 
Financials and HR' 2010 NOVOCORP Replacement of AGRESSO; 
Trial run of SAP LDS module 
. Table 6.2: SAP Implementations in AGOCORP: a chronological overview. 
6.9 IS Strategy in AGOCORP and NOVOCORP. 
"One of the things about the IT strategy, one of the areas where it needs to be strong and 
perhaps even stronger over here (NOVOCORP), and it certainly was a weakness in the past, 
the odd time, is individual businesses processes here or business units here tending to go it 
alone when it came to IT decision making. They needed to be reined back in and (told) 'We 
need to do this together; we need to do this collaboratively ' ... " (RAF. Interview 3, 2). 
IS strategy in both NOVOCORP and the wider AGOCORP group is now discussed with an 
initial focus on how the strategy is formulated and evaluated. identifying the key roles 
involved. The importance and practice of IS governance across the group is then considered. 
9 The formal project title given to the AGRESSO to SAP changeover. 
Interviewee's views on the current level and extent of alignment of business and IS strategies 
in NOVOCORP is then considered. 
6.9.1 Strategy formulation, evaluation and key roles. 
As discussed, one of the three key IS relationships between AGOCORP and NOVOCORP is 
as a provider of a "broad framework for IT strategy within the group and for all business 
units that pertain to that group ... " (RAF, Interview 1, 1). The formulated strategies "which 
would be aligned with the business unit strategies and (each business unit) implement them in 
conjunction with the corporate IT function ... "(RAF, Interview 1, 1). Each business unit has 
independent input into their respective IS strategy which feeds back into the overall group IS 
strategy. The creation and delivery of IS strategy across the AGOCORP Group underwent a 
sea change in the mid 2000s, when firstly, IT support became a shared service hosted 
centrally (RAF, Interview 10, 2) and it was also decided (at group level) that each business 
unit would have a separate Business Process and IT manager, with more of an emphasis on 
the IT component of the role (RAF, Interview 2, 1). Given its long-standing systems 
independence, unsurprisingly NOVOCORP was the last business unit to acquire and appoint 
a BPIIT manager, who was reassigned from the parent (RAF, Interview 40, 3). The role of the 
BPIIT manager is strongly strategic in nature: "it was about really putting a shape on IT 
across the organisation; defining an IT strategy for the company and directing that strategy 
and putting IT governance in place also ... " (RAF, Interview 2, 1). In specific terms, the role 
can be described as having three key components (RAF, Interview 2, 2): firstly, they act as an 
intermediary between the business unit and the central services provision in the case of 
system issues, secondly, they implement and manage IS governance across the business unit 
in compliance with AGOCORP Group standards (which will be discussed momentarily) and 
lastly, they are principal authors of the IS strategy in the business unit; "The strategy is 
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effectively the BPIIT manager's. She came up with it ..... (RAF. Interview I. 15). The delivery 
of the IS strategy from business unit to group and vice-versa is facilitated by the BP-IT 
manager and other key senior management stakeholders' membership of the three-tier IS 
governance structures in the organisation. Not only does the SP-IT manager have 
responsibility for strategy construction. governance and communication. there is also an 
evaluation responsibility. As a member of the senior management team In NOVOCORP 
outlined: 'The BPIIT manager reports to the Senior ManaKement Team on the peiformance 
of the strateg.\', where she is on the strateg.\', what needs to he chanKed aholll the strategy and 
specifically, there would he a project dashhoard and she "'(mld report on specific projects 
that would he the emhodiment of the strategy .... · (RAF. Interview I. 2). Although each 
business unit in the group has a SPIlT manager. their impact and value can vary: the impact 
of the NOVOCORP SPlIT manager was strongly praised within the business unit ("we're 
very lucky to have her and she applies mas.\·i\'e enerKY to the joh ..... (RAF. Interview I, 4», 
given that in the words of one senior manager: hin fairness to the (NOVOCORP) IT and 
Business Process people, they hare a pretty small resource for lin orKlIni.wtion of over a 
thousand people ..... (RAF. Interview 6. 9). 
6.9.2 NOVOCORP's key strategic IS objectives. 
As part of the wide-ranging IS strategy changes implemented group-wide in 2005/6. each 
business unit had the opportunity to undertake a strategic review project. NOVOCORP 
engaged an external implementation partner as part of this process. In December 2007, 
documents outlining the implementation plan and target application architecture \0 were 
presented to the NOVOCORP senior management team. The implementation plan outlined 
10 The researcher was given copies of both of these documents and they are drawn from in this section's 
discussion. However, for reasons of confidentiality (i.e. detailed financial information), they could not be 
included in the thesis. 
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and espoused the key formal strategic IS objectives for the next three year period (2008 to 
2011) [Note: with the knock-on delay of the XYZ implementation, the plan covered the 
period 2008-12 rather than 2008-11]. The time period and length for the implementation of 
the plan was not random: off the record comments by senior management in both AGOCORP 
and NOVOCORP would indicate that this three to four year time period would be critical in 
the implementation of structures and systems that would more closely integrate AGOCORP 
and NOVOCORP. As a enior manager in NOVOCORP commented; "But (in) five years 
time will it (IS strategy) be quite as important? I'm not sure it would, to be blunt now ... " 
(RAF, Interview 1, 4). Drawing on these confidential documents, off the record comments 
and interviewee descriptions (RAF, Interviews 1 and 2), it is possible to further describe these 
five key strategic objectives. 
AGRESSO 
repl •• "" nt by SAP 
Implement"'n of 
_newETllM 
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Figure 6.2: NOVOCORP's five key strategic IS objectives (2008-2011). 
As the issue of centrally provided IT support has been discussed and both the AGRESSO to 
SAP changeover and IS governance will be, the two remaining strategic IS objectives will 
now be briefly con idered. With full connectivity with the UK market, NOVOCORP were 
keen to develop a suitable system that would enable them to manage trading in both the Irish 
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and UK markets (RAF, Interview 1, 7). Such a system is known as an Trading Risk 
Management System (or TRM). Although an expensive investment (RAF, Interview 6, 9) the 
system had one important difference with respect to the Financials and HR project: the level 
of impact. Every employee in NOVOCORP will have used AGRESSO to some degree and 
they all will also have to use the replacement SAP solution. However. in the case of the TRM 
system, use will be limited and relevant to those working in the area. Expensive and strategic 
though the system will be. its levels of real process impact would be marginal. ll 
The often unheralded final strategic objective was the ongoIng scanning that the BPIIT 
manager in NOVOCORP undertakes to examine ongoing IS system developments externally 
that could improve employee productivity. Such scanning activities involved liaising with 
leading international software and system providers and presenting outcomes of such 
interactions and system prototypes internally and in suitable governance fora (ref: RAP, 
Interview 1, 10-11). 
6.9.3 IS Governance. 
IS governance across the AGOCORP Group has acquired a serious significance since the 
formal reorganisation of the group IT strategy and support structures in the mid 2000s. The 
AGOCORP group has attributed such an importance to IS governance that it is considered to 
be a business leader in the area nationally (RAF. Interview 9. I). IS governance structures 
will be described on a group-wide level first and then the impact of the relevant practices in 
NOVOCORP will be specifically discussed. 
11 The researcher was offered the alternative opportunity to research the ETRM implementation but declined 
principally on these grounds. 
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6.9.3.1 IS Governance in the AGOCORP Group. 
"What governance/or me is about making sure that AGOCORP'S IT investments are 
aligned with the business strategy, nothing more beyond that ... " 
AGOCORP Group ClO (RAF, Interview 9, 1) 
The AGOCORP group has a defined IS governance section 12 which works in tandem with 
the ICf group and three other specific corporate councils to mandate and monitor IS 
governance practices across the entire group. These three specific entities are the ISIIT 
Leadership and the (more junior) ISIIT Technical councils (RAF. Interview 39, 12) with an 
additional layer of governance applying to each business unit which have their own Business 
Councils. 
The Leadership council is led by the CIO and includes senior management from across all the 
business units13 and from the ICf group, and addresses governance and high-level technical 
issues. The technical council addresses more specific system issues and is chaired by the 
Chief Technical Officer (CfO) from ICT group and includes all BPIIT managers from across 
the different business units (RAF. Interview 39. 12). The BPIIT managers chair the business 
councils in their respective business units which also involve members of the senior 
management and representative users: 
12 Both the NOVOCORP BP/IT Manager and the Financials and HR Project Manager came from this IS 
Governance section. 
13 NOVOCORP are represented by the Senior Financial Controller. 
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IICT Group common membership 
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I BP/IT Manager common m m bership 
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Figure 6.3: AGO CORP Group: IS Governance tructur . 
As can be seen from the ummary diagram above, the governance tructure are de igned to 
facilitate the parallel flow and control of both governance control and IT i ue. Typically 
the council meet both once a fi cal month and once a fi cal quarter and the equence of 
meeting is important. Ideally, the bu ine council would meet fi t and the e are chiefly 
populated by non-IT taff (RAP, Interview 3, 2) and at the e meeting , i ue pecific to the 
busines unit (i.e. the Financials and HR project in ova ORP, XYZ in etwork) would 
be di cussed. Any pre ing IT i ue or relevant development are then brought by the 
busine s unit' BPIIT manager to the technical council meeting (ref: RAF, Interview 2) 
where these issues can be di cu ed on a more technical level wi th the CTO and other 
technical taff and in addition with BPIIT manager from the other bu ine unjt . The CTO 
and representative of the IS governance and technical taff then it on the leader hip council 
where along with the chair (the CIa), they pre ent up-to-date figure and dashboard on IT 
u age, y tern development etc to enior management from aero the group (RAF, 
Interview 9, 1). A the e enior manager are al 0 member of their own bu ine council 
they will be in a position to further detail any i ue that ari e that are more pecific to their 
bu ine unit (Ref: RAP 1, Interview 1). Any new I governance, trategy or y tern 
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initiatives can be cascaded down this structure and elaborated on by the CTO, Senior 
management and the BPIIT management layer. 
6.9.3.2 IS Governance in practice in NOVOCORP. 
"In NOVOCORP, governance has the commitment and is maybe stricter than in 
other business units but that's a project environment ... " 
Senior AGO CORP ICT Group Manager 
(RAF, Interview 40, 3). 
As previously discussed, the onset of these group-wide IS Governance structures and 
protocols has radically altered the procurement of new IS systems in NOVOCORP. The 
emphasis on IS governance has been critical in moving the IS systems mentality of 
NOVOCORP from an "IS islands" approach more to one where strong rationales and 
justifications must be provided for any proposed development; as one interviewee remarked: 
"in the old days, if we wanted to buy a new system, we'd just go away and do it ... " (RAF, 
Interview 18, 4). Although there was some lamenting for the old freer ways ("They are a 
victim of their own culture - we're used to having come from a more manual card-driven 
process to getting the software and adapting it to our own needs .... " (RAF, Interview 14,2», 
some interviewees appreciated the systems visibility that governance had brought to the 
business unit; "The business has a much better view of IT then it used to .... " (RAF, Interview 
11, 11). With respect to the Financials and HR project, one interviewee observed that under 
the prior approach that ''five years ago you'd be told SAP is turned on and AGRESSO is gone 
and that's that ... " (RAF, Interview 14, 7). 
Although some interviewees felt that the new approach was a deterrent to systems 
development (i.e. RAF, Interview 46), others felt that although it was a rigorous process, it 
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was transparent and fair: "You generally go to IT or BP (Business Process) here with your 
homework done and (if you) don't treat it like a fait accompli, you generally get a fair 
hearing and support ... " (RAF, Interview 20, 5). Considering the effort expended in designing 
and maintaining the governance processes across the group and within business units and its 
clear link to strategy formulation and implementation, it is worthwhile to consider the views 
expressed as to the level of strategic IS alignment within the business unit and wider group. 
6.9.4 Views on Business and IS Strategy alignment in AGOCORP and NOVOCORP. 
"We're not an IT house; IT should not decide the strategies we should take; 
It's the other way around. IT strate g)' on!. .... really supports the business 
decisions we may have. It's an enabler rather than a driver ... " 
(RAF. Interview 3. I) 
Given the strong governance culture and processes built-in to IS strategy development and 
implementation, there was a strong confidence (certainly at senior management level across 
the group) that the level of alignment between Business and IS strategies are fundamentally 
high (ref: RAF, Interview 1; RAF, Interview 9), The governance practices necessitate that the 
IS strategy must be agreed to by the senior management in each business unit (RAF, 
Interview 1, 13) which in the views of many senior managers both on and off the record, 
naturally enhance the level of alignment. Given the former systems independence of 
NOVOCORP, unsurprisingly many engineering managers felt differently with one remarking 
that: "So when we talk about business and IS strategy being aligned, there are certain parts 
of the business where they are very closely aligned and parts where they're not .... " (RAF, 
Interview 6, 3). In the candid words of another senior interviewee; "There was a certain 
amount of adhocracy about (IT)in the past, there was a complete lack of standardisation in 
terms of how IT was presented; engineering would have done it's thing, other parts would 
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have done something completely different with no real move towards standardising it as 
such .... " (RAF, Interview 4, 1). 
Regardless of their views on the level of alignment, interviewees were virtually unanimous in 
viewing business strategy as the driver of IS strategy ("Well, there may be misalignment 
between the two (i.e. business and IT strategy), but business strategy definitely comesfirst ... " 
(RAF, Interview 6, 2» and that the strategic and governance changes implemented in the 
prior 5 years or so had strengthened the hegemony of business strategy: "over the last five or 
six years (there has been afocus on) getting systems in place that support the business rather 
than getting systems in and seeing where we (they) can support the business ... " (RAF, 
Interview 4, 1). Although there were critical observations with respect to the levels of 
strategic alignment, external observers were more positive with one stating that "I would feel 
it's quite strong in NOVOCORP to be honest. Having seen other business units (within 
NOVOCORP), I would feel this would be one of the stronger ones .... " (RAF, Interview 3, I). 
Financial managers and employees however somewhat departed from this view, with a 
fmancial controller particularly identifying the level of intervention required to align the 
fmancial activities in NOVOCORP with the parent: "I think it's a relatively good alignment. I 
think there's a difficulty in terms of what we need internally from our own business units and 
what the AGOCORP Group finance want in terms of the level and method of reporting .... " 
(RAF, Interview 8, 8). The BPIIT manager for the business unit also critically commented on 
the decoupling of the business and the IS strategy ("It's probably not (the IT strategy) where 
it should be. Where I would like to see it is as an integral part of the business strategy 
(formulation) process. But, it's definitely not there yet ... " and how she in her own words, 
strove to "stitch it (together) anyway ... " (Both from RAF, Interview 2, 3). To summarise, 
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despite the strong governance practices in place, the view within NOVOCORP was that the 
levels of strategic alignment internal to the business and external to the group, although 
improving, needed further enhancement. (As shall be seen in detail), the Financials and HR 
project was intended as a vehicle for this enhancement: "Why are we doing this? I mean the 
clear answer I got back was we're doing this to line-up our (NOVOCORP) systems with 
those of head office which seems to make sense with having a strategy of having an 
integrated company". (RAF, Interview 14,4). 
6.10 Chapter Summary. 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide organizational context. A very brief history of 
AGOCORP was briefly presented followed by a description of the critical market changes 
brought about due to deregulation. The background and limited detail on AGOCORP's new 
strategic and structural initiatives (i.e. Financial Efficiency Project and GTS) which will be 
revisited in the next chapter were also explained. The founding of NOVOCORP and its 
ongoing and changing relationship with its parent AGOCORP was then considered with a 
particular focus on cultural and process and operational differences that have emerged over 
their joint history. The history of IS implementation in NOVOCORP was then discussed, 
looking in detail at the uses of and views on the AGRESSO system whose changeover to 
SAP will be the alignment narrative of interest in the succeeding chapter. The IS support 
given to NOVOCORP by AGOCORP, the development of IS strategies and the importance 
and practice of IS governance was then discussed. The chapter then concluded with a 
discussion of employee's views on the level and nature of Business and IS strategy alignment 
in NOVOCORP. 
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Chapter 7: 
Moving from AGRESSO to SAP in NOVOCORP: 
A Strategic IS alignment narrative. 
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7.1 Introduction. 
"As a narrative form, strategy seems to stand somewhere between theatrical drama, the 
historical novel, futurist fantasy and autobiography" (Barry and Elmes, 1997; 5) 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the organisational case study which is indicative of the 
given quote, in describing the p a ~ t , , present and the considered future of key events in the 
implementation of a new SAP ERP system to replace an existing AGRESSO system within 
NOVOCORP. The case study is the outcome of 17 months of in-depth longitudinal qualitative 
data collection. The resultant c a ~ e e narrative therefore, affords a rigorous consideration of the 
processes involved as the organisation strove to align business and IS strategy. The 
implementation of the SAP system is then presented as a polyphonic narrative using the formal 
six stages of SAP implementation as a chronological framework for structuring the description. It 
should be noted at this point that the case narrative is deliberately written with an emphasis on 
rich description, with no theoretical engagement and/or practical analyses, which are considered 
in depth in the subsequent analyses and discussion chapters. Principal data sources are utilised 
and accessed in a similar fashion to the previous chapter. A narrative description of the 
implementation process will now follow temporally bounded by the six defined stages in SAP 
implementation (as per the ASAP Roadmap) I and focusing on the key experiences of 
organisational actors at multiple levels of the organisation. 
1 The ASAP Roadmap consists of six defined stages: Project Preparation and Mobilisation, Business Process 
Blueprinting, Realisation, Final preparation, Go-live and Support and Continuous Improvement. 
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7.2 The implementation begins: Project Preparation and Mobilisation (Dec 2009-
February 2010). 
The first phase emphasises the need to define project goals and objectives, scope the project 
appropriately, (which includes the identification of project risks), clarify and define project 
schedule, implementation, resources and personnel. 
7.2.1 Project Goals, objectives and functional Scope. 
"The core reason for providing and installing an integrated package is that in order 
to maximise the benefits of shared services. that it is necessary to break down 
departmental barriers ... " 
(RAF, Interview 39,3) 
Changing over AGRESSO to SAP was a key business and IS strategic objective; "One of the key 
aspects of strategy was to ensure that that (SAP) would be put into place and that has (will) been 
done ... " (RAF, Interview 1, 8). As part of the implementation plan for IS strategy, several key 
targeted benefits (Page 15) that would accrue for both NOVOCORP and the wider AGOCORP 
Group, due to the Financials and HR project, were identified. These benefits informed the 
business strategy and case for the implementation and could be segregated on business and 
technical benefits. The technical benefits included both an enhanced application support and 
technical environment and the more effective use of IT resources: in the words of a senior leT 
group manager, "SAP is an expensive system and AGOCORP will want to sweat that asset has 
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much as they can ... " (RAF, Interview 40, 4). The project would enable "compliance with 
AGOCORP IT strategy" (Page 1 5 ) ~ ~ the project had already received support from the governance 
function within the group (ref: RAF 2, Interview 2). In addition. NOVOCORP would get access 
to a "stable. tried and tested solution" (ao; the SAP system wao; already in-situ in AGOCORP). 
Moving from AGRESSO to a more stable and maintained system that also had IT support was a 
welcome development for many NOVOCORP staff (RAF Interview 13. 3) who had expressed 
relevant concerns: "You buy Windows 7, you get support - you get Windows 7 NOVOCORP. you 
don't get the support ... so we'd be happy to get SAP and have it supported ..... (RAF, Interview 29. 
4). The fact that SAP systems were long established in AGOCORP also created a sense of 
comfort: "/ would be confident in so far as the system is already with AGOCORP. / might feel 
different about it if it was an entirely new system ..... (RAF, Interview 8. 5) ". That feeling of 
comfort for some was further heightened by the belief that the changeover would not entail huge 
disruption: "/ mean 6Oo/c 2 of it (the system) is there already .... " (RAF. Interview 16.3). 
However, the principal benefits lay in the enhancement of business processes and the supporting 
of NOVOCORP's future growth plans. Business processes in the areas of finance and HR were 
particularly emphasised. As far as the AGOCORP Group was concerned. "we're back to the 
business alignment argument again, where you saying well the reality is that NOVOCORP is no 
longer a different business. but part of an overall AGOCORP strategy ..... (RAF. Interview 9, 8). 
The ongoing GTS and associated reorganisations had also sharpened the need to have a unifonn 
system: "If A GOCORP is going to reorganise and different business lines end-up moving across 
2 Many interviewees often used percentages to describe how close the proposed system was to corporate SAP - as 
the complexity of the changeover became clearer, so decreased the percentage of closeness' 
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to different business units, then we all have to be on the same line. If not, that would be an 
obstacle to that reorganisation happening ... " (RAF, Interview 3, 7). 
The new system will assist in "enabling finance to further streamline, automate, standardise and 
centralise its transaction processes, thereby improving the efficiency and effectiveness of these 
processes" (page 15). In simple terms, start to eradicate "wooden dollars"; as one interviewee 
clearly stated: "to have a situation in the modern financial world where we're still physically 
paying our fellow subsidiaries or being paid by them in physical cash is just crazy ... " (RAF, 
Interview 16, 4). Not only is there excessive intervention as a result, the opportunity costs are 
substantial: "why would you want to be spending time billing each other when you have this 
integrated asset which can give you integration across all that ... " (RAF, Interview 40,3). 
Although the vast majority of system users would be employees (and more importantly quite a 
few managers), the community are not identified directly in the formal implementation plan 
documentation as beneficiaries from the new system. Even within the community, there was an 
acceptance that this was predominantly a system for the finance and HR departments: "/ think a 
system like SAP is more a system for the finance and HRfunctions. That's where the main users 
are going to be in terms of managing the finances and HR side of it .... " (RAF, Interview 6, 14). 
A senior manager even commented that "Well, we'll see no immediate benefit to it. They'll be 
(employees) doing what they're always doing. I've seen no figures to say it will reduce our costs 
to be honest ... " (RAF, Interview 4, IS).Even so, there were hopeful expectations that the new 
system would add value for them also: "For me, the biggest win is that we can get reports. Often 
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with projects, you're so focused on the process and design that you often forget about the end 
user ... " (RAF. Interview 5, 5). There was awareness (within AGOCORP ICT Group and the 
wider business) of the differing commercial practices and processes existing in NOVOCORP but 
not relevant to AGOCORP. In order to accommodate these differences. it was proposed that an 
additional SAP component be added to the project specification. Known as Project Costing and 
Billing (or PCB) this component would offer some bespoke functionality new to AGOCORP 
SAP that would reflect the commercial practices of NOVOCORP. As described in the 
implementation plan (page 15). "minimal additional (AGOCORP SAP) system development will 
be undertaken. Key exception to this is relates to the Time and Expense processing requirements 
that will require additional developments to enhance the functionality currently deployed in 
AGOCORP, to reflect the consulting nature of some of the E and FM business". The successful 
design of this PCB component would be instrumental in aligning AGOCORP and 
NOVOCORP's system and processes. 
The opportunity to leverage better productivity and process metrics was also identified as a 
possible system advantage: "If we could review those (time) measurements we might get a sense 
of where our bottlenecks might arise and work on that .. That's the kind of that's in the data we 
have but we've yet to fully utilise it ... " (RAF. Interview 23. 10). The positive system impact on 
the user community was also identified external to the function: "there's a lot of reponing effon 
in tenns of turning a figure one-way for one guy and another for some other person. They would 
find that frustrating but needed and if the new system (SAP) could a l l e ~ ' i a t e e that in some way then 
that would be welcome ... " (RAF, Interview 8. 9). Even though the financial community were 
very supportive and broadly welcoming of the proposed new system particularly at more senior 
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levels ("a lot of the key change agents in the finance function certainly would be very strongly of 
the view that we should be on SAP ... " (RAF, Interview I, 8», there was a view in middle 
management that the process benefits would enrich AGOCORP Group more: "It will be a benefit 
as much if not more AGOCORP Group Finance as we'll be on the same system as the normal 
data reporting role. We'll have to move to the same timeframe as them so it should make all the 
reporting smoother ... " (RAF, Interview 8, 2). 
The positive strategic and process impact on NOYOCORP's HR department was also 
emphasised: as one senior HR employee remarked: "enabling us to be freed up to do more 
strategic staff if you like ... " (RAF, Interview 18, 3). [Note: as discussed, the NOYOCORP HR 
Department had moved onto SAP as part of the P and HR project in 2007]. The current systems 
utilised by HR were dispersed and lacked the potential for consolidation. There was a huge 
reliance on EXCEL packages to store training and performance management information. In 
order to manage this information, a huge amount of manual intervention was required in addition 
to placing an onus on managers to provide the data to the HR department to enable the data to be 
inputted (RAF. Interview 19, 1). This was a frustrating and time-consuming process for the HR 
department with one employee remarking: "[t's like pulling teeth trying to get managers to come 
back to us with that - we end up calling them and chasing them ... " (RAF, Interview 28, 3). 
As the improvement plan states (Page 15), the system should enable HR to focus more on 
"higher value activities including improved resource management, performance management 
succession planning and enhanced training capabilities". In essence the system should free up 
HR staff and empower NOVOCORP managers to carry out more HR functions (and 
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responsibilities). There were two additional positive outcomes for HR. No longer would they 
need to manually enter timesheets or expenses into SAP; all expenses 3 will be inputted on SAP 
directly and routed to the responsible manager for approval for processing. The expenses change 
was flagged as a possible issue very early in the alignment process. HR administrators were very 
experienced and informed with regards to the expenses rules and procedures and in effect acted 
as expense "watchdogs" who could identify an issue with an expense which could be rectified 
before it w a ~ ~ ever entered into ABeD: "managers know that if they sign off on something (as an 
expense) that 
they shouldn't have, that it won't get past the girls. So (the new system) will pose a behavioural 
challenge for us .. " (RAF, Interview 18,2). That "watchdog" role would now be gone with the 
advent of the SAP system. The onus would then be on approving managers to be more active 
approvers of expenses than had been the case for many previously. 
The second positive outcome was that as part of the project. NOVOCORP HR had gained the 
approval of the parent to trial a specific SAP module, known as LOS (or Leaming Development 
Solution) that was targeted to enhance the performance management process: "LDS should 
really drive all our performance management and all the learning and development and book 
and record all our training and development, everything though bookings, trainers, courses, 
metricsfeeding into performance management ... " (RAF. Interview 19.3). This module had never 
been implemented in AGOCORP and NOVOCORP were in effect engaging in a trial run for the 
entire group: "we're the guinea pigs if you like ... "(RAF, Interview 28, 2). The perfonnance 
management (PM) module in SAP in AGOCORP corporate was considered to be "under-
3 All AGOCORP Expenses are processed in Tullamore, Co. Offaly. who would have never processed NOVOCORP 
expenses directly. 
utilise'" (RAF, Interview 27, 1-2) and there was support for this new LOS module to be 
implemented. Albeit in the view of one senior HR stakeholder: "they're (AGOCORP) supporting 
us but they're standing well enough back so that if it does fall flat, then we'll be the ones to pick 
up the pieces ... But if it all goes well, then they've been there from the beginning, well, that's just 
my observation (BROAD SMILE), not cynical in any way ... " (RAF, Interview 31, 10). 
The existing performance management module utilised by AGOCORP would be adapted fully by 
NOVOCORP with no changes requested. The same performance management interventions that 
normally occurred in NOVOCORP (i.e. employee has Annual Review of year past and Goal 
Setting meeting for the year ahead in January, then a mid-term review in June which assessed 
additional training and ~ e v e l o p m e n t t needs (where LOS would be most utilised), followed by the 
annual review the January after and so on) would be maintained. Although the implementation 
plan prioritised certain benefits, interviewees also identified some ancillary strategic benefits that 
would accrue from the system implementation. As part of the system changeover, data would 
have to be migrated from AGRESSO to SAP, and as part of this process, data would be cleansed. 
Bearing in mind that AGRESSO replaced a DOS system and had been active since 1999 in a 
high transaction volume environment this would be welcome: "to be honest we always wanted to 
do it (data cleansing) but we had an opportunity know that SAP was coming ... " (RAF, Interview 
43, 7), Configuring a new system that incorporated purchasing functionality was also (felt by the 
financial function) an opportunity to impose some rights management: "We have 200 purchase 
order requisitioners and we'd be pushing for that to be brought back into a responsible team of 
twenty or ten people ... " (RAF, Interview 8, 4). 
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A part of the purchasing change, a new purch e ord r bureau would be created to fa ilitate 
greater efficiencie and control (Page 16) renecting the tru ture em dded in the parent a 
change expected to be difficult to manage: • o ~ , , in A RP there' on bureau that deaLs 
with all purchasing order (throu hAP) 0 if} e're to replicate all that, it oin to be 
problematic in terms of fittin all OVO ORP need .. .' RAF lnterview 12 7. OVOCORP 
was al 0 then engaged in a bu acqui ition ph e and the finan e fun tion weI omed the 
tructural clarity that a ingle y tern would pre ent to the a quired firm: "We ha e an i ue now 
for the Last couple of organi ations that we've taken over. The haven 't been put on GRE 0 in 
light of the upcoming conver ion to AP ... ' (RA , Inter iew , . en raj u abilit (i.e. 
changing aJary bank account, greater vi ibilityof taff e perti e than form r1ya ai lable on the 
current HR Y terns) were aJ 0 identified (i.e. RAF, Interview 1, II . ther than the new LDS 
module and P B componen the ova ORP and P fun tionaJit 
to be irtually identical; de pite the clear y tern cope and trategic benefi ,it 
evident that there were ub tantial fea and concern about the propo ed tern. 
Pre-4 mplementation 
8CS Consolidation 
+ 
AG ESSO 
Post-4mplemen on 
PCB lOS 
im nded 
trongly 
Figure 7.1: OVOCORP y terns: Pre and P t R t P impl m ntati n. 
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7.2.1.1 User concel'M. 
As far as NOVOCORP employees at all levels of the organisation were concerned, the new SAP 
system was being imposed: "/t (the SAP system) is being imposed. / mean we have to be honest 
and upfront about that ... " (RAF, Interview 10,4); "/ think it's more of a case that we have to do 
it ... " (RAF, Interview 5, 7). The system was chiefly seen as indicative of the changing functional 
and strategic relationship between AGOCORP and NOVOCORP; as one very senior 
NOVOCORP manager stated: "/ think if we were left to our own devices, we won't be adopting 
SAP ... " (RAF, Interview 4, 14). There was a perception that because NOVOCORP had opted for 
AGRESSO and turned down SAP when it was first-offered, that this implementation was the last 
step on the path of reparation: "We forgive you! (LAUGHS). Come back into the fold ... " (RAF, 
Interview 18, 7). Many off-the record comments identified that the public declaration by the then 
AGOCORP Group Chief Executive 4 that NOVOCORP was going on SAP, prior to any 
implementation plan or business case being formulated, only accentuated this feeling of system 
imposition, although NOVOCORP senior executives felt this strengthened their hand in 
introducing the system: "we were delighted in one respect that he said that.." (RAF, Interview I, 
8). 
Putting aside feelings of imposition, cultural differences between AGOCORP and NOVOCORP 
led to concerns as to the cost of the system and the failure to justify system expense in the 
business case. As one interviewee commented: "To make the case for SAP to go forward, you 
needed to show savings ... " (RAF, Interview 8, 4). ''Thinking as a consultancy" (as an interviewee 
4 Ironically, the then Chief Executive of AGOCORP (now retired) had been Senior Executive of NOVOCORP when the 
AGRESSO decision had been made. 
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described NOVOCORP - RAF, Interview 46) predicates cost considerations must be central to 
the broader business case, yet: "I've seen no figures to say it .... ilI reduce our costs to be honest ..... 
(RAF, Interview 4, 18), There were also concerns with regards to the impact of such an outlay on 
a system for NOVOCORP's overall competitiveness: "We have a lot of internal and external 
(pressures) to be commercial - I don't see any of our competitors in either the consulting or 
environmental energy services having SAP either ... " (RAF. Interview 46. 5). Some of the cost 
concerns were prompted by negative experiences of the XYZ implementation. As the business 
caseS for the system emphasised cost savings and efficiencies. there was considerable scepticism 
on the side of the managers given the impact of XYZ. Despite a coherent message that the 
Financials and HR project was going to be different. i.e. "The prel'ious project that he got burnt 
by had 95% development and 5% configuration .... hereas this project has 5% del'elopment and 
95% configuration .... (RAF, Interview 12. 10), the impression that SAP systems benefit the 
parent, increase inefficiencies and require dedicated manual intervention had began to permeate 
through the user community: "It (XYZ) makes us very inefficient, it makes us do work that 
previously we wouldn " have had reason to do and there's no added mlue if you look at it in a 
very narrow sense, However. if you look at it from an AGOCORP Group perspectil'e, they would 
feel it's very beneficial as they hal'e an overall \'iew or look at things ... " (RAE Interview 4,4). 
There was a negative connation associated with SAP. as one interviewee neatly stated "If it was 
just an expenses system and it was up and running over a .... eekend and )'OU were gil'en a "How-
to" list. everyone would get into quickly because everyone wants that ... Do the same and call it 
SAP, then people feel different!.v ... ., (RAE Interview 21. 5). 
5 The formal business case was not made available to the researcher for reasons of financial confidentiality: 
However, the implementation plan and several off·the-record conversations made the content clear. 
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SAP systems also seemed to equate to processing delays with concerns that some parts of the 
business would be overwhelmed coping with varied customer requirements (RAF, Interview 21, 
11) whereas views in the parent seemed to be that the business case was passed understanding, 
i.e. "The trouble with the current solution is the huge amount of manual intervention required. 
That almost makes the business case stand up by itself. In fact, it does ... " (RAF, Interview 3, 3). 
The community may not have been overly enamoured of AGRESSO, but they didn't seem to 
have been adequately convinced of ("I think people will say our systems are efficient and won't 
see it as a business case .. " RAF, Interview 6, 12) or informed ("I don't recall seeing a business 
case or seeing a presentation on it", RAF, Interview 20, 3) about the business case for SAP 
either: "On the finance, HR and IT side it (SAP) project) seemed to be very clearly understood, 
whereas on the business side, the coalface side, there was definitely a gap ... " (RAF, Interview 7, 
5). Some senior managers had obtained unsatisfactory explanations with respect to system cost: 
"There was certain bewildennent around the question I asked around Cost-Benefit analyses .... I 
never got an answer to that question. I mean we're spending X million bringing in this system-
what will be benefit of it?" (RAF, Interview 14, 10-11). There was a view that: "Senior 
management signed off on it (the project) but they didn't get any buy-in, there was no 
consultation with the next level down ... " (RAF, Interview 7, 4). There was also some allusions to 
the possibility that system acceptance had been conflated with business case acceptance: "I think 
that there is an acceptance that the whole group should be on the one system but have we 
properly explained the reasons for change? Probably not ... " (RAF, Interview 5, 7). However, 
some felt that the system was such a fait accompli, that "I think the presumption would be that 
it's not necessary for us to understand it if that's not too cynical". (RAF, Interview 14, 12). 
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Notwithstanding feelings about the system being imposed, XYZ hangovers and lack of business 
case clarity, there were also specific concerns as to the system impact. Although SAP was not 
new to the AGOCORP Group, there was little extant SAP experience and know-how in 
NOVOCORP and that was a concern for some interviewees (i.e. RAF, Interview 20, 4). Some, 
though accepting of the broad business case, were concerned as to whether SAP would improve 
on the existing system; as one interviewee stated: "the concern though is whether or not the new 
system plugs the holes that were in AGRESSO - is it going to be a better system. is it going to 
have that financial and project management functions. the billing information be available and 
visible to those who need that access to information at the appropriate level ... " (RAF, Interview 
25,2). 
The longer-term concerns of the users were more associated with the changes in work practices 
that would ensue (RAF, Interview II, 5; RAF. Interview 20. 10) and whether they would lose 
control over certain information or a process (RAF, Interview 15. 10) which given their customer 
focus is understandable. The fundamental changes in financial and HR processes that were going 
to occur would force certain managerial levels to take on more administrative responsibility 
(such as validating expenses) which was a concern for some (RAF. Interview 18, 5). Some 
managers were concerned whether a common system would led to more transparency around 
billing structures (RAF, Interview 14,9) although that was dismissed as already present by others 
(RAF, Interview 18, 7). 
There were also some concerns around the project delay (due to the problems associated with the 
XYZ system). The business had engaged in some information sessions with employees and 
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indicated the timescale and importance of the system but with the delay, there were concerns that 
this "conditioning" as it was described by one interviewee (RAF, Interview 9, 9-10) would have 
dissipated; in one manager's view the delay "screwed it (the project) up big time yes. I'd say that 
they created a certain amount of hype about it and then it died. That would be my impression or 
feeling; I haven't great evidence to prove that ... " (RAF, Interview 10,4). To summarise, there 
were some concerns as to the system being imposed, lacking justification, the work changes that 
would ensue and the delay in implementation. 
7.2.1.2 Formally identified project risks. 
As part of the original IS strategic implementation plan within NOVOCORP, formal risks 
attendant to the project had been identified (page 16 of the implementation plan document) 
which informed the business case and were the initial items on the project manager's risk 
register; 
1) "Data must be migrated (from AGRESSO to SAP) in an appropriate format". 
2) "Project must be adequately resourced with experienced, knowledgeable personnel" 
3) "The adequacy/experience of local resources 6to support a challenging 9 months project" 
4) "Poorly executed project roll-outs can result in prolonged business interruptions". 
Data migration will be considered in detail at a later point in the implementation though it was 
considered to be a clear and present risk: "it was said to me before the project as well to be 
careful with respect to the data migration" (RAF, Interview 51, 4) and the staffing and local 
resources associated with the project will be discussed in sections 6.13.1.5 and 6.13.1.6. With 
respect to the functional scope of the project, the emphasis was on minimal additional 
6 Emboldened and Italicised as per original implementation plan document presentation. 
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configuration with respect to the existing SAP system (with the exception of Project Costing and 
Billing (PCB) and the trial HR LOS module), There had been concerns generally in prior SAP 
implementations that the scope of projects had not been clarified:"not really understanding what 
you're !?ettin!? into hefore you !?o do"'n that path, I suppose that ~ \ ' ( } u l d d he our key lessons learnt 
if you like .. ," (RAF. Interview 9. 8), Issues that had arisen in the XYZ implementation had also 
prompted re-evaluation of project risks. in particular the perceived lack of engagement (RAF, 
Interview 4, 16) and the failure to clarify fully the system de,ign: "one of the biggest (XYZ) 
issues was that the desi!?n was ne\'er really settled on .. ," (RAF. Interview 40, 5), 
Furthermore. as the project was being scoped. two additional ri,ks were added. one high-level 
and business relevant. the other project specific, Firstly, there was the inherent risk associated 
with the process changes that would have to be nece\\ary in l"OVOCORP: to some. this was not 
just a "straightforward" IS changeover: as one senior leT Group member commented: "it's a 
significanr challen!?e ro implement somerhin!? m'er something that's already there and has a 
process la .. rer as well .. , .. (RAF. Interview 39, 3), If anything, ,enior stakeholders, at least 
initially. emphasised the business rather than then the ,y ... tem components of the project: "Is;t an 
IT project or a Business Project? In my \'ie"' it's more ahout the h'lJineH than the IT. .. .. (RAF, 
Interview 16. 2) and at times even dismi ... sed the IS component of the project: "we're just 
chan!?in!? O\'er from one system to another .. , .. (RAF. Interview 9. 7), 
Maintaining the interest of the busines ... in the project and achieving their buy-in was the 
overarching risk: "For me, and I think the project manager has identified this as well as the 
hi!?!?est risk, is the business acceptance side .. , .. (RAF. Interview 39. II), The levels of system 
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impact were al 0 een to be marginal: "but in real day to day terms it (the system) might affect 50 
people and they're the people you target ... " (RAF, Interview 21, 3). In term of project specific 
ri ks, it had al 0 been decided that thi project would not rely on any formal continuou external 
experti e in the form of an implementation partner ( uch a a major con ulting company). The 
Financial and HR project would be unu ual in not having a SAP implementation partner (RAF, 
Interview 24, 4) and according to one enior AGOCORP manager (RAF, Interview 9, 7), would 
be the fir t AGOCORP SAP implementation without one. The rationale for thi deci ion was 
ba ed on three core criteria. Fir tly, the de ire to develop competences in project and change 
management, not extant in the organi ation (RAF, Interview 48, 6). Secondly and most 
importantly, the i ue of co t: it wa e timated that utili ing an implementation partner would 
have doubled the project budget (RAF, Interview 30, 6). Thirdly, the level of SAP 
implementation experti e in the organisation would make the need for an external 
implementation partner redundant given that the project wa perceived to be relatively small at 
lea tin compari on to pa t SAP implementations (i.e. "There's no real value thell in bringing in 
that external expertise? No, the experience is here" (RAF, Interview 9, 7): Also, in orne cases 
(i.e. the XYZ project) it had been felt that the value of the implementation partner was cost-
ineffective (ref: RAF, Interview 3, 5). 
7.2.1.3 Project Schedule and Implementation. 
The project had already been delayed by the XYZ implementation a it was tied to the financial 
year. A the priority functionality in SAP is financial, it had to be operational by the tart of the 
next financial year (in effect, January 7th 2011) and the project chedule had to reflect this 
con tant unmovable deadline. A mi ed project deadline even by a few days would likely mean a 
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delay of a year (i.e. until the beginning of the next financial year). hence the importance of a 
well-managed project schedule. AGRESSO would in effect to be turned off as SAP went live; 
parallel processing (i.e. running AGRESSO and SAP simultaneously and comparing 
performance and outputs) w a ~ ~ neither a cultural norm within AGOCORP or deemed appropriate 
for this project (RAF. Interview 3. 5). In order to ensure project governance. (and as is the 
normal case for AGOCORP IS projects 7). the PRINCE2 project management methodology was 
utilised. In essence this entailed the creation of a project board that would meet regularly and be 
reported to (by executive members of the project team) over the duration of the project and 
would help manage the strategic and functional direction of the project. Also a project team with 
defined roles to deliver the implementation on a day to day basis would be recruited. The roles of 
the project board and project team and their backgrounds and recruitment are now briefly 
discussed. 
7.2.1.4 Project Resources and Personnel: project board roles and recruitment. 
In the PRINCE2 project management methodology. the project board once established formally 
launches the project using a project initiation document (or PIO). The PIO forms the basis ofthe 
project scope. schedule. resources, roles and responsibilities (RAF, Interview 2, 9). The project 
board also ultimately formally brings a project to an end with a closeout meeting (RAF, 
Interview 50, 9) and in the interim are responsible for signing off on the project moving from one 
p h a ~ e e to another and for allowing the project to go-live and for providing support after for some 
defined period to resolve any outstanding issues (RAF. Interview 2. 9). At certain intervals in the 
7 Within a certain set of financial cost parameters. 
project, the project board must also initiate and act on the findings of a third-party independent 
Quality Assurances (QA) process. 
Project boards have defined roles and responsibilities and in the case of this project it was the 
role of the BPIIT manager to help identify and resource suitable candidates acting on AGOCORP 
ICT Group and NOVOCORP recommendations. She was determined that the right candidates 
would be identified and recruited rather than selecting people because they should be or are 
interested in the implementation (RAF, Interview 2, 7-8). Rather than just selecting people who 
ideally would be interested in the project, she was deliberate in targeting those who had an active 
stake in the project and who also would be reliable in terms of attendance and contribution and 
meeting their responsibilities (RAF, Interview 2, 8). There was a clear determination not to 
repeat the mistakes of the XYZ implementation, where: "very early on in XYZ, the project board 
wasn't that active or questioning - the attendance was poor and also the reporting to the board 
was poor and issues weren't being highlighted ... " (RAF, Interview 40, 5). Ensuring clarity as to 
project team roles and responsibilities was critical: "Make sure that the project board know what 
their body of work is, which in the past was certainly an issue on AGOCORP projects ... " (RAF, 
Interview 9, 7-8). The project board consists of the following roles and responsibilities: 
• Project Sponsor: the individual (or a representative thereof) who is the fundamental 
owner in the business of the project (In this project, this was the Senior Executive 9 of 
NOVOCORP, represented by the Head Financial Controller). 
8 Of which, there were three on this project. 
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• Senior Users: representatives of the key user constituencies of the system or those 
directly affected by the implementation (senior NOVOCORP users included the heads of HR and 
Managers and IT (i.e. the ITIBP manager) with the project sponsor acting as senior finance user 
from NOVOCORP) and also representatives of the key AGOCORP functions most affected by 
the implementation (namely HR, Finance and the ICT Group). 
• Senior Supplier: representative of the ICT Group who supplies IS support and expertise 
to the project (doubles as senior ICT group user on the project). 
The role of the senior user was seen as particularly problematic to manage: in essence, their roles 
were to represent the views of their user constituencies but also to provide resources (i.e. for 
testing) and contribute to functional decisions. However on many projects. the representation role 
had been heightened to the detriment of the provision role: "instead of just mouthing off about 
what the user wants, they have to produce the goods too ..... (RAF, Interview 2. 8). 
It should be noted that all the senior NOVOCORP users were formerly AGOCORP senior 
management and that the project sponsor had seen first-hand (in his role as head of AGOCORP 
AP) just how efficient SAP could be in reducing costs and streamlining processes: "He would 
have had J 5-20 people in AP when he took m'er and they were manually inputting invoices 
etc ... As a result of the ERP processes, there's probably about 2-3 people there now so he would 
seen a 500O/C decrease in staffing costs as a result of these process changes ... " (RAF. Interview 
39. 5). Once the project scope. schedule and board were identified. the next stage was to recruit 
the project team. 
9 The senior executive (SE) of NOVOCORP left in early 2010 and was replaced by a former SE of AGOCORP 
Networks; the replacement is now Chief Executive of the AGOCORP Group, the second consecutive NOVOCORP SE 
to hold the post. 
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7.2.1.5 RecruiUng the key execuUve roles within the project team. 
Given that this project would not utilise an implementation partner, it was critical that the project 
team "must be adequately resourced with experienced. knowledgeable personnef' (Project risks 
as identified in the implementation plan). The high-level project team 10 consisted of the 
following key roles: Project manager, change (and communications) manager, the Business 
Implementation Manager (or BIM 11 who was not appointed until the beginning of the realisation 
phase) and the functional team leads from ICT Group and also from NOVOCORP HR and 
Finance. The effective project team including the executive roles, functional leads and functional 
team, external SAP consultants and "borrowed" staff from AGOCORP ICT Group meant that by 
project-end approximately 60 people had worked on the project (including 25 people from the 
ICT group, one-eighth of the their total cohort) with an average day-to-day cohort of about 30 
team members (RAF, Interview 50, 2). 
7.2.1.6 Background and appointment of the Project Manager. 
The project manager appointed had a background in IS Governance and had some prior PM 
expense on an AGOCORP banking project (i.e. changing IS processes to reflect a new banking 
protocol) which had been considered successful, certainly within NOVOCORP (RAF, Interview 
5, 13). The project manager's responsibilities (ref: RAF, Interview 3) include project planning 
and schedule control, activity tracking, maintaining the project risk register and managing risks 
(RAF, Interview 2, 10). The key roles of the project manager are encapsulated in his capstone 
10 NOVOCORP would provide team members long-term from both Finance and HR to assist in project team 
activities: the so-called "functional team". 
11 The appointment of the 81M proved to an important part of the deSign/blueprinting phase and is discussed in 
detail at a later point. 
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role of reporting to the project board on project progress and issues to enable them to make 
optimal decisions. The appointment of the project manager needs to happen early in the 
preparation phase (and ideally earlier) as they typically are involved in drafting the key role 
attributes and functions for the other executive roles as part of creating the PID (RAF, Interview 
51, 3). Typically in prior AGOCORP SAP implementations, the project manager role had been 
split. Someone wa'i appointed from the business to manage the project from a business readiness 
and acceptance perspective (RAF. Interview 9, 3). The (IS) project management experience and 
skill-sets are provided by a complementary resource typically from an external implementation 
partner (RAF. Interview 30, 5). However in the case of the Financials and HR project, only one 
person was appointed to the role that was not part of the business per se (NOVOCORP IS 
Governance rather than NOVOCORP). He had some prior (but not extensive) project 
management experience but would not have an implementation partner on hand for support. As 
already discussed. given the level of SAP implementation experience in the organisation, this 
was deemed appropriate even though there were known risks (RAF. Interview 30.6). 
7.2.1.7 Background and appointment of the Change Manager. 
"Well, he (the change manager) came to me and said "what have I let myself in for ... " 
(RAF, Interview 27, 4) 
The appointment of the change manager was considered to be critical for a project of this nature 
where business rather than IS issues were universally considered (at the outset) to be more 
problematic, i.e. "The most difficult part of this project is going to be the change management, 
the "sell" to the stakeholder. end-user buy-in . .. " (RAF. Interview 3. 4). The change manager 
role had not always been a part of IS implementations and the appointment of the role on the 
Financials and HR project was deemed necessary (RAF. Interview 3. 9) and welcome: "this is a 
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new experience for me as we're actually being consulted and there is a change management 
aspect to it (the project) ... " (RAF, Interview 14,2). 
Very quickly in the preparation phase, it was decided that appointing someone from the business 
(Le. NOVOCORP) would be critical: "It's difficult enough to do change and you really need a 
business person from the business to do it. If you drop an IT person in there, the reaction you get 
back is that 'this is IT trying to change our business'''. (RAF, Interview 9, 3). The change 
manager could therefore be drawn from one of three populations within the business: , finance or 
HR. In terms of the population most affected in number, the population with over 800 staff (out 
of an approximate total of 1200 staff in NOVOCORP) were the most affected. An employee was 
identified (RAF, Interview 23, 5) and offered the role by the Head of Managers (RAF, Interview 
11, 7). 
He had a track record as an excellent project manager (RAF, Interview 11, 7) and his 
appointment was welcomed: ""The fact that he is involved as change manager is helpful as he 
has the understanding (of where employees are coming from). He's not coming down here as an 
IT person shouting the odds ... " (RAF, Interview 15, 9) and as an employee, that he would be 
open and literate with respect to user issues as they arose: "if the guys on the ground have issues; 
that these issues are taken seriously ... " (RAF, Interview 4, 15). There was also a view that the 
KAMs could be especially problematic and his familiarity and warm relationships with them 
would help the project, something he freely acknowledged himself: "We needed someone from 
the business on the inside of the project dealing with the key account managers (from 
NOVOCORP Managers) to minimise their complaining and to deal with any issues. So, if there is 
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an issue there, 1 can get involved, understand it and feed it back from there. That was the main 
reason (I was appointed) ... " (RAF, Interview 7 3). Hi appointment was con idered by many to 
be an important career opportunity; "an opportunity to rai e his profile with important people in 
the business ... " (RAF, Interview 27, 5), an opportunity he embraced. In hi 0 n word '[ was 
asked by a senior manager in NOVOCORP to undertake the role; it wa old to me as an 
opportunity, which it was, to get a bit more experience, to get a bit more exposure and to see the 
company from a different perspective, so no problem (for me) gettin in of ed in the role ... " 
(RAF, Interview 7, I). The effort involved in electing the per onnel and the project board had 
been ub tantial and there wa trong feeling both in AGO ORP and OVOCORP, that 
capable, appropriate people had been elected and that the nece ary experience w pre ent in 
the teams and in the busine at large. From OVO ORP' per pecti e, "The fact that there is a 
lot of NOVOCORP people involved in the project reassures everyone - thi i ju t not being 
imposed but has our people not just head office in charge .... " (RAF, Interview 15, 9). 
However, as the implementation continued, the very foundation of the e b lief were haken and 
the succe of the project came into eriou que tion. The project board formally launched the 
Financials and HR project on Tue day, the 19"' of January 2010 (RA Inter iew 3 1) bringi ng 
the project preparation and mobili ation phase to an end and officially launching the 
de ign/blueprinting pha e. 
7.2.2 Clarifying the y tern design: Busine Proc Blu printing 
(1st February - 31 t May 2010). 
"When you say we have no deviation in the system, do you fee l it ' decided (alread )? 
No, no the design pha e will allow for that and that' where that will be orted out 
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but when that's over, that's it; there will be a scopeJreeze and no more changes 
will be possible ... .. Head of Managers (RAF, Interview 11,6) 
The key intended purpose of this phase was to clarify and agree the final design of the proposed 
SAP system (known as the Blueprint) and also revisit the project scope and schedule. The initial 
stage in this phase involved the preparation of the BPIDs (Blueprint Phase Implementation 
Directive). 
7.2.2.1 Preparing the BPIDs. 
BPID documentation was prepared for each business process within the scope of the Financials 
and HR project and consisted of two separate documents: an "AS-IS" BPID which detailed the 
process as it currently existed in AGRESSO and a ''TO-BE'' BPID which was intended to detail 
the process as it would be implemented in and supported by new SAP system (RAF, Interview 
17, 4). The AS-IS BPIDs were typically authored by employees from NOVOCORP in a pre-
designated priority of High, Medium, low initially but over time moved to a first-in first out 
system (ref: RAF, Interview 17), whereas the TO-BE BPIDS were crafted by members of the 
project team (also NOVOCORP employees) with assistance from the leT Group's SAP 
competency centre (RAF, Interview 50, 3). These authors would have had respectively, 
experience and day-to-dealings with the processes as supported in AGRESSO or the SAP 
system, which enhanced structure and clarity in the view of one interviewee: "/ suppose when 
they were doing the BPIDs there was clarity about what people on the project team were doing -
you had people taking creditors, others taking banking, others taking financial reporting and 
preparing the BPIDS and Design for all those ... " (RAF, Interview 37, 3). 
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An additional benefit accrued in that the people from the business who would be the likely 
trainers and testers would gain an early exposure to the new processes (RAE Interview 17, 8). 
There was some efforts from the managers to add some of their accounting staff to the BPID 
author teams but this was rejected, which wa<i dismissed by one senior manager as: "I really 
wanted her on board as she knows our processes well and would really be useful in the 
BLUEPRINTING but the" didn't use her very well unfortunately .. But then again if you were 
Finance, you might not want her on the team as her experience and understanding could maybe 
influence the project in a direction .. .. (RAF, Interview 29.9) 
There were some concerns as to the veracity of the Finance AS-IS BPIDS ("some of the 
descriptions of how things were done in terms of the processes (i.e. the AS-IS), you'd wonder at 
times was this how the processes actually worked and how come this hadn't been made available 
to us when we started working here!", RAE Interview 43. 3), but more so with regards to the 
TO-BE documentation. These concerns seemed to arise from the lack of SAP user experience 
within the business and on the project team; as one senior finance stakeholder remarked: "In the 
case of the TO BE (BPIDs), it was more SAP from a manual: the experience and expertise wasn't 
there ..... (RAF, Interview 17, 4). The identified Finance TO-BE BPIDS were annotated as a 
result by the project team, with a clear description of what the SAP changes would entail, and 
routed through the various financial controllers for any recommended changes and discussion 
points for clarification prior to the blueprinting workshops (RAE Interview 17, 4). 
As the HR function had already moved onto SAP in 2007 as part of the P and HR project, they 
had a substantial advantage (RAF, Interview 26, 4) in having all the their AS-IS processes 
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already mapped (with the exception of the training and development processes which would be 
moved across to the LDS module). In order to understand the HR differences that existed 
between AGOCORP and themselves, the NOVOCORP HR team obtained test accounts where 
they could see how the AGOCORP SAP HR system worked (i.e. the Performance Management 
or PM module) and appreciate how different to their AS-IS, the TO-BE BPIDs would have to be 
(RAF, Interview 28, 4). With respect to the entirely new LDS module, the team work shopped 
with other HR teams from across the entire group to get a sense of their HR practices and how 
NOVOCORP as early adopters of LOS could make the eventual adoption of the new module by 
all easier (RAF, Interview 27, 5). This entailed a smoother transition for the function (ref: RAF, 
Interview 26, 8). Approximately 150 BPIDS were created, 120-130 relating to financial 
processes, the remainder describing HR (RAF, Interview 7, 8; RAF, Interview 8, 3). By the end 
of the BPID writing process, 50 new system developments had been identified; in other words, 
the current AGOCORP SAP system would need to incorporate 50 specific changes to 
accommodate fully NOVOCORP's process needs. By the end of the design phase, that number 
had been reduced to 12 (RAF, Interview 50, 3). 
7.2.2.2 The Blueprinting Workshops. 
Once the BPIDs had been finalised, the next step entailed organising and facilitating the 
Blueprinting workshops that would enable the final system design to be clarified. There were 
nine different workshops (RAF, Interview 30, 2) which were organised by business process: "you 
might have a workshop for Invoicing or AP (Accounts Payable) or Fixed assets where you'd 
have different degrees of importance in terms of the BPIDs -a mixture of high, medium or low ... " 
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(RAF, Interview 17, 6). The purpose of the workshops was to enable the (NOYOCORP) end-
users to have direct input into the final design with different user communities attending different 
workshops depending on their level of responsibility and workshop relevance. The focus of the 
workshops was on clarifying processes, rather than indicating how SAP would function, a 
disappointment to some (RAF, Interview 14, 4). As one senior manager commented: "there was 
no meeting in my head where even at a relatively high LeveL where we got (a sense of) this is 
going to work this way or that ... " (RAF, Interview 37, 4). 
The project team would also be present on similar criteria; for example, the HR team members 
would attend for a HR Process Workshop, Finance for a finance process workshop (ref: RAF, 
Interview 28) with the change manager also an attendee. The finance staff member who would be 
chosen as the business implementation manager also attended some of the financial workshops, 
but in a different role. An external moderator with SAP expertise also attended to record the 
interaction and offer directive comments (RAF, Interview 17,6). Within the wider NOYOCORP 
community the principal workshops given the level of process change implied by the system 
were those concerned with the finance function, in particular those processes different to 
NOYOCORP than AGOCORP. The managers, particularly the KAMs were anxious to have 
their say for functional reasons "But at the end of the day, we're the ones dealing with the 
customers every day so the idea that a system would be created that would be based on what the 
accountants think is important. We can't befaced with afait accompli . .. (RAF, Interview 21,6). 
An external SAP design consultant had been recruited in order to provide guidance on the 
transferability of processes to SAP and also to direct the design of the finalised system. It had 
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proven enormously difficult to source an adequate external resource: "The Project Manager was 
trying to source this resource before Christmas and he didn't get someone until the 6th of 
April ... " (RAF, Interview 12, II). His reaction to the issues raised was instructive: "(He)found it 
hard to understand how the business had so much internal custom -taking money from one 
pocket and putting into another ... and so much time on the commercial relationships, lot of time 
fighting and sometimes bad blood trying to get paid ... a lot of "wattless" energy as we say but he 
was fascinated by it ... " (RAF, Interview 27, 8). Views on the external consultant but generally 
people felt that "the SAP expert was capable, knew his terminology, accountancy and finance 
and was able to relate SAP to the processes we would have ... " (RAF, Interview 23, 5).After only 
a few workshops, this external consultant left the project for personal reasons (RAF, Interview 
30, 1) prompting further time pressures and user disquiet (RAF, Interview 15, 10) as a 
replacement was sought and finally obtained. The perception of the project team was that the 
sessions were valuable and were well-attended (RAF, Interview 48, 2). The views of the 
NOVOCORP user community were generally appreciative of the opportunity to have an input 
(RAF, Interview 14,6; RAF, Interview 20, 6; ): "in all my time here, I've never seen more of a 
concerted effort to get everyone on board. That may be as much of the fact that it is a critical 
implementation as much as the context and you're also dealing with relatively senior people in 
the organisation who are not going to be comforted by some weasel words from very senior 
management" (RAF, Interview 21, 8).There were some critical views expressed with regards to 
the impression that the project team were overly defensive with regards to the content of the 
BPIDs when questioned by the users (RAF, Interview 17, 5) and that they were anxious to sign 
off on BPIDs far faster than necessary (RAF, Interview 22, 9), even though the users themselves 
felt they were naturally constrained also by their commitments (RAF, Interview 23, 5). 
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There was a degree of surprise that the existing AGOCORP SAP system would be the default 
system with as few changes allowed as possible (RAF. Interview 37. 5); as one interviewee 
remarked: "In tenns of other projects on the HR side that I would have worked on in other 
companies, they've been much more business driven than this one; much more customisation was 
possible - not the case in tenns of this project ... " (RAF. Interview 19. 2). However, this approach 
was strongly trailed in both the business case and the original IS strategy implementation plan 
indicating that the earlier view that the business case was not diffused had credence. However in 
the view of one NOVOCORP project team member who attended may workshops: "(given) ... the 
budgets and resources that were on the project, you would have no choice but to do it ... (like 
that) ... " (RAF, Interview 50, 3). Adhering to this default approach was strongly encouraged by 
some senior members of the AGOCORP leT function (RAF. Interview 8, 4) and in the views of 
some attendees was clear by the nature of the interaction: "I mean the focus is them asking us 
questions - they don't want us asking questions - their view is that they want to ask us questions 
and get the answers they need for functionality etc from us. They're saying "Why are us asking 
us all these questions: You tell us the answers and then we'll give ..... ou the system you '/I user' 
(LAUGHS) .. " (RAF. Interview 14, 12). The view of a very senior NOVOCORP manager12 
neatly described the views of senior management with respect to the design phase: "What we've 
been trying to do here for years is to change the work to fit with the SAP system and that's going 
to involve different levels of change for different people ... " (RAF, Interview 24, I). Some 
interviewees showed considerable frustration 13 at the "tow-the-line" mentality of some of their 
12 Formerly a senior AGOCORP ICT Group manager. 
13 In the words of one KAM, "I've been at a few and no doubt there's been a lot of bullsh·t spoken by people who 
should know better ..... (RAF, Interview 20, 6) 
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colleagues and there was some surprise at the lack of resistance exhibited by the user community 
to the overall changes (RAF, Interview 50,3). The nature of the workshop interaction was felt to 
inhibit real engagement: "In that hall of mirrors (the room in Merrion Square) environment, you 
have people who clam up and then you have the squeaky wheel effect (as in the old phrase -
"the squeaky wheel gets the most oil") ... " (RAF, Interview 20, 9). The project team were asked 
directly by managers had they considered the lessons from the XYZ implementation and 
received (what they felt) was an inadequate response: "it (XYZ) was mentioned at one of the 
(BLUEPRINTING) meetings and we were asked had we thought about it ... very negative from the 
first meeting ... " (RAF, Interview 36, 3). 
There was seemingly also substantial surprise (RAF, Interview 14, 3; RAF, Interview 15, 4) as 
just how different NOVOCORP's business processes l4 were: "They were looking at us saying 
"NOVOCORP are off on one again", but we were different, our pay scales, our grades, our sick-
leave and maternity policies, all were different ... " (RAF, Interview 18, 11). The varying 
requirements of different customers and impact on KAMS were also evident and as one 
interviewee commented: "it would take 2-3 years of meetings to go through and do everything 
the KAMs would want ... " (RAF, Interview 36, 4). The commercial realities faced by KAMs on a 
monthly basis were also unknown to the project team: "Maybe a KAM might need be able to 
tweak things if a client's budget was tight that month but something still had been done but 
would be paid for next month - that kind of human intervention or human side of things was 
important for us to have ... " (RAF, Interview 27, 8). Broadly within the finance function there 
14 In particular PCB and the approvals process which will be discussed in more detail. 
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was surprise as to the level of interest users from the managers had in the system: "You have a 
slight bewilderment on the Finance side of the house here in them wondering: 'this is a system 
for us, ajinancial tool, why are these people (i.e. employees) getting so excited about it?" (RAF, 
Interview 14. 2).This led to a brake on BPID approval as views initially softened on the project 
side (RAF. Interview 15. 5). However. this led to a slowdown in the rate of approvals and there 
was a realisation the design phase w a ~ ~ running out of time with the result that BPrD approval had 
to be rushed (RAF. Interview 17. 4). 
The experiences of the project team was felt by some to be an issue a ~ ~ they had only some 
limited SAP experience. and were coming to terms with the content of the BPIDs themselves 
(RAF. Interview 16.6). This lack of SAP experience manifested itself somewhat in the order in 
which BPIDs were reviewed. as one interviewee remarked: "at times there was a lot of 
discussion around BPIDS that were going to he JUJt as they are in AGOCORP SAP ... I think it 
was more that there wasn't more time for the more important BPlDs ... .. (RAF. Interview 22, 5), 
The impression arose that in some c a ~ e s s certain BPID discussion was rushed (RAF, Interview 14, 
6) and even forced through (RAF. Interview 16. 6) leaving users with a less than satisfactory 
outcome (RAF. Interview 34. 3). An example was the decision that NOVOCORP's Accounts 
Payable (AP) system would be brought back to AGOCORP centrally despite process differences 
that would become clearly evident at a much later stage (and in the absence of NOVOCORP's 
head of AP): "It was decided when I was away that AP and IP were going to shared 
services .... regardless of thinking ahout like we discussed a minute ago the very different ways in 
which AGOCORP and NOVOCORP do things ..... (RAF. Inten'iew 38, 10). For some, the 
workshops were poorly managed: "I mean the last session on reporting ended abruptly or had to, 
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I should say but we didn't really have a follow up session ... " (RAF, Interview 15, 9).Users 
however were particularly concerned as to what the final design specification would be and how 
it would function in SAP (RAF, Interview 38, 9; RAF, Interview 41, 5): "you never get to see 
whether their understanding of the processes actually tallies with your understanding ... what they 
perceive to be our processes and what's achievable in SAP - that two part process seems to be 
missing well in terms of what we get to see ... " (RAF, Interview 25, 3). Users also questioned 
whether "the project team have enough SAP knowledge and experience to definitely say "this is 
finished" .. " (RAF, Interview 20, 9). Comparisons with XYZ were also raised with one 
interviewee remarking: "The big thing from it should have been clarity as to the system reports, 
which is more important than the system in some respects ... This was coincidentally the big issue 
with the XYZ system - it doesn't do reports, well at least not in a way that the output is believable 
or credible ... " (RAF, Interview 25, 8). 
7.2.2.3 Concerns with respect to Project Costing and Billing. 
"It was always the case tluft this (Project Costing and Billing) is the area is the area with the 
highest complexity ... and which needed the most management ... " 
(RAF, Interview 30, 3) 
In the original IS strategy implementation plan and project scope, two additional high-level 
functional additions had been certified; namely the HR LDS module and Project Costing and 
Billing (PCB). The PCB was facilitated in recognition of the different commercial space in which 
NOVOCORP operated. As the blueprinting workshops moved more deeply into examining the 
financial BPIDs, issues and conflicts began to arise. The extent of variation in business processes 
and the level of engagement and push-back from the KAMs as to what they wanted from the new 
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system in term of PCB processes was hitherto unrealised and unexpected by the parent: "It came 
into focus fairly clearly when we had to start (in blueprinting) fighting hard for the job numbers 
and they're important to us in operations and client charging and how we access data that we 
need ... " (RAF, Interview 14,5). The parent expected to have to facilitate charging of commercial 
customers as in a customer billing system in addition to the billing systems already supported. 
However the NOVOCORP billing systems were considerably more complex. and convoluted, as 
well-described by one interviewee: "our billing s .... 'stem has to be able to manage different job 
numbers, different costs, international clients in different countrie/5, working with financial 
institutions like the World Bank, all these different tat arrangements. totall ..... differenLand SAP 
as we're experiencing now (LAUGHS) isn'tflexible enough to deal with everything our business 
needs ... " (RAF, Interview 38, 2). 
In addition, different KAMs were affected in different ways with Networks processing 20-30 
times the billing volume of other sections [unsurprisingly (as mentioned in section 6.13.2.2), 
internal tensions arose as to how important these processes were to retain).As the parent simply 
billed domestic and commercial customers on the basis of unit consumption, there had never to 
been the need to provide customers with tailored bills or granular information. Whereas for the 
KAMs, they had (rightly or wrongly) created a climate and expectation that the customer could 
dictate their reporting requirements: "we would have approached it (the blueprinting) here with 
the view that our client has been asking us for certain things for years ..... (RAF, Interview 34, 3). 
There was a realisation on behalf of some KAMs that this level of reporting had got out of hand 
(one described it as "asinine" (RAF, Interview 20, I» but there wa<; fear of a negative customer 
15 A serious issue around invoicing and payment in foreign currency emerged later in the implementation. 
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reaction post go-live with KAMs taking a very proactive approach to blueprinting: "we thought 
as we had got in early that we could have got some customisation out of it if some was 
available ... we had as KAMs to compromise with one other and push for a common outcome ... II 
(RAF, Interview 34, 5). 
At the heart of these reporting requirements, lay the desire for the KAMs firstly to ensure that 
timesheets and expenses were approved by project as opposed to line managers (as will be 
discussed in the next section), secondly that the regulatory requirements were maintained and 
also the retention of job numbers. In some cases (Networks) the level of project detail required 
was necessary to satisfy the Regulator that the infrastructure was being maintained and secondly 
that Networks using NOVOCORP for services was based on cost and quality rather than some 
anti-competitive favouritism, however as one senior manager commented: "Unfortunately, 
there's no-one senior enough who really understands that argument and is willing to fight and 
argue for it - I'll say what I can when I can but ... " (RAF, Interview 29, 8). The notion that job 
numbers could be important was not considered; "When this was explained to the parent, it 
became clear (to the SAP team) that was alien to them" (RAF, Interview 14,3) as the parent had 
a supply as opposed to project culture. AGOCORP Corporate (in terms of the ABCD SAP 
system) had been abstracted from all these functional complexity; in preparing monthly accounts 
that were passed over to ABeD via BCS (as discussed), the NOVOCORP KAMS and Finance 
(particularly) manual intervened on a elaborate and time-consuming level with AGRESSO to 
force their processes to configure. 
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Furthermore, job numbers meant different things to different KAMs and customers (RAF, 
Interview 2], 7) and were broken down by activity codes (Note: of which there were 700(!), that 
the KAMs agreed16 to rationalise). KAMs used the activity codes to allocate expenses (such as 
training) against annual project budgets as well as using them to give more detail to a customer 
as to what work was done on a project (RAF, Interview 46. 6). Some key accounts had very few 
job numbers but they involved substantial individual income whereas alternatively other accounts 
had multiple job numbers with less income (RAE Interview 27. 5). AGRESSO facilitated job 
number flexibility whereas SAP demanded singular job numbers that would be uniform across 
projects and not have the "intelligence" (RAF. Interview 14, 4) for the customer that AGRESSO 
would have supported. 
After considerable debate, there was a realisation on all sides that satisfying every KAM and 
customer requirement was not realistic; nobody wanted to be in a situation whereby (in the words 
of one KAM); "You then end -up with a bastardised system that doesn't work and you have to 
try and spend six months trying to make it work ... " (RAF, Interview 21. 5). After much difficult 
debate, it was agreed (RAF, Interview 25, 8) that job numbers would be facilitated in the system 
design (but as will be seen, a lack of clarity as to how, became problematic). There was a sense 
that "we presented what we had and then at the end there was a final system which seemed to be 
what was on offer before we went into the room ... we didn't like that obviously and there ;s a still 
an underlying feeling around it ... " (RAF, Interview 34, 4). 
16 Refer: RAF, Interview 20, 2. 
7.2.2.4 The approvals process: differences, discussion and democracy. 
An adjunct process difference that emerged during the discussion of PCB in the blueprinting 
workshops was the approvals process. In the parent, all expenses and timesheets were approved 
by an employee's direct line manager. In NOVOCORP, expenses and timesheets were informally 
approved by the project manager (typically) as opposed to the line manager (RAF, Interview 23, 
6). This process difference may have been allowed live on if AGOCORP had agreed to 
implement and utilise the project management (or PM) module in SAP. However, such a 
decision was outside the scope of the pre-agreed configuration and also too costly, which as one 
senior manager stated: "We would regret though that the Project management module in SAP 
wasn't purchased- that's very short-sighted in my view ... " (RAF, Interview 29, 4). There was 
also a view that "there could be (a sense) of the tail wagging the dog in that we're the only part 
of the business who do things in that way ... " (RAF, Interview 23, to) and that could be perceived 
as a further message from the parent as to how was important in the implementation: "when we 
didn't get the Project Management module on SAP given that all of us on the side are either 
project managers or potential project managers tells its own story ... " (RAF, Interview 29, 8). In 
order for NOVOCORP to confirm to the respective processes in AGOCORP, there would need to 
be a change in how line managers worked in terms of having to take on additional responsibility 
which before would have been indirectly that of the project manager, a step that did not meet 
with universal approval: "Initially, the reaction (of the managers) was quite negative ... things like 
'(Our reporting) managers won't do this ... " (RAP, Interview 28, 5). The managers did not like 
the new administrative burden but welcomed that in the new system there would be finally be 
systematic oversight and sign-off of timesheets and expenses. Their worry was more who would 
be signing off (RAF, Interview 29, 4) on the expenses and timesheets and this concern had two 
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principal cau e . Fir tly, there was a feeling that line manager appro al would affect the role and 
effectivene of the project manager as "We're creating a di connect ben een the project 
manager and hislher ability to manage co t etc, the team ' time and the client ... ' (RAP, 
Interview 23, 6). Secondly, the nature of OVO ORP' work w proje t-b ed and relied on 
the ability of a project manager to bring different ) kill to bear on a project kill that exi ted 
acros the bu ine : in other word the project b of OV ORP' acti itie nece itated a 
de-facto matrix organj ational tructure: 
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Figure 7.2: Projects in OVOCORP: matrix or ani ationaJ tructur in op ration. 
An employee from any of OVO ORP' ub-divi ion could be working on multiple different 
project and doing different activitie on the e project; when the engineer entered their 
time heet and expen e , their activitje mu t be entered agajn t the re pecti e acti ity code on 
the right job (number) a the client can get billed appr priately. In term f impa t, certain ub-
divi ion wa likely to be more affected they typically had the m tempI yee econded to 
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projects (RAF, Interview 29, 5). In the case of the SAP system, the concern was that this 
engineer's line manager who literally may not see an employee from one week to the next would 
be signing off on timesheets and expenses whose veracity he/she has no way of confirming, with 
some potential governance implications. Currently, the timesheets were routed to the project 
manager who could at least verify them (though they could not approve). In the words of one 
attendee at the particular workshop after this difference was clarified, " .. .it all went quiet (in the 
meeting) ... " (RAF, Interview 23, 7). 
Finalising the project design had come up against a substantial obstacle and senior managers 
were keenly aware that this was an important decision: "That was one clear decision that will 
influence the design ... ! could see that ... ", (RAF, Interview 25, 8). The project team recognised 
also that design decisions were becoming critical: "Next week actually will be a critical week for 
us as we will be making a couple of key strategic decisions around the design. To some degree, 
we had loosened the reins a bit and now, we're pulling back on them, especially in the last few 
weeks. There's been a recognition! think that has happened and we have to pull it back to where 
it needs to be ... " (RAF, Interview 13, 5).Ultimately it was decided that this should be discussed 
formally among representatives of the key stakeholders and there was a meeting called for the 
17th of May (2010), attended by the change manager, project manager, BP-IT manager, the most 
senior manager and two of his senior reports 17. After much discussion the project manager 
called for a vote to decide on the preferred approach to the approval process to be incorporated in 
the design (RAF, Interview 32, 11); all managers attending (with the exception of the change 
manager, a project manager by background) voted in favour of line manager approval. The 
17 Neither manager of the two most impacted sub-divisions attended this key meeting. 
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project and BPIIT managers' expressed justification wa<; that the paradigm and scope for the 
project was AGOCORP SAP standard and that having a different approval process would be a 
contravention (RAF, Interview 32, II). There were also post-rationalised views that the 
absorption of GENCOM who operated on line manager approval and time pressures on the 
project would have made the decision that was made inevitable (RAF. Interview 47, 9). 
The decision of the senior managers to vote in favour of line manager approval seemed counter-
intuitive given their backgrounds; however they had a clear rationale. They were vary of project 
managers acquiring excess power; "you might get an upstart project manager who's budget is 
under pressure who starts going 'reject reject' for every expense and timesheet and anarchy 
would ensue and they won't want that ..... (RAF. Interview 32. 12). notwithstanding the 
complexity of workflows that would ensue (RAF, Interview 28, 6). However, despite this 
exercise in democracy, the final decision and how it was arrived seemed to remain unclear to 
many others in the business, even towards the end of the project: "I'm not sure has this been fully 
resolved and I still have to see that approval process working .... (RAF. Interview 46, 7). This 
lack of clarity unnecessarily further fuelled a suspicion that they had been marginalised in the 
decision-making process: "Some of the lads got it into their heads though that this was decided 
b.v Finance and HR and if they had been more involved Ihe)' would hw'e realised ;1 would be 
difficult to do no matter what Finance and HR wanted or didn 'I want ..... (RAF, Interview 47, 9). 
However, a conciliatory step were taken with the incorporation of a project manager report into 
the system design (RAF, Interview 28, 6) which would enable project managers to flag expense 
and timesheet concerns prior to line manager approval. However, for some managers, this was 
insufficient and they planned to look at add-on EXCEL functionality (RAF. Interview 34, 4) or 
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adjust their budgets for the next financial year to manually check all timesheets and expenses: 
"This (2 hours extra time) is going to be very expensive - roughly about 400,000 Euros a year in 
an area where costs thanks to new systems and for other reasons are supposing to be going this 
way (GESTURES THUMBS DOWN) ... But if the business wants and needs timesheets and 
expenses to be entered accurately, then this is what needs to happen ... .. (RAF, Interview 23, 7). 
Overal1 the feeling around PCB was a sense of incompleteness: "Take a module in SAP called 
project control and also billing - they're yet to be closed off - I mean people say they're closed 
offbut they're not ..... (RAF, Interview 16,5). 
7.2.2.5 The project team and board: internal and external perspectives and quality 
assurance outcomes. 
Throughout the BPID and more especially the blueprinting process, there had been concerns with 
respect to the level of SAP expertise and experience. The decision to not utilise a formal 
implementation partner necessitated a strong reliance on the project team to acquire the necessary 
skil1 sets at the initial stages, only 2 people on the project team, (both from the AGOCORP SAP 
competence centre) had SAP experience (RAF, Interview 50, 2) and at this stage, the project 
team were still awaiting SAP training (RAF, Interview 20, 6). The lack of project team SAP 
expertise was mentioned as an early learning outcome (RAF, Interview 17, 2) for the 
organisation from the implementation (RAF, Interview 16, 2) even though the experience pool, 
internally within NOVOCORP was considered quite shallow (RAF, Interview 42, 7). The criteria 
for project team selection was also queried; as one senior AGOCORP parent employee 
commented: "it's important to give people a developmental opportunity ... (IAUGHS) but did we 
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really have to give seven people a developmental opponunity at the same time in different 
roles?." (RAF, Interview 40, 6). Additional feedback to the project team highlighted the need for 
increased HR and Managers stakeholder involvement in design and more focused 
communication (RAF, Interview 13, 3). The level of finance function involvement was beginning 
to increase: "You can definitely see that ratcheting up ..... (RAF, Interview 17. I). The project 
board and team were then apprised of the outcomes of the first (of three) quality assurance 
review. This first review was undertaken by a retired AGOCORP employee 18 who had worked 
in project manager roles on prior AGOCORP SAP implementations. The review was described 
as "quite scientific and detailed ....... (RAF, Interview 51. 4) and a "\'ery thorough process" (RAF. 
Interview 13. 6) and had some concrete recommendations. 
The main recommendation was that more resources were required on the project in particular in 
terms of managing the transition to the new system within the business (i.e. NOVOCORP) and 
the number of members of the functional components of the project team for the system testing 
phase to come in realisation (RAF. Interview 13. 6). There was also some observations as to the 
adequacy of levels of project management tracking and reporting on the project (RAF. Interview 
30.6). These key observations brought the team and particularly the project manager back to the 
original PID: "I got some input from him in refining project principles that was useful in crafting 
the PID and that I leaned on again and again as time went on .... (RAF. Interview 51. 5).In tenns 
of addressing the business transition. the role of the Business Implementation Manager (81M) 
was revisited with recommendation made for a fast appointment and the reporting lines the BIM 
18 This retired individual agreed to meet the researcher but unfortunately he became ill and the meeting was not 
possible to fulfil. 
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should follow: "I think though in terms of how the reporting relationship structure would work, 
there definitely was an input there ... " (RAF, Interview 13, 7). In terms of the project board, 
issues around the availability of resources in the leT group 19 began to become an issue but as 
soon as their importance become clear, the senior user on the NOVOCORP side intervened to 
get a commitment that this resource would be available until the end of the project (RAF, 
Interview II, 10). The senior user though he saw his role as a user advocate: "my role is to insure 
we (users) get what we can from the system .... " (RAF, Interview 11, 9) was not visible to the 
user population ("I wouldn't be aware of there being a Senior User on the project as such ... " 
(RAF. Interview 15, 7» and users did not feel they were getting the opportunity to communicate 
their concerns: "That's probably a loop that's missing there ... " (RAF, Interview 14, 12). 
7.2.2.6 The creadon and management of informal project structures. 
As the blueprinting phase continued, different people involved in the project strived to create and 
manage their own supports in order to enable their role and/or satisfy the business. The change 
manager made an initial attempt to access past change management experiences by engaging it 
with change managers on both the prior XYZ and P and HR projects. Reaching out to access past 
expertise was a necessary step as "It's all new for the change manager too; he's being 
challenged on this ... " (RAF, Interview 10, 3). The issues with XYZ (at that point still unresolved) 
seemed to prevent the former from engaging in this forum (RAF, Interview 12, 13) and in 
addition his role as a change manager in his business unit was more of a "back-office role" (RAF, 
Interview 12, 13); the P and HR change manager was close to retirement and on going through 
the process and reviewing relevant documentation, he found "there was little of value in it" 
19 There had been a lot of retirements in the ICT group over the prior calendar year. 
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(RAF, Interview 12, 14). Despite the number of SAP (and other IS) implementations, and 
notwithstanding the ongoing wide scale changes in the business; "we actually here haven'l had 
too many projects that have involved change management initiatives ..... (RAF, Interview 39, 7). 
Not having this expertise to readily fall back on, the change manager (on the suggestion of the 
senior manager (RAF, Interview 12, 9) decided to initiate a change management steering group: 
"/ hope to fonn a change steering group, basically of six managers around the business and sit 
down with me, and go through my change plan, my communication plan. which I'm trying to 
develop at the moment and basically what / would so 10 try and get them agreed to it ... " (RAF, 
Interview 7, 9).The idea's genesis arose from the fact" / was used to hal'ing more ofafree rein 
and working on my own. (as a project manager): Additionally, because of the project board 
structure to this project, I was more held back. I could come up with ideas say around a 
communication plan but everything had to be appnJ\'ed (by the project board) .... " (RAF, 
Interview 12, 7). It was recommended to him by the senior manager that he attend a senior 
management team meeting to recruit volunteers but in order to secure what he felt were the 
appropriate candidates, he decided to pre-empt by asking managers in advance: "/ didn't want to 
leave it loose like that so before the meeting; I made a point of talking to particular people and 
ask them would they volunteer. One guy agreed and the second said he'd \'olunteer on the day if 
nobody else would. On the day, actually, someone else l'Olunteered instead of the second guy bUI 
/ managed to steer it away from him ... " (RAF, Interview 12. 9). He saw himself as striving to 
"keep a balance between different views and the different social groups that exist and I managed 
to (manufacture) get that but I don't think the senior manager wa.f aware of that need. It could 
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have been any two (as far as he was concerned) but I had a certain spread or rationale in 
mind ... " (RAF, Interview 12,9). 
The steering group was perceived to be separate from the formal project structures: "There is a 
project board and a project team. Separate from that, for me to manage the level of change in the 
business, to communicate and work with the (affected) people, we have the change management 
steering group ... " (RAF, Interview 12, 3), although the project manager did attend some of the 
initial meetings (RAF, Interview 12, 5). The concept and role of the steering group though 
suggested to the project manager did not reach the BPIIT manager: "it was bought (into) and out 
there in the business and then the BPIIT manager heard about it..." (RAF, Interview 12, 7). But 
it (in his view); "it's being accepted, almost embedded in the business with the result that in a 
few presentations recently, it almost feels that the project board came up with the idea and not 
me, but 1 don't mind. For me though, it's a great inteiface with the rest of the business ... " (RAF, 
Interview 12, 7). The steering gtoup was seen by the change manager as a way of cascading 
information down through the population and also as a way of accessing resources for a later 
stage in the project, i.e. "/ will use the steering group as my vehicle to get super-users 
nominated .... (RAF, Interview 12, 3). The value of the steering group became evident in 
escalating a sick leave issue that had arose with respect to a HR BPID in the blueprinting 
workshops. As the change manager explained "I explained that (the "to-be" intended process in 
the new SAP system) to the steering group and they went ballistic about it. They felt people 
would be doing things that might not be appropriate and also that it placed an extra burden on 
management. People were saying that they'd have to get legal advice as to how to deal with sick 
leave issues .... " (RAF, Interview 12, 9). 
, 
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The steering board gave an opportunity for the issue to be raised and clarified and emphasise to 
the managers that "They are going to have to deal with these issues themselves as they arise in 
tenns of people management and cope with it ... " (RAF, Interview 12, 6). It also gave an 
opportunity for managers to not only address live project issues but to raise issues themselves 
such as the different processes in NOVOCORP as opposed to AGOCORP (RAF, Interview 14, 
3). In addition to the steering group, the chief financial controller taking the recommendation of 
the first quality assurance review, decided to instigate a transition group 20 composed of the 
financial controllers in the business (RAF, Interview 12, 7), which began to consider some of the 
core process changes that would arise. For example, in terms of the new centralised purchase 
order bureau that would reflect what already existed in AGOCORP and which accelerated the 
appointment of the transition or business implementation manager, which will be discussed in a 
latter section. 
7.2.2.7 The absorption of GENCOM. 
As part of the GTS re-organisation (as already discussed), GENCOM was absorbed into 
NOVOCORP. This process occurred in late March 20 I 0 (with the official unity date being April 
I Sf) and overlapped with the design phase of the project and presented one important issue: 
GENCOM were already SAP compliant. Although this additional complexity was well-
signposted, it was not considered to be high on the risk register: "/ don't see a problem with say 
GENCOM people being on an ERP plat/ann, / don't see it as a huge risk to be honest ... " (RAF, 
Interview 9, 6) and providing an additional driver for SAP adoption by NOVOCORP (RAF, 
20 Separate entirely to the formal transition group later on in implementation. 
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Interview 7, 12). In addition, the impact of absorbing GENCOM had role, process and perception 
implications. In terms of roles, GENCOM being a distinct business unit had their own BP/IT 
manager and function but that was subsumed into NOVOCORP with the NOVOCORP BP/IT 
manager retaining her lead role post restructuring (RAF, Interview 40, 3). The process 
implications would prove to be more problematic. Due to regulatory requirements, even though 
NOVOCORP and GENCOM were ostensibly part of the same structure, their operation had to 
remain separate which posed problems for the finance and HR control processes. In order to 
facilitate a smoother absorption, the HR, some of the Finance and all of the ITIBP function were 
moved over to SAP at this point in the project. The roll-out of training was considered to have 
been problematic at best with issues around communication and delivery as stated by 
interviewees (RAF, Interview 7, 13) and in various off-the-record remarks by managers. 
Perceptually this was also a concern as "We're also aware that if they (the NOVOCORP staff) do 
move across and are using SAP, they'll be communicating with their former colleagues in terms 
of what SAP is like to use, what kind of training and supports they're going to get etc ... " (RAF, 
Interview 7, 14) and also that other people in the business would demand to move over sooner to 
SAP (RAF, Interview 12, 17). Also, the emphasis within this new structure on traditional utility 
activities, and (seeming) downplaying of the consultancy associated with NOVOCORP created 
some genuine fears; as one interviewee remarked: "People are thinking about this new GTS 
strategy - might be almostforgonen if that's the case .. " (RAF, Interview 47, 10). This fear was 
particularly felt within the division which had a similar function to GENCOM: "there would be a 
feeling that the business could be under a linle bit of a threat ... " (RAF, Interview 7, 13). The 
GENCOM absorption was not seen as problematic by everyone. In the view of the project 
216 
manager, it went "seamlessly" (RAF, Interview 13,4). However the change manager had a very 
different view, a view that led to him (in retrospect) to begin to question his roles and 
responsibilities: "there were a lot of lies and untruths about the whole process" (RAF, Interview 
12, 17) though he did not feel alone: "Well, I felt it and the BPIIT manager did and the project 
did ... " (RAF, Interview 12, 17). 
7.2.2.8 Redefining the roles of the change manager. 
The concerns expressed by the change manager in relation to the GENCOM absorption came at 
the end of three months in the role. He had taken an active role in communication with the 
general view being positive, notwithstanding that "he has an uphill job in order to get the 
communication across as people are so busy but so far it's gone well ... " (RAF, Interview 23,5). 
He had been intent on using existing management meetings as a forum for delivering updates 
(RAF, Interview 7, 9) and had been strongly supported by management in doing so (RAF, 
Interview 10, 1). Despite his visible presence in the business, there was still substantial 
uncertainty as his role (RAF, Interview 18, 14): "I'm not sure where his role starts and his role 
finishes ... .. (RAF, Interview 17, 3). The involvement of a change manager was welcome but what 
the role entailed was unclear (RAF, Interview 21, 6). In terms of role clarity, user concerns had 
been raised and not just confined to the change manager (RAF, Interview 37, 3). 
In addition to uncertainty as to the parameters of his role, there was also concerns as to his lack 
of SAP experience though it was felt important by the population that he was one of them: "[ 
mean the positive is that he as an employee should have a good feel for our business; the 
negative is he doesn't know enough about SAP ... You put someone in there who's strong on SAP, 
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then they don't know enough about our business so you lose out that way .... " (RAP, Interview 
20, 7). The lack of SAP experience was seen as undermining his role: "but he doesn't know 
enough about SAP ... People are running rings around him and he doesn't even know it .... the vibe 
I'm gettingfrom the project is that people are saying or acting like "shortcut him, take him out of 
it, go to the people that matter and tell him what to do then (afterwards}", not really the role the 
change manager should be doing ... " (RAP, Interview 18, 14) and there was the view that "He 
used to get overruled at meetings an awful lot early on ... " (RAP, Interview 41, 6). He had 
decided to focus more directly on communication (RAP, Interview 12, 2) although at this 
relatively early project stage, certain key stakeholders felt that no specific need for same (RAP, 
Interview 17, 3). The lack of business case understanding made open and transparent 
communication difficult: "It's diffiCUlt communicating and presenting on the project and then 
being asked why the project is being done. Is it to save on resources? People are understandably 
concerned with the economic situation at the moment ... " (RAP, Interview 12, 12). 
He had also decided to attend the blueprinting workshops, in particular those attended by the 
KAMs and other managers, a decision that led to conflict with the BP/IT manager: "The BPIIT 
manager has been giving out to me for going to the workshops, telling me "You shouldn't be 
going to those workshops-if you're going to those workshops, you're not doing your job ... " 
(RAF. Interview 12, 1). He felt that attending was helpful in that : "They like to talk about it and 
get the inside view in a way and I'm trying to help them and prod them along a specific way 
when they ask and say "Do wefocus on this?" or "Should we go to that?". (RAF, Interview 12, 
8). 
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This conflict drove him to revisit his roles and responsibilities and after agreeing a meeting with 
the BP/IT manager, turned up only to find "The BPIIT manager came to the meeting with a 
revised job description ... had rewritten it and we both brought it with us unknown to the other 
person ... " (RAF, Interview 12, 2). They agreed that his focus was and should be from then on, to 
engage the community first and foremost, although he felt that was not explicit in his role 
description: "My role is to make sure that those people (the employees) are engaged and stand 
back a bit. Now. when she said it. it made sense and I agreed (with her) but that was not what my 
role said ... " (RAF, Interview 12, 2). Parallel to these broader voiced concerns and developments, 
the role of the transitionlbusiness implementation manager was also being revisited. 
7.2.2.9 Deciding on the business implementation manager's roles and reporting 
structure. 
In drafting the original project scope and PID, the role of a transitionlbusiness implementation 
manager had been identified and described (RAF, Interview 13, 4). There was also uncertainty 
about two a ~ p e c t s s of the role however, namely who would fill the role and also what would be 
their reporting and structural relationship with respect to the project team. The first quality 
assurance review had made some recommendations as to the reporting structure and this led to 
some discussion as to whether the transition manager should report direct to the change manager 
(and that their role should be fused in some way) or directly to the project manager (RAF, 
Interview 13,3). 
In parallel with this role clarification, the change manager's role was also being reviewed and 
their mandate was moved move towards communication, leaving a role for fully managing the 
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transition of the bu ines (RAP, Interview 12, 8) even though the change manager only became 
aware of the separate bu ine implementation manager role in April (RAF, Interview 32, 15). As 
the project manager tated: "That role will have a number of responsibilities, really to make sure 
that the business is ready for the system, interacting with the business, getting us the data we 
need, the activities we need and the people for training ... " (RAF, Interview 13, 3). 
There was an initial understanding that the change and transition manager roles were separate: 
"You need someone to coordinate between the project and the business and there needs to be a 
point of contact between the two so communication is clear ... A different role to the change 
manager? Oh Yes .. . " (RAF, Interview 16, 1). By the end of the blueprinting phase, there was 
still some uncertainty a to the reporting line thi role would follow. Also, despite a plan to 
recruit for the role by April, the blueprinting pha e came to an end without a transition manager 
being appointed (RAF, Interview 22, 2). De pite the role being part of the original scope, 
"officially, the post has not been filled and the employees don't know about it .. " (RAF, Interview 
12,8). 
7.2.2.10 No sense of an ending. 
"The problem is that the door is not shut in afew areas ... they need to be closed in my view .... " 
Senior Finance Manager, NOVOCORP (RAF, Interview 16, 3) 
As the blueprinting/design pha e came to an end, issues had begun to emerge with respect to 
project role ,reporting tructure and elements of the design, issues which would continue to be 
challenging as the project progre sed. A the board prepared to sign-off on the design, the project 
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manager appealed for a two week extension for the completion of the new HR functionality and 
also three weeks for the PCB functionality (RAF, Interview 13, 1), both justified on the basis of 
novelty and issues with external expertise (i.e. the loss of the first external consultant). The delay 
in HR functionality would mean that the LDS module could not go live until February 2011 
(RAF, Interview 32, 3). Given that this module was not intended to be effectively used until 
Summer 2011, this was not considered to be overly impactful. Both these requests were accepted 
and the design phase was concluded with the project manager confident of regaining deadline 
control in the next phase (RAF, Interview 13, 1). 
7.2.3 Bringing the design to life: Realisation (June-Sep 2010). 
"[ wouldfeel the hard part is really coming; the iterative design, implementation, 
data cleansing, migration, the rubber really hits the road now in my mind" 
Senior Finance Manager (RAF, Interview 16,6) 
The formal description of this third phase emphasises the need to realise or configure the design 
blueprinted in the previous phase, while re-scoping the project (if necessary), preparing end-user 
documentation and implementing integration testinl1. With respect to testing; "90% of it is 
already in use in AGOCORP, so we're not expecting any serious problems ... " (RAF, Interview 
12, 15) although this were some issues expected: "We get the system testing well-done and that's 
when we hopefully will catch the problems" (RAF. Interview 16. 7). Early integration and 
system testing was to be the responsibility of the project team (RAF. Interview 13. 6) with end-
users involved at a later date in business readiness testing (BRT). The project team (and board) 
21 Integration testing had a 90% plus success rate (RAF, Interview 39, 6). 
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were aware of the ongoing business commitments to the project and were anxious to ensure that 
NOVOCORP (which had to continue operating regardless) was not exhaustively pushed by the 
project to provide testers and documenters (RAF, Interview 12,5). There was an expectation that 
there would be some early slack in the realisation phase (RAF, Interview 32, 1); however, this 
did not happen due to the need to replace the external SAP consultant (RAF, Interview 15, 10). 
There was also some unfinished recruitment from the previous phase in the form of the business 
implementation manager role. 
7.2.3.1 Appointment of the 81M. 
Despite being part of the originally pinpointed project roles, the BIM was not formally appointed 
until June 2011 (RAF, Interview 22, 1) not as early as would have been preferred (RAF, 
Interview 16, 2). The delay had arisen due to the uncertainty over whether the original choice 
(from the AGOCORP parent) would be available. Issues arose over not over availability but also 
the reporting structure the BIM would follow. How the BIM would report to the project was an 
issue considered in the first quality assurance review with the tentative conclusion that the BIM 
or the change manager would report to each other and then via one of the roles to the project 
(RAF, Interview 13,3). The original candidate was more senior than the project manager so it 
was not considered appropriate that they report directly to the project manager but rather to the 
senior financial controller in the business (i.e. NOVOCORP). The original choice was then 
unavailable and the replacement22 though not as senior as the original choice still followed that 
original reporting structure (RAF, Interview 30,7). 
22 Her selection was the choice of the senior financial controller within NOVOCORP (ref: RAF, Interview 35,7) 
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The appointee to the role had some SAP experience from a prior financial role in AGOCORP 
and had recently joined NOVOCORP in a different role totally independent of the project (RAF. 
Interview 22, 1). Being one of the few financial staff in NOVOCORP with a SAP (and 
AGRESSO) background and having had some involvement in past SAP implementations (RAF, 
Interview 16, 2), she was seconded to support the finance function where her SAP experience 
stood out: "I felt in some of the project workshops, that she was the Chosen One" (RAF, 
Interview 17, 1). Her contributions and appointment were considered both welcome and 
necessary (RAF, Interview 16, 1) and there was confidence in her ability to fulfill the role (RAF, 
Interview 17, 2). Her experience and knowledge was perceived as not just limited to SAP but 
also to encompass her original finance background: "she has that finance knowledgi 3 and she's 
really driving the finance side ... She has the legitimacy and she has the kudos around the place in 
terms of the past successes on other projects ... " (RAF, Interview 31,3). She (and felt others also) 
saw the role as separate from the project team and that she was there to "close-off and protect the 
business" (RAF, Interview 22, 2) in case the project had terminal difficulties. She was conscious 
that she acted as a conduit from the business to the project and that financial decisions being 
made on the project should have financial controller input (RAF, Interview 22, 3). Initially her 
view and that of other finance stakeholders in the business was that she was principally a 
business legate: "The role of the BIM is to ensure that the project vision and business vision are 
23 She was the only member of the project team executive (i.e. including Project and change managers) with a 
finance background. 
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lined-up / Her job is to ensure that the design that get's implemented reflects the business 
demands" (RAF, Interview 16, 2). 
Although her appointment was welcomed by many, it was a massive surprise to many others: "it 
totally come out of the blue ... " (RAF, Interview 50, 2) with particular disquiet amongst senior 
managers:" we got the impression that this wasn't planned when the project started in 
January ... " (RAF, Interview 27, 8). Managers who participated in the (blueprinting) workshops 
were unsure as to when she had taken on the BIM role and what it involved: "she was a BIM - I 
would have hoped that there would have been some communication on that, a circular 
maybe ... lnteresting .... " (RAF, Interview 20, 8). The appointment for some observers implied that 
the change management role was not as effective as hoped: "This is why the pressure has been 
put on for the BIM to come in, a much stronger personality and a much stronger business focus 
as well ... " (RAF, Interview 18, 14) though that view was discounted by others (RAF, Interview 
27,8). 
As her role was later to the project than planned, she found herself inheriting a heavy workload: 
"When I started, I was given 121 tasks, 60 from Data migration, 60 from the finance, functional 
side - not allfor me, some passed back to the business to make a call ... " (RAF, Interview 22, 12) 
and also additional tasks such as system access and administration rights (RAF, Interview 22, 
12). As many of the tasks were HR related (68 from 121, RAF, Interview 18, 12) and she had a 
finance background, the HR functional lead and team member agreed to share the HR task load 
with the support of their senior HR manager back in the business (RAF, Interview 18, 13). There 
was an observation even as she took on the role that "it's a very big job and also that people 
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might use her as a scapegoat. She could easily fall into the trap, and I think she has already, of 
being another finance person on the project ... Some of the finance people are already asking her 
to do things ... lt'll be interesting to see .. " (RAF, Interview 18, 13). 
7.2.3.2 Configuring the design; resolving Finance and DR process issues. 
As part of configuring the design of the new system, issues arose that potentially affected the 
existing AGOCORP SAP system or would have to involve changing the outcomes of the 
blueprinting phase. To order to manage such issues, the organisation utilised four formal 
structural arrangements that were demand-led. Firstly, any configuration issues that would 
potentially impact on the AGOCORP SAP system were dealt with by a design authority 
comprising a senior HR manager from NOVOCORP, a representative of the (Corporate) ICT 
function (in the form of the acting CTO) and a senior finance manager from NOVOCORP IE 
(RAF, Interview 26, 9). 
Any proposed changes to the design outcomes blueprinting phase were referred to by the project 
manager to an NOVOCORP change board24, which comprised of senior finance and HR 
managers and senior managers from the parent; if a change issue is beyond the scope of the 
NOVOCORP change board, then an AGOCORP change board is constituted to judge on the 
issue (see RAF, Interview 31). Over the duration of the project, 13 change requests were brought 
24 It should be noted that on occasion, the change board informally advised certain executive team members: "there 
was some suggestions from the change board that I engage with a mentor but it didn't materialise ..... (RAF, 
Interview 12, 14). 
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to the NOVOCORP change board and only 3 were approved (RAF, Interview 30, 12). The case 
for approving or referring change requests had to be "very thorough and clear" (RAF, Interview 
26, 10) with the key factor involving the weighing-up of attendant cost in terms of impact or 
additional days development versus whether the change was just cosmetic or a more serious 
design defect that had not been identified in the earlier phase (RAF, Interview 28, 10). 
During the course of the implementation, three major configuration issues were considered, 
namely the PS timesheet, the Salary bands or grades HR issue and the FX (Foreign Currency) 
reporting issue. The PS timesheet was the name given to the AGOCORP Standard SAP system 
timesheet as displayed for the user. When the HR Functional lead and members of the project 
team were configuring the NOVOCORP timesheet as entered currently with the AGOCORP 
standard, they noticed an important difference: AGOCORP employees were allowed work 
.flexible hours ("Flexi-Time") whereas NOVOCORP employees (contractually) operated on core 
working day arrangements (RAF, Interview 26, 9). There was a concern that NOVOCORP 
employees using this system for the first time would think they're entitled to new flexi-time 
arrangements and so a case was made that NOVOCORP employees should not be offered this 
option when entering their time. As this would involve changing the AGOCORP SAP standard, 
the request was forwarded to the design authority where it was rejected on the basis of cost and 
relevance (RAF, Interview 26, 9). The senior NOVOCORP HR manager on the design authority 
(also on the change board) observed that there were other working terms and conditions that 
applied to AGOCORP and not to other sub-divisions already on SAP and this did not constitute 
sufficient grounds for development (ref: RAF, Interview 31). 
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The same senior HR manager then experienced the bureaucratic force of these control structures 
(ref: RAF, Interview 18) in attempting to introduce new pay bands for NOVOCORP employees 
in the existing SAP PM module. Under their old structures, NOVOCORP had single broad 
grading bands (i.e. one from 15000 to 65000 Euros; one form 65, 000 to 125,000 etc). Both the 
NOVOCORP HR and Finance functions wished to utilise the project as a means of moving from 
broad grading bands to indicative shorter grading bands (i.e. instead of one band from 5 - 65, 
000, that they would have bands from 15-25, 25-45 etc) to aid in reporting (RAF, Interview 28, 
10). Again, process differences in the parent (AGOCORP did not have a multitude of employees 
within income ranges) resulted in this request being referred to the design authority. Despite 
support from within AGOCORP and NOVOCORP (RAF, Interview 31, 7) the request was 
rejected: "I had a good reason for doing so (i.e. changing the bands), but I was trying to wrap it 
into the project ... we tried to bring it through as a change request and AGOCORP insisted that it 
couldn't be done that way ... " (RAF, Interview 31, 6). Despite clear organisational benefits (Le. 
"you would know who was on a specific salary band and also who was on a certain pension 
scheme etc .. ", RAF, Interview 31, 6), the request was rejected on the basis that that information 
could already be extracted from the existing SAP system (RAF, Interview 28, 10) and therefore 
would not be a cost-effective development. However, with the support of her senior HR manager 
(RAF, Interview 28, 10) and gaining insights into how Networks and the ICT group segment 
workforces , she was able to informally identify a solution. By changing the semantics of the 
request: "As long as I said salary bands, no problem - but if I said Grading bands where I could 
see direct hires or line manager etc, then it was No .... "(RAF, Interview 31, 7). As she 
commented with the benefit of hindsight: "The learning for me was that I needed to change my 
agenda - once I began to listen to why I wasn't being allowed do what I wanted, rather than 
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pushing on, 1 began to ... 1 changed my business case to make it work ... " (RAF, Interview 31, 7). 
Another process difference that arose in configuration was the level of foreign currency 
transactions in NOVOCORP as opposed to AGOCORP. This issue in the eyes of some key 
NOVOCORP stakeholders had been sidelined in the blueprinting phase and they had been denied 
a workshop request to discuss the issue (RAF, Interview 22, 4). All AGOCORP's customers 
were national and their default currency settings on SAP were in Euro; NOVOCORP had 
multiple businesses with an international dimension being paid or paying in a multitude of 
currencies (RAF, Interview 39, 9), The concern was not so much that different currencies would 
make the accounting structures incompatible but more to ensure that reporting would be clear for 
the management and the customer (RAF, Interview 39, 9). The user disquiet over the furtive 
handling of the FX issue was identified by the BIM who raised it as an issue with the senior 
financial controller (RAF, Interview 22, 8) who pressurised for an urgent meeting to address the 
issue. The design authority became involved and although SAP does facilitate multiple currency 
transactions and reporting, for legal and governance reasons, a call was made to retain the 
AGOCORP SAP currency standard of Euras (RAF, Interview 39, 9) with some back-end 
flexibility for reporting. 
7.2.3.3 Where's the system? Managing transition and change in an information 
vacuum. 
Given the manner in which the prior phase had ended, there was concerns amongst the broader 
user community as to what the finalised design would functionally entail: " But now, we're in a 
vacuum as we have no understanding or concept of what or how much was taken on board ... 1 
would have felt that towards the end of the summer (2010) that they would come back to us with 
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something like a system that you could smell and touch and get a sense of whether the system 
was going to do it (what was required) for us. That would be the concern for us ... " (RAF, 
Interview 20, 8). There was a perception emerging amongst the user community that the project 
team was beginning to disengage from the business ("generally there is reluctance on behalf of 
the project team to engage with the business, why -I don't know ... ", RAF, Interview 22,3) as it 
dealt with testing and configuration issues. There was a broad understanding that the design was 
completed but that the business was disconnected from the result: "The design is done and we 
have to deal with that but in terms of say being conscious of how the business being affected, no, 
they haven't been aware enough of that .. " (RAF, Interview 24, 4). 
The need for the project to push through the phases and manage deadlines was also understood 
but the business was beginning to feel left behind: "I realise you have to make decisions quickly 
and you have a deadline that pushes things along quickly ... but there's a balance there that has to 
be achieved between the different stakeholders and 1 would like to have seen a bit more of 
bringing the majority of people with them and also to be showing people the system ... " (RAF, 
Interview 25, 11). The inward facing priorities of the business was also raising again the issue of 
project team experience: "don't think it is a case of not being open; it's more that they don't 
know ... So instead of saying we were hoping to do certain things and now it looks like we can't, 
this is more a case of finding out what's not going to happen three or four months after we 
agreed something else ... " (RAF, Interview 25, 4). The steering group (that) had not met as 
frequently since the end of the design phase met with the leT group and helped resolve this key 
issue (RAF, Interview 25, 9-10). 
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Given the paucity of project information available ("He's asking the project the questions but 
he's not getting the answers to communicate ... ", RAF, Interview 22, 3), there were differing 
opinions as the effectiveness of project communication. Amongst the functional team, there was 
a view that communication could have been more effective: "there were a few missed 
opportunities in terms of sending out electronic mails and also in updating the SOIAS project 
page where we were updating how things were coming along ... ", RAF, Interview 28, 7. Senior 
managers generally were supportive of the change manager. Some remarked on his enthusiasm "I 
see him more as the PR man for the project, selling SAP .. " (RAF, Interview 29, 7). Others 
commented positively on his tendency to informal appraise them of project issues and 
developments: "Well, I'd see him occasionally as he'd still be at his own desk over here 
occasionally and he'd remark on how things were going ... 1 wasn't unduly worried .... " (RAF, 
Interview 27, 7). 
In many respects, this definition indicates just how the change and business transition roles had 
began to coalesce and combine; as one senior manager had predicted in the blueprinting phase: "I 
can see them changing roles - the change manager will become the RIM and the RIM the 
Change Manager ... " (RAF, Interview 18, 14). In the views of the finance users, the BIM was 
"doing a bit of the change management on the business side ... " (RAF, Interview 36, 5). The BIM 
and the change manager had a fluid understanding of their own roles, as the BIM commented: "in 
some ways, it probably works well because of our personalities - we both want to just get it in, 
do it well and do it right. .. he doesn't care that I go and communicate - he's not saying 'Oh, I'm 
the change manager and I do all the communication' and vice-versa ... " (RAF, Interview 22, 7). 
The reporting line of the 81M to the senior finance controller was seen (by her) as an important 
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advantage, ensuring that her views were listened to: "(the change manager) doesn't have the 
flexibility I have outside the team ... " (RAF, Interview 22, 7). 
The 81M was seen as a strong supporter of the change role, supplying finance knowledge and 
general support: "But the BIM, she's very good, very strong and I know she'sfinance but she has 
supported him a lot, I would think ... " (RAF, Interview 28, 8). Both the 81M and the change 
manager would meet regularly and informally prior to important project meetings: "we meet and 
tease things out and he now comes to the financial controller and HR manager meetings so 
there's nofear that I mightforget to tell him something ... " (RAF, Interview 22, 7). Although this 
combining of roles seemed to work well for the 81M and change manager, it was a source of 
frustration for some senior observers directly and indirectly involved on the project, i.e. "Well, I 
would feel they would have worked well TOGETHER (Speaker's own emphasis) but at times, 
they weren't fully aware of the priorities of the project and that say the priorities of the project 
were different to theirs .. "(RAF, Interview 30, 8). There was the perception that the roles had 
become unclear: "The role of change manager and BIM has been confused .. .let's just say .... so 
that learning that's been there on other projects hasn't been taken on board .... " (RAF, Interview 
40,6). 
Senior managers generally perceived the change manager role to be as much a "conduit" (RAF, 
Interview 25, 7) as an agent of change in that "he knows what we're looking for and the finance 
functional team member is the same" (RAF, Interview 29, 8). There was a general feeling "that 
they're (the BIM and change manager are) frustrated by the process - there are (the) people on 
the project from HR and the Finance and they are fighting for the system to reflect what their 
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(functional) needs are ... " (RAF, Interview 34, 6). These divided loyalties were seen as damaging 
the project: "[t's also important not to have mixed messages either - when you're trying and 
selling the system and you get feedback, instead of batting it away, if you end up bringing it back 
to the business, then you're passing a parcel over the wall rather than (selling the system) ... " 
(RAF, Interview 33, 7). 
This recurrent role ambiguity was a serious source of frustration for senior stakeholders given 
that they (in the project mobilisation phase) had "spent a lot of time very early on defining those 
roles - I don't think we could have been more explicit ... " (RAF, Interview 51, 3). In order to try 
and clarify the roles, senior stakeholders revisited the original reporting recommendation made in 
the first quality review, namely that to combine the two roles with one reporting to the other who 
would then report to the project manager (RAF, Interview 30, 7). In addition to clarifying roles, it 
would also alleviate the number of direct reports to the project manager, which at this point a 
total of nine people (RAP, Interview 40, 5). However clarifying the change manager's roles and 
responsibilities had become more of a priority and this proposal was put to one side (RAF, 
Interview 30, 7). 
Concerns with regards to project costing and billing had been continuously voiced by the users 
with the change manager specifically asked to address this issue by the BPnT manager (RAF, 
Interview 32, 4). Conscious of his testing responsibilities, he appealed for the assistance of the 
main finance project functional team member who had worked in accounting roles for many of 
the key senior managers who esteemed her (RAF, Interview 27, 5-6). Both the BIM and change 
manager were concerned about getting into an information sharing exercise with senior 
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management where they would respectively have neither the finance or systems knowledge to be 
effective (RAF, Interview 22, 13). Due to testing resource constraints, the finance project 
functional team member was unavailable to the level the change manager and BIM felt was 
necessary and this led to further conflict with the BP/IT manager and the project manager which 
would reignite in as training came into view. Although the role of the change manager had been 
already been revisited in the blueprinting phase with a resultant emphasis on communication (and 
some involvement in testing), demands were beginning to be made on the role in terms of 
supporting training. Organising training was to be formally co-ordinated and delivered by the 
change manager function which also had responsibility for undertaking the necessary training 
needs analyses (RAF, Interview 28, 8). The business thought that training would be addressed 
formally in circulated plan ("we keep on being told there's a big training plan coming but none 
of the detail is clear but it's expected that everyone will get a chance to look at it ... " RAF, 
Interview 21, 9), which only added to expectations. 
The BP/IT and the project manager began to pressurise the change manager to take ownership of 
the training responsibility as the training plan had been approved by the project board; the change 
manager felt that his priorities were to keep up the communication and continue to test; a 
difference of opinion that led to strong disagreements (RAF, Interview 32, I). This resulted in 
another meeting where the parameters of the change role were addressed to reflect the training 
responsibility (RAF, Interview 32,3). The change manager reacted to this role change by sending 
an e-mail to the BP-IT manager prior to going on leave: "[ knew it would wind her up but I 
wanted to get a reaction as I felt there had been no communication ... " (RAF, Interview 32, 3). 
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On his return, the BP-IT manager had sourced extra financial resources enabling him to acquire 
an external training 25 resource (RAF, Interview 32, 2). 
Obtaining an external training resource was seen by the change manager as necessary. However 
by others it was seen more as a pyrrhic victory that was avoidable if informal networks and 
contacts had been availed of. As one senior manager remarked "He was led a merry dance 
around the training - he didn't know the right people to ask or talk to - as an organisation we 
were a little bit naive putting in someone (into the change manager role) who didn't have the 
experience ... for something that's so critical..." (RAF, Interview 31, 3). Engaging an external 
consultant to assist on the training sent a message to some members of the functional team that 
"he's (the change manager) disengaging from that but that's part of his responsibilities ... " (RAF, 
Interview 28, 8). 
7.2.3.4 The wheels begin to come off. 
"It (the project) worked well, Ifelt up until about mid-summer whereby 
the team kind-of fell apart ... " 
Senior AGOCORP Group Manager (RAF, Interview 47, 10) 
Discussions over resources, the late appointment of the BIM role and the ongoing difficulties 
posed by Project Costing and Billing had began to place the project under perceived pressure 
(RAF, Interview 47, 10). Constant request demands and issues as to PCB and other delays had 
led to the project board to question the planning and execution of the project (RAF, Interview 22, 
12). The effectiveness of the project board had also been questioned with concerns as to how 
25 Neither NOVOCORP nor the AGOCORP Group has a dedicated (system) training function. 
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removed the senior users were from the day-to-day issues the end-users would face (RAF, 
Interview 24, 5) and how request and issues were prioritised and handled (RAF, Interview 31,8): 
"/ mean they're (the senior users) signing off on decisions made a level below them on the 
project anyway and I would question the big value of them ... ... " (RAF, Interview 31, 9). A 
project board member commented as to how the board had to be overly managed: "On the 
(Financials and HR) project board, everything was a problem ... which is probably due to a lot of 
experience ... the project manager ended up managing them as much as anything - now the 
project board are there for support, for clear thinking and it needs to be more clinical in 
understanding the real problem .... " (RAF, Interview 40, 7). 
The BIM (as already discussed) faced a significant workload and difficulties over the role of the 
change manager and attendant requests for resources had been brought to the project board. 
Consistent resource demands created a view that: "this is all cost... we didn't get the answers we 
needed - it was frustrating that people weren't getting what was missing (i.e. the plan) ... it took 
us a long time to quantify what the problem was .. . and only then did the realisation arrive we 
didn't have the full plan and the (BIM task) list management .... "(RAF, Interview 40, 8). The 
project manager was aware that they were concerns in the business (RAF, Interview 30, 5) but 
these concerns around planning had been raised in the earlier quality assurance review and had 
been known in the business (RAF, Interview 30, 6). As one interviewee commented: "Well, it 
was identified as a risk but the project board did what it did (and) didn't make the decision -
they didn't bite the bullet on it ... " (RAF, Interview 40, 6). The possibility that the time available 
for the project manager to plan had been affected had already been considered as an issue and 
had helped prompt the re-evaluation of the reporting roles (as already discussed). Planning on the 
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project was viewed as "a very macro schedule which would lack detail..." (RAF, Interview 32, 
1). As the project manager remarked "the planning consultant brought an expertise to the 
project in terms of planning and reporting that - I would have felt we had a good project plan in 
place but when we brought the planning consultant in externally ... "(RAF, Interview 30, 5). 
The stark nature of the planning issues was brought home when the BP/IT manager stood in for 
the project manager (who was on leave) and realised assistance on the planning side was 
necessary (RAF, Interview 28, 9). After some initial work on the project plan, she recruited an 
external planning consultant was known to the organisation (RAF, Interview 33, 1). 
Concurrently, the second project QA review 26 was underway, facilitated on this occasion by an 
external consultant. When he joined the project, it was made clear to him that the project was in a 
difficult position and had gone off track in terms of planning, reporting and overall governance 
(RAF, Interview 33, 2): "in terms of controls, structures, governance, I have to say, it (the 
project)just was not there ... " (RAF, Interview 33,3). 
As part of the QA, the external QA consultant undertook to interview (in person or over the 
phone) a total of 22 key project stakeholders, and as a result, came to discuss the state of the 
project with this new planning resource. There was a strong meeting of minds as to what were 
the key issues; as the planning consultant remarked "Well, early on, I did meet with them and was 
ad-idem with them in terms of what they had observed on lots of things ... In fact I'd go so far as to 
say that I probably gave them a bit of collateral in terms of suggestions .. " (RAF, Interview 33, 
2). The issue of planning particularly was raised with project team members, such as the change 
26 What follows in terms of the second QA review process has been informed by several off-the-record 
conversations with key project stakeholders. 
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manager: "the external planning consultant brought great structure on the planning side but a 
lot of that I suppose I felt that came out of suggestions I had made before but ... When I talked to 
the external QA consultant, he had asked about that ... " (RAF, Interview 52, 3). 
Both identified that there were gaps in terms of project team experience and effectiveness (RAF, 
Interview 32, 14), some of which were attributed to the lack of an implementation partner (RAF, 
Interview 42, 7). The external QA consultant was familiar to many of the project team from past 
projects and his interactions were honest and open, and his interventions were felt to be of 
benefit: "We had a QA with .... , and things improved after that..." (RAF, Interview 50, 5). He was 
particularly keen to explore the levels of support given to the BIM and change manager roles by 
the project team and to how meetings were conducted (RAF, Interview 32, 5). He emphasised 
the need for the change manager to leverage the senior user (not unlike what had been done by 
the BIM with respect to the senior financial controller back in the business) on the project team 
and as a result (RAF, Interview 32, 5), when this issue was brought to the project board, the 
change manager began to get more access to resources (as will be seen in terms of the key 
presentations made at the start of the next phase). 
He also recommended that different members of the project team get to present to the board as 
opposed to just the project manager (RAF, Interview 32, 5), a view seconded by the external 
planning resource as "people probably weren't telling "porkies" but the board mightn't have 
been getting the full picture as to what was happening ... " (RAF, Interview 33, 4). The change 
manager then was asked to present to every second project board: "The change manager now 
comes to every second project board and he presents his strategies and what he intends to 
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do .. Any reason in particular why that has happened? More a recognition that the change 
management piece is that important in this project ... " (RAF, Interview 30, 7). The external 
planning consultant immediately went about drafting a new detailed plan and initiated some 
additional practices which will now be described. 
7.2.3.5 The Man with the plan. 
"Well, the first thing was to get the plan fixed and up and running, then you could 
stitch integration across the plan ... once people understand that they were on the 
same journey hence the baseline plan and the integration sessions then .. Hard to 
say which comesfirst ... you could argue one should precede the other but ... " 
External Planning Consultant (RAF, Interview 33, 9). 
The creation of a detailed and granular project plan was welcomed by the project team: "He's 
really put a detailed plan together, outlining in real detail and you can drill down as well into it 
what it is we are doing and what we need to get done by a certain date ... ", (RAF, Interview 22, 
11), with the project board gaining more insight and comfort as there was a realisation that the 
project was in a better position than envisaged (RAF, Interview 40, 9). For the project manager, 
it enabled greater clarity and sense of control (RAF, Interview 30, 10). Structuring a detailed 
project plan was not the only key role of the planning consultant. Formally, he worked on 
improving tracking and reporting on project tracks, implementing RAG (Le. Red, Amber, Green) 
reporting, enabling task progress to be measured and highlighted negatively or positively with a 
weekly meeting to discuss (RAF, Interview 33, 4). 
Meetings generally become much more structured events, ''where we talk about (systems) 
development, release from development and testing and how things will go ... " (RAF, Interview 
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28, 9). Meetings were redesigned to not only reflect improved tracking but also to act a tool for 
increased team integration. [Note: this had also emerged as a recommendation from the second 
recent quality assurance review and was part of the presentation given to the project board by the 
QA consultant on the 6th of September, as will be discussed]. The disconnect within the greater 
project team (RAF, Interview 31, I) and particularly that of the BIM and change manager had 
been commented upon external to the project team: "they could have been embedded more in 
what was going on ... " (RAF, Interview 31, 3). This was a view shared by the individuals 
themselves: "I'm not a part of it (the project team} .... We as in the BIM and I should have been 
far more integrated into the team .... " (RAF, Interview 32, 13). The lack of internal project 
communication prior to the interventions of the external planning consultant was also identified: 
"We had a weekly meeting and I think until about August, the (project team) communication was 
poor ... " (RAF, Interview 50,3). The external planning consultant agreed with the view (expressed 
in the first QA review and never really clarified) that the BIM and change manager roles should 
be separate in function but not in lines of reporting: "At the moment you have the BIM working 
the angles on the business, business data and some change too and the change manager looking 
after the communication and the training ... there's more than enough work there for two people 
but one would need to report to the other and that person back into the project..... (RAF, 
Interview 33, 8). 
There was a realisation that the team had failed to fully integrate: "If you were to do it again, 
you'd probably try and bond the teams together more - they were so driven by deadlines and 
pressures ... " (RAF, Interview 31, 2) and that the different functions (HR, Finance) had become 
"siloed" (RAF, Interview 33, 5). As a consequence, bi-weekly integration meetings were initiated 
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(RAF, Interview 32, 14) where on Tuesdays, there was a general team meeting and on Thursday 
a specific Change and (Business) implementation meeting (RAF, Interview 32, 14). The 
Thursday meeting addressed more specific project issues relevant to the business whereas the 
Tuesday meeting was concerned with "looking at operational-tactical issues in one of the 
meetings, so everybody needs to be on the same page in terms of integration testing, security and 
roles, trial conversion with data and BRT, issues that people needed to be aware of. "(RAF, 
Interview 33, 5). Both the BIM and change manager strove to control the agenda (in so far as 
they could) for the Thursday meeting leveraging senior stakeholder influence to shape the 
discussion and meeting outcomes: "the project manager might cut back time and does that 
constantly or limits the agenda beforehand - but he gets the comeback from the senior financial 
controller then if issues that the BIM raises don't get discussed - I used to do the same with the 
senior user but you are conscious of the reporting line as well ... minutes are kept and are sent 
out by the project manager and we go through and the BIM or I send back the real minutes but 
they're never reissued ... " (RAF, Interview 32, 14) 
.In addition to the more formal integration and reporting changes, the external planning 
consultant also saw himself as having an informal "coaching " role acting on the outcomes of 
particularly the integration meetings (RAF, Interview 33, 6), an informal role with important 
consequences later in the project. The realisation phase had proved to be traumatic in many ways 
for the project and members of the project team, with important external interventions helping to 
steer the project in the direction of a recovery. Important design issues were yet to be fully 
resolved as the project moved into the last pre-production phase: risks remained and success was 
not yet guaranteed. 
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7.2.4 The End Game: the Transition and Final Preparation Phases 
(Sep 2010 - April 2011). 
"I use the word reasonably good (to describe the outcomes of the project) because 
there is a lot of water gone under the bridge already ... " (RAF, Interview 33, 2) 
The intention of these final pre-production system phases was to conclude any testing, undertake 
end-user training, resolve any design issues, continue systems management and prepare for 
cutover. 
7.2.4.1 Forgetting to close the door: where's the sign-otT? 
At the end of the realisation phase, there was a certain feeling amongst some of the key users 
participating in the blueprinting workshops that the final design was vague: "we were going to 
workshops and there was a lot of back and forth about approving BPIDs so as to allow the 
project to get busy and then they went away and we didn't hear anything ... " (RAF, Interview 38, 
9). The broad user population was aware that a formal design phase had concluded but had never 
seen a sign-off on the design: in the sceptical view of one manager: "Well, there was none (a 
sign off) - sign-off means that you've got something you wanted ... " (RAF, Interview 34, 5). 
More important than who signed-off was the understandable impression that if there had been no 
sign-off then the system design was yet to be finalised (RAF, Interview 30, 11). In order for the 
project to pass into this final pre-production phase, it had been signed-off at project board level 
but not by the wider business per se: "The design was signed-off but it wasn't and it has had 
enormous implications for the project down the line ... " (RAF, Interview 33, 2). This proved to be 
particularly problematic for project costing and billing where "where you had one key 
stakeholder that you were trying to keep informed and into July and August they were saying 
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they never signed off on the system ... " (RAP, Interview 48, 1). The issue with sign-offs was not 
confined to the higher-level project design but was also was damaging with respect to certain key 
milestones in the realisation phase. When the external planning consultant was reviewing testing 
plans and documentation for project costing and billing, there was a realisation that "we have to 
go back to the beginning and more or less, not completely reconfigure itfrom scratch - that's the 
project costing and billing section of the project ... lt may have been configured - there's no 
evidence that it was though so ... that was hearsay, again more water under the bridge and you 
have to factor that it in terms of planning moving forward ... " (RAP, Interview 33, 3). 
7.2.4.2 Project Costing and Billing: an ongoing issue. 
Lack of a sign-off structure and "culture" within and between phases and the resultant need to re-
implement configuration testing and the additional difficulty in retaining suitable technical 
expertise 27 had only complicated a part of the project that "is always highest on the risk 
register ... it is always the critical piece in terms of the testing and ideally you would want to do 
this up front and not have it late as it is now ... " (RAP, Interview 30, 4). The recasting of project 
planning had crystallised the fact that "we're behind in terms of system testing on that (project 
costing and billing), we're also behind in terms of developments on that part of the 
implementation .... " (RAP, Interview 30, 2). The need to expedite configuration, system and 
integration testing worried some: "there are some design issues that really concern me about the 
system in terms of the finance side ... that will come back to bite .. " (RAP, Interview 45,5) 
27 The project was now on its third external SAP consultant. The second consultant had left without a completed 
design. 
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In real terms, the project had lost a month due to the issues with project costing and billing (RAF, 
Interview 32, 7) and with all the other project team commitments in terms of migrating data and 
integration testing, the change manager had been enabled to focus solely on the communication 
plan (as discussed). The risks associated with this part of the implementation were not just about 
traceability and control but more profoundly about what the new system would enable and the 
work changes that would ensue. There was a ''fear of being unable to understand the system as 
they have to in January be able to use it and report to senior management and they would be 
afraid that they won't be able to do that and also as well there is more visibility in the SAP 
system - others can see more easily what's involved in a job so they need to be able to use that-
that's the main source of resistance - that and the feeling that they can't work the way they used 
to anymore ... " (RAF, Interview 36, 3). There was also a practical concern that NOVOCORP had 
"3000 jobs per annum that you need to collect information on and bill ... " (RAF, Interview 30, 1). 
The finance function had already reacted: "they went out and got someone because they were so 
disappointed with the level of support from the project... That's a resource that could be over on 
the project rather than sitting in the business ... " (RAF, Interview 32, 14). Such a measure was 
indicative of the fact that the level of user interest in the project costing and billing component of 
the system had never really waned (RAF, Interview 42, 2). The change manager had striven to 
manage their fears of what the change might mean: "trying to get all the variations in the BPIDs 
to the TO-BE which is tough and difficult and we had some requirements gathering and 
conversations in the BLUEPRINTING phase ... Part of my Job was to get them on the right road 
to accept this change ... " (RAF, Interview 36, 2). Not an easy task as one senior ICT manager 
commented: " ... there was a couple of key areas that needed to be watched like particularly, 
project costing and billing and that's a challenge given the personalities in there (SMILES) ... " 
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(RAP, Interview 40, 9). There was a concern (on the user side) that the blueprinting phase had 
presented an opportunity that they had not fully grasped: "the billing side they didn't have so we 
could have maybe told them more rather than ask them ... " (RAF, Interview 38, 5). 
The sheer complexity of this new SAP system component was initially not understood and as the 
BIM commented on receipt of her initial task list: "the Project Costing and Billing side of the 
project which was given to me and only supposed to be a few BPIDS has turned out to be 
huge ... that was very much underestimated in terms of what was going to be required ... " (RAF, 
Interview 36, 8). The number of people working on PCB quickly grew to accommodate the 
complexity: "only one person (i.e. the BIM) was put on the new really new part of the project, 
project costing and billing ... That was an issue ... they know have three people and another form 
the business who does all the timesheets ... that part was underestimated ... " (RAF, Interview 41, 
7). The inability to retain the necessary external SAP design expertise lead to the stark 
"realisation that we had an exposure on the Project Costing and Billing side .. " (RAF, Interview 
39, 13). Most SAP systems were designed and maintained as utility systems and were not 
typically deployed in organisations with mUltiple discrete jobs making the necessary skill-set 
expensive and rare (RAF, Interview 30, 1). 
Despite the many concerns and the perception that the design was not signed-off, there was a 
clear understanding that some changes to work practices would ensue: ''you can't have a 
procedure for every KAM - that wouldn't be realistic .... " (RAF, Interview 29, 6). The new 
system would demand a new oversight role of line and senior managers that would be: "there's 
been a shift in work onto the managers and there's nervousness about that and the 
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implications .... " (RAF, Interview 34, 9). The changes associated with the system would not just 
be the concern of the end-user. Project costing and billing though challenging and risk-laden was 
going to be become an unexpected catalyst for structural and work practice changes. 
7.2.4.3 Structural and strategic effects of Project Costing and Billing. 28 
The complexity of the BPIDs and the realisation as to what internal trading demanded in terms of 
reporting had prompted both AGOCORP and NOVOCORP to reconsider the exiting modus 
operandi: "they had to take a step back and ask themselves why they were doing what they were 
doing ... Both us and the internal customer are going to be on SAP anyway and they (the internal 
customer) know what SAP can do so they should be able to accept what the new situation (will 
entail) .. " (RAF, Interview 36, 2). The clear conclusion was that existing business practices 
would alter and the finance function initiated the change by staking a claim on the territory 
hitherto occupied by the KAMs and their accounting staff. The ownership of the project had 
always been a source of contention in the user population and was seen by some to symptomatic 
of a larger debate: ''''Every couple of years this control issue comes to light - are we an services 
company or are we a financial company or a HR company?. "(RAF, Interview 29, 7). Even the 
project name, "Financials and HR project" had alienated the population to some degree, as one 
finance staff member commented: "they (the employees) are completely left out in the cold -
they're the main users and they do the input but we have to account for the output ... " (RAF, 
Interview 38, 8). Throughout the project, the (NOVOCORP) finance function had been 
embedded in the project organically (approximately one-fifth worked on the project at some 
28 As these effects were quite contentious, discussion in this section is informed not only by given interview 
references but also by many off-the-record conversations with and comments from members of the finance and 
management functions. 
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stage (RAF, Interview 30, 2) and with intent (Le. financial controllers requesting and reviewing 
the results of testing (RAF, Interview 22, 10). 
There was a determination to assert control even during the blueprinting workshops: "The 
financial controller was very adamant in a meeting that Finance were in charge of the project, a 
comment which troubled me - I mean what's the point in having workshops etc if you have a 
situation where Finance are vetoing everything good, bad or indifferent?" (RAF, Interview 20, 
9). Managers and employees redeployed from other parts of the business identified the strong 
organisational power of the HR and especially the finance function: "when I first come over here 
what struck was the influence and power of the finance and HR departments were far stronger 
here than I'd ever seen them in any other part of AGOCORP that I had worked in ... " (RAF, 
Interview 42, 4) and that "maybe certain business managers had not been taking on as much of 
the financial and HR responsibilities as they should and so you ended up with that situation, I 
don't know" (RAF, Interview 42, 4), a view echoed by many off-the-record comments. 
With the complexity of the existing billing system now transparent for the first time, and the 
incumbent need to align the financial processes within NOVOCORP and AGOCORP 29, it was 
decided that "we're going to have a central accounting team in NOVOCORP so everything will 
be centralised whereas before everyone on the accounting teams could be doing different things 
for KAMs ... " (RAF, Interview 36, 1). A central accounting team and structure would bring to an 
end the era of KAMs setting up and maintaining their own jobs as per customer or individual 
requirements (RAF, Interview 32, 9). The formal rationale for this decision was difficult to 
29 NOVOCORP would no longer have the freedom to set their own month-end either - this would have to be done 
in exactly the same way and at the same time as AGOCORP. 
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accept for the managers: "The argument from the financial side of the house here and above (the 
corporate side) is that if this was to happen in SAP, then the level of training required to input 
such data and changes would be very detailed ... That's a lot of crap as far as I'm concerned-
just financial people talking crap -they just want to centralise everything so they can control it. " 
(RAF, Interview 29, 7). 
For the change manager, however, this decision was irreversible and he felt this role was to 
prepare the KAMs for what this would mean in real tenns: "Now, if finance is going to take the 
billing function from that KAM, that could mean taking some of the KAM' s people with them or 
taking the functionality - I didn't want the KAM to go to that meeting in September (i.e. the 
system demo that will be discussed in the next section) and not be aware that this could be 
happening .. . some of those people are on temporary contracts so there could be job losses etc so 
there's a lot of sensitivity around that ... "(RAF, Interview 32, 9). The effects of this change were 
clear to him and he had to prepare them: "If the Head of is there (at the system demo and this 
(change) is said at the meeting, the three lads (senior managers) would just get up and walk out 
because I know what they're like, so I had to do it ... " (RAF, Interview 32, 10). For the most 
affected KAM, the change manager met him in advance of his proposed meeting with finance to 
clarify the situation. The KAM's response was telling: "He asked me if he should fight the battle 
and if he had any chance of winning it and I told him no, so he said OK, I'm not going to fight 
the battle ... " (RAF, Interview 32, 10). After the meeting with finance, the most affected KAM 
asked for time to reflect and as the September presentation draw nearer, senior managers began 
to reconcile themselves with the new reality. 
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On a logistical level outside the system, all AGOCORP expenses were processed by a field office 
outside the capital. This office (containing ten staff) had never processed any NOVOCORP 
expenses and there was a concern over as how this would be managed, so much so that 
NOVOCORP HR had decided that "we'll keep on systems switched on until March (2011) so 
we'll have a back way in and can fix issues ... " (RAF, Interview 31, II). There was a worry that 
the efforts involved in selling one of the biggest gains of the new system (Le. online expense 
submission and faster approval and recompense) would be wasted: "/ can just see that manager 
(in the field office) saying 'Well, NOVOCORP willjust have to wait ... ' We're going out there (to 
the users) giving them a really positive message and it could all go belly-up in January (2011) if 
there is an issue ... but that's where my nervousness resides ... " (RAF, Interview 31, 11). Engaging 
in depth with the nature of financial transactions had been one of the consequences of project 
costing and billing (RAF, Interview 37, 2) leading to identifying the potential of notional 
banking. Notional banking was a possible solution to the ongoing arrangement where 
NOVOCORP settles accounts with other business units through the transfer of physical cash. 
Notional banking would entail accounts being settled virtually on a monthly basis but physically 
on a quarterly basis, making the use of "wooden" dollars (a key plank of the Financial Efficiency 
project) less prevalent. Originally identified by a financial controller who was physically setting 
with Networks and GENCOM (RAF, Interview 17, 7-8), it was brought to the project board 
where it garnered support not only to be brought into her area but across the whole of 
NOVOCORP (RAF, Interview 37, I). The concept was supported but it had not been part of the 
original project scope (so no BPIDs etc existed). There was an agreement that this would be 
reconsidered in the first quarter of 2011 and would fall under the purview of the BIM but there 
was a general view that "the project will not fail if it doesn't go in but if it doesn't go in, there 
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may be a bit of a mess later on .. " (RAF, Interview 37,2). As the consequences of project costing 
and billing began to be absorbed, the project embarked on a critical period. 
7.2.4.4 Three Days in September. 
The prior realisation phase had been riven by disputes over roles and resources and had 
concluded with two formal external interventions beginning to take effect. The external QA 
consultant was preparing to deliver his report to the project board on the sixth of September and 
on the seventh, a system demonstration was going to be shown to 125-150 of the most senior 
managers and team leaders in NOVOCORP (RAF, Interview 31, 4), described by the project 
manager as "a key day for us and it was like a crossroads .... " (RAF, Interview 30, 9). As the 
external QA consultant prepared to present the outcomes of canvassing key stakeholders for 
their views on the project, the external planning consultant who had been dovetailing with the 
QA consultant on identifying key issues had begun to instigate improvements in project task 
tracking, reporting and team integration. By early September, most of the user population had 
yet to see a physical representation of the news system and the change manager had felt under 
pressure for some time to provide some demonstrable evidence of system function. Prior 
concerns as to the availability of the senior finance functional team member had prevented him 
from scheduling earlier communications: "I would focus on the communication plan that was 
agreed but I've no resources to deliver it..." (RAF, Interview 32, 7). 
The external QA consultant had become aware of the need for greater support from the (project) 
team for communication back into the business and had emphasised that some pressure had to be 
brought to bear on the senior Managers user on the project board. This senior user would have 
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been aware that this issue would be raised in the project board meeting: "The senior user was 
under pressure to put pressure on me and also to get things scheduled in terms of the senior 
management .... " (RAF, Interview 32, 5). Leverage was used on the project manager to provide 
the senior finance functional team member, an availability issue that had been an ongoing 
interpersonal struggle between both the project manager, BIM and change manager. The project 
manager needed her as a testing resource: "The project manager has told me to work on these 
specific things and nothing else .. " (RAF, Interview 32, 4) and had to row back on her availability 
on more than one occasion: "He said you're always looking for her to do things and she's 
overworked and I said I'm always looking for things but I never get them and it turned into a big 
heated argument .... the project manager just cut me off when I suggested anything - focus on the 
testing and project costing and billing .. ".(RAF, Interview 32, 4). 
As a precursor to the big set-piece presentation on the 7th of September, the change manager gave 
a brief system demo to the senior manager and his team which was well-received with the caveat 
that no finance representative was present but she had been freed up as a resource for the next 
presentation. The external QA consultant was going to recommend in his presentation that an 
urgent communication plan be drafted and the BIM and (in particular) the change manager had 
redrafted one for presentation to the project board 30 and also for discussion with the senior 
managers in this preview presentation. He focused in his discussion on his earlier efforts to 
acquire communication resources and targeting those who he felt on the 7th of September "would 
be say more negative in their contributions ... " (RAF, Interview 32, 6). 
30 Bearing in mind that the QA consultant had recommended that different people present to the project board 
(RAF, Interview 32, 5) 
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The change manager then formally introduced his communications plan, which had evolved from 
its original drafting with the steering groups. His plan was well-received and supported: "I laid 
out my communication plan and asked them to come up with theirs that 1 could overlay on mine 
because I would have gaps ... one of the KAMs came up to me afterwards and said 'You sound like 
you have a plan - you know what you're doing, we'll come up a plan and we'll have to go along 
with it' and 1 said yes, that's just sit..." (RAF, Interview 32, 6). He over-emphasised the system 
negatives up-front and stressed the need to support the senior finance functional team member at 
the forthcoming large-scale presentation; she was a former colleague of most of them and known 
and respected by all (RAF, Interview 32, 6). The change manager feIt that "they (the managers) 
could see that there were things that 1 had tried to get and for them and after that meeting, then 
they had a good reaction - the resistance was beginning to shift ... " (RAF, Interview 36, 2). This 
meeting was viewed by the rest of the project as a notable success (RAF, Interview 30, 6). The 
change manager and the senior managers had agreed on a common communication path forward 
but the spectre of project costing and billing would soon re-emerge. 
As these presentations were being prepared, the project board composition changed. The senior 
user (representing the function) had been promoted to acting head of HR within the parent and 
had to formally recuse himself from the project board. He was replaced by the senior manager 
who felt: "I had an advantage over most people in that I could see the business and IT side and 
knew the people on it very well and where they were coming from ... " (RAF, Interview 42, 6). 
Although the original senior user was no longer on the project board, he was still involved in the 
project: "we didn't really lose him - he was off the project board but he was supportive in terms 
of key communication and if there was an important meeting, he would attend it ... " (RAF, 
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Interview 48, 5).The senior manager had formally worked as a manager in the parent leT group 
and had been on previous project boards (including XYZ) as a senior supplier (RAF, Interview 
10, 1). Also, in his current role, he had the KAMs and managers as line reports and was more 
directly familiar with the day-to-day processes and issues that would arise: "He is definitely 
closer to the users and he is always very positive .. " (RAF, Interview 48, 4). He felt that his 
addition to the project team was important: "getting on the project board was really significant 
for me as it enabled me to see what was happening and also bring in the business a bit as well ... " 
(RAF, Interview 42, 9). He was particularly keen on providing more resources informally and 
formally to the change manager: "arranging for him to get access to people ... " (RAF, Interview 
42, 7) as well as providing some coaching and one-to-one sessions: "had a few sessions in the 
middle and at the end to try and get that across to him, the human dimensions of the role (he 
had) ... ... " (RAF, Interview 42, 7). As the change manager prepared the day before the project 
board to present his high-level communication plan31, he was faced with a negative development; 
ongoing issues with the testing of project costing and billing and resulting delays meant that he: 
"would have to change my communication plan to reflect this - and I was presenting to the 
project board the following day!" (RAF, Interview 32, 7). The following day both the change 
manager and the project manager presented to the project board 31. 
The external QA consultant's presentation stressed that project planning had been weak and 
improvements were underway and that greater project team communication and integration and 
co-ordinated plans for communicating to and involving the rest of the business in the remainder 
31 All communication plans had to be approved by the project board. 
32 Content of presentation elicited from multiple off-the-record conversations. 
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of the project would be necessary. As the new senior user from had commented: "the whole 
design needed to be socialised a lot more and there was resistance on that and that was mainly 
from people who did not get involved early enough and then felt disengaged ... " (RAF, Interview 
42, 9).The issue as to what the business should be shown in terms of the system was discussed 
and a decision was made that the employees would not be shown the full system until late 
September or even October: "it was decided that it was peifectly fair for us to say to the business 
that we've no system to show you yet but we will when we've completed and ready to do so ... " 
(RAF, Interview 30, 8). 
The justification given for this decision was supported by the senior users when it became clear 
that an important SAP systems upgrade had occurred over the previous August Bank Holiday 
weekend. This would mean the appearance of the system (still in development) would change 
and there were concerns that it would "have been difficult to show people a system and then say 
'That's what it looks in the old system, when we get the upgrade, we'll show you how it looks in 
the new ... ' The decision was made to not show the system until September or October and in 
retrospect I think that was the right call ... " (RAF, Interview 31, 5). Justified as this decision may 
have been, the user population did not seem overly appraised of this rationale nor were the 
business facing roles (Le. BIM and change manager) "completely accepting of that .. " (RAF, 
Interview 30, 8). 
The project board approved the communications plan and a limited system demo was designated 
for the presentation the following day. There were some concerns raised off-line that the users 
had been over-promised in terms of what the presentation would show (RAF, Interview 50,5) and 
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that the system may not tally with what the users expected (RAF, Interview 30, 4). There were 
some off-the record comments that the change manager and BIM roles should have been more 
project rather than business supportive, an issue that would be revisited as this phase rolled on. 
The presentation was received positively and "It was a key milestone for us ... a hugely positive 
reaction, huge buy in ... " (RAF, Interview 30, 9-10). The change manager felt validated as praise 
was forthcoming from the project manager: "A very good meeting; the project manager said 
'Well-done' I had got no support from the project and a lot of other things hadfallen back and I 
needed to catch up ... " (RAF, Interview 32, 6). The presence of the senior finance functional 
team member so long fought for, made a substantial difference: "she was there and she was able 
to answer any questions that they had which was a big comfort factor ... "(RAF, Interview 31, 5). 
The success of this presentation not only reassured the user population with respect to system 
progress but also the quality of communication and the constraints the project were facing: "both 
the change manager and the senior finance functional team member are doing well in terms 
of. .. even at the presentation yesterday; ... what became very apparent was that she was very 
proactive and she knew what areas would cause grief and she also knows the limits in terms of 
the processes already in AGOCORP. So, overall very good ... The team are very good ... " (RAF, 
Interview 29, 9). The overall user reaction was guarded relief: "Now, that KAM wasn't there 
yesterday but a girl from his team was there and I asked her "What will this (new system) mean 
for your (add-on EXCEL) database?" and she replied 'Thanks be to God, It'll be gone ' .. " (RAF, 
Interview 27,6). 
With the importance of stakeholder communication emphasised at the project board the previous 
day, there was also a show of managerial strength with senior users (including the recently 
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departed head of ) and stakeholders from the finance and functions turning up at the end of the 
meeting in the words of a senior manager (and member of the presentation audience) "to whip 
along the unwilling (SMILES) - in order to get us to take ownership for it (the new system) and 
not to be pushing it back onto the project team .... " (RAF, Interview 27, 4). 
7.2.4.5 The BIM role: clarifying roles and reporting lines. 
The BIM had been a late addition to the project executive and from the point of recruitment had 
been perceived (externally to the project) as being responsible for a wide variety of tasks, some 
of which were outside the normal remit of a BIM (RAF, Interview 37, 2); "I think the role 
became the role that all other tasks seemed to fall into .. " (RAF, Interview 53, 2). When she 
joined the project, she was "told 'here's the list' - and it took her six weeks to get up to speed 
and prioritise the tasks and start from there .. " (RAF, Interview 32, 16). As one interviewee 
commented: "in fairness the RIM was thrown in at the deep end ... " (RAF, Interview 38, 10). As 
she had some SAP experience, she "ended up doing more (there) than I should ... and Data 
migration which I shouldn't have been on - but the (migration) team had no finance experience 
so they needed help mapping (data across) ... Also, the functional team were busy working on the 
design so they weren't available ... there was a gap that I filled ... if I hadn't worked on SAP and I 
was a normal RIM that wouldn't be happening ... " (RAF, Interview 41, 1). 
Along with the change manager, she had sought to get information to communicate back to the 
business and been frustrated in that: "both the change manager and I fought for about six weeks 
to get information out of the business -they said they were too busy doing the integration 
testing ... " (RAF, Interview 41, 4). The views on the role and its effectiveness held within the 
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project and within the wider bu iness (both AGOCORP and NOVOCORP) contrasted sharply. 
For some members of the functional team, the BIM "was a negative role and focused on the 
negativity in the business rather than the functional team's issues ... " (RAF, Interview 50,7). It 
was a role that were more business than project focused: "We felt that the functional leads were 
too concerned with what they wanted from the system as opposed to say delivering on the 
planning side ... " (RAF, Interview 40, 6). It was one of the highest risks on the project (RAF, 
Interview 51, 4) with a sub tantial issue around the fulfilment of the 4-5 key BLM roles (RAF, 
Interview 30, 7). 
The business generally had a more positive view: "Would the project have been delivered on time 
- no, it wouldn't have been (INTERVIEWEE FINISHED OFF SENTENCE UNPROMPTED). 
The RIM is really whipping them into shape and getting things delivered ... "(RAF, Interview 31, 
3) and that before she wa appointed the project "lacked someone to knit things together ... "(RAF, 
Interview 31, 3). In the opinion of the finance function; "She is the only one really keeping that 
ball rolling at the moment for us ... " (RAP, Interview 37, 2) and "if the RIM had been involved in 
this from day 1, we would have had a system she would have shaped the system more and we 
would have got more of a (financial) system ... " (RAF, Interview 37, 6) According to one senior 
AGOCORP manager, "I think she's been an excellent RIM, a big asset to the project .. " (RAF, 
Interview 39, 10). The issue of business as opposed to project loyalty was a common refrain 
from the project team: "I've had dealings certainly in the RIM case, there is an issue there in 
terms of being part of the business more than the project OK ... That is having (an effect) -
measures are being taken to address that - there is a fine balance between the business and the 
project - you have to be both at the same time ... " (RAF, Interview 33, 7) even though there was a 
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strong acceptance that "Being able to split yourself - it's a difficult job" (RAF, Interview 33, 8). 
Nevertheless, the BIM saw herself as an advocate for the financial function: "I was able to fight a 
bit for things ... say certain things that shouldn'l go through without FC approval - I would have 
insisted that they went to the FCs - someone else was there - they would have gone through ... " 
(RAF, Interview 41,5). 
Although the integration sessions introduced by the external planning consultant had been 
worthwhile, the sense of a decoupling from the project team was still pervasive: "There is a view 
that the BIM and I should be one team, part of the project team and we do different things but 
one reports to the other within this team which is part of the project team .... " (RAF, Interview 
32, 13). In particular the informal leverage that the BIM could bring to bear was perceived to be 
distinctive: "When I ask for things, the project manager says No - when the BIM gets a No, she 
goes to the senior financial controller who makes a phone call and then she gets it ... " (RAF, 
Interview 32, 13). She was seen to be ''fighting equally both sides and she's got a business bent 
obviously ... " (RAF, Interview 37, 3). 
This informal leverage resulting from the initial reporting line began to become a bone of 
contention. Initially "When she joined the business she was the only one reporting outside, that is 
to the senior financial controller and that was the way it was and she was the real interface 
between the business and the project ... " (RAF, Interview 32, 15). Even though the project team 
were concerned about the reporting structure, according to the BIM "The senior financial 
controller told me that I reported to him and that my responsibilities were ... (X) and if people 
thought differently that was fine ... " (RAF, Interview 41, 1). For the project manager, this was a 
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substantial issue in tenns of task allocation and clarity responsibilities: "I have to be able to 
assign tasks, monitor and track them - if someone doesn't accept me as their direct report, than I 
can't really assign them tasks .... " (RAF. Interview 30, 8). There was also the feeling within the 
broader project team that "when she came on board, we were kind of cut-off from the business -
everything had to go through her ... She was reporting to the senior financial controller and she 
wasn't sitting with us, she was over in the business yet she was creating a lot of issues that 
weren't really issues .. " (RAF, Interview 50, 2). From the BIM's perspective, she felt that she was 
"struggling to say that it's not a business issue and not a project issue - all these tasks were 
flying out to the business so it became almost a case of the project on one side and me and the 
business as the problem on the other side ... " (RAF, Interview 41, 3). From her perspective, 
"relations between me and the others on the project team weren't great ... " (RAF, Interview 41, 
3) 
The conflict over the BIM role got to a point at a meeting of NOVOCORP financial controllers 
where "where they argued about what my role was in front of me (LAUGHS) .... the senior 
financial controller wasn't there that day but the others were all there ... Some people thought my 
role was to document processes ... the BPI/T manager said my responsibility was for cutover ... 
another Fe said I should be doing processes, another Fe thought I shouldn 't ... so .. " (RAF, 
Interview 41, 1). After the meeting, when the senior financial controller returned, he "said that he 
had bad news for me: I was no longer reporting to him but rather to the project manager ... l was 
a bit put out at the time ... " (RAF. Interview 41,3). The rationale from the project team and senior 
stakeholder perspective 33 was accurately identified by the BIM: "It was maybe too to get the 
33 Off the record 
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senior financial controller out of it - it was splitting responsibility onto him and he's not part of 
the project really so ... ... " (RAF, Interview 41, 3). 
The change in reporting lines was seen externally to the project as the right outcome: "the RIM's 
reporting now to the project manager rather than to the senior financial controller, which is 
probably right, as the role should be within the project .. " (RAF, Interview 35,1). As a result of 
the change, responsibility for the BIM role was passed completely onto the project manager 
(RAF, Interview 30, 7) and the BIM became more formally integrated into the team. From her 
perspective, it clarified her role and she was no longer a "catch-all" for business tasks: "I'm not 
hearing as much about 'that's a business issue' at meetings anymore ... ! don 'tfeel under as much 
responsibility as not everything is on the business and! was in that space so in that sense (its 
better} ... " (RAF, Interview 41,3). 
7.2.4.6 Part of a greater strategic master plan: more structural and work changes ensue. 
As a result of the project, additional structural and work changes were underway, other than from 
the consequences of project costing and billing. At an early stage in the project, there had been 
whispers that the Pinancials and HR project was not just a strategic NOVOCORP IS objective 
but (from the user's perspective) the thin end of the strategic wedge with regards to something 
more significant coming in the near future. Such concerns were based not just on process 
changes but also on fears of dispensability: "people are beginning to ask what this new system 
means for their job ... will I still have a job and what are! going to be doing? One of our financial 
controllers has been doing a lot of work on that... We need to be careful about headcount ... " 
(RAP, Interview 31, 9). Reducing staff numbers had been obliquely mentioned as one of the 
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side-benefits of implementing SAP given the amount of manual intervention currently in 
NOVOCORP. However the organisational experiences of the P and HR system and latterly IWN 
had been the opposite leading one senior manager to observe: "it will be at least J 8 months 
before they can look at letting people go ... we are not looking at redundancies and that's the 
message we're trying to give out - it's more redeployment .... " (RAF, Interview 31, 9). The 
change manger had been moved to address the possibility of a wider strategic plan directly with 
the senior financial controller early on in the project: "[ had a meeting with the senior financial 
controller and talked this through as [ needed clarity as to what's been happening; as in, is there 
a second parallel project (as part of the AGOCORP plan to cut costs} .. ". (RAF, Interview 12, 
13). The senior financial controller demurred on the grounds that the current project carried 
sufficient risk therein, a view supported by the first QA review. Further concerns were raised 
with the recruitment of a new Group Finance Director and the launching formally of the 
Financial Efficiency Project (Ref: Section 6.5.1) in June 2010. The long-term objective of the 
Financial Efficiency Project was to co-ordinate as much of the business unit financial activities 
into a shared financial service operated centrally in the parent: the first step in such an 
undertaking was to ensure all the financial systems were all configurable and as such on SAP 
(RAF, Interview 53, 2). 
People had begin to question whether the Financials and HR project was really a part of this 
Financial Efficiency project which had therefore been planned for some time or whether this was 
just a coincidence. Meetings were already underway in the parent, suggesting there was a 
relationship and a significant one at that: "We've had a few initiatives identified out of that 
meeting, J 3 or so strategies or approaches that we need to progress to further leverage the value 
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from the ERP system which we could be doing more on .. . some of these initiatives are related to 
what 's going on in the NOVOCORP project at the moment .. " (RAF, Interview 39, 8). Th 
aftermath of the project brought their relationship more sharply into focus. The new SAP HR 
system component (LOS) was already being identified as one of these initiatives: "b 
NOVOCORP going to run the LDS linking to training and development - AGOCORP can s 
how they could leverage the value of something like this like NOVOCORP are doing (in thi 
current implemenlation} .. . that was one of the initiatives discussed ... " (RAF, Interview 39,8). Th 
creation of a centralised purchasing orders bureau had been mooted as a desired outcome of th 
project in the implementation plan well before project initiation. However the achievement f 
same would entail substantial process change34, as one finance manager commented: "So, (with 
the new PO system) that will be better but there will be war in the business as SAP is very ri id 
and unforgiving but in the long-run it will be better for us ... " (RAF, Interview 38, 4). A far a 
the parent wa concerned the change that would accrue were strategically significant: " W d 
have departments but we don 'I have say a process owner where there is someone who ha 
responsibility for a process and who can reduce costs etc ... That 's the way the organisation will 
probably go ... Y Oll 011. see in terms of Ihe new PO office that there is that movement going ill 
NOVOCORP as the result of the implementation ? Spot 017. .. " (RAF, Interview 39, 5). 
With NOVOCORP' deci ion to opt for AGRESSO in 1999, their accounting y tern wa 
structured differently to that of AGOCORP's, particularly in Accounts Payable or AP. 
AGOCORP had two components in their AP system, namely Purchase Orders (PO) and Invoic 
Processing (lP), though with all purchases paid for from the same account. In NOVOCORP 
34 The following explanation is a combination of interviewees' and off-the-record explanations. 
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because different sub-units had different purchasing requirements (e.g. what you need to 
purchase to build a wind-farm is quite different to what's needed to carry out an environmental 
impact assessment) there are single AP systems spread across the business (RAF, Interview 38, 
6), leading to multiple bank accounts needing to account for multiple currencies (related to the 
FX issue that had arisen and been resolved earlier in the project). The outcome of a centralised 
PO bureau would entail NOVOCORP's accounting system becoming split like AGOCORP's 
with Invoice Purchasing being dealt with centrally in AGOCORP (actually in a field office) and 
the PO bureau in NOVOCORP collating all the purchase orders from the different business units 
and routing them through the central (group) PO function. 
In other words, NOVOCORP looked after the ordering but AGOCORP would fundamentally 
validate all the purchases and also pay for anything delivered through the central IP function,\5. 
For NOVOCORP employees, this would be perceived as a (further) loss of control and there was 
also a fear that as the AGOCORP systems and processes would not be changing, that there was a 
fundamental lack of understanding as to how NOVOCORP operated differently: "we're setting 
up a Purchase Order Bureau in the business (to reflect the system) - how is that going to work-
is it a case of that being the concern of the project or maybe that should be the business ... that 
would be a concern, that process understanding .. " (RAF, Interview 35, 7). Again, these 
differences in process understanding became even clearer at this stage when there was a testing 
issue with respect to paying mobile phone bills. In AGOCORP a mobile bill for the entire 
company is uploaded from the provider in the fonn of an EXCEL spreadsheet sent to their IP 
function where it is validated for payment; this approach was the basis of the TO-BE BPID for 
this transaction and was incorporated in the design. In business readiness testing however an 
J5 1t can be recalled at this point that the decision to make the accounting system change was decided in a 
BLUEPRINTING workshop in the absence of the NOVOCORP AP lead. 
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important anomaly arose: in NOVOCORP (who use the same provider), an EXCEL spreadsheet 
is also provided but in AGRESSO compatible format: as one financial manager commented: 
"The AGOCORP upload might not be sufficient for our needs - there's a bit of a panic -that 
should have been thought about in BPID stage as far as I'm concerned -have we going to do this 
but that should have been communicated (to the provider) long ago ... "(RAF, Interview 38, 9). 
The consequences of rushing some decisions in blueprinting in the absence of key stakeholders 
were beginning to bear some malign consequences. Unsurprisingly, "even now, we're putting 
new BPIDs together in terms of accounts payable which are at a different level to what was done 
before - the Jury is out on all that (i.e. the proposed AP changes) ... "(RAF. Interview 37. 9). 
However. there was a substantial degree of unhappiness with the current purchasing system: "I'd 
be interested in seeing what the purchasing system will be like in SAP - can't be any worse than 
what we have now ... (LAUGHS)". (RAF, Interview 29, 11). Approximately 220 staff in 
NOVOCORP are eligible to make purchase orders (RAF, Interview 38, 7). These orders are 
made independently of AGRESSO in an on-line portal and when the order was processed, it was 
then entered retrospectively into AGRESSO. The new process will entail the order being made 
directly into SAP where it can be tracked "live". The issues that the senior management had with 
communication though chiefly around project costing and billing were also concerned with the 
development of the purchasing component of the SAP system. In the system demo held earlier in 
September, there was "a lot of questions, some on the purchasing system - (as in) why can't I get 
a communication on that?. " (RAF, Interview 32, 12). The issue began to reach a critical point 
when key stakeholders began to push aggressively for information on the purchasing system 
(RAF, Interview 32. 8). Some of their concern was practical; in moving over to the new PO 
system, the number of open purchase orders were to be minimised, which could inhibit their 
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current activity (RAF, Interview 38, 7). The issue over the lack of purchasing information 
continued to bubble over and finally came to a head (RAF, Interview 47, 8) at a meeting with the 
senior managers at the end of November (2010). There 36 a substantial audience waited to 
express their views. The meeting, intended to a brief (5 minute) presentation without 15 minutes 
for questions, took over an hour and a quarter and was a very hostile reception; as the change 
manager stated: "They proceeded to tear me apart, piece by piece ... " (RAF, Interview 47, 7) 
with representatives of the finance function particularly stunned by the vehemence of the 
mangers'reactions. 
The aftermath of the meeting proved to be seminal as one of the key financial controllers queried 
the level of communication. As the change manager described the exchange, "She said to me 
"What's just happened? You expected this?" and I said I did because we left them out; we didn't 
talk to them ... She asked me how come I hadn't talked to them and I told her she and the project 
said to me that they didn't want to talk to them last summer and she said No and I said you did, 
you said that there were only employees and that this was a jinancials and HR project - She 
laughed and said 'You're right, I did and I was wrong', so we spent the next 80 minutes with 
them trying to get a feel for what all their issues were and then arranged a meeting the following 
(week) with them .. " (RAF, Interview 47,8). 
This exchange and outcome fed into a wider narrative in the business: that the level of change 
management and communication had moved onto a different plane of effectiveness. 
36 This description is supported by many off-the-record comments from those who attended the meeting. 
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7.2.4.7 Change we can believe in. 
The initial view on change management within and without the project team was not overly 
positive: some people felt the role was hampered by a lack of clarity (RAF, Interview 31, 2). The 
skill-set required to succeed as a change manager was markedly different to his prior experience 
as a project manager (RAF, Interview 24, I) and he had blinded to some degree by his allegiance 
(RAF, Interview 36,4). There was a view that the "change management throughout the project 
was very down, very pat and monotone (SMILES) -it was only towards the end that it started to 
become upbeat - it took a long time but the level of integration meetings which we had and a few 
quiet chats to try and up the energy a little bit ... " (RAF, Interview 49, 3) and that he could have 
been more enthusiastic (RAF, Interview 33, 7) and confident about the system: "if he's confident 
about it then they'd be confident about it ... the job of a change manager as you say on aformal 
and informal level is to be having those quick 5 minute chats with people in the corridor ... the 
feedback on the business would be that the communication is not that great formally or 
informally ... " (RAF, Interview 36, 5). The level of communication with respect to the project 
was seen differently by some managers external to the project: "Well the change manager is 
meeting people to find out where the stumbling blocks are and trying to remove them although 
he's being blocked from doing so ... " (RAF, Interview 34, 7). This was a view supported by some 
members of the project team: "they were telling him to do communications and do presentations 
yet were not communicating him or the other way around ... " (RAF, Interview 45, 4) and "when I 
first started on the project there was lot of people badmouthing him ... but recently more people 
have been saying 'He's doing really well'; he took a lot of hits when the project stopped 
communicating ... " (RAF, Interview 41, 6). 
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That less than positive perception began to shift (RAF, Interview 31, 2) as the project moved into 
transition phase: "Well, in the transition it was very good but up to then it had been quite poor ... " 
(RAF, Interview 50, 4). There was a commonly held view that "the change manager seems to 
have hit his stride and maybe this is the part of the project that suits him best .. " (RAF, Interview 
44, 3) .. Changes in how project meetings were conducted and an emphasis on integration enabled 
an improvement in the role. More important however was the fact that since the September 
project board meeting, the change manager had a defined communication plan with stakeholder 
buy-in and a working system to present: "The change manager has played a blinder and 
integration is a different stage where you have something to go and talk about and he knows 
these people ... " (RAF, Interview 49, 3). 
This was view he echoed himself: "/ suppose what got me more into a comfortable place was 
that the transition plan which was talked about and planned for, for months ... on the business 
implementation side ... " (RAF, Interview 47, 5). The support of the then senior user in enabling 
him to get access to meet an external coach "helped me a great deal ... " (RAF, Interview 32, 6), 
in particular in creating informal networks at a senior level. The change manager had continually 
focused on the senior manager (RAF, Interview 32, 19) who then became the new senior user on 
the project board. The senior user emphasised the need to access these informal networks: "You 
can go the formal routes but you also need an informal route to go ... You need social awareness, 
drive and enthusiasm to go that informal route and / think the change manager will have learned 
a lot from the process ... " (RAF, Interview 42, 7). With a clear communication and transition plan 
in place and strong stakeholder support, the change manager began to focus more on the system 
training. 
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7.2.4.8 Where's the VAT? 
As the system underwent additional training, the focus was on Business Readiness Testing (or 
BRT). Preparation of the BRT plan had become part of the BIM's responsibilities since she 
joined the project in the earlier phase: "I've never put together a BRT plan, never worked on a 
project before - I presume the BRT plan will come from the project ... " (RAF, Interview 22, 10) 
and she had an ongoing concern that "BRT outlining is fine but what value can I bring to BRT ... I 
know nothing about scenarios ... " (RAF, Interview 41, 2). With his role redrafted, the change 
manager was content to let the BIM have BRT responsibility: "the BRT I'm leaving as much of 
that as possible to Marie, I'm staying out of it - I need to take up some communication from her 
and go with communicating with the management ... "(RAF, Interview 32, 20). Indeed the lack of 
clarity that some stakeholders as to BRT responsibility was said to be indicative of the lack of 
role integration back into the project team; as the external planning consultant remarked: "we're 
seeing the consequences of that "siloing" now in BRT... we have to try and manage that and 
make it better ... change impact and communication go hand in hand and I did say at the very start 
that one person should report to the other - didn't say who should report to whom but people 
decided not to do it ... " (RAF, Interview 33, 8). The BRT phase was considered to be critical: 
"BRT has to go well- we have to have a good sense of where the system is ... configuration has to 
be completed and no outstanding design issues and that stop this is it ... " (RAF, Interview 35,5). 
The project would take people from the business to test the business-readiness of the system 
continuing the approach of having as many people from the business involved in testing 
generally (members of the project team had played important roles in both system and integration 
testing in the prior phase). Few problems were envisaged in sourcing testing "volunteers" from 
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the business: "there are people in the business that you often can go to and ask to get involved in 
the testing side of things ... ] don't see that being a problem ... ".(RAF, Interview 28, 11). Testers 
from the business brought one undeniable context and experience driven advantage: "the 
business people find the problems in the system a lot quicker ... " (RAF, Interview 36, 7). 
Selecting the right people from the business was key as "BRT is designed to test whether we are 
ready - you can't ask people who won't be doing the processes as to whether we're ready or 
not ... that won't help ... " (RAF, Interview 41, 9). There was also the additional benefit of users 
returning to the business post-testing with positive feedback as to the usability of the new system 
(RAF, Interview 35, 2). Issues did arise with business users testing system parts for processes 
they would not be familiar with (RAF, Interview 41, 8) and that was rectified as quickly as 
possible. Initially 20 people from the business would be selected even though "we'd love more 
but from the finance side a lot of people have already been committed on the project" (RAF, 
Interview 30, 3). The emphasis on involving as many testers from the business and the emphasis 
meant that the project would not have a formal user-acceptance testing (or VAT) phase. 
Typically in AGOCORP SAP (and indeed other) implementations, "we don't really do UAT; 
because we have so many users in BRT, we take UAT as implied ..... (RAF, Interview 30, 2). 
There was also the view that the system design is an output of extended user input (as per the 
blueprinting workshops) reducing the need for formal VAT (RAF, Interview 30, 3). 
Although initially accepted, this began to be questioned firstly by the financial controllers. They 
had gone on a corporate visit to see a SAP finance system that had been installed in a major 
accountancy firm. There, they had received a strong impression that a robust VAT was necessary 
for system success and began to push for it when they returned (RAF, Interview 30, 3). There 
268 
was also a concern expressed on behalf of the managers: "I do feel myself that it will be a big 
issue when the part of the business realise that there will no user testing .... it 's going to come 
up ... " (RAF, Interview 32, 18) and also by the external planning consultant: "I've never worked 
on a project anywhere that did not have some formal UAT component ... " (RAF, Interview 33, 9). 
There was also a view that "the first few months we heard about UAT and now it's all BRT" 
(RAF, Interview 32, 17) and that UA T was planned but the project had run out of time (RAF, 
Interview 45, 6). The sudden de-emphasis on UAT was a concern: "Could there be a perception 
around the project that UAT is not happening for some reason? Yes, I think the project would 
have to be very careful about that ... " (RAF, Interview 35, 6). There was also the parent's 
perspective: ''for the Business the concept of acceptance testing is important but for say ICT 
group it's more about the readiness testing as acceptance suggests that maybe there's some 
comeback on the design. .. which brings us back to the earlier issue we discussed - where' s the 
sign off? .. " (RAF, Interview 33, 10). 
In practical terms, the financial controllers began to push for some degree of user-acceptance 
testing: "now you have a financial controller saying 'hold on, I've four people here in the 
business who'll be using the system - they've never been on the project' - if there's no UAT, 
when are they going to test it - they need to be brought on the project to make sure it works ... " 
(RAF, Interview 32, 18). The business formalised thi UAT desire in an official request initially 
opposed due to time pressures (RAF, Interview 30, 2). 
Eventually a compromise was agreed at a meeting between the financial controllers and the 
project team: "we proposed to bring new people on board from the business onto the BRT - we 
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would train them and there would be a flavour of user acceptance testing in the BRT ... " (RAF, 
Interview 30, 3). There would be no formal "named" VAT phase (RAF, Interview 41, 8): "We 
have redesigned the BRT phase to incorporate some functional testing using the business, so 
there is some UAT in there ... the UA bit is the sensitive bit and it's not couched like that ... " (RAF, 
Interview 33, 10). As far as the finance controllers were concerned: "we're not allowed call in 
UAT but to my mind it's UAT ... " (RAF, Interview 35,5). There were concerns as to the time 
pressures on BRT: ''A lack of BRT testing is the problem - it was a bit of a joke to be honest with 
you - a graveyard for good ideas is what I would I think I said about it ... " (RAF, Interview 45, 
5) and that issues over whether to have VAT or not fundamentally "manifested itself in a lack of 
a credible testing management approach ... " (RAF, Interview 49, 9). As the testing proceeded, 
the project began to manage system training. 
7.2.4.9 Managing training and system cutover. 
Given the number of users that would need to be system proficient, the approach taken in training 
was that super-users would be identified, trained and brought back to the business where they 
could act as de-facto trainers responding to user queries and concerns: "we have 40 (super) users 
and then they go out and train the 8 or 900 or so users on the HR and Timesheets and Expenses 
and then we had 10 Finance super-users who had to train 60 users ... So you had a training ratio 
of 1:20 and 1:6 respectively? Yes, and this would have been considered quite good ... " (RAF, 
Interview 48, 4). The training would involve three key strands: namely project costing and 
billing, timesheets and expenses and the LOS solution. The LDS solution was in effect an on-line 
equivalent of the documentation from the performance review process which employees already 
did three times a year and so "it should not be too much of a burden on them ... " (RAF, Interview 
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45, 3). The LDS training could be prioritised differently to the project costing and billing and 
timesheet and expenses side as "the initial training they will get will be in January will not only 
allow them to do training and expenses and request annual leave - it will be an introduction to 
how to go through the first actual performance meeting in their year as it will also allow them to 
say set objectives, set their training goals etc ... We'll mention this in November (2010) to them 
but it will only really start in June (2011). We'll let everything bed in first ... " (RAF, Interview 
26,3). 
The training plans had originally been the responsibility of the change manager who had pushed 
to recruit an external training resource earlier in the project, an issue that had led to conflict with 
the BPIIT manager but which eventually he was given freedom to do so. He initially recruited a 
training consultant who arrived to do the initial training needs analyses in August, an 
inauspicious time to join the project team: "I got the sense that the project was at a Tipping point 
- that it could go one way or another ... (and) that (they) had left the training late ... " (RAF, 
Interview 45, 2). The change manager welcomed the extra resource (RAF, Interview 32, 12) 
although he was conscious of the less than ideal first impression of the project (RAF, Interview 
47, 2). The consultant seemed to have a strong finance background which initially was a source 
of anxiety for the HR members of the project: "Well, so far I wouldn't have massive confidence 
in him I have to say in terms of what I've heard ..... when we (her and the change manager) talked 
about the HR transactions within SAP, he felt the training consultant didn't seem to know them 
so that would worry me ... " (RAF, Interview 28, 12). The addition of an external training 
consultant was also welcomed by many users, i.e. "a big hobby horse of mine was to push for 
someone totally external, outside of AGOCORP completely who would be a super-user of SAP, 
come in and train us so we could get the most out of the system ... I have a few friends who use 
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SAP in AGOCORP and their consensus is that they don't use it to its full potential -you get 
trained up on the bit that you use ... " (RAF, Interview 38, 5). 
Adding an external resource was seen retrospectively as a good idea (RAF, Interview 49, 2) 
given that there was no formal system training capability in AGOCORP. Although he was hired 
as a training consultant, the change manager felt that he too had to involve himself in the training 
to fulfil his project team reporting role (RAF, Interview 47, I), a decision which sidelined the 
training consultant to a degree and did not enable him to make his own key connections in the 
business (RAF, Interview 47, 2). The training consultant though considered very experienced and 
capable had a rigorous even idealised approach to SAP training which did not lead to the most 
comfortable working arrangements: "he needed to be willing to be able to adapt a bit more 
though to the environment he was put into, to be frank ... You have to be willing to work with what 
you have ... " (RAF, Interview 49,2). 
Given that the timesheet and expenses reflected strongly what currently existed in AGOCORP, 
there was a surprise when "there was no training documentation for that system, we had to start 
from scratch and also we would have hoped to in the budget to have identified a strong internal 
resource to deliver the training and keep all that knowledge in-house ... " (RAF, Interview 48,3). 
As a result, "it probably took a long time to get the training material together and most of the 
December doing the training ... " (RAF, Interview 42, 1).With neither training documentation or 
appropriate training resources available, an external resource was acquired to assist on the project 
costing and billing side. Without an implementation partner, the business should be striving 
during the project to acquire competences not available in the business (RAF, Interview 48, 6). 
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Where possible, the project tried to partner internal and external staff so the knowledge would be 
retained in the business (RAF, Interview 48, 3). However the project costing and billing 
consultant left "with all the knowledge and experience ... Getting someone internal who could 
have done it would have allowed that golden opportunity f or learning to stay within the 
business ... as we did for the finance and the other sides .. . " (RAF, Interview 45, 8). The outcomes 
of the training were considered to be strongly positive particularly on the side of expenses: "(the) 
new system should empower them to do that themseLves and they should get reimbursed faster ... " 
(RAF, Interview 45, 3). The training team (RAF, Interview 44, 2) and the super-users were 
considered effective (RAF, Interview 42, 10). The super-users in particular being well-supported 
by the project when they returned to the business (RAF, Interview 48, 4) with some managers 
even feeling that they were over-trained (RAF, Interview 46, 3). Within project costing and 
billing, there were some concerns as to the intercompany processes: "the one / found hardest was 
the intercompany trading one .. . Like NOVOCORP and AGOCORP Networks doing business 
together? Yes, exactly, that would be a large part of our work and that's one where we would be 
concerned about but we 'll get the hang of it .... " (RAF, Interview 43, 6). However the biggest 
issue to be faced in training was technical and proved difficult to resolve. 
The training environment 37for the new system had been rai sed as an issue early on in the project 
with respect to whether resources would be available (RAF, Interview 12, 16). In order to 
provide the super-users with the most realistic representation of the system possible, the training 
consultant had requested that a copy of the designed system be made available for training. This 
was a very different approach to what the parent had normally done in the training phase: "They 
37 Training system as an environment rather than just training facilities . 
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had never done it like that ... What they would do is give a back-up for training and as the system 
is (being progressed) write-over that back-up on a weekly basis ... " (RAF, Interview 45, 2). 
Therefore if any system changes or upgrades were being done the training system would become 
unavailable as it was not a copy but a real version of the system. This led to some training delays 
as the system would be taken done at short notice with the external training consultant feeling 
that he would have to take a more extreme approach: "They agreed to that strategy but didn't 
really deliver on it until the last minute where I said that I would have to pull the training as I 
couldn't send in employees to get trained without a (proper) training system ... " (RAF, Interview 
45,2). From the project manager and the ICT group's perspective, a separate training system for 
groups of users at certain times was an expensive undertaking not just in time but also in terms of 
data storage and processing (RAF, Interview 48, 4) whereas in other people's views, this was 
another understandable instance of the ICT group rather than NOVOCORP driving the project 
(RAF, Interview 47, 3).However the delays in training began to get noticed and was escalated 
from the BIM up to the senior financial controller who then raised the issue at a project board 
meeting (RAF, Interview 47, 12) where it was aired and resolved with training getting back on 
schedule as a result. 
One of the key initial risks identified in the project scope was the migration of data from the old 
AGRESSO to the new SAP system, a key component of what is known in SAP as cutover 
activities. As discussed, the project manager had been forewarned as to the difficulty in 
executing this process and the opportunity to cleanse data was welcomed by many on the 
financial side of the business in order to attain greater data clarity and accuracy (RAF, Interview 
16, 7). The task of data migration was allocated to the BIM (RAF, Interview 47, 10) and involved 
274 
very detailed processes implemented by the finance function. The financial controllers strove to 
gain control over what data should be migrated with the project team long insistent that no live 
project systems data should be transferred (RAF, Interview 22, 3). The minutiae involved in data 
migration was quite complex with for example data stored under specific codes for sales and 
costs in AGRESSO needing to be mapped to some equivalents in SAP (RAF, Interview 22. 6). 
Data migration was a particular concern for the new PO bureau with existing suppliers for 
NOVOCORP who had become inactive needed to be reactivated before moving across to SAP 
(RAF, Interview 43. 5). The data migration process proved more problematic than initially 
envisaged with issues regarding responsibilities and roles and as a result. "there was a lot of i/l-
feeling generated between the project and the business at the time ..... (RAF. Interview 51. 5-6). 
Data migration and cleansing was among the responsibilities of the cutover (or transition) group 
which included representatives of the HR and Finance function. another transition consultant 
employed by the finance function and chaired by the external planning consultant. This group 
met twice a week up to GO-LIVE and afterwards to monitor system issues and discuss progress 
(RAF, Interview 44, I). As the project moved in its final fortnight of pre-production, the third 
and final quality assurance review was undertaken38 and outcomes presented to the project board 
on December the 15th • The external QA consultant was much more positive on the level of 
communication and integration and particularly highlighted the valuable involvement of the 
external consultants. Training was considered to be being successfully rolled-out and project 
planning and governance far more effective. The key reservations raised were around the need to 
follow through on the communication plan and to have a clear protocol in handling any issues 
that arise post GO-LIVE. 
38 Again, this discussion is strongly informed by off-the-record conversations and comments. 
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7.3 Flicking the Switch and the Aftermath: Go Live and Support (End of Dec 
2010lbeginning of Jan 2011) and Continuous Improvement Phases (Ongoing from Jan 2011 
to present day). 
The intention of these phases are to manage the move of the new system from a pre-production to 
a live environment and to address continuously any performance or usability issues that have 
arisen and to realise as many benefits from the system as possible. The AGRESSO system was 
switched off and the SAP system switched on January 4th 2011. 
7.3.1 User reactions to the new system and some initial difficulties. 
The initial user reaction to the system was positive39• The business focus groups set up in parallel 
with the cutover transition groups in December (and whose members included senior managers) 
were supportive of the system (RAF, Interview 48, 2). The finance function had been given an 
exemption from doing a February month-end so in essence their "acid-test" use of the system 
would not begin until the middle to end of March 2011 (RAF, Interview 44, 7); such an 
exemption was welcomed as it artificially extended the time for data migration until March 11th 
(an important extension given one or two issues that were to arise). During the next three-six 
months, the finance function underwent a substantial reorganisation with the creation of the new 
PO bureau and the splitting of the AP function and many former functions going to shared 
services in the parent (RAF, Interview 53, 1). The upshot of all the structural changes makes it 
difficult (to this day) to see whether there were significant reductions in employee numbers due 
to the deployment of the system on the finance side (RAF, Interview 53, 2) though the 
39 Some of the discussion below is informed by several off-the-record comments and conversations. 
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management were more confident: "it's too early to say but I expect that we should be able to get 
infonnation more easily without the anny of people we have doing it now ... " (RAF, Interview 42, 
5) 
Training had yet to be fully completed with respect to intercompany trading in terms of project 
costing and billing (RAF, Interview 49, 1) which also prevented immediate full utilisation of the 
system. Given the fears that surrounded the purchasing, the overall reaction to the new system 
was one of relief (RAF, Interview 44, 5), relief that was to be tempered by a data migration issue 
that would emerge. The reaction to the HR system was muted as expected given that the real 
value would emerge in the LOS solution over at least a calendar year as performance 
management and training activities were implemented. There was an impression that the HR side 
of the system had been sidelined somewhat due to the priority given to the financial side of the 
system (RAF, Interview 47, 4) although the newly integrated data on staff formerly held in many 
disparate systems was immediately identified as a quick-win by managers (RAF, Interview 42, 
I). There was also a general sense of relief that the truncated BRT and covert VAT phases had 
not led to a usability issue, at least "Not yet, but it could and I suppose you're running the 
gauntlet not having afonnal UAT. .. " (RAF, Interview 49, 9). 
Concerns with regards to data migration however proved to be well-founded when an issue arose 
with regards to users trying to make certain purchase orders. The Vendors had not been validated 
on SAP or were missing entirely. There was a concern that an understandable focus on the 
project scope had minimised the importance of getting data migrated successfully (RAF, 
Interview 53, 4). When the vendor file was reviewed, multiple mistakes were identified (RAF, 
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Interview 50, 8) and when the business looked for a sign-off on the migration of the data, none 
was available (RAF, Interview 49, 5). The cultural issue of having traceable sign-offs had arisen 
again and was resolved by using sign-offs of input files (of raw unclean AGRESSO data), output 
files (cleaned validated vendor data for SAP transports) and reconciled files and was part of the 
ongoing issues for the BIM that were resolved by March the 11th. Although GO-LIVE had 
passed, the project board had continued to meet and acting on business focus group suggestions, 
had identified that there were ongoing design issues that affected the population. The former 
change manager was tasked with this role and "We ended up with about four key change requests 
and some of them are ongoing, some of them are on the shelf as leT don't have the resources to 
deal with them right now ... " (RAF, Interview 52, I). As the Financial Efficiency project began to 
gain momentum, these issues began to be viewed in a different light. 
7.3.2 The finishing line and new horizons come into view. 
The final project board meeting was held in June 2011 and the outstanding issues brought by the 
former change manager to the board's attention were allocated to different stakeholders in the 
business (RAF, Interview 51, 1). The parent perspective that the project would bring innovative 
gains to the wider AGOCORP (RAF, Interview 39, 10) was still subscribed to, with the 
additional parallel synergy of the Financial Efficiency project. The movement of NOVOCORP 
onto the same finance system, the centralisation of PO and the splitting of NOVOCORP's 
accounting system to replicate that of the parents had brought NOVOCORP onto the same 
finance process continuum as the rest of the business units. Decisions could now be made as to 
what services could be shared across all the businesses, a conversation in which NOVOCORP 
were now full interlocutors rather than observers. Financial data could be integrated, costs could 
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be more effectively identified and controlled and as one senior finance manager commented: "If 
we hadn't implemented SAP we would have had to do it anyway as part of this Financial 
Efficiency project ... We would have had to do SAP plus Financial Efficiency project otherwise 
which would have been very difficult ... " (RAF, Interview 53, 1). 
In many ways, the integration of NOVOCORP and AGOCORP's financial systems had 
strategically far more effects and benefits than ever could have been envisaged in the original 
implementation plan. Conversely the decision to allow NOVOCORP to have system and process 
independence proved to be far more difficult and important to reverse than could ever have been 
originally envisaged. The level of internal trading hitherto not especially well understood at 
parent level may have been beyond the scope of the project (RAF, Interview 51, 1) but had raised 
a fundamental question: "we have to ask ourselves and this is coming from director level (as in 
directors of subsidiaries) whether we need to be going through that data and saying 'There's 5 
cenls that shouldn't be there etc ' .... " (RAF, Interview 51, 1). As the Financial Efficiency project 
continues, there may even come a point as one interviewee comments when "you won 'I need the 
Project Costing and billing system like we have - you 'Il need a different system for that 
then .... With hindsight we may have spent a lot of time on a system that may not be what you need 
in the future ... " (RAF, Interview 53, 5). 
7.3.3 Some stakeholder reflections. 
As the project came to more of a formal point of closure, some key stakeholders took some time 
to reflect. For some, the system represented a missed opportunity particularly around the area of 
notional banking (RAF, Interview 44, 4). For some it showed the flaws in the parent and in the 
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business. Some criticised the lack of flexibility of resources and environments: "they may need to 
become a bit more flexible maybe in terms of their use of resources and environments - there are 
a lot of different environments and as such I would feel that they're all there and needed for a 
reason but the ITS group get wrapped in constraints ... " (RAP, Interview 49, 1). Others identified 
the lack of role clarity as an important lesson (RAP, Interview 51, 3), others the need for a 
project to never tum its back on a business, to be more experience balanced and to understand the 
difference between a process and a transaction (RAF, Interview 35, 7). The need for the 
organisation to improve its ability to bring its vast experience and resources to bear on a project 
was also identified (RAF, Interview 49, 7). Some took the opportunity to reflect on their own 
perceived shortcomings and to consider the developmental opportunities that they had or had not 
grasped (RAF, Interview 52, 4-5). Notwithstanding personal, project team and implementation 
observations, the final key reflection remained the salient one: 
"We managed to achieve our goals, at one stage that was looking unlikely -
We were really staring down the barrel of a gun ... " 
(RAF, Interview 49, 5) 
7.4 Chapter Summary. 
In this chapter, an SIS alignment process has been presented as a case narrative. The 
organisational implementation of a new and strategically significant system has been described in 
rich detail. Using the standard ASAP implementation phases as a framing device, the 
implementation was described with a particular emphasis on the views of different participants 
coming from multiple levels of the organisation and even externally where appropriate. The 
aftermath of the implementation has also been briefly described, a phase which is still in 
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progress. In the next chapter, this narrative will be analysed using both process theory and 
research approaches and techniques. Key process events and their progressions will be initially 
identified and discussed by temporal bracket and using visual mapping. These outcomes will 
then be used to identify and describe generative mechanisms, lower-level process theory motors 
and higher-level motor relationships within the alignment process. 
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Chapter 8: 
Analyses of the SIS alignment narrative. 
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8.1 Chapter introduction. 
At the conclusion of chapter 3, the following research question was determined: What process 
theory motors and relationships characterise SIS alignment process? Four supporting research 
objectives were also defined: 
1. Identification and description of the events that constitute SIS alignment process, from 
multi-level organisational perspectives. 
2. Identification and subsequent appraisal of how these events progress, in order to determine 
the generative mechanisms of the alignment process. 
3. Utilising these generative mechanisms to identify possible theory explanations in the fonn 
of lower-level process theory motors. 
4. Utilising these lower-level motors to abduce higher-level process motor relationships (i.e. 
nested, entangled, aggregated), indicative of the overall SIS alignment process. 
The alignment narrative in the previous chapter was structured on the basis of distinct temporal 
phases. Using the broad sensitising incident and event categories described in Chapter 5, 
incidents and the accruing key process events for each phase are identified and discussed. In 
order to illustrate how these different events progress and how these progressions interrelate, a 
visual map (as per Langley, 1999) will be created for each phase. The first research objective has 
then been achieved. Fundamentally, the alignment narrative content strongly reflects primary and 
secondary data collected qualitatively at multiple-levels of the organisation. In addition, the 
polyphonic nature of the narrative fuses multiple-perspectives on the same incidents, lending 
greater credibility to the events to be identified and their progression. Considering the mode and 
outcomes of data collection, the base-point for further analyses has credible levels of internal and 
construct validity. Therefore, the visuals maps constructed, directly reflect these multi-level 
views and perspectives, rather than being constructed in an ad-hoc fashion. Utilising these said 
maps as a foundation, generative mechanisms (from process theory) that indicate how these 
different event progressions inter-relate can be identified, satisfying the second research 
objective. Although these generative mechanisms describe how event progressions are 
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interrelated, an additional theoretical per pective is necessary to determine the causal ba is and 
outcomes of these inter-relation hip. This additional perspective can be obtained by identifying 
the proces theory motor (i.e. cau al drivers) of these inter-relationships. These cau al motors 
can be con idered from two different perspective : low-level and high-level. The low-level 
process theory motor when identified, help to describe the causa] relationships within each 
phase and addresses the third research objective. However, in order to characterise the causal 
relation hip that exi t across the entire alignment process (as opposed to individual temporal 
phases), the relation hips between different lower-level motor across pha es need to be 
identified and discussed. These high-level process motor relationships can be nested, entangled 
or aggregated: their identification and description satisfies the final research objective. The 
sequence and focus of each analy is tep can be summarised in the table below: 
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Table 8.1: a summary of the analyses steps to be undertaken. 
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This step-by-step approach offers different cumulative perspectives on the alignment process 
narrative, building up to a more macro view at each step, using rich description and theory. The 
approach begins with a micro-level perspective by identifying incidents, which combine up a 
level to process events, and then to a more macro-view of how these events progress for each 
phase. Then, for each phase, gaining an understanding of the nature (generative mechanisms) and 
the resulting causes and effects (low-level process theory motors) of these event progression 
relationships. However, the ultimate macro view is gained by understanding the overall 
alignment process. This equates to a theoretical understanding of the relationship between the 
different temporal phases, in other words the relationships between lower-level process theory 
motors. These higher-level process relationships will then be identified and described and 
discussed in more detail. The chapter then concludes with a brief summary. 
S.2. The first research objective; for each phase: identifying process incidents, events and 
generating the resulting visual map. 
In section 8.2.1 and subsections, the key incidents, and events in which they collectively 
combine, are identified and discussed for the first temporal phase. The section concludes with a 
creation of a visual map which indicates how these identified events progress and how these 
progressions inter-relate. An identical approach is taken for the remaining temporal phases, 
satisfying the first research objective. In order to clarify the sequence and approach of analyses, 
additional explication will be provided for the first temporal phase of Project preparation and 
mobilisation at each step of the analyses. As the outcome of this analyses step is the creation of a 
visual map detailing process event progression and their inter-relationships, the reader may find 
it useful at each phase to initially and continuously consult the reSUlting visual map (Le. Figure 
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8.8. for the first temporal phase) which in analogous terms is the finished jigsaw as the individual 
pieces (Le. the process event progressions) are identified and discussed. 
8.2.1 Temporal Bracket 1: Project Preparation and Mobilisation (Dec 2009-Jan 2010). 
8.2.1.1 Initial project decision to move to SAP from AGRESSO. 
This event can be categorised at a high level as a structural integration and structural fit event. 
From the perspective of senior management in NOVOCORP, changing from AGRESSO to SAP 
was a fundamental strategic objective ("One of the key aspects of strategy was to ensure that that 
(SAP) would be put into place and that has (will) been done ... ", RAF, Interview I, 8) and 
entailed structural fit with the external environment in terms of the processes and strategies of 
their parent company. As far as the parent company was concerned, the need for greater 
structural fit was intellectualised clearly in alignment terms; "(we're back to the business 
alignment argument again), where you saying well the reality is that NOVOCORP is no longer a 
different business, but part of an overall AGOCORP strategy ..... , RAF, Interview 9,8). Structural 
reorganisation underway in both parent and subsidiary necessitated structural fit and integration 
as stated by the project manager: "If A GOCORP is going to reorganise and different business 
lines end-up moving across to different business units, then we all have to be on the same line. If 
not, that would be an obstacle to that reorganisation happening ... " (RAF, Interview 3, 7). 
Integration was an important strategic driver for NOVOCORP: "(AGRESSO) was causing huge 
problems from a support point of view, from an integration point of view, from a cost point of 
view. So one of our key IT strategies was integration ... " (RAF, Interview 1, 7) and there was 
middle managers (in NOVOCORP) intellectualised this as inevitable ("There's only one way the 
company is going - so we're just going to see more integration in Finance, HR and other 
286 
systems ... ", RAF, Interview 16, 4). The nature of the integration required would not only be 
strategic but would be process orientated. The busine s processes were intellectualised by senior 
management in both businesses as layers that needed to be streamlined and co-ordinated: "We're 
still siloed but better in terms of integration and reduction of costs etc ... We do have departments 
but we don 't have say a process owner where there is someone who has responsibility for a 
process and who can reduce costs etc ... That's the way the organisation will probably go .. . " 
(RAF, Interview 39, 5). Although the deci sion to change from AGRESSO to SAP is 
fundamentally a formal strategic event that aggregates budgeting, scheduling and other logistical 
considerations, other component incidents were identified at different organisational levels that 
collated to thi s overall event. A key informal strategic incident at the overall organi ationallevel 
was the public declaration of the AGOCORP Chief Executi ve that NOVOCORP would be 
moving onto SAP (RAF, Interview I , 8), which wa followed in turn by the presentation of the 
new IS architecture and strategy implementation plans (drafted by external consultants) to 
NOVOCORP management. The IS strategy was finalised and identified five key strategic 
objectives, one of which was the SAP changeover. Origi nally planned to be completed by Jan 
2010, the implementation was delayed by a year due to complications with the XYZ system with 
GO-LIVE then targeted for January 2011. 
Figure 8.1: Event (Initial project decision to move to SAP from AGRESSO): key incidents. 
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8.2.1.2 Decision to add the Project Costing and Billing (PCB) component to project scope. 
At the very early stages of formulating the strategy implementation plan, there was a realisation 
that the SAP changeover would entail some additional functionality to be added to the existing 
SAP system (as the implementation plan stated on page 15): Hthe Time and Expense processing 
requirements (that) will require additional developments to enhance the functionality currently 
deployed in AGOCORP ... ". This decision though formal and strategic was made to maximise 
structural fit and integration between the subsidiary and the parent. This additional component 
aimed to address the core process difference between the businesses, namely a consultancy 
aligning with a utility. Although arising out of the initial implementation plan, the expected 
scope of PCB was intellectualised very differently by different levels of the organisation, with 
the degree of expected development and associated importance varying widely. In the view of 
the parent and some NOVOCORP finance managers; this decision indicated only marginal 
development: "90% of our new system is already in AGOCORP" (RAF, Interview 13, 1). 
Whereas, for the engineering community and particularly the KAMs, they intellectualised this 
component in an entirely different fashion. They were concerned as to how they would manage 
reporting and whether this new component would offer the level of detail and reporting that their 
customers continuously demanded (ref: RAF, Interview 27). The overall business had some 
high-level understanding of these concerns and were also conscious of the risk entailed (ref: 
RAF, Interview 30, 3). They were also beginning to recruit for the technical skill sets that would 
be required to implement the component. 
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Figure 8.2: Event (Adding PCB to project scope): key incidents. 
8.2.1.3 Decision to add LDS to project scope. 
Unlike PCB, the deci sion to add LDS to the project cope was not borne out of an 
implementation plan but rather the initiative of the NOVOCORP HR function. Although within 
AGOCORP, the use of the performance management module in SAP wa considered to be sub-
optimal (RAF, Interview 27, 1-2), no initiatives had been undertaken until as part of the SAP 
changeover, NOVOCORP tentatively suggested fir tly informally that the LDS (Learning and 
Development) Solution could be trialled by NOVOCORP for the entire organisation. The 
NOVOCORP HR team worked informally with other HR teams from aero s the entire group to 
get a sense of their HR practices and get a greater understanding of how NOVOCORP could 
simply the eventual adoption of the new module by all (RAF, Interview 27, 5). In other words, 
using informal and informal channels, the HR team were pre-emptively managing the structural 
integration that would eventually accrue. In some key formal meeting , the level of intere t from 
other busi nes units was 0 high that "the BP/IT manager had to remind the business that this 
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was an NOVOCORP and not an AGOCORP project (LAUGHS) ... " (RAF, Interview 26, 5). 
From the parental per pective, "AGOCORP can see how they could leverage the value of 
something like this (i.e. WS) like NOVOCORP are doing (in this current implementation) .. . " 
(RAF, Interview 39, 8) although orne NOVOCORP HR staff felt the parental support was more 
at arm's length; they're (AGOCORP) supporting us but they're standing well enough back so 
that if it does fall fiat, then we 'll be the ones to pick up the pieces ... " (RAF, Interview 31 , 10). 
The views of the engineering cohort were les sympathetic to this new module as they 
conceptualised the change as more of an administrative burden (unlike HR who perceived this 
component a a ub tantial efficiency gain): "The reaction you get is often ''I'm a manager, now 
I'm an administrator ... " (RAF, Interview 18, 8). However, the efforts of NOVOCORP HR and 
the support of AGOCORP and NOVOCORP management had helped turn an informal trategic 
initiative into a fonnal component of the project scope . 
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Figure 8.3: Event (Adding LDS to project scope): key incidents. 
8.2.1.4 Identifying the key Project Risks. 
When the proposed SAP changeover was addres ed in the strategy implementation plan, four 
initial project risks were identified (on page 16). The key identified risk was the adequacy of 
local resources to manage the project (an is ue that was already being partially addressed through 
efforts to source the necessary external SAP experti e). Concerns were also stated with respect to 
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managing the process of data migration and the negative effects of a system delay. As the project 
began to mobili se, lessons from recent implementations were also rai sed at parental level, in 
particular, the need to have a clearly closed-off blueprinting or design phase (RAF, Interview 40, 
5). Although the project scope in terms of additional components (PCB and LDS) was becoming 
clear, there was also a senior management warning that in past implementations, "not really 
understanding what you 're getting into before you go down that path, I suppose that would be 
our key lessons learnt if you like ... " (RAF, Interview 9, 8). Senior management in the parent had 
clearly intellectuali sed project ri sks in terms of scope and design. The issue of data migration 
although di scussed in the implementation plan, had also been informally di scussed within the 
business by middle management as a potential stumbling block to be avoided (RAF, Interview 
51 , 4). Although there were overall project specific ri sks, there was agreement across all levels of 
the organisation that managing the changes that would ensue was the key risk to be managed: 
"For me, and I think the project manager has identified this as well as the biggest risk, is the 
business acceptance side .. . " (RAF, Interview 39, \1). 
Figure 8.4: Event (identifying key project risks): key incidents. 
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8.2.1.S Crafting the business case. 
Views on the business case to move from AGRESSO to SAP were intellectualised very 
differently by disparate stakeholders, dependent on their social groupings. Attitudes in finance 
and HR were generally more positive than the engineering cohorts. Finance could clearly see the 
benefits of streamlined processes (e.g. RAF, Interview 16, 4) reducing the proliferation of 
wooden dollars. HR though having some cost concerns saw the system as a boon, freeing them 
up from mundane tasks and allowing them to fulfil a more strategic role: (Le. RAF, Interview 
18). The engineering community tended to intellectualise their (more) negative feelings on the 
system on the basis of firstly, that it was being imposed: "/ think if we were left to our own 
devices, we won't be adopting SAP ... " (RAF, Interview 4, 14), secondly, that it would be costly 
and be unlikely in the long-term to reduce costs (RAF, Interview 46, 5): "To make the case for 
SAP to go forward, you needed to show savings ... " (RAF, Interview 8, 4). Thirdly, that the 
existing system met their functional needs (RAF, Interview 6, 12) and finally that their recent 
experiences of the XYZ implementation had raised concerns with regards to SAP. The XYZ 
implementation, part of the IS strategy context, through its lack of perceived success polluted 
how the engineering population intellectualised the new system and acted to further socially 
differentiate them from the finance and HR functions, who were not affected by the 
implementation in any great deal. Recent IS strategy and implementation history should 
therefore be included as a sensitising concept in identifying alignment events and incidents. The 
XYZ system delay also resulted in a revisiting of the business case. The circulation of a business 
plan (perceived to be limited by some) was an important incident in shaping social and 
intellectual conceptions of the changeover and ostensibly was a formal strategic event; however 
the different social interpretations that resulted would indicate that the event was more informal 
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than planned. The SAP presentation given by the Senior SAP architect to the engineering 
managers and team leaders was an important signpost that the changeover decision was made 
and that the coming system would offer process changes and advantages (ref: RAF, Interview 39, 
10). 
Figure 8.5: Event (crafting the business case): key incidents. 
8.2.1.6 Recruiting the project board. 
The project preparation and mobili sation phase concluded with the recruitment of two important 
project supports: the project board and the process team. As the organisation followed the 
PRINCE 2 project methodology, the composition of the process team was pre-determined and 
was a formal strategic event. It was the ITIBP manager' s responsibility to identify suitable 
candidates but her views on the composition (ref: RAF, Interview 2) were informally supported 
in the parent particularly in light of how XYZ implementation (RAF, Interview 40, 5) and past 
failures to clarify responsibilities for process team members (RAF, Interview 9, 7-8) had been 
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intellectualised. The BP/IT manager was very clear a to the respon ibilitie and informally made 
this clear in conversations and formally in some project ream training in advance. Once the 
project board was constituted, the formal project initiation document or PID could begin to be 
clarified which outlined the project scope and the roles and responsibilities of the project board 
and team: 
Figure 8.6: Event (Recruiting the project board): key incidents. 
8.2.1.7 Recruiting the process team. 
The recruitment of the process team, although formally strategic involved the views and input of 
stakeholders at multiple organisational levels. The initial incident that prefaced process team 
recruitment was the decision to not employ an implementation partner (RAF, Interview 24, 4): 
"in most SAP implementations here, we 've had an implementation partner who's experienced ... ". 
The project manager was the first member of the process team to be recruited and became 
heavily involved in drafting the PID with the project board (RAF, Interview 51, 3). A decision 
was made to recruit a change manager, welcomed by the different user cohorts (RAF, Interview 
14, 2), specifically from the engineering population. The change manager was duly appointed 
(RAF, Interview 7, 1) by the senior user for engineering (on the project board), an opportunity he 
welcomed in terms of career prospects (RAP, Interview 27, 5) and was followed by functional 
leads from HR (RAF, Interview 26) and Finance (RAP, Interview 50). Once the project board, 
executive and wider team had been recruited the project could be formally launched: 
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Figure 8.7: Event (Recruiting the process team): key incidents. 
A visual event and incident map can now be constructed for this phase and is incorporated 
overleaf. 
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8.2.2 Temporal Bracket 2: Business Process Blueprinting (1 st February - 31st May 2010). 
8.2.2.1 Putting the BPID documentation together. 
The most important preparatory step in Blueprinting was the formulation of the BPID documents 
which was a structural integration event designed to make the AGOCORP and NOVOCORP 
business processes and process layers as uniform as possible. These documents were prepared 
separately by the process team and the HR and the Finance departments in the business and there 
were substantial differences in how the processes being described were intellectualised, 
depending on the social grouping involved. BPIDS were originally prioritised, but then put 
together in the order in which a particular process was examined (RAF, Interview 17). From the 
finance staff perspective, at times it was difficult to intellectualise the AS-IS BPID as equating 
with the day-to-day processes: "you'd wonder at times was this how the processes actually 
worked and how come this hadn't been made available to us when we started working here!", 
RAF, Interview 43, 3). From the process team's perspective, a lack of SAP expertise (ref: RAF, 
Interview 50) made the involvement of the parent's SAP competency centre critical. Some senior 
engineering managers had made many informal efforts to get representatives of their KAM 
accounting on to the BPID drafting teams (RAF, Interview 29, 9) but were denied, which was a 
source of deep regret. In putting together the BPIDS, the HR staff had an enormous head start 
from having started to work on them from the time of the earlier P and HR SAP project (RAF, 
Interview 26, 4). They had also taken the informal initiative in getting access to the AGOCORP 
HR SAP system components to get a clearer sense of what moving to AGOCORP processes 
would entail (RAF, Interview 28, 4). Approximately 150 BPIDS were created but 50 system 
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developments identified a initially necessary to enable NOVOCORP and AGOCORP' 
processe to match (RAF, Interview 50,3). 
Figure 8.9: Event (Putting the BPID documentation together): key incidents. 
Once the BPIDS were finalised, the nine blueprinting workshops began. Three critical event can 
be identified, which are now analysed. 
8.2.2.2 Debating Project Costing and Billing. 
Project Costing and billing was added to the project scope in the prior pha e a an important 
structural fit and integration event. In the PCB workshops, there were stark difference in terms 
of intellectualising how the new PCB component would work and more fundamentally how the 
existing billing and reponing processes worked in NOVOCORP. The KAM were anxiou to 
obtain some valuable design outcomes and had met informally before the PCB workshop to try 
and present a unified agenda ("we thought as we had got in early that we could have got some 
customisation out of it if some was available ... we had as KAMs to compromise with one other 
and push for a common outcome ... ", RAF, Interview 34, 5). Finance taff who attended the 
workshops expressed surprise at the level of interest and engagement of the senior engineer and 
the key account managers: "You have a slight bewilderment on the Finance side of the house 
here in them wondering: 'this is a system for us, a financial tool, why are these people (i.e. 
engineers) getting so excited about it?" (RAF, Interview 14, 2). A far a the ellior engineering 
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staff were concerned, retaining as much of their current reporting and billing practices was 
fundamental but it quickly became clear that these practices were not sufficiently comprehended 
by many of the process team (RAF, Interview 20, 9). There was also a fear amongst the KAMs 
that there wasn't sufficient SAP experience in the process team and when concerns over the 
recent XYZ implementation were raised, the response of the process team was seen to be 
defensive whereas other observers felt that there was substantial baggage associated with the 
recent implementation "it (XYZ) was mentioned at one of the (BLUEPRINTING) meetings and 
we were asked had we thought about it ... very negative from the first meeting ... " (RAF, Interview 
36, 3). Although the KAMs realised that it wasn't possible to have every billing and reporting 
requirement in the new system (RAF, Interview 21, 5), there was a sense that the proposed 
system was no different to what would have been offered regardless (RAF, Interview 34, 4) 
although job numbers were agreed to be incorporated in the final system. 
The parent perspective on the PCB system was totally contrary: "What we've been trying to do 
here for years is to change the work to fit with the SAP system and that's going to involve 
different levels of change for different people ... " (RAF, Interview 24, I). As far as the 
engineering managers were concerned however, they felt that they needed someone who 
understood their concerns and their businesses processes fighting for their case: "Unfortunately, 
there's no-one senior enough who really understands that argument and is willing to fight and 
argue for it - I'll say what I can when I can but ... " (RAF, Interview 29, 8), with some concerns 
as to the advocacy role of the senior user on the project board (RAF, Interview 14, 12). There 
was also a perception amongst the financial (RAF, Interview 22, 5) and engineering participants 
(RAF, Interview 15, 9) that the workshops were poorly prioritised leading to a lack of time for 
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discussion (not helped by a loss of the external SAP con ultant) and some forced approvals of 
BPIDs (RAF, Interview 16, 6). The sudden and incomplete ending of the PCB workshops (and 
workshops generally) let to the design being viewed a more of an unknown quantity: "you never 
get to see whether their understanding of the processes actually tallies with your 
understanding ... what they perceive to be our processes and what 's achievable in SAP - that two 
part process seems to be missing well in terms of what we gel to see ... " (RAF, Interview 25, 3). 
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Figure 8.10: Event (debating Project Costing and Billing): key incidents. 
8.2.2.3 Deciding on the approval process. 
Early in the blueprinting workshops, it was clearly communicated that the project management 
module in SAP would not be purchased by the parent as part of the implementation, a deci ion 
regretted by the senior engineering managers (RAF, Interview 29, 4). This deci ion had one 
inalienable outcome: new (time heet and expense) approval proces es in NOVOCORP would be 
necessary to marry with the parent, where line managers had approval and that thi would be an 
important structural fit outcome. Due to NOVOCORP's matrix organi ational structure, line 
managers had little visibility over staff activities making approval of their time heets and 
expenses problematic. Akin to the project costing and billing discussions, the process team and 
parent seemed rather surprised at tills difference as corning from a utility culture, mo t parent 
employees only worked for one project manager at a time, not multiples as could be the case in 
NOVOCORP. The resistance to purchasing the project management module in SAP from a 
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parent level was attributed to concerns with respect to cost and scope creep and there was al 0 
the perception within NOVOCORP that the parent agreeing to the purchase could lead to " (a 
sense) of the tail wagging the dog in that we're the only part of the business who do things in 
that way ... " (RAF, Interview 23, 10). After much workshop discussion, a meeting of key 
stakeholders took place on the 17th of May (20 I 0) and after a vote was taken, line manager 
approval (with one di ssenting vote) was agreed). A project manager report would be 
incorporated into the system design (RAF, Interview 28, 6) which would enable project 
managers to flag expense and timesheet concerns prior to line manager approval. However, for 
some managers, thi s was insufficient and they planned to look at add-on EXCEL functionality or 
adjust their budgets for the next financial year to manually check all timesheet and expenses 
(RAF, Interview 23, 7). 
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Figure 8.11: Event (deciding on the approval process): key incidents. 
8.2.2.4 Splitting AP (Accounts Payable). 
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This structural fit and integration event was a consequence of a legacy proce sand ystem 
deci sion. Since its establi shment in 1989, NOVOCORP had deliberately operated a separate 
accounting system to the parent. However, the parent had two components in their AP system, 
namely Purchase Orders (PO) and Invoice Proces ing (lP), though with all purchases paid for 
from the same account. In NOVOCORP, due to differing purchasing requirements, different AP 
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systems had been developed across the system (RAP, Interview 38, 6). As this became clear in 
workshop discussions, the business came under pressure to adopt the parent approach and split 
their AP also. The then head of AP aware of this pressure urged for no decision to be made until 
she had returned from leave. However, the decision was approved in her absence and 
NOVOCORP's AP system would now be split as the parent with the new PO bureau playing a 
part in the new structure also. 
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Figure 8.12: Event (splitting accounts payable): key incidents. 
8.2.2.5 The first quality assurance review. 
This first of three quality review was undertaken by a retired AGOCORP employee and was 
described as "a very thorough process" (RAF, Interview 13, 6) and had some important 
consequences for the management of the project. The first key recommendation made by the 
external QA consultant was that more resources needed to be added to managing busines 
transition which brought the project manager back to the project initiation document (or PID) 
which was then revisited in terms of roles and responsibilities. In particular, recommendations 
were made to appoint a transition or business implementation manager as soon as possible with 
some comments as to how the reporting line should work "[ think though in terms of how the 
reporting relationship structure would work, there definitely was an input there .. . " (RAF, 
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Interview 13, 7). The external QA con ultant also made an observation as to the need to improve 
the current levels of project management tracking and reporting on the project (RAF, Interview 
30, 6), an issue that was rai sed with the project board: "it was identified as a risk but the project 
board did what it did (and) didn't make the decision - they didn 't bite the bullet on it.." (RAF, 
Interview 40, 6). How these observations were intellectualised by different social groupings was 
apparent with the senior supplier and the former AGOCORP employee commenting on issues 
which the project manager (and others) felt were either unrealistic or not as important at that 
moment in time: "the feeling would be that the projects that the external QA consultant had been 
involved in the past never had a shortage of resources and that resources could be called upon (to 
manage issues). I'm not sure that's always appropriate in every situation .... " (RAF, Interview 13, 
6). The scale of the implementation challenge was made very clear by the external QA consultant 
with the result that the project scope (and structural fit) objectives became even tighter: "there's 
been a realisation at project board level that there is a sufficient enough challenge in terms of 
achieving the January next deadline for the SAP implementation. So, there is a need to focus on 
achieving this first and not try and do two things at once ... " (RAF, Interview 12, 13). 
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Figure 8.13: Event (first quality assurance review): key incidents. 
8.2.2.6 Creating a change management steering group. 
The change manager attempted at an early stage in the blueprinting phase to reach out for 
internal guidance and expertise but felt that this was a limited success (RAF, Interview 12, 13-
14) so after a meeting with the senior engineering manager initiated informal contact with 
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favoured candidates. When the formal meeting was held, the change manager was able to 
formally create the steering group of his choice (RAF, Interview 12, 9). Although the steering 
group had been created, the BP/IT manager were not informed and the group then become a fait 
accompli (RAF, Interview 12, 7) with the change manager seeing it a means of appointing super 
users in the future. The value of the steering group became evident as the Blueprinting 
workshops threw up issues that could be debated or issue could be identified in advance (RAF, 
Interview 14,3). In this way, the informal creation and management of the steering group began 
to play an important role in handling structural fit and integration issues. 
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Figure 8.14: Event (creating a change management steering group): key incidents. 
8.2.2.7 Creating a business transition group. 
A recommendation made by the first external QA consultant was the more resources needed to 
be placed into business transition. The senior financial controller initiated a business transition 
group which he chaired and encompassed the financial controllers and which the busine s 
transition or implementation manager would report to as soon as they were appointed. Again , 
this was an informal action initially which over time began to become omewhat more finali ed 
and was strongly concerned with how the existing financial processes in the busines would be 
represented in the final system, and was therefore concerned with structural integration. 
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Figure 8.15: Event (creating a business transition group): key incidents. 
8.2.2.8 Absorbing GENCOM. 
An important structural fit and integration event during the implementation was the absorption of 
GENCOM, the former parent subsidiary. The move of GENCOM was necessary die to the new 
structure and was significant for the implementation in terms of the early SAP changeover for 
some employees and al so the implications of how the changeover was managed. The necessary 
training was considered to have been not entirely successful with issues around communication 
and IT identified by interviewees (RAF, Interview 7, 13): "The whole thing (i.e. reorganisation) 
is actually a very political and sensitive process and wasn 't managed (that well} ... " (RAF, 
Interview 12, 17). The form al incidents had poor outcomes leading to informal queries and 
complaints which were rebuffed. The change manager began to feel isolated and not li stened to 
(RAF, Interview 12, 17). 
SubsidIary 
employe'" 
ilff"ct"d by 
GENCOM 
~ 5 5 r r t t o n n
identified 
IT Trainine 
and c h a n e ~ s s
a r r a n g ~ d d for 
d d l i v e r v v
0...", 
M ~ r r
queries 
proc:eu but 
f .... 15 rebuffed 
Figure 8.16: Event (absorbing GENCOM) key incidents. 
8.2.2.9 Clarifying the change manager's roles and responsibilities. 
The feelings of the change manager post-GENCOM allied to the feeling abroad in the business 
that his role was undefined (RAF, Interview 21,6) and that he lacked sufficient SAP experience 
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(RAF, Interview 18, 14). He felt his communication was inhibited by a lack of business plan 
clarity (RAF, Interview 12, 12). He arranged a meeting with the IT/BP manager where his 
responsibilities with respect to engaging and communicating with the user population were 
emphasised. This informal incident had formal outcomes in how the role was detailed on paper 
and was driven by different intellectual representations of what a change manager role entailed. 
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Figure 8.17: Event (clarifying the change manager's roles and responsibilities): key 
incidents. 
8.2.2.10 Clarifying the business implementation manager's roles and responsibilities. 
Although the role of the transition or business implementation manager had been identified in the 
PID, the input of the external QA consultant helped frame how the reporting lines and role would 
operate although at the end of the blueprinting phase, ambiguity stil1 prevailed. The role had 
been formal1y redrafted and reappraised but no appointment had been made. The view of the 
senior finance function in the subsidiary was that the role was crucial but their social perspective 
was far removed from the engineers in that "officially, the post has not been filled and the 
engineers don't know about it .. . " (RAF, Interview 12, 8). 
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Figure 8.18: Event (clarifying the business implementation manager's roles and 
responsibilities): key incidents. 
8.2.2.11 Failing to close the design phase. 
As the blueprinting phase unwound, Users were querying as to why there was no physical 
representation or documentation of the agreed design: "you never get to see whether their 
understanding of the processes actually tallies with your understanding ... what they perceive to 
be our processes and what's achievable in SAP - that two part process seems to be missing well 
in terms of what we get to see ... " (RAF, Interview 25, 3). There was also the issue as to whether 
"the process team have enough SAP knowledge and experience to definitely say "this is 
finished" ... " (RAF, Interview 20, 9). Issues with PCB and LOS had led to design extension 
requests but there was a strong user sense that the design had not been finalised as no sign-off 
had been communicated: "Well, there was none (a sign off) - sign-off means that you've got 
something you wanted ... " (RAF, Interview 34, 5). The opportunity for a formal event to indicate 
structural fit and integration and to allow different social groupings to intellectualise what the 
system would mean for them was missed. By the end of the reali sation phase, the number of 
expected system developments had fallen from 50 to 12 (Ref: RAF, Interview 50). 
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Figure 8.19: Event (failing to close the design phase): key incidents. 
A visual event map can now be constructed for this phase: an abbreviated high level version is 
included with a more detailed granular incident version available in the appendix: 
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8.2.3 Temporal Bracket 3: Realisation (1st June-31st August 2010). 
8.2.3.1 Appointing the DIM. 
The BIM was not formally appointed until June 20 II (RAF, Interview 22, I) and her 
appointment was an important formal strategic and structural fit event. The delay in her 
appointment was regretted but issues had arisen with re pect to her reporting role and more 
importantly who would take on the role. The first QA review recommended that she report to the 
change manager or vice-versa and then to the project (RAF, Interview 30,7). However, as the 
original choice was more senior than the project manager, this was deemed inappropriate and so 
she would report directly to the transition group and the senior financial controller. Although the 
eventual BIM did not have that seniority issue, thi reporting line was maintained. This new role 
was intellectualised very differently: she saw herself as di stinct from the project group and there 
to protect the business (RAF, Interview 22, 2); the finance function welcomed her addition as she 
had some SAP experience from a prior financial role in AGOCORP "she has that finance 
knowledge and she's really driving the finance side ... She has the legitimacy and she has the 
kudos around the place in terms of the past successes on other projects ... " (RAF, Interview 31, 
3). Her appointment however, came (as predicted) a a complete shock to the engineering 
population (RAF, Interview 27, 8). Some perceived the appointment as a necessary antidote to 
the failings of the change management role (RAF, Interview 18, 14). Although she inherited a 
heavy workload, HR relieved some of the pressure informally (RAF, Interview 18, 13). 
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Figure 8.21 : Event (appointing the DIM): key incidents. 
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8.2.3.2 Addressing the PS timesheet issue. 
Three clear functional issues arose early on in realisation, which were critical to resolve in term 
of structural fit and integration of processes. The first of these wa the PS timesheet i ue. Thi 
was an event that showed the formal structures (i.e. change board and design authority) acting on 
the alignment process. The PS timesheet is the AGOCORP Standard SAP system timesheet used 
by all AGOCORP employees. However, as the design began to be reali ed, the HR Functional 
lead and members of the process team detected that AGOCORP employees were allowed work 
flexible hours ("Flexi-Time") whereas NOVOCORP employees could not (RAF, Interview 26, 
9). A formal call was made on the project that NOVOCORP users should not see a flexi-time 
option when changing their timesheet. Such a change would involve altering the existing 
AGOCORP SAP standard, and therefore the request was forwarded to the design authority, but 
was rejected on and relevance grounds (RAF, Interview 26, 9). The senior NOVOCORP HR 
manager on the design authority made the comment that other working terms and condition that 
applied to AGOCORP would also not apply to other sub-division and there would be the 
potential for whole-scale change if this was consented to (RAF, Interview 3]). 
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Figure 8.22: Event (addressing the PS timesheet issue): key incidents. 
8.2.3.3 Addressing the FX timesheet issue. 
NOVOCORP as an international business processes payments and invoices in a multitude of 
currencies unlike the parent (RAF, Interview 39, 9). NOVOCORP stakeholders had concern 
that this process difference was not recognised as important and had felt disturbed when denied a 
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workshop request to di scuss the issue in the blueprinting phase (RAF, Interview 22, 4). The issue 
was also identified by the BIM who rai sed it as an issue with the senior financial controller 
(RAF, Interview 22, 8) who pressuri sed for an urgent meeting to address the issue. The de ign 
authority became involved it was decided to retain the AGOCORP SAP currency standard of 
Euros (RAF, Interview 39, 9) with some back-end flexibility for reporting in different currency 
denominations. 
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Figure 8.23: Event (addressing the FX timesheet issue): key incidents. 
8.2.3.4 Adding HR Salary bands to system design. 
A senior HR manager strove to introduce new pay bands for NOVOCORP employees in the 
existing SAP Performance Management module. Both NOVOCORP HR and Finance felt that 
moving from broad grading bands to indicative shorter grading bands would be of benefit 
structurally and also in staff reporting (RAF, Interview 28, 10). This reque t had to be referred to 
the design authority. Even with strong managerial support from within AGOCORP and 
NOVOCORP (RAF, Interview 31, 7) the request was rejected as the information was already 
extant in the existing SAP sy tern (RAF, Interview 28, 10). However, after meeting with 
objectors in the parent, and with the support of her senior HR manager and by changing the 
semantics of the request and understanding the structures of other business units, she pivoted 
successfully: "As long as I said salary bands, no problem - but if I said Grading bands where I 
could see direct hires or line manager etc, then it was No .. .. " (RAF, Interview 31, 7). This event 
was an instance of how the informal can "game" the formal to achieve a structural integration 
desired by one party in the implementation. 
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Figure 8.24: Event (adding HR Salary bands to system design): key incidents. 
8.2.3.5 Managing Business and project disengagement. 
Given the ru hed manner in which the blueprinting pha e had ended in the eye of many, there 
wa a growing perception emerging amongst the u er community that the proce team was 
beginning to disengage from the bu ine s ("generally there is reluctance on behalf of the process 
team to engage with the business, why - I don't know ... ", RAF, Interview 22, 3). There wa a 
view that the project was beginning to tum in on it elf a it struggled with ongoing deadline-
driven system issues (RAF, Interview 25, 4). In some re pects, this event wa more a structural 
di integration rather than an integration event as the bu ines and indeed the change manager and 
BIM began to become unmoored from the process team. The lack of information emerging from 
the project imposed a restriction a to how much the change manager could inform the greater 
busines (RAF, Interview 22, 3) though there was a perception that they were tiJ1 
communication opportunities that were not being exploited (RAF, Interview 28, 7). However, 
there were informal incidents where the change manager would keep the bu ines in touch with 
the project (RAF, Interview 27, 7) and where the teering group formally intervened to deal with 
certain issues (RAF, Interview 25, 9-10) and a such became informed on progre . 
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Figure 8.25: Event (managing business and project disengagement): key incidents. 
312 
8.2.3.6 Change manager and BIM informally co-ordinate roles and responsibilities. 
As a response to becoming unmoored from the process team, the change manager and BIM 
informally began to co-ordinate their roles and responsibilities as predicted by some senior 
stakeholders in the implementation (RAF, Interview 18, 14). Meeting together before key 
meetings enabled them to have a common approach in engaging in more formal settings (RAF, 
Interview 22, 7). The BIM began to move into the change management space as far as the 
finance function was concerned (RAF, Interview 36, 5) with the full mutual support of the 
change manager (RAF, Interview 28, 8) with both understanding that the ability of the BIM to 
leverage the senior financial controller due to her reporting line was critical in pressuring 
information release and agenda setting (RAF, Interview 22, 7). 
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Figure 8.26: Event (change manager and BIM informally co-ordinate roles and 
responsibilities): key incidents. 
8.2.3.7 Fighting for communication resources. 
Both the BIM and change manager were under informal pressure to provide system 
demonstrations and information back to the business but they were concerned about formally 
communicating a system without sufficient levels of financial SAP knowledge (RAF, Interview 
27, 5-6). Despite an initial agreement to provide a resource to support formal delivery of system 
information, this was reneged on due to time commitments delaying communication to the user 
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community and adding to the perception of project and business decoupling. Lack of formal 
resource supports had led to another tructural disintegration event. 
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Figure 8.27: Event (fighting for communication resources): key incidents. 
8.2.3.8 Fighting for training resources. 
As part of his original role, the change manager had training responsibility and was put under 
increasing pressure informally by the project and the BP/IT manager to tart developing a 
training plan with concerns also being expressed by HR (RAF, Interview 28, 8). The change 
manager intellectualised his role as predominantly about communication and formally requested 
a training resource to aid him but was rejected initial1y (RAF, Interview 32, 1). After strong 
communication with the BPIIT manager, there was formal consent given to the training re ource 
but there was some informal damage done to the change manager role as this led to a perception 
(in some quarters) that he lacked the capability to fulfil his role (RAF, Interview 28, 8). 
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Figure 8.28: Event (fighting for training resources): key incidents. 
8.2.3.9 The BIM role and reporting line is revisited. 
The ad-hoc informal role reallocation engaged in by the BIM (and change manager) began to 
become a source of frustration for the process team and senior stakeholders (RAF, Interview 30, 
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8) with role overlap becorrung problematic: "The role of change manager and BIM has been 
conf used. .. let's just say .. " (RAF, Interview 40, 6). The fi t of the role had become an i sue with 
concern that the BIM was prioritising business needs at the expense of the project (RAF, 
Interview 33, 7). The project manager and other senior taff revi sited the original 
recommendation of the first external QA consultant and recon idered combining the change 
manager and BIM roles and reporting lines but issues with the change manager role became 
more urgent (RAF, Interview 30, 7). 
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Figure 8.29: Event (BIM role and reporting line is revisited): key incidents. 
8.2.3.10 Revisiting the change manager's roles and responsibilities. 
The change manager's view on his roles and re pon ibil ities had led to him looking for an 
external training resource to aid him in the creation and delivery of the training plan. There had 
been conflict with the BP/IT manager and this led to another fo rmal meeting where the roles and 
responsibilities could be revi sited. After formally adding trai ning as one of hi s responsibilities, 
the change manager reacted with a disgruntl ed communicati on which was replied to by the 
granting of the training resource. 
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Figure 8.30: Event (revisiting the change manager's roles and responsibilities): key 
incidents. 
315 
8.2.3.11 Beginning to question project schedule and planning. 
Although the initial external QA had observed potential issues with respect to project cheduling 
and planning (RAF, Interview 22, 12), these had not been acted upon at project board level 
(RAF, Interview 40, 6). Concerns though were beginning to be raised with re pect to demands 
from the project for resources without clarification as to the rationale and expected duration of 
resource (RAF, Interview 40, 8), concerns that were reinforced when the project schedule and 
task lists were examined. 
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Figure 8.31: Event (beginning to question project schedule and planning): key incidents. 
8.2.3.12 Scheduling and planning issues are laid bare. 
Parallel to the previous event, the BPIIT manager was standing in for the project manager (then 
on leave) and arrived at the same view as some senior stakeholder on the project board (RAF, 
Interview 28, 9) that the structural fit and integration of the project had gone radically off cour e. 
Her reaction was to engage an external expert to help on the scheduling and contro11ing of the 
project (RAF, Interview 33, 3) whose reaction to the state of the project was stark: "in terms of 
controls, structures, governance, I have to say, it (the project) just was not there ... " (RAF, 
Interview 33, 3). 
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Figure 8.32: Event ( cheduling and planning· u ar laid bare : k y incidents. 
8.2.3.13 Making project management chang : trackin , r portin nd r integration. 
One of the fir t formal tep taken by the external planning con ultant w to re i it the original 
project plan and chedule and impo e time and re pon ibility con train on t at a highly 
granular level (RAF Interview 28, 9). He al 0 initiated RAG reporting which would fo rm the 
ba i of how project meetjng would be tructured in term of agenda prioriti ation. The e 
incident holi tically form an import formal tructural fit which allowed different 0 ial 
grouping (i.e. proce team, project board) and individual i.e. project manager enior 
upplier) to intellectuali e the implementation as controlled and m re appreciably u ce ful. In 
addition to improved tracking and reporting, the external planning con ultant in tigated two new 
weekly meeting , one each for change management and one for bu ine tran ition (RAF 
Interview 32, 14). Thi wa a con ciou and formal attempt at tructural reintegration of the e 
role back into the proce team after their earlier decoupling in thi ph e (RAF, Interview 3 1 
3). However, even though the role welcomed the e formal tructure there w till informal 
coale cing by the change manager and BIM to manage the agenda (RAF Interview 32, 14). 
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8.2.3.14 The new external consultant collects data fo r the second QA review. 
In addition and aloin parallel with the action of the external planning consultant, a second 
(new) external QA con ultant had began to con ult with proce team members and business 
takeholder with regard · to putting together a econd QA review. A part of thi data collection 
proce ,the con ultant met with the change manager, the enior finance functional lead (RAF, 
Interview 50, 5) and the eternal planning con ultant: "I'd go so far as to say that I probably 
gave them (i.e. [he external consultant had assistants) a bit of collateral in terms of 
suggestion .. " (RAF, Inter iew 33, 2). The external QA con ultant stressed informally before 
delivering hi formal report and pre entation (in the next pha e) that increased intra-process team 
communication w a nece ity. He al 0 identified the need to reintegrate the change manager 
and BIM back into the proce team and was upportive of the pecific meetings being initiated 
by the external planning con ultant. He al 0 provi ionally tre sed the need for the change 
manager to be able to acce the enjor u er on the project board and that different people should 
pre ent to the project board (RAF, Interview 32, 5). Before the formal event of delivering ills 
report, the external QA con ultant had informally legitimj ed orne of the stakeholders' key 
concern in additional to validating orne of the corrective action already taken. 
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Figure 8.34: Event (n w e ternal consultant collects data for the second QA review): key 
incidents. A vi ual e ent map can now be con tructed for tills phase: an abbreviated illgh level 
veT ion i included with a more detailed granular incident ver ion available in the 
appendix: 
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Figure 8.35: Project realisation: visual event map. 
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8.2.4 Temporal Bracket 4: Transition and Final Preparation Phases 
(1st Sep 2010 - 31st December 2010). 
8.2.4.1 Attempts to address the lack of a sign-off. 
The perceived incomplete ending of the blueprinting pha e had never fully been reso lved and 
had led to a belief for some that the design wa still live. The lack of a formal ign-off event had 
been queried by multiple takeholder (RAF, Interview 30, 11) and had become a key i ue for 
the newly external planning consultant to try and resolve. A he reviewed the ign-off on the 
prior pha e, he realised that the lack of sign-offs wa not only re tricted to the de ign pha e but 
al 0 to configuration testing, in particular of project co ting and billing (RAF, Interview 33, 3). 
Configuration testing had to be done delaying the project by a month. 
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Figure 8.36: Event (attempts to address the lack of a sign-of 0: key incidents. 
8.2.4.2 Further PCB delay and resource pressures. 
The i sue with a lack of ign-off on configuration testing had been compounded by res urc 
issues as another external SAP con ultant had left and had to be replaced. ncern over P B 
and the lack of project support had forced the finance function to go out and hire a tran iti n 
pecialist (RAF, Interview 32, 14). The BIM's appointment had coincided with ng ing de ign 
i sues in PCB which were sti11 to be resolved (RAP, Interview 41, 7) and he had pu hed for and 
managed to get additional resources to manage the i ue that were arising. In addition to the 
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technical issues posed by PCB, there was also a concern with respect to the work changes that 
would ensue: 
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Figure 8.37: Event (further PCB delay and resource pressures): key incidents. 
8.2.4.3 Managing KAM reaction to new centralised accounting function. 
As the PCB component began to be configured and the project strove to manage the structural 
fit, it had prompted people to reconsider the accounting structures and practices that currently 
existed in NOVOCORP. A deci sion was made to create a central accounting function that would 
handle all invoicing for the business (RAF, Interview 36, I ), a deci sion that would disempower 
KAMs, in particular those with high billing volumes. Informally, the change manager discussed 
with the most affected KAM in advance of hi s meeting with the senior financial controller in 
order to appraise him of the change and the futility of excessive resistance. The KAM was then 
able to absorb and manage the implications prior to hi s meeting with the financial controllers and 
was able to ask for time to reflect. The change manager had pre-emptively managed the situation 
in order to ensure that the long-awaited system demo would not turn overly confrontational 
(RAF, Interview 32, 10). This event was an instance of informal control of a formal deci sion 
made to foster additional structural integration (i.e. all KAMs centralising their accounting 
functions) and structural fit (i.e. ensuring NOVOCORP's month-end and accounts could comply 
with the rigid timelines imposed by the parent). 
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Figure 8.38: Event (managing KAM reaction to new centralised accounting function): key 
incidents. 
8.2.4.4 Parking notional billing. 
In addition to creating a new centralised accounting function, another financial controller 
suggested an additional structural integration improvement (RAF, Interview 17, 7-8) which 
would involve settling internal business as it arises notionally and then once a quarter with real 
finance transfers: in other words, reducing the need for these often quoted "wooden dollar ". 
Although brought to the project board, this change would involve technical change to the 
existing project scope (RAF, Interview 37, 2). This proposed improvement was put back to the 
first quarter of 2011 due to scope and PCB prioriti ing issues. 
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Figure 8.39: Event (parking notional billing): key incidents. 
8.2.4.5 Getting buy-in for communication plan. 
The change manager had arranged to give a brief system demo to the senior engineering manager 
and his team without the finance team SAP resource, with the demo perceived to have been an 
important personal and project success by others (RAF, Interview 30, 6). He was very aware that 
the forthcoming QA's presentation would emphasise the need for a formal communication plan. 
322 
He had drafted one in advance and wanted to use the system demo to get buy-in and input on the 
communication plan and al so reassure those who might be problematic in the bigger set-piece 
presentation coming in the next few weeks (RAF, Interview 32, 6) and to enforce the need to 
support the fin ance team SAP resource which would be part of the set-piece presentation. His 
initial plan was accepted and the senior engineering managers bought in to the communication 
plan and agreed to come up with their own specific versions. (RAF, Interview 32, 6). The change 
manager had used a formal event to informally strengthen structural integration and to socialise 
the need for formal communication planning. 
Presented t o C h a ~ e eCha",. seniof" manager 
c __ 
Manacer e",n-ril1l: att .. ins buv-in plan pre"",ed drafts 
manacement from for projKt 
conwnunic.tion 
.. t system e ~ r i r 1 l l bou d 
plan demo rnanacement 
Figure 8.40: Event (getting buy-in for communication plan): key incidents. 
8.2.4.6 A new senior user joins the project board. 
Because the senior user (representing the engineering function) had been promoted to acting 
head of HR within the parent, he had to leave the project board to be replaced by the senior 
engineering manager (RAF, Interview 42, 6). The outgoing senior user had acted on the informal 
recommendations of the external QA consultant though in pushing for the finance team SAP 
resource to be made available for the formal presentation. He has al so pushed for different 
people to present to the project board, beginning with the change manager presenting his 
communication plan. The new senior user was more familiar with the KAM processing and 
reporting issues (RAF, Interview 48, 4) and had begun to mentor the change manager and ensure 
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he had access to re ource . Although the replacement of the senior u er was a formal event, the 
informal outcomes and re ource access arising were key incidents. 
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Figure 8.41: Event (a new senior user joins the project board): key incidents. 
8.2.4.7 The September project board meeting. 
The presentation was critical in socially formalising and supporting the change to planning, 
tracking and integration initiated by the external planning consultant and al 0 to emphasise the 
need to instigate formal communication planning across the business. As the external QA report 
was discussed by the project board, issues were raised with respect to the awareness of the u er 
population (RAF, Interview 42, 9) and it wa agreed that the full system would not be 
demonstrated to the user population at this point (RAF, Interview 30, 8), not fully welcomed by 
the BIM or change manager (RAF, Interview 30, 8). 
5 hews stronc For"",lRst"" IIIM.nd flItl!m1ll QP. 
support for .-dfor I Projod lond cN.e mnsuII&II! 
oternol CIlhIr_ decides to rMUI"'not presents pa....,q (lOI'm ..... ·CIIi n c1Nyfui SMtIululy 
report COMuhnt pan system demo KUplw. d this cIKision 
Figure 8.42: Event (September project board meeting): key incidents. 
8.2.4.8 Presenting the system to the main user body. 
The presentation by the change manager and the finance team SAP resource wa an important 
formal event in socialising the de igned system and in legitirrusing the proce team and the 
efficacy of the change manager. Observers from the busines and the proces team were po itive 
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in terms of the outcomes (RAF, Interview 32, 6) and after fighting for her presence for so long, 
the presence of the finance team resource was instrumental in reassuring some key stakeholder 
(RAF, Interview 31 , 5) as was the concerted effort of the senior management to attend and 
enforce the inevitability of the system (RAF, Interview 27, 4). 
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Figure 8.43: Event (presenting the system to the main user body): key incidents. 
8.2.4.9 Changing the BIM's reporting lines. 
The reporting lines of the BIM initially set for a more senior member of staff had been queried 
along with the clarity of her role had been questioned in the previous phase. Her formal (in the 
form of reporting to the transition group) and informal back-channel to the Senior Financial 
Controller had allowed her to have an input into project agendas and priorities and had become a 
loyalty issue for some members of the process team (RAF, Interview 33, 7) and a concern for 
task allocation and management (RAF, Interview 30, 8). The transition group, BP-IT manager 
and BIM met formally to di scuss the role and diverse views existed; when the senior financial 
controller returned, the BIM was informed that her reporting line had changed and she was now 
formally reporting to the project manager (RAF, Interview 35, 1). Two formal incidents assisted 
in minimising the informal communication and leverage that previously existed. 
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Figure 8.44: Event (changing the BIM's reporting lines): key incidents. 
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8.2.4.10 Preparing for the new purchasing system and structure. 
The centralised accounting office was not the only change accruing from the system. An 
additional structural integration and fit event was the (planned and expected) new Purcha ing 
order bureau that would be established in NOVOCORP. The PO bureau was seen by the parent 
as absolutely necessary for structural fit (RAF, Interview 39, 5) and would involve the 
unwinding of the existing AP system in NOVOCORP (recalling that the decision to do 0 had 
been made in a blueprinting workshop in the absence of the AP head). The purchasing system 
had been raised as question and concern by several attendees at the sy tern presentation in 
September and there was anxiety as to the effects and consequences, anxiety that per isted when 
some late testing showed anomalies in AGOCORP and NOVOCORP handling of invoice that 
complicated the transition even further. The need to have formally decided on the AP plit in the 
presence of the head of AP was clear. Members of the finance function on the team and in the 
bu iness began to work on open purchase orders, striving to minimi e the amount of data 
migration necessary. 
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Figure 8.45: Event (preparing for the new purchasing system and structure): key incidents. 
8.2.4.11 Presenting the new purchasing system and dealing with the aftermath. 
In attempting to address user concerns raised reo Purchasing system, the change manager and 
financial controller agreed to hold a purchasing system demo. The reaction they received wa 
unfavourable (RAF, Interview 47, 7) and in the informal conversation that followed, there wa a 
realisation that the level of communication to the engineering users had been Ie than ideal with 
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the result that the community was re-engaged with and that the change manager had been further 
validated. 
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Figure 8.46: Event (presenting the new purchasing system and dealing with the aftermath): 
key incidents. 
8.2.4.12 Labelling the testing process. 
As final testing was being organi sed, an important issue arose over the labelling of the testing 
that would be undertaken. For hi storic, cultural reasons, AGOCORP did not engage in formal 
user acceptance testing or VAT (RAF, Interview 30, 2), whereas in the views of the external 
planning consultant (RAF, Interview 33, 9) and the busi ness (RAF, Interview 35,5), such a 
testing step was necessary. The views of the financial controllers had been shaped by a vi sit to an 
external organisation which had just successfully completed SAP and had emphasised the need 
for a VAT phase. In order to structurally fit different intellectualisations of the same key step, a 
compromise was informally reached. Additional users from the business would join the testing 
process and undertake de-facto informal VAT. 
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Figure 8.47: Event (labelling the testing process): key incidents. 
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8.2.4.13 Dealing with training system issues. 
Sy tern training had begun with the formal recruitment of the forty super-user who would return 
to the busine s with transferrable y tern knowledge. An external training consultant recruited by 
the change manager had done a training-needs analy e and was co-ordinating the training 
delivery (RAF, Interview 48, 4). An additional external re ource had been recruited in order to 
aid in PCB testing but had left early leading to a knowledge drain on the project (RAF, Interview 
45, 8). Specific internal resources were then utilised to shadow the remaining external re ource. 
I sues with training sy tern reliability were problematic and eventually the enior finance 
controller pressurised the parent ICT group once he had been made aware of the problem 
inadvertently by the change manager (RAF, Interview 47, ] 2). Again the informal contact had 
enabled formal pre sure to positively affect project progre . 
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Figure 8.48: Event (dealing with training system issues): key incidents. 
8.2.4.14 The last QA review. 
The third and final QA review wa delivered in mid December and further formally validated the 
contribution of the external participant and the mechanic of training and te ting. There wa a 
clear recommendation to have an open and effective communication plan and al 0 to put together 
a business focus group to help manage i sues that ari e after GO-LIVE. 
Dt QA further 
va .... t .. 
,,.-ininC,, 
tes:tw. and 
_t 
oonsulta .... s 
~ . ' t O O
.... h .... c I e _ ~ ~
----
_ .. 
...... ---....-. 
.... -
- < 
R.c:lO<i . ......... 
.-... 
foa.tI: croup to 
... --
Figure 8.49: Event (the last QA review): key incidents. 
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8.2.4.15 Managing data migration. 
Although data migration had been long recogni sed as a "clear and present" project risk, there 
were ongoing concerns as GO-LIVE loomed ever nearer. The responsibility of data migration 
had been given to the BIM (RAF, Interview 47, 10) but the mechanics of the process began to be 
problematic with financial controllers insisting that that no new project data be carried over to 
the new system, accountants concerned with transaction codes matching in different systems and 
users of the new purchasing system aiming to minimise the number of live purchases and 
validate vendors (RAF, Interview 43, 5). There was ongoing resentment over how the phase wa 
managed with both sides blaming the other for deficiencies (RAF, Interview 51, 5-6) with the 
cutover group striving to manage the process . An event and process that should have been highly 
formal became more complex and socially divisive than envisaged. 
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Figure 8.50: Event (managing data migration): key incidents. 
A visual event map can now be constructed for thi s phase: an abbreviated high level version i 
included with a more detailed granular incident version available in the appendix: 
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8.2.5 Temporal Bracket 5: Go-Live and Support and Continuous Improvement Phases 
(Ongoing from Jan 2011 to present day) 
8.2.5.1 Reaction of the business focus groups. 
The business focus groups recommended by the final external QA set up in parallel with the 
cutover transition groups in December began to meet formally post GO-LIVE and were positive 
as to system outcomes (RAF, Interview 48, 2). The fact that training was incomplete had led to a 
less than complete utili sation of the system (RAF, Interview 49, 1) but any user system issues 
that were rai sed were added to an issue li st to be formally di scussed in a different setting. The 
parent had given an exemption from doing a February month-end so their key issue was more as 
to the effectiveness and completeness of data migration (RAF, Interview 44, 7). 
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Figure 8.52: Event (reaction of the business focus groups): key incidents. 
8.2.5.2 Reorganising the finance function. 
The expected creation of the new PO bureau and the unpredicted splitting of the AP function had 
led to the finance function being reorganised (RAF, Interview 53, 1) with a trading optimisation 
function being created to enhance structural integration: 
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Figure 8.53: Event (reorganising the finance function): key incidents. 
8.2.5.3 Getting "bitten" by Vendor Master File. 
A key issue raised by the business focus groups was missing vendors on the new purchasing 
ystem, an issue that when investigated multiple mistakes in the vendor file were identified, 
raising the issue of a lack of sign-off (RAF, Interview 49, 5). The external planning consultant 
instigated a repeat of vendor data migration with full formal traceability and sign-off control and 
became the responsibility of the BIM. 
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Figure 8.54: Event (getting "bitten" by Vendor Master File): key incidents. 
8.2.5.4 Identifying and dealing with outstanding issues as the project comes to an end. 
Four major change requests were raised by the business focus groups with a specific ta k group 
was created to examine the issues with the (now former) project change manager ta ked with 
assessing the cost and functional impact of the changes (RAF, Interview 52, 1). After informal 
conversations with some engineering managers who had requested the change, they became 
aware that costs would be prohibitive and accepted that they would not happen (RAF, Interview 
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52, I). One outstanding issue with respect to internal trading was taken by the former project 
manager in hi s new role and subsumed into the ongoing Financial Efficiency project (RAF, 
Interview 51 , 1). 
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Figure 8.55: Event (Identifying and dealing with outstanding issues as the project ends): 
key incidents. 
A visual event and incident map can now be constructed for this phase and is incorporated 
overl eaf. Before the vi sual maps are utili sed to determine patterns of event progression, the 
events identified will be di scussed. 
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Figure 8.56: Project Go-Live and Continuous Improvement: visual event and incident map. 
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8.3 The second research objective; for each phase: identifying the generative 
mechanisms that characterise event progression inter-relationships. 
For each phase of the alignment proce , a visuaJ map has been generated that indicates process 
event progression and how these progressions inter-relate. The next tage in analyse and the 
second research objective is to characteri e the nature of the e inter-relation hips within each 
phase; in other words, identifying the generative mechani m . A di cu ed in chapter 3 (section 
3.7), process theory typically utilise ix di stinct generative mechani m . Each pha e i revisited 
to identify these generative mechanisms and a a re ult, the vi ual map created earlier, can be 
extended to illustrate these identified mechani m . The following notation will be utili ed to 
indicate the relevant mechani sm on the extended visual map : 
c =:> Unitary Event Progression 
~ ~ Init iat ion of one of mult iple event progressions 
,. ..... Divergence of event progressions 
I ) 
'-
0 Cumulative event progression 
0 Conjunctive Progression due to absorpt ion (inclusion) 
0 Conjunctive Progression due to chance (probabilist ic) 
0 Conjunctive Progression due to linkage (mediation) 
Table 8.2: Notation for illustrating generative mechanisms. 
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8.3.1 Project Mobilisation and final preparation. 
Revisiting Figure 8.8, four distinct parallel event progressions can be identified which form the 
logical basis for identifying the relevant generative mechanisms. These event progressions are 
distinct in occurring in parallel and initially independent of each other with some blending or 
conjunction as the first phase draws to a conclusion. Taking a top-down approach to the visual 
map, the four parallel event progressions are as follows. Firstly, the identification and addition of 
extra functionality to the project scope in terms of Project Costing and Billing (PCB). Secondly, 
the addition of the learning and development solution (LOS) to the project scope. Thirdly, the 
construction of the business case, project tearn and board recruitment and preparation of the PIO 
and finally, identification of specific risks in the system changeover. 
The most complex event progression involves the construction of the business case, project team 
and board recruitment and preparation of the PIO and is considered as a coherent and different 
event progression for the following reasons. Firstly, there is immediate causality within this 
distinct progression which entails treatment as a whole. Construction and acceptance of the 
business case is a pre-requisite for the recruitment of the project tearn and board which must be 
in place and acting to construct the PIO and initiate the project. Hence this can be seen as an 
intact and distinct progression. The addition of LOS and PCB to the project scope formally in the 
fonn of the project initiation document (as below) can be described as a conjunction of parallel 
event progressions that are independent and are linked by a chance (probabilistic) mechanism, 
rather than deliberately: 
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Figure 8.57: Chance (probalistic) conjunction of LDS and PCB into project scope. 
Using a chance generative mechani sm to describe thi s scope inputs, can be justified by the 
observation that the addition of LDS was driven firstly informally by the activities of 
NOVOCORP's HR fu nction independent of and unaffected by the addition of PCB. 
J 
Figure 8.58: Absorptive mechanism bringing together formany and informally identified 
project risks. 
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Identification of pecific ri ks in the SAP changeover i a conjunctive event absorbing three 
separate ri k identification event formal and informal. These identified risks are absorbed by 
the project manager in term of hi input into crafting the project initiation document. 
J 
Figure 8.59a: Absorptive (inclusive) conjunction of identified risks into actions of project 
manager. 
The project manager then u e the identified ri k to develop the PID further: this is a mediating 
or influencing inter-relation hip or generative mechani m: 
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Figure 8.59b: Mediation of identified ri ks into actio of proj ct mana er. 
Two component event equence converge at the training of the project board member. Both 
component event equence are a linear or unitary progre ion of con ecutjve event . The event 
equence converge and combine a a conjunctive mechani m, with the project manager directly 
mediating with the appointed project board to con truct the project initiation document. 
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Figure 8.60a: Construction and di emination of the business case, project team and board. 
Thi di tinct et of e ent progre ion can be further decon tructed as follows. The XYZ system 
deJay directly mediate the urgency and content of the bu ine s ca e due to resource and deadline 
adju tment : 
Figure 8.60b: ediation of busin case formulation by the XYZ system delay. 
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Furthermore, the deci sion not to have an implementation partner further mediates the final 
busi ness case as decided upon and presented to the business (and in turn the project board and 
team staffing requirements): 
Figure 8.60c: Mediation of final business case by the decision not to have an 
implementation partner. 
Finally, the selection of project board members and how they' re trained directly mediates the 
recruitment of the change manager and other project team roles: 
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Figure 8.60d: Mediation of project role selection by member selection and training. 
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The original visual map for this phase can now be revisited with the identified event progression 
mechanisms added using the previously identified notation (Table 8.2): 
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8.3.2 Project Blueprinting: identifying event progression mechanisms. 
Analysing this second project stage, the first progression mechanism that can be determined i a 
unitary progression up to the event where senior engineer push for a repre entative on the BPID 
design team but are denied, leading to a divergent parallel progression that immediately 
conjuncts in a mediating fashion, as the workshops begin: 
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Figure 8.62.:. Mediating conjunction of events as KAMs informally organise. 
Six distinct high-level multiple event progressions can be identified, namely the informal 
creation of the change management steering group, the decision to split AP, the debate over 
PCB and the project approval process, the outcomes of the first external QA review and the 
absorption of GENCOM into NOVOCORP. These multiple event progressions conjunct just 
prior to the end of the blueprinting phase with the outcomes of these event progressions 
344 
mediating the determination of 12 new system developments that are brought into the next phase, 
realisation. These high-level event progressions can be further analysed. 
The first two high-level event progressions (steering group decision and AP split) can be 
described as a probabilistic or chance conjunction of two separate event progressions, which 
contrast the informal activities of the change manager and the steering group and the formal 
workshop process driving a future business structure deci sion: 
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Figure 8.63: Chance (probalistic) conjunction of steering group and AP split event 
progressions into new system developments. 
The next two high-level event progressions (the debates over PCB and the project approval 
process) contrastingly can be described initially as divergent parallel event progressions that 
converge as a direct linked or mediated conjunction: 
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Figure 8.64: Directly-linked (mediated) conjunction of PCB and project approval debates 
as event progressions. 
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This mediated conjunction proved to be fundamental a the proce continued into the reali ation 
pha e as the lack of a ign-off become an important i ue for the end-u er population. The 
outcomes of the first external QA review directly affected (in a divergent and parallel fashion), 
the formation of the transition group and initiated a di cu ion as to the roles and identification 
of the busine s implementation manager (BIM). The decision on the role of the BIM/tran ition 
manager and a lack of an appointment can be seen a an inclusion or ab orption conjunctive 
progression: 
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Figure 8.65: Absorptive (inclusive) conjunction of BlMffransition manager role and lack 
of role promotion. 
The remaining high-level event progre ion in thi pha e (ab orption of GEN OM into 
NOVOCORP) though ostensibly progres ing in a unitary fa hion, eparate and di tinct from 
other event progression, proved to be more complex on deeper con ideration: 
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Figure 8.66: Initial unitary progression of the events as GENCOM 
NOVOCORP. 
absorbed into 
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However, the deci sion to appoint the BIM and their role as projectlbusiness interface contributed 
to the change manager reflecting on and questioning their roles and responsibilities and the view 
of the change manager amongst some elements of the user population. In addition, the meeting 
of the BP/IT and change manager was affected by the deci sions on the BIM roles and 
responsibilities. This event progression can therefore be linked to the events that led to the 
deci sion to appoint the BIM as the projectlbusiness interface. Deciding on the roles of the BIM 
acted to push back or modify the change manager's view of hi s own roles and responsibilitie 
and is indicative of a cumulative progression, whereas the BIM role deci sion directly linked or 
mediated the clarification meeting between the BP/IT and the change manager: 
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Figure 8.67: Modifying cumulative 0 ) and mediating progressions linking BIM role 
and GENCOM absorption event sequences. 
The detailed visual map originally created for the phase can be adapted to reflect the identified 
event progression mechanism (with a detailed incident version available in the appendix). 
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8.3.3 Project Realisation: identifying event progression mechanisms. 
This phase was characterised by a higher incidence of events and a greater complexity of event 
progression mechanisms. The first progression mechani m that can be identified i a multiple 
event progression occurring in parallel that account for the outcomes of de ign board deci sion 
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Figure 8.69: Conjunctive absorption of design board event progressions. 
The outcomes of the design board deci ions are ab orbed into the realised project; hence a 
conjunctive absorption is the most appropriate progression mechani m. In term of the initial 
event progression identified in this phase, there is a clear unitary progre ion until the event 
where the change manager and BIM began to meet informally (prior to meeting ). The informal 
actions of the BIM and change manager directly mediate the battle for finance team re ource to 
upply business information; the BIM enabled informal financial controller input into project 
team meetings and the ensuing lack of clarity over the role of the BIM: 
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Figure 8.70: Event progressions directly mediated by the informal meetings of the BIM and 
change manager. 
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In addition, the deci sion to defer BIM responsibility clarification directly mediated further BP/IT 
and change manager conflict: 
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Figure 8.71: Direct mediation of BPIIT and change manager connict. 
As the process began to be problematic, a key event that directly mediated the recruitment of the 
external planning consultant and the redrafting of the project plan and schedule: 
Figure 8.72: Direct mediation of BPIIT manager in recruitment of external planning 
consultant and attendant project management improvements. 
The changes introduced by the external planning consultant mediated the initial 
recommendations of the external QA consultant who absorbed or included the outcomes of his 
meetings and phone caJls with members of the project team: 
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Figure 8.73: Inclusion of project and business feedback into external QA feeback mediated 
further by external planning consultant initiatives. 
The detailed visual map originally created for the realisation pha e can be adapted to refl ect the 
identified event progression mechanism and is included in detail for clarity in the Appendix. 
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8.3.4 Transition and Final Preparation: identifying event progression mechanisms. 
The first event progression mechanism that can be identified in this phase pertains to the 
outcomes of the second formal external QA review which resulted in a change of the BIM 
reporting structure and responsibilities. The decision by the project board to delay a system demo 
and the resulting perceived lack of acceptance by the change manager and the BIM directly 
mediated a revi siting of the BIM role which in turn mediated directly to alter parameters of BIM 
responsibility: 
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Figure 8.75: Directly mediated change of 81M reporting line and responsibilities. 
A second event mechani sm that can be identified emerges from the multiple event progressions 
concerned with system testing that occur in parallel though in an unrelated fashion (as AP testing 
issues a separate concern to the political interplay surrounding UAT and BRT): 
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Figure 8.76: Probablistic conjunction of testing event progressions. 
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In a contrasting fashion, two para]Jel event progre ion which both re ult in project team and 
change manager validation can be described as an inclusive conjunction mechani m: 
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Figure 8.77: Inclusive conjunction of project team and change manager validation. 
Event progressions concerning with the development of the y tern communicati on plan, the 
gaining of engineering manager commitment and the involvement of the external QA con ultant 
in stre ing the need for the communication plan can be characteri ed a the proge ion 
mechanism below: 
c .... r ....... '.it. 
". ..... , .... , ... 
.... tu ",pMe". 
-.,..,.. .. 
-....... 
,tin 
-
co .... 
., .... , .. 
.. ... ltlltlft 
11-
""," ... ", _..... 
,--
"M" ...... ' ,.,,' .... 
..... 
' . t " ' f I I ' t ~ ~• 
... -, ..... ~ , . .1M'.,. •• 
Figure 8.78: Event progression mechanism characterising communication plan 
development. 
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The communication plan developed by the change manager and bought into by the engineering 
managers (though directly mediated by the PCB system component delay) is directly absorbed 
into the event progression that culminates with the communication plan acquiring a new 
momentum which is directly mediated by the suggestions of the external QA consultant. The 
PCB system component delay which delays the agreed communication plan futher mediates 
directly to further deprioritise notional billing as a system development and compel the finance 
function to hire a additional transition manager. The PCB system component delay however i 
directly mediated by the loss of external SAP expertise (in the form of an external SAP 
consultant) and also the need to redo configuration testing due to lack of evidence as to whether 
it had been done effectively. The causes and effects of the PCB system component delay a a 
progression mechanism can be characterised as follows: 
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Figure 8.79: Event progression mechanism characterising PCB system component delay. 
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The last key event progression mechani m that can be identified for this pha e is the ecuring of 
a finance team resource for the pre entation to the target u er population. The trongly medi ating 
roles of the outgoing and new senior u ers on the project board in term of pres uring for the 
re ource to be made available is important to characteri e: 
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Figure 8.80: Strongly mediating event progression mechanism characteri ing ecuring of 
finance project team resource for user presentation. 
The detailed visual map originally created for thi pha e can be adapted to refl ect the id ntifi ed 
event progression mechanism and is included in detail for clarity in the Appendix . 
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8.3.5 Go-Live and Support and continuous improvement: identifying event progression 
mechanisms. 
The last phase in the process is predominantly characterised by unitary event progression 
mechanisms with the exception of the two directly mediating mechanisms can be clearly 
identified; namely the impact of the PO bureau and the voiced reactions of the business focus 
group. The launching of the PO bureau directly links to the final formal splitting of the AP 
function as well as exposing the user population to purchasing issues as vendor file issues 
emerge. The formation of business focus groups as recommended by the external QA consultant 
directly links to purchasing issues being ventilated and resolved: 
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Figure 8.82: Event progression mechanism characterising initial live system outcomes. 
The visual map originally created for the final phase can also be redrafted (overleaf) with the 
identified event progression mechanisms included. 
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Figure 8.83: Go-Live and Support and continuous improvement: identified event progression 
mechanisms. 
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8.4 The third research objective; for each phase: identifying the lower-level process 
theory motors that explain the causes and consequences of the identified mechanisms. 
In the last stage of analyses, the inter-relationships or generative mechanisms between event 
progressions were identified for each phase of the alignment process. However, identifying and 
discussing the causes and consequences of these inter-relationships rather than just their nature 
of connection, has the potential to offer a richer theoretical perspective. Such causes and 
consequences are known as motors in process theory and (as discussed in chapter 3, section 3.8) 
can be life-cycle, teleological (goal or intent-driven), dialectical (conflicting) or evolutionary. 
Motors are identified for each phase and are thus reflective of the phase rather than the overall 
process; hence they are termed lower-level motors. Identifying the lower-level process theory 
motors satisfies the third research objective. This section concludes with an overall graphical 
summary of lower-level process theory motors by temporal phase. 
8.4.1 Process Preparation and mobilisation: lower-level process theory motors. 
The initiating divergent generative mechanism within process preparation and mobilisation (the 
outcomes of the news IS architecture and implementation plan) can best be described as a 
teleological process motor. There is deliberate intent in this mechanism as actors in the 
alignment process at multiple levels (senior management, initial project team members etc) strive 
to take the high-level strategic objectives and address the consequences for the scope of the 
project, in addition to clarifying the scope in preparation for mobilisation. In this respect, the 
immanent nature of this initiating mechanism enables the project to progress into the next 
implementation phase. The clarification of both the project costing and billing component and 
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project risks that feed into the overall project scope though immanent is not pre-determined. 
Both the specific risks and the complexity of the PCB component are unknown, commensurate 
with a criterion of teleological change (Nutt, 1983). The next generative mechanism is also a 
divergent mechanism and a teleological motor, as the SAP project decision leads to the 
development of the business case and the development of the PID. The appointment of the 
project manager which is followed by the project board selection is the actions of a collective 
unit, synonymous with teleological motors (Poole and VanDeVen, 2004). The decision not to 
have an implementation partner intentionally impacted on the roles and responsibilities of the 
project team and board lending further credence to the selection of a teleological motor. Indeed, 
the selection of the change manager and the (soon to be proven as flawed) belief that the project 
roles had been optimally described can be characterised as expressions of cognitive bias 
(Kahneman, 2011). The equating by senior stakeholders of project management expertise with 
the requisite change management skill-set and the actions of the newly appointed project 
manager, who is aware of, yet relegates the risks of data migration are instances of cognitive 
bias, a common characteristic of teleological motors (Poole and VanDeVen, 2(04). 
The absorptive conjunctive mechanism of specific risks relevant to the SAP changeover can be 
described as an evolutionary motor (Garud and VanDeVen, 2006) as the understanding of the 
specific risks changed in a single cycle, as stakeholders from multiple-levels of both 
organisations were consulted and past implementations were reconsidered. The risk varied by 
stakeholder experience: those experienced in prior organisational implementations emphasised 
data migration risks, those involved in the current implementation emphasised the lack of an 
implementation partner and the need for substantive process and user change to be managed. 
358 
Although the risks varied, it can be argued that they were selectively retained, in particular in 
terms of importance. The lack of priority given to data migration as a live risk proved later in the 
process to be particularly problematic. The subsequent conjunctive absorption of the identified 
risks by the project manager further mediates the crafting both of project roles and the content of 
the project initiation document. Such mechanisms are indicative of strongly teleological motors 
with other senior stakeholders (such as the BPIIT manager) striving to avoid past mistakes in 
project board recruitment and preparation. To summarise, the project preparation and 
mobilisation can be largely categorised as teleological in terms of low-level process motors with 
the key phase impetus being strongly immanent in nature, with stakeholders at all levels striving 
to clarify and finalise the project scope and delivery group. 
8.4.2 Process Blueprinting: lower-level process theory motors. 
As the process moved into the blueprinting phase, broad immanent teleological behaviour is also 
present by the desire of the project delivery group to finalise the final system design. However, 
unlike the more prescriptive teleology evident in project preparation and mobilisation, there is 
more evidence of process conflict and tension. Indeed, given the research observation that the 
initial number of system developments were scaled back from 50 at the beginning to just a dozen 
by the end of this stage, infers that the motors of this phase are more dialectical (Burke, Lake and 
Paine, 2008). The broad goal of a final system design may be driving the process but the specific 
content of the goal only becomes apparent at the end of this stage, characteristic of an emergent 
or dialectical motor (Langley, 2009). The first moment of conflict that emerges within this phase 
is the KAMs pushing for a representative on the BPID design team and being rebuffed. This low-
level dialectic motor in turn encourages greater KAM integration as they deliberately or 
359 
teleologically engage to present a largely-united front as the workshops begin. The workshops 
though a unitary progression is characterised strongly by conflict as differing groups strive to 
impose their desired outcome on each other. The differing groups are not simply the project 
delivery group and the engineering managers as the roles and perspectives of the Finance and 
HR departments are also important. The equanimity of approach of HR and Finance contrasts 
markedly with the more individualistic intents and behaviours of the engineering group, with 
differing group approaches being fundamental in driving dialectical motors (Smith and Berg, 
1987 cited in Poole and VanDeVen, 2004). The different perspectives can also be described in 
terms of alternate low-level motors. The project delivery group had a mandate to deliver a 
system with as few new developments as possible (hence no project management module for 
instance). Therefore, they adopted a classic teleological approach with the "problem" to be 
resolved being the likely resistance of the engineering population, as the management of change 
had been identified by senior stakeholders in mobilisation as a key issue to be overcome. The 
lack of parent and project delivery group understanding of the different business processes in 
NOVOCORP meant the teleological process become internally more dialectical than first 
presumed. The engineering population though also teleological and immanent in terms of 
desiring to maintain as much of the business processes as possible also become involved in the 
dialectic: same lower-level models but different motivations and perspectives. This duality of 
independence and interdependence is typically evident in conflictual dialectic motors (Seo, 
Putnam and Bartunek, 2004). The debate as to how the project approval process would operate in 
the new system, though resolved democratically instantiates a dialectal motor in action with a 
thesis (i.e. line manager approval only), an antithesis (i.e. project manager approval only) and a 
resulting synthesis (i.e. line manager approval but with project manager receiving expense and 
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timesheet report summaries) being adopted. The outcomes of the low-level dialectical motors 
driving the workshops though clearer to the delivery group were viewed as unresolved or 
unknown by the user body. Although there was convergence of event progressions and a clear 
number of developments for realisation, there is an argument (at least from the engineering 
cohort's perspective) that no full synthesis had been achieved. The project delivery group may 
have initially felt that they had full closure or synthesis: as far as the engineering population was 
concerned, there was a feeling that the antithesis (as they perceived the final proposal of the 
delivery group) as opposed to their thesis was probably being adopted. This failure to fully 
synthesise drove further conflict in subsequent stages. 
The development of informal support structures was a prominent feature of this phase as 
participants worked outside the formal project structures to optimally manage the process from 
their varying perspectives. The change manager initiated a (change) steering group whereas the 
head financial controller initiated a transition group in response to the first external QA report. In 
the instance of the steering group, an informal structure which worked well (when called on) 
throughout the entire alignment process, this was the change manager's response to a perceived 
problem and thus was teleological in nature. However, unlike many other teleological motors in 
this phase, there was a preventive step taken to limit dialectical tension by building informal 
support with senior stakeholders for the support group which aided legitimacy. The other support 
structure was also viewed as a solution to a problem: namely the first external QA's 
identification of a lack of significance attached to managing transition and is also a low-level 
teleological motor. Unlike the change steering group however, the transition group further 
engendered rather than resolving conflict, in light of the inability to recruit a transition 
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managerlBIM and to clarify roles and responsibilities. The outcomes of the first external QA 
consultant's report also prompted consideration of the current roles and the efficacy of the 
current tracking and reporting structures. The report though teleological due to being mandated, 
led to a dialectic motor as the roles and responsibilities of the BIM/transition manager were 
discussed, but again without clear synthesis. The changing understanding of the BIM role 
directly mediated the change manager's view of his own role, already conflicted by the 
teleological failure of the GENCOM absorption, and which engendered further conflict as the 
change manager clarified his role with the BPIIT manager. The trend emerging in this phase is of 
a lack of complete synthesis compounding rather than solving conflict. The conflict is resulting 
from unresolved dialectic tensions as teleological motors fail to achieve immanence. The 
development of the alignment process is being driven by the inability of the organisation to 
resolve satisfactorily this conflict. In terms of how organisations can approach conflict resolution 
(as classified by Werner and Baxter (1994) cited in Poole and VanDeVen, 2(04), this phase can 
be characterised as initially integrative as the conflicting parties engage and then more spiralling 
inversion as the conflicting groups (i.e. finance, engineering) gain specific attention, but ending 
in a form of denial as a key stakeholder group remains unsatisfied. 
8.4.3 Process Realisation: lower-level process theory motors. 
The realisation phase is initially teleological as the developments identified at the end of 
blueprinting are attempted to be satisfied in the system design. This phase is strongly 
characterised by a clash of informal and formal teleological motors. The initial teleological 
motor of realising the system design initially diverges into informal and formal teleological 
motors, with conflict arising as a result. The informal meetings of the BIM and change manager 
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have the purpose of creating an ongoing alliance to enable more input into and informational 
output from the ongoing process. This approach instantiated a teleological low-level motor as 
there is clear intent on their behalf to resolve what they perceived as a project issue. These issues 
are largely driven from conflict in the previous phase; in particular the failure to circulate a 
signed-off design and resolve clearly the reporting lines and responsibilities of key interfacing 
roles. In process theory motor terms, unresolved dialectic motors have generated an informal 
teleological motor. Contrastingly, there is more of a formal teleological motor from the 
perspective of the project team and the formal business. This formal teleological motor is based 
on two motivations: firstly, the desire to manage the flow of project and process information and 
secondly, the wish to restrict the roles and responsibilities of interfacing roles to their defined 
activities. 
The clash of these informal and formal teleological motors creates a dialectic motor where the 
thesis is proposed as the normative project structures and the antithesis the then current informal 
supports and reporting lines (in particular the anterior reporting of the BIM to the project 
manager and the reluctance of the change manager to take on training responsibilities). The 
outcome of this conflict, i.e. the synthesis, is the redrafting of the BIM role and reporting line 
and the adoption (with the proviso of additional resources) by the change manager of the 
responsibiHty for training. This synthesis resulted in two additional low-level motors, both 
immanent and unplanned. Firstly, the resolution of the BIM role and reporting role results led to 
additional responsibilities and secondly, the change manager pursuing the recruitment of a 
training resource. Three important design issues (desired salary band structure, PS timesheet and 
Foreign Exchange) were resolved using the informal change steering group and the formal 
change and design boards and conjunctively absorbed into the realised system. The roles of both 
these formal and informal structures in process progress through achieving synthesis in times of 
dialectic conflict, proved instructive. Viewed from the perspective of multiple and at times 
overlapping groups (HR, Finance, Parent), these parallel dialectic process motors when 
synthesised, allowed these issues to converge resolved into the realised design. 
Issues with respect to tracking and reporting of the ongoing project came to light as the project 
board queried project executive requests for additional resources in tandem with the temporary 
substitution of the project manager by the BPIIT manager. A failure of process control implies 
that a teleological motor has becomes a source of discord. Addressing this issue involves 
restarting the teleological motor to enable greater process control and involved critical 
teleological intervention by both the external QA and external planning consultants. The 
conjunctively mediating activities of these external actors not only addressed control and 
tracking concerns but also strove to reintegrate business facing roles back into the project. Both 
external actors deliberately acted to reinforce and legitimise each other's actions and advice. 
There was a dual effort to resolve process control issues and then to reintegrate outlying roles. 
Theoretically drawing once again on the conflict resolution categories of Werner and Baxter 
(1994), both external actors initially emphasised balance (acknowledgement of issues and mutual 
alleviation) followed by recalibrating both the project and the outlying roles to create more 
integration. Alleviation of these issues led to a loss of project control as resources and 
communication opportunities (i.e. project board presentations) were made available to the 
change manager and BIM. External intervention had enabled the informal teleological approach 
taken by the change manager and BIM in the earlier phase to ultimately be successful as they 
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gained access to necessary information and resources. However, external actor intervention, 
though ostensibly achieving calibration, still engendered further informal teleological process 
motors as the change manager and BIM continued to ally to manage meeting agendas and 
outcomes. 
8.4.4 Process Transition and Final preparation: lower-level process theory motors. 
Assessing the generative mechanisms identified for this penultimate process phase, the mediating 
influence of the PCB system delay is particularly striking in delaying the development of the 
communication plan, in shelving notional billing as an additional system development and in 
forcing the finance function to hire additional expertise. The delay though is initially mediated 
by the conjunction of two other mediating mechanisms, namely the inability to maintain 
consistency of the external SAP expertise and secondly, the need to redo configuration testing. 
Redoing testing is a direct consequence of external actor intervention that arose due to a lack of 
formal recording as to whether testing had been undertaken or not. This is indicative of a low-
level goal-driven teleological motor, which in turn drives the (avoidable) PCB system 
component delay. 
This teleological motor directly mediates however to derail two other parallel low-level motors, 
in the form of the development of a communication plan and making the case for notional billing 
to be part of the final project scope. The development of a communication plan pursued by the 
change manager, who obtained senior engineering manager commitment. though initially 
teleological as a process motor, becomes dialectical as a result of the system delay. The change 
manager is conflicted as to whether to continue pursuing the communication plan, or return to 
more of a testing role. The resulting synthesis is that the testing role takes precedence and the 
change manager diverges from his original objective, sacrificing the individual for the need to 
address a more urgent coHective objective (Poole and VanDeVen, 2(04), though still cognisant 
of the need to develop a communication plan. Although put to one side by the PCB system delay, 
the communication plan attains a new momentum due to the intervention of the last external QA 
who makes a recommendation to pursue the same with more urgency. Not unlike the previous 
phase, the external actor has reinvigorated a teleological motor that strives to manage a live 
issue. Conflict as to whether to aJIow a system demo for the engineering popUlation is indicative 
of a dialectical process motor with the change manager and BIM and some project team 
members and senior stakeholders taking the thesis and antithesis stances in terms of their support 
or opposition to the system demo. The resultant outcome though formaJly synthesised in the 
decision not to aJIow a system demo had another more important consequence. An impression 
arose that the BIM in particular had deliberately began to decouple from the project and further 
conflict (and a dialectical motor) arose in terms of clarifying that person's particular reporting 
and responsibilities. The outcome was synthesised in terms of the roles and reporting Jines of the 
BIM role being adjusted and reformalised. This was commensurate with a new teleological 
motor as prescribed objectives for the role had been set. 
Considering the process holistically, a clear pattern can be discerned. Firstly, business and 
project roles seem to be a constant source of conflict (and therefore) an instigator of dialectic 
process motors. Such conflict is not a simple battle between the individual and the co))ective that 
typically catalyses a dialectic process motor, but rather an individual as a proxy for one 
coUective in conflict with another. The motivations of the change manager in engaging in role 
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conflict though partially self-motivated are also motivated by a desire to advocate for the 
engineering population (e.g. system demo conflict) with a similar observation possible for the 
BIM who utilises the informal contact with the head financial controller to shape the outcomes of 
the project for the finance group and to protect that part of the business in the event of project 
failure. Secondly, the syntheses that conclude from these conflicts in turn initiate new goals for 
the roles, and are therefore immanent and teleological in nature. This formal teleological 
outcome is typically shadowed by an informal teleological motor as the business facing roles 
further align and swap roles to protect their business cohorts. The tension between these formal 
and informal teleological motors coexists until the next moment of conflict and synthesis and the 
cycle recommences. This cycle had never hitherto had a moment of real "role catharsis" and so 
has stayed unbroken. However, at the end of this phase, the combination of: managerial support, 
access to resources and the migration of the project into an arena where these business facing 
roles are more comfortable enabled this cathartic moment in the form of role validation. 
Both business-facing roles had been pushing for access to SAP finance knowledge resources 
from the project team in order to present in an informed fashion to the wider user population. 
The actions of the outgoing and incoming senior user on the project board in pushing for such 
resources can be seen as teleological driven, goal-orientated though such actions were greatly 
mediated by the second external QA report. This teleological low-level motor was also the 
effective synthesis of a long running dialectical motor that began further back in the process as 
the project team opposed calls on this resource made by the business-facing roles and indeed the 
business at large. The reinforcing actions of senior management both immediately after the key 
presentation and in the longer term further enabled the validation of the change manager and the 
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overall project. Re-considering the process, another clear pattern can be discerned. The actions of 
external actors though more directly influential in the prior phase reverberate through the 
process. From a low-level process motor perspective, their actions have two (not necessarily 
exclusive) outcomes. Firstly, they enable a new clear direction and momentum for teleological 
paths that have lost immanence (i.e. improving tracking and reporting). Secondly. they help to 
bring about closure for incomplete dialectical syntheses indirectly (e.g. conflict over the SAP 
finance team member resource) and directly (e.g. communication plan). Further dialectical low-
level motors can be identified with respect to the decision to create a central accounting office 
and the alteration of existing purchasing routines and rights, the latter resulting in a teleological 
motor as user concerns with respect to the new purchasing system are taken on board. 
8.4.5 Process Go-Live and Support and continuous improvement: lower-level process 
theory motors. 
The last phase in the process is characterised by unitary event progression mechanisms and a 
teleological drive to tie-off the process On a high level, although the project formally closes. 
ending the higher-level life cycle motor, the teleological absorption of the outcomes into the 
Financial Efficiency project is illustrative of the functional fit of an alignment process into 
higher-level strategic objectives. The planned PO bureau intended to be a teleological outcome 
turns dialectical as unresolved vendor file issues emerge from discussions in the business focus 
groups, with a synthesis emerging in a newly engaged transfer of vendor file information. A 
teleological motor is evident in the motivations for creating the business focus group to identify 
issues. These issues were examined through a teleological use of a representative group of 
stakeholders to scope and cost these issues. Remaining outstanding issues were deliberately 
368 
ab orbed into the ongoing Financial Efficiency project, bringing the proce to a conclu ion, The 
following figure summari e the lower-level proce theory motor identified for each phase: 
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Figure 8.84: SIS alignment lower-level process theory motors (by temporal phase). 
8.4.6 Reflections on the lower-level process theory motors identified. 
Teleological and dialectic proces theory motor are clearly dominant withjn the phase, Given 
that the proces researched wa indicative of a planned trategic implementation bounded by a 
deadline, it is unsurpri ing to ee a plethora of low-level teleological motor a the proce 
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moved through the different phases to completion. However the level of dialectic conflict and the 
resolved (and unresolved) teleological causes and consequences are also prominent in nature and 
non-trivial in explanation. Considering the lower-level process motors identified, some clear 
patterns can be discerned. 
Firstly, business and project roles seem to be a constant source of conflict (and therefore) an 
instigator of dialectic process motors. Such conflict is not a simple battle between the individual 
and the collective that typically catalyses a dialectic process motor, but rather an individual as a 
proxy for one collective in conflict with another. The motivations of the change manager in 
engaging in role conflict though partially self-motivated are also motivated by a desire to 
advocate for the engineering population (e.g. system demo conflict) with a similar observation 
possible for the BIM who utilises the informal contact with the head financial controller to shape 
the outcomes of the project for the finance group and to protect that part of the business in the 
event of project failure. Secondly, the syntheses that conclude from these conflicts in tum initiate 
new goals for the roles, and are therefore immanent and teleological in nature. This formal 
teleological outcome is typically shadowed by an informal teleological motor as the business 
facing roles further align and swap roles to protect their business cohorts. The tension between 
these formal and informal teleological motors coexists until the next moment of conflict and 
synthesis and the cycle recommences. This cycle had never hitherto had a moment of real "role 
catharsis" and so has stayed unbroken. However, at the end of this phase, the combination of: 
managerial support, access to resources and the migration of the project into an arena where 
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these business facing roles are more comfortable enabled this cathartic moment in the fonn of 
role validation. 
Both business-facing roles had been pushing for access to SAP finance knowledge resources 
from the project team in order to present in an infonned fashion to the wider user population. 
The actions of the outgoing and incoming senior user on the project board in pushing for such 
resources can be seen as teleological driven, goal-orientated though such actions were greatly 
mediated by the second external QA report. This teleological low-level motor was also the 
effective synthesis of a long running dialectical motor that began further back in the process as 
the project team opposed calls on this resource made by the business-facing roles and indeed the 
business at large. The reinforcing actions of senior management both immediately after the key 
presentation and in the longer term further enabled the validation of the change manager and the 
overall project. Re-considering the process, another clear pattern can be discerned. The actions of 
external actors though more directly influential in the prior phase reverberate through the 
process. From a low-level process motor perspective, their actions have two (not necessarily 
exclusive) outcomes. Firstly, they enable a new clear direction and momentum for teleological 
paths that have lost immanence (i.e. improving tracking and reporting). Secondly, they help to 
bring about closure for incomplete dialectical syntheses indirectly (e.g. conflict over the SAP 
finance team member resource) and directly (e.g. communication plan). Further dialectical low-
level motors can be identified with respect to the decision to create a central accounting office 
and the alteration of existing purchasing routines and rights, the latter resulting in a teleological 
motor as user concerns with respect to the new purchasing system are taken on board. The final 
stage in analyses, which strives to identify and characterise the higher-level relationships 
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between these lower-level motors, both within and between temporal pha 
undertaken . 
can now be 
8.S The fourth and final research objective; for the overall alignm nt proce : 
identifying the higher-level relationships between lower-level proce theory motor within 
and between the different phases. 
Three di tinct approache to higher-level process motor relation hip (a di cu ed in hapter 3, 
Section 3.9) have been identified in the proce theory literature, namely: ne ted, aggregate and 
entangled relationship (VanDeVen and Poole, \990). Taking the identified motor. , it ip s. ible 
to identify high-level proce motor relationship , both within and betwe n th di fferent 
temporal phases. The summary lower-level proce s motor di agram (Figure . 5) can b adapt 
on two distinct occasions to illu trate these identified relation hip , u ing the ~ ~ II wing n tali n: 
Relationship Graphical Equiralent 
Nested 
!!J 
Entangled 
M 
Aggregated 
~ ~
Table 8.3: notation for illustrating lower and higher-level proce motor r lationship . 
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8.5.1 Identifying the higher-level process motor relationships within each temporal phase. 
With respect to the mobilisation phase, there is a clear aggregate relationship between the 
teleological motor of system component scoping and the evolutionary motor of risk identification 
with respect to finalising the project scope. The recruitment of the project board, project manager 
and the finalisation of the business case, all driven by teleological process motors, are in an 
entangled relationship, as the linkage between them is neither tightly coupled or combinatory. 
Considering the blueprinting phase, there is a nested relationship between the dialectic and 
teleological motors with respect to the KAMs striving to get a representative on the BPID design 
team and then allying through the blueprinting workshops. This relationship is entangled with the 
following relationship. There is an aggregated relationship between the dialectic motor and the 
component and competing teleological motors. The teleological motor driving the creation of a 
steering group has a loose entangled relationship with the teleological motors pushing for 
business and project requirements to be met. The first external QA report as a teleological motor 
has a clear nested relationship with both the creation of a transition group (teleological motor) 
and the discussion of the BIM role and responsibilities (dialectic motor). The dialectic motor of 
change manager conflict is entangled with the BIM role as he and the business questions his role. 
With respect to the realisation phase, there is a strong nested relationship between the alliance of 
the business facing roles and the actions of the project in controlling these roles and project 
information (as teleological motors). The resulting dialectic is an aggregate of these conflicting 
motors, entangled with the clarification of the BIM roles and further change manager role 
conflict. There is a more nested relationship between the conflict over project tracking and 
373 
reporting and the teleological motors striving to integrate roles and manage project control 
issues. There is a nested relationship between the teleological drive to manage role integration 
and the ongoing informal alliance of the business facing roles. In the final preparation phase. 
there is initiaJly a nested relationship between both the redoing of PCB testing and the shelving 
of the communication plan (both teleological) which in tum is entangled with the re-impetus of 
the same plan (teleologically driven by the actions of the external QA consultant in delivering 
the third report and intervention). There is an additional nested relationship between the dialectic 
motor (addressing system demo conflict) and the teleological motor concerned with redrafting of 
the BIM role. There is also an entangled relationship between the system demo and purchasing 
system dialectic motors and a nested link between the latter dialectic and the deliberate taking 
on-board of user concerns with respect to the new purchasing system. In the final phase (Go-
Live/Continuous Improvement), the teleological motor driving the use of the business focus 
group is entangled both with the resulting vendor file dialectic conflict motor and the teleological 
creation of the stakeholder group. This latter teleological motor has a nested relationship with the 
resulting conflict over live system issues. The few remaining issues that emerge as synthesis are 
absorbed teleologically into the Financial Efficiency project. The higher-level motor 
relationships within each temporal phase can be summarised in the following diagram using the 
notation in Table 8.3: 
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8.5.2 SIS alignment process from a top-down macro perspective: higher-level motor 
relationships. 
Looking at the process from a top-down macro perspective, there is a clear high-level life-cycle 
process theory motor with the implicit generative mechanism of complying with logical and 
institutional requirements (Garud and VanDeVen, 2006) reflective of a financial year deadline 
and formal business strategy. Although the overall process is reflective of a higher-level process 
theory motor, there is also as each phase concludes and moves to the next, a substantive change 
in the nature of the developing process (Poole and VanDeVen, 2004) with the intent and 
outcomes of (for example) project blueprinting clearly distinct from that of project mobilisation. 
Therefore, at an initial consideration there is a nested relationship between this higher-level life-
cycle process motor and the component phases of the alignment process. Though acknowledging 
the fact that not every SIS alignment process is composed of identical phases as per the SAP 
implementation researched, there is likely to be some deconstruction possible in any alignment 
process researched (i.e. strategy implementation deadlines, systems development life cycle etc). 
Regardless, to enable useful process research techniques like visual mapping to be applied will 
entail imposing some logical temporal split on the process. This nested relationship is clear as the 
changes in the life cycle of the process, its development and progression in form and function is 
dependent and synchronised (Poole and VanDeVen, 2004) on motors in the component temporal 
phases. Viewing the relationship between the temporal phases at a higher-level, although they 
are individually teleological, they combine to constitute the alignment of the business and IS 
strategies. This combination is not as tightly or loosely coupled as a nested or entangled 
relationship. The temporal phases must happen in the sequence identified, with each phase 
coupled with the next, explicitly but not in a loose fashion. However, the coupling is not tightly 
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nested with clearly looser linkages between phases in terms of incomplete progressions and 
unsynthesised dialectic conflict. Each of the latter phases is directly dependent on the 
combination of outcomes from the previous phases. For example, testing a designed system 
would not be possible without the combination of a system blueprint and realisation. The 
relationship between individual phases can therefore be best described as an aggregated 
relationship (Poole and VanDeVen, 1990). Even though alternative templates can be more 
clearly drawn at lower levels of granularity, these identified high-level nested and aggregate 
relationships will be more inviolate. These identified relationships, though offering perspectives 
with utility, reflects a strategic perspective held at a certain (higher-level) in the organisation and 
is therefore not reflective of the multi-user experience. Explicating the relationship between 
motors both within and between temporal phases will capture a greater cross-section of 
organisational process experiences. Although each temporal phase in the alignment process has 
been identified as teleological or goal-orientated (i.e. the purpose of realisation is to bring a 
design to life), the relationship between these phases at lower-levels is considerably more 
complex. As identified in the relevant literature (VanDeVen and Poole, 1990), many process 
motor relationships are not as strongly or even as apparently linked as these initial nested and 
aggregate relationships. As discussed, the process phases may in of themselves be teleological, 
but the internal process motors identified may be not be as clearly linked (if at all) to this 
teleological outcome. 
8.5.3 Higher-level process motor relationships across the temporal phases. 
The identified higher-level process motor relationships are summarised in the following diagram: 
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These identified higher-level relationships can now be discussed in more detail. However, there 
is an overall relationship perspective that needs to be initially considered. There are two parallel 
supra-level relationship "clusters", though distinct in origin, interact throughout the process 
regardless of the temporal phase under consideration. The first supra-level relationship cluster 
(indicated by blue connecting arrows in Figure 8.87) isolates the fonnal project management and 
control motor relationships that persisted through the process. The higher-level relationships 
relevant to this cluster are now discussed. There is a nested high-level relationship between the 
teleological recruitment of the project board in the mobilisation phase and the dialectical issues 
in project tracking and reporting due to the lack of relevant experience available to be recruited 
internally. Project tracking and reporting issues had been raised as a risk by the first external QA 
report, hence the entangled high-level relationship between the first external QA report and the 
project tracking and reporting issues. The lack of exposure of the business case amongst the user 
population in the project preparation has an entangled relationship with the conflict over the 
centralised accounting office in the final preparation phase (as this was discussed as a possible 
option in the original business case). The first conflict episode with respect to the change 
manager role in the blueprinting phase has an entangled relationship with the resolution of 
responsibilities in the realisation phase, including the responsibility for communication, which in 
turn has a coupled nested relationship with the development of the communication plan in the 
final preparation phase. The dialectical failure to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the 
BIM/transition manager role in the blueprinting phase has nested relationships with both the 
infonnal alliances fonned with the change manager and the further deliberate move to further 
clarify the role, both in the realisation phase. Again, though the role is clarified, there is a further 
nested relationship with the changes in the BIM reporting line and responsibilities. The ongoing 
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infonnal alliance between both business-facing roles, a strong feature of the realisation phase, 
also directly entangles with the conflict over the system demo as both roles coalesce to push for 
an earlier system demo, though the project board and executive demur. The communication plan 
which attains a new impetus as a teleological motor, following the last external QA intervention 
is linked to the creation and use of the business focus groups in the last phase through an 
entangled relationship. 
The second supra-level relationship cluster (alternatively indicated by the red connecting arrows 
in Figure 8.87) isolates the unresolved scope and sign-off motor relationships that also persisted 
through the process. The higher-level relationships relevant to this cluster are now discussed. 
There is an entangled relationship between the risk assessed project scope and the dialectic 
behaviours seen in the blueprinting phase. Although new system components were fonnally part 
of the overall project scope, a lack of understanding of the business process consequences led to 
a divide between the project delivery group and different business cohorts (in particular, the 
engineering community). The absence of a known communicated outcome for all stakeholders at 
the end of the blueprinting phase and no design sign-off acted a catalyst for the remaining 
higher-level relationships to be discussed. Firstly, an entangled relationship can be identified as 
the business-facing roles co-aligned to (seemingly) protect their business cohorts, dissatisfied by 
a lack of design closure. Failure to synthesise conflict has a direct nested relationship with the 
decisions to temporarily cancel the communication plan. Although there is also a direct nested 
relationship with the need to redo configuration testing, this is due not so much to the lack of 
design sign-off, but more due directly to a culture of a lack of sign-offs. The lack of fonnal proof 
that configuration testing has been done necessitated its repetition. Traceability issues that arise 
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with the vendor file where data migration was done in an uncontrolled way was another example 
of a nested higher-level relationship resulting from this cultural issue. The unresolved system 
design problems that have to be revisited in the final phase (in a fashion akin to the alliance of 
the business facing roles) have a more nested relationship with the unresolved design. 
These clusters though distinct in definition and content, do however interact and affect each 
other at clear points in the process. These interactions largely reinforce the cycles of conflict in 
each cluster. The first clear interaction can be described as follows. The lack of a clear sign-off 
compelling the business facing roles to unilaterally broaden their defined responsibilities clashes 
with the failure to define the roles clearly in the PIn (and on earlier occasions when previous 
non-design issues had arisen). The clash of clusters at this point only entrenches the business 
facing roles further as well as distracting from the control roles necessary to manage the project. 
A second clear interaction arises when PCB configuration testing has to be redone due to a lack 
of historical evidence to prove it had been completed. This directly impacts on defined roles and 
the control of the project as the communication plan gets shelved only to be re-emphasised by 
the external actors who try and address project management issues. From a project control 
perspective, the failure to prepare the BIM role for data migration tasks and also the original 
failure to register data migration as a critical risk interact with the cultural lack of a sign-off to 
cause vendor file issues for users when the system goes live. Although the clashes of clusters are 
predominantly malignant, the increased emphasis on the communication plan towards the end of 
final preparation enables the forming of business focus groups that prove effective in tacking 
outstanding design and user issues post go-live. 
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8.6 Chapter Summary. 
This chapter satisfied the four key research objectives using process research techniques 
described by Langley (1999), Pentland (1999) and others. Temporally bounding the alignment 
process enabled individual events to be identified and discussed and their progression and inter-
relationships illustrated using visual mapping (thus satisfying the first research objective). These 
visual maps generated for each temporal phase were then revised to reflect the addition of 
identified generative mechanisms which characterised how event progressions interrelated 
(satisfying the second research objective). In order to address the causes and consequences, as 
opposed to just the nature of event progression inter-relationships, these inter-relationships were 
characterised as lower-level process theory motors by temporal phase (satisfying the third 
research objective). Higher-level process motors relationships (nested, aggregate or entangled) 
that emerged from these lower-level motors were identified for the entire alignment process 
(satisfying the fourth and final objective) and discussed. Two relationship clusters were 
identified, initially distinct but continuously interdependent and mutually malign (in most 
instances). The main body of the thesis now continues with the final chapter, which discusses the 
research conclusions, contributions, limitations and future research recommendations. 
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Chapter 9: 
Discussion, conclusions and recommendations. 
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9.1 Chapter introduction. 
This concluding thesis chapter initially revisits the research question and the initial literature 
critiques for context. The theoretical methodological and practitioner contributions of the 
research are discussed and appraised drawing on the analyses in the prior chapter. The 
limitations of both the research design and the alignment process researched will then be 
discussed. These limitations will inform recommendations for both further analyses of existing 
data and new research avenues from complementary theoretical and methodological 
perspectives. The chapter then concludes with a brief summary. 
9.2 Revisiting the original research question and initial literature critiques. 
At the conclusion of the second literature chapter (Chapter 3). the following research question 
was stated: What process theory motors and relationships characterise SIS alignment 
process? In the analyses chapter. process research techniques and process theory were utilised 
to identify the process theory motors and relationships characterise SIS alignment process. 
In addition, revisiting the original critique of the SIS alignment literature. three distinct criticisms 
were identified (Refer to Chapter 2. Section 2.7). namely: 1) Measuring or understanding SIS 
alignment is principally focused on the executive function within the studied organisations; 2) 
Treating SIS alignment as a variance phenomenon fundamentally ignores the social and cultural 
dimensions of alignment and 3) Efforts made to explore SIS alignment as a process has failed to 
sufficiently utilise either the methodological and theoretical frames offered by process theory. 
Given these initial critiques and research question. the relevance, value and contribution of the 
theoretical and methodological contributions made by the research can now be discussed. with 
recourse to relevant methods and theories. 
9.3 Theoretical conclusions and contributions of the research. 
The clear gap identified in the literature was the lack of theoretical understanding of SIS 
alignment process. Although, general theoretical contributions will also arise due to t h ~ ~
implications of this research for practice and will be discussed, the contributions of this research 
to the practice and management of SIS alignment will be considered in more detail in section 9.5. 
Established process research methods and theoretical concepts (i.e. process motors and motor 
relationships) were utilised to explore and characterise the process, leading to the following 
theoretical conclusions and contributions. 
9.3.1 Multi-level perspectives on and involvement in the alignment process. 
The first literature critique identified and discussed was that (measuring and) understanding SIS 
alignment had been principally focused on the higher levels within the researched organisations. 
The views and involvements of the upper echelons (Hambrick, 2005) and the executive level 
(Luftman, Papp and Brier. J 999) in SIS alignment has been the principal focus of research. The 
outcomes of this research however directly addressed this critique by reflecting the multi-level 
perspectives on and involvements in the alignment process. The alignment narrative is strongly 
polyphonic, eliciting the views and engagement of senior stakeholders in the parent and 
subsidiary, the project team, business-facing roles. external actors and the different business 
cohorts. The value of a polyphonic process narrative illuminates the intellectual dimension of 
SIS alignment highlighting the contrasting understanding and strategic ambiguity that 
385 
organisational stakeholders ascribe to SIS alignment, both as a concept and activity (Reich and 
Benbaset, 2000), awareness of which will be important for managers of the process. 
As Smaczny (2001) and others have commented, differing ways in viewing the same process is 
not inimical to alignment success and indicative of different mental models of the same process. 
Different mental models of the same strategy process held at different organisational levels 
(Raynor, 2007) though natural and defensible can also indicate strategic disconnects. In the 
process researched, this is instantiated in the understanding (or lack thereoO of the business case. 
The teleological characteristics identified (exhibited particularly in event progressions featuring 
senior stakeholders and the project executive) was indicative of the business case being made on 
the grounds of increased integration and effective cost reduction. The entangled dialectical 
relationships identified in the analyses chapter with respect to the reactions of certain business 
cohorts (i.e. engineering) and their lack of exposure to and understanding of the business plan 
reflect an entirely different organisational perspective. Upper echelons view the process as 
fundamentally about increasing integration and reducing costs with middle-tier organisational 
levels seeing the same process as unnecessary destruction of working business processes, and 
likely to increase costs. These perspectives though sharply contra"ting are not the only different 
views captured in the process. The need to proactively manage and reconcile these alternative 
mental models and perspectives, though theoretically explainable, tends not to be overly 
considered by alignment practitioners. 
Ambiguity in the attitudes of the project delivery group and the more business-facing roles are 
also evident. The project delivery group often display defensive attitudes (akin to Argyris's 
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defensive routines, which will be discussed in a latter section) and play strategic games 
(Mintzberg, 1983) with respect to the provision of information and individual resources (i.e. 
offering to make the financial resource available to the change manager for KAM presentations 
and then changing their minds). In certain situations, there is often deliberate inaction and 
passive responses (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970) to issues raised by the business directly or 
through the business-facing roles. In a contrasting fashion, the business-facing roles have a 
natural ambiguity to the process due to their organisational backgrounds. Their mental models of 
the process are torn between fulfilling their mandated roles and shielding their respecti ve "home" 
business areas. The different organisational levels in addition to different mental models of the 
same process also equate to different intellectual dimensions of SIS alignment. These differing 
intellectual dimensions act to restrain the level of structural alignment as actors at different levels 
strive to enact their own strategic understanding (Jenkin and Chan, 2010); such behaviour is 
resisted rather than embraced by management, often an important practitioner failing as it limits 
the emergence of novelty in the alignment process. This enactment, reflecting organisational 
sense-making (Weick, 1995) is expressed as strategic activities, formal and informal leading to 
expected and unexpected outcomes (which will be discussed in the next section). 
These restraints on structural alignment can be seen in both supra-level relationship clusters 
identified and discussed in analyses. Although structural alignment is restrained, the mediating 
involvement of external actors at multiple points in the process proves critical in bringing some 
concord to these different intellectual dimensions. Both actors, in promoting greater 
organisational integration and openness of information and resources are critical in reducing the 
distance in intellectual dimensions of alignment seen at different organisational levels. To 
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summarise this contribution, the research has identified the preponderance and importance of 
different intellectual dimensions of alignment at multiple-levels of the organisation. that these 
competing mental models engender conflict and restrict the desired degree of structural 
alignment and the key role of external agents in melding different mental models through 
mediation at crucial stages in the process. Selecting and recruiting these external agents therefore 
should be ascribed a far higher level of importance for those with such process responsibilities. 
9.3.2 Strategic activities in the alignment process at different organisational levels. 
Although SIS alignment research has identified key staffing roles and activities in the alignment 
process (Edwards, 2000) the focus has been more on roles that act to reduce user/employee 
resistance and less on how roles interrelate and co-enact to create process outcomes. The 
presence and actions of an appropriate change agent or agents who can overcome structural and 
communication barriers, which act as obstacles to SIS alignment have been identified as 
important (Edwards, 2000; Jenkin and Chan, 20 I 0). Although there is a formal change manager 
role in this process, change initiatives are also driven by the business implementation manager 
role, financial controllers and external actors. 
The change manager role as discussed in the SIS alignment literature emphasises the generic 
communication and marketing components of the role. Although these formal roles are evident 
in the activities of the change manager, the informal structures that he creates and leverages (or 
not as also arises) is a specific outcome of this research. Understanding how these informal 
structures emerge and are often managed in an ad-hoc fashion is instructive for oversight of the 
process. 
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Creating the steering group (initially informal though quickly formalised by the project board) to 
access extant change experience and also as a diffusion device for change messages is initially 
very effective and at a stage in the blueprinting phase, acts as a shadow design forum. In this 
instance, the change manager is exhibiting the classic entrepreneurial activities of middle 
management in strategy process (Burgelman, 1983). However, the initial momentum is lost at the 
most critical time and is conspicuous by its absence in the difficult realisation phase. However, 
as the communication plan, the change manager again reaches out informally to gain key 
stakeholder buy-in prior to a critical formal project communication. 
The key conclusion that can be determined with respect to the creation of the informal structures 
for change is to ensure they're sustained and retain momentum so they can be accessed as 
required. It could also be concluded that the informal change structures (though initiated by the 
change manager) could have shown more proactive behaviours in terms of supporting the change 
manager rather than just being reactive to issues as they arise. The transition group instigated by 
the senior financial controller differs in being a formal structure that acts as a conduit for 
concerns from the finance cohort to the project and vice-versa given the role of the business 
implementation manager (as the occupier originally understood the role). Both the formal 
transition group and informal steering group structures enable certain corrective actions and 
adjustments (as per Mintzberg, 1979) from the perspective of the business and business-facing 
roles. Enabling and sustaining such structures should be more of a priority for process managers, 
even though it contradicts their default controlling roles. 
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There has also been insufficient consideration of how SIS alignment activities differ at the centre 
(upper echelons and project executives) in comparison to the other peripheral levels. with the 
centre engaged more in exploitation and the periphery in more furtive exploration and 
experimentation (Regnor, 2003). Furthermore. how these activities lead to new and unexpected 
structural configurations, though identified in the literature (i.e. Bergeron. Raymond and Rivard. 
2001; Ward and Peppard, 2(02) have not been sufficiently explored. 
The PRINCE2 methodology by definition strives to formalise and control process activities as 
can be seen not just in the project board, but also in the constitution and roles of the change and 
design boards. The change and design boards act to legitimise the intellectualisation of alignment 
held by the upper echelons and the project executive. It could be argued that these boards in 
particular promote exploitation and act to defend the project against unnecessary exploration (as 
perceived by the centre), reflecting differences in strategy activities at organisational levels 
(Regnor, 2003). Although the unexpected structural configurations that can result from an IS 
implementation process have been discussed in the IS strategy literature (Robey and Boudreau. 
1999), the informal and emergent characteristics of SIS alignment, reflecting strategy without 
design (Chia and Holt, 2009), has also been under-represented in SIS alignment research. 
Although process controllers have natural constraints in terms of timescales and resources. in this 
process there is an argument that following such constraints became more a default setting. Such 
reflexive behaviour limited the degree to which unexpected opportunities could have been 
exploited and is an important practice outcome. 
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The description of how the salary band issue was resolved to the satisfaction of the subsidiary is 
particularly indicative of this conclusion. The periphery (Le. NOVOCORP's HR manager) was 
keen to utilise the system implementation as a vehicle to enable a change in how employees were 
absorbed into the organisational structure (i.e. through set salary bands). The resistance of the 
centre (i.e. AGOCORP and the formal design board) was presaged on a desire to use the SAP 
system as being designed (Le. exploitation) rather than entertaining any unnecessary exploratory 
change. 
The ability of the HR manager to leverage support informally to get acquiescence to the salary 
band change illustrates how the formal can be bypassed in an alignment process. The failure of 
notional billing to be added to the project scope offers further evidence of this formal brake on 
exploration. Leveraging the informal does not offer just a means to an end but provides ongoing 
learning opportunities for process participants (Stacey 2010), that will likely inform their future 
strategic actions. In certain cases, the difference between process exploration and exploitation is 
not especially clear and the ability to attain support for an unexpected system development is 
power-dependent. This can be seen by the decision to implement a centralised accounting 
function in NOVOCORP, which was not part of the original project scope or design. Although 
the fact that it was not part of the original design would suggest this was purely explorative, it 
was in effect exploitative as the system consequences were minimal. The structural 
consequences however were dramatic in terms of re-organising the KAM teams and more 
particularly their supporting accounting teams. The extent of structural impact was not a 
deterrent however, due to the power of the finance function in the project and that the centralised 
accounting function enabled increased process integration, a key plank of the business case. The 
391 
importance of power justified by arguments for increased integration was clearly observed in the 
process and will be considered as an avenue for future research. 
The role of external actors in particular has not been a subject of much discussion in the SIS 
alignment literature, which has emphasised top-down alignment control and direct traditional 
authority and mediation. External actors (i.e. the external planning consultant and the two 
different external QAs) in this process, through mental models informed by greater skills and 
experience (particularly in project tracking and reporting), act to engender greater structural 
alignment. Both actors, in promoting greater organisational integration and openness of 
information and resources are critical in reducing the distance in intellectual dimensions of 
alignment seen at different organisational levels. An important conclusion arises here with 
respect to how external actors are selected and recruited. 
External actors act to strengthen eltisting formal structures by broadening the access to 
information (e.g. getting different people to present to the project board). In addition. they fulfil 
an important role in promoting formal structures lacking in the process (i.e. business focus 
groups post go-live). Formal structures post go-live proved especially important in bringing 
synthesis to unresolved dialectic conflict across the entire process. Supporting eltternal actors in 
their introduction and sustaining of these new process routines was therefore an important 
observation for good managerial practice. 
Both the informal and formal process structures are leveraged with the same objective: 
optimising system integration and cohesion (Chan, 2(02). However, the understanding of and 
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approach to integration and cohesion differs due to the social and cultural dimensions of SIS 
alignment which will be discussed in the next section of this chapter. The ability of some project 
and business individuals to create informal networks. leverage the informal organisation and 
draw on the experience. expertise and power of others wa .. instrumental in delivering a project 
that had parent and business resonance. a conclusion that reflects the findings of Luftman. Papp 
and Brier (1999). Jenkin and Chan (2010) and others. Exploring the roles of process participants, 
under-explored in SIS alignment research such as the external actors. the business stakeholders 
not part of project delivery and informal actions of business-facing roles is a key research 
contribution. The tensions between exploitation and exploration actions and agenda .. drive some 
of the most important strategic outcomes and activities. 
9.3.3 Social and Cultural dimensions or the SIS alignment pnKess. 
Understanding and exploring the social and cultural dimen!'lions of alignment (Henderson and 
Venkatraman. 1999: Sabherwal and Hirschheim. 2001) is in essence considering the 
relationships between actors in the process. Considerable insights into the formal and informal 
interactions of internal and external stakeholders in the alignment process have resulted from the 
longitudinal and embedded nature of the research undertaken. Though the SIS alignment 
literature with practice outcomes addresses the need to integrate systems and the business with 
stakeholders (i.e. Luftman. Papp and Brier. 1999; D'Souza and Mukherjee. 2004; Tallon. 2008; 
Jenkin and Chan. 2010). there is minimal consideration of the importance of social integration in 
the process. The importance of understanding the social and cultural dimensions of SIS 
alignment lies in the important contributions made to positive alignment process outcomes 
(Sledgianowski and Luftman. 2005). A lack of social integration in this process not only 
unmoored important delivery functions but also resulted in a deepening of the information gap 
between project delivery and the business. The causes of social disintegration are directly related 
to the entangled dialectic motors identified in the process. The decision by the business-facing 
roles to decouple from the main project executive was in essence a defensive routine. 
Disintegration was not just as explicit as the actions of the business-facing roles. The project 
executive and delivery group striving to realise the project design also implicitly decoupled from 
the business. These outcomes arise from multiple entangled conflicting motors. Incomplete 
synthesis due to a lack of a design sign-off and unclear roles and responsibilities drove increased 
social process disintegration. 
The coping mechanism deployed by the business-facing roles to deal with this social 
disintegration is an important research outcome. The forming and sustaining of a gainful alliance 
was critical for these roles in both process sense-making and indirectly integrating the business 
with project delivery. The tendency of the business-facing roles to proactively reallocate 
elements of their roles to each other is an example of "heedful interrelating" (Weick and Roberts, 
1993: 361), where to cope with complexity and more specifically, uncertainty, working 
colleagues dynamically share roles and responsibilities. Although these actions have a clear 
theoretical explanantion in the enactment phase of sense making (Weick, 1995), there are 
implications for practice in enabling such behaviours. These coping mechanisms that strive to 
manage ongoing disintegration ironically catalyse further disintegration and conflict, as the 
project executive reacts by pushing to clarify roles and responsibilities. Coping mechanisms to 
manage process disintegration are not just limited to the interaction of the business-facing roles. 
The social interactions of the business implementation manager and the senior financial 
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controller proved consequential for the finance function in terms of adjusting the priorities of the 
project. Indeed, these social interactions at the periphery of the project posed a threat to the 
controlled agenda desired by the project executive and eventually reporting lines had to be 
adjusted to reflect this. 
As already mentioned, roles of the external actors in mediating throughout the alignment process 
has been critical. From a social alignment perspective. this is particularly evident in the actions 
of the external planning consultant formally creating mechanisms for reintegration of the 
business-facing roles. Though an important intervention. the heedful inter-relating of the 
business-facing roles still continues as they meet to shape and control meeting agendas and 
content of future plans. Another important aspect of the social dimension of SIS alignment was 
the input of employees into ongoing and retrospective implementation reviews (i.e. 
Sledgianowski and Luftman, 2(05). Even though the outcomes of these reviews were fonnal in 
the form of a report and project board presentation. social interaction of the external QA with 
those involved in the alignment process was critical. This entailed conflict closure in 
encouraging the release of project resources and information required by the business and the 
business facing roles and also supporting the integration activities instigated by the external 
planning consultant. 
The cultural dimension of alignment can also be seen strongly in the process researched. 
particularly in the attitudes and perspectives of the different stakeholder segments in the process. 
Those cultural attitudes are expressed naturally with respect to the implications of the system for 
the cohort to which the individual belonged. having affiliation with the parent a ~ ~ opposed to the 
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subsidiary and internal differences between the subsidiary cohorts. Cohort tribalism is an 
important cultural dimension of the process and is clearly articulated with respect to the levels of 
resistance to the system. HR and to a lesser degree the finance function can see clearer benefits 
to the system than the engineering cohort. The different system attitudes can be ascribed to 
cultural changes that will ensue. HR sees the system as a positive enabler of a working culture 
that allows them to be more strategic and add organisational value. Finance may not see the same 
level of working culture benefits but appreciate the efficiency gains arising from integration. The 
engineering cohorts see their entire culture of operation threatened from the ability to control the 
biJIing process to their relationship with project managers. The importance of addressing cultural 
variation in a process audience has been addressed in the literature through the use of a cultural 
audit (Burns, 1993) yet the application of such a technique emphasises historic cultural attitudes 
to technology, rather than immediate cultural concerns with respect to work and process changes. 
The importance of capability in leading change and managing the alignment process, though 
obliquely mentioned in the literature (D'Souza and Mukherjee, 2004) is overshadowed in this 
process by the need to address cultural misgivings. The selection of the change manager from the 
engineering population is largely (though not completely) driven by a desire to reassure that part 
of the process population with the greatest cultural misgivings, that their concerns were being 
given consideration. Cultural appeasement was a stronger selection criterion than change 
experience. Another irony of the process was that in striving to manage cultural concerns, the 
process actually gave rise to a greater cultural issue as it became apparent that the change 
manager lacked sufficient financial literacy. Although the capability to lead change is a lodestone 
in change management theory, it is critical as demonstrated in this process for practitioners to 
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legislate for such capability in the selection of the process teams and structures. Cultural 
dimensions of this alignment process were also process independent and symptomatic of 
embedded cultural issues, in particular the lack of "sign-off' and fonnal or enabled knowledge 
sharing cultures (Jenkin and Chan, 2010). The conflict that echoed throughout the process as the 
result of a lack of a sign-off culture has been described in detail. Understanding the change 
context, again well-discussed in change theory (Balogun and Hope Hailey. 2(08). needs to be 
more carefully appreciated by the managers of the alignment process. The lack of a knowledge-
sharing culture (reflected but not caused by the absence of an organisational knowledge 
management strategy) was particularly evident in the failure of key roles to access past 
experiences of similar past processes in the organisation and in the loss of valuable experience in 
system training. 
9.3.4 Summary of theoretical contributions. 
Reflecting on the theoretical conclusions identified and discussed. the following contributions 
can be summarised. Two parallel supra-level relationship "clusters" which interact and 
fundamentally drive the alignment phase were identified. Each cluster substantiates specific 
focused theoretical contributions, and in addition induces wide-ranging theoretical contributions 
reflecting the varying actions of practitioners within the alignment process. 
The first supra-level relationship cluster constituted the formal project management and control 
motor relationships that persisted through the process. The formal structures within the project 
such as the change and design boards act as (often necessary and understandable> promoters of 
exploitation and bulwarks against exploration with strategy activities at the periphery 
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(exploration) and at the locus of process control (exploitation) profoundly different. Although 
this "tension between actions and structures is the ultimate moving force of the process" 
(Pettigrew (1992: 8), the importance of the informal structures and networks accessed by process 
stakeholders to get around these bulwarks enabled some explorative outcomes and learning from 
the process as an important result (Stacey, 2010). The cultural and social dimensions of SIS 
alignment are also evident here in general project role recruitment but more specifically in the 
timing of recruitment and nature of engagement of external actors. These conclusions though 
broadly theoretical, as they are presaged on the work of March, Pettigrew, Regnor, Stacey and 
others, indicate important implications for practitioners, as will be discussed. 
The second supra-level relationship cluster constituted the unresolved scope and sign-off motor 
relationships that persisted through the process. The cultural dimensions of alignment process 
with respect to attitudes to phase closure and traceability were highly instrumental with respect 
to these higher-level relationship clusters. Social dimensions are particularly evident here in term 
of ''heedful interrelating" (Weick and Roberts, 1993: 361), as a coping mechanism for business-
facing roles and the wider business at large to manage process disintegration and to (strive to) 
control project priorities. Such actions are fundamentally resisted by the formal structures which 
adjust roles and reporting roles as a result. Such adjustment and efforts at formal and informal 
control theoretically grounded in concepts such as sense-making and heedful-interrelating, draw 
attention to important issues for practitioners. 
The interactions of these parallel supra-level relationships, intermittent and having some 
common characteristics (i.e. role clarification, addressing control issues), bears some theoretical 
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resemblance to punctuated equilibrium (Tush man and Romamelli. 1985). However. this 
theoretical explanation lacks internal logic as these issues are revisited rather than evolving in 
terms of resolution or clarity. The conclusion that the SIS alignment process can be expressed as 
two interacting high-level process motor relationships also reflects the dual motor of 
organisational process (Cule and Robey. 2004). These dual clusters are however more than just 
motors, but an expression of their inter-relationship across all the phases of the process. To 
conclude. the research has made some specific theoretical contributions in terms of striving to 
explore and explain multi-level perspectives on SIS alignment. Broader theoretical contributions 
that lead to specific recommended practitioner actions were also identified. Firstly. through 
identifying and describing formal and informal SIS alignment structures. secondly. by 
considering the exploiting. exploring and coping behaviours of alignment actors at different 
levels of the organisation and finally. in examining the recruitment and co-ordination of the 
formal project structures. 
9.4 Methodological contributions of the research. 
One of the major SIS alignment literature critiques was that effons made to explore SIS 
alignment as a process has failed to sufficiently utilise either the methodological and theoretical 
frames offered by process theory. Therefore. from a methodological perspective. this research 
has made a novel contribution by utilising both process theory and process research methods to 
analyse SIS alignment process. Initially. in researching this SIS alignment process. alternative 
definitions of process were considered and the view of process as a developmental event 
sequence was considered most apposite to address the gap identified (VanDeVen. 2007). The 
lack of application of process theories and concepts to SIS alignment research was further 
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emphasised by the failure to employ process research methods. Given that the research question 
was indicative of the need to consider multi-level alignment process perspectives; different 
conceptual approaches to process were explored, identifying process as a developmental event 
sequence as the most appropriate research definition of process. Process research approaches 
were discussed and the process model approach selected and justified. Longitudinal data 
collection was undertaken with an emphasis on capturing multiple organisational perspectives on 
process incidents and events. The process event-driven narrative that resulted is coherently 
framed by the process model research paradigm, emphasising the development of the process 
and rich in detail and polyphonic in content. Therefore, the application of the process model 
approach as described in Chapter 5 and instantiated in the case study chapters (Chapter 7 in 
particular) offers an initial methodological contribution. The detail in the sequence of steps 
described proffers repeatability for coUecting data in future related research. 
A second and more important methodological contribution lay in the use of process research 
methods for presenting analysed data. The use of temporal bracketing (Pentland, 1999) to 
segment the process (albeit that there are natural temporal brakes in the process researched) 
provides an approach to deconstructing an alignment process for specificity and also for 
increased comprehension. In tandem with temporal bracketing, the use of visual mapping 
(Langley, 2009) offers an accessible graphical mode to represent the process. The explication 
given in the analyses chapter of how the visual maps were constructed again offers a 
methodological contribution through enabling repeatability. Such a format may enable the 
components of a process or process phase to be more communicable to a lay or non-academic 
audience, particularly in an organisational or pedagogical setting. 
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More importantly, the representation of event progressions and how the progressions inter-relate. 
in effect. creates a tabula rasa for both academics and practitioners. It can offer practitioners 
valuable insights dependant on their involvement in the process. In the case of process 
control1ers, overseeing but independent of the process, it articulates the process as a logical 
sequence, indicating the direction in which the process has moved and the antecedents and 
outcomes of formative events. The higher-level view of process progression also can indicate 
how seemingly unrelated processes often in paral1el, and often at total1y different organisational 
levels, actual1y fit together. Without a coherent visual representation, the relationships between 
such processes would be difficult to represent and be parsed by the observer. From the 
perspective of the embedded practitioner, it offers some (theory-free) insights into the impact of 
their actions and where their overal1 activities fit within the different temporal phases and the 
overal1 alignment process. 
Representing the alignment process chronological1y, but more significantly by immediate 
causation, offers an additional benefit for practitioners. It offers the potential to explore counter-
factual scenarios and decisions and the means to track the possible outcomes and consequences 
that may ensue. For example, within the initial temporal phase (Project preparation and 
mobilisation), absorption of project risks and the resultant lack of complete mediation, with 
respect to these risks in the project implementation document or PIO can be discussed as a 
possible counter-factual scenario. The consequences of the failure to ful1y mediate project risks 
can be seen in terms of ineffective project board behaviours and malign data migration 
outcomes. Practising managers can see through both the delineated event progression and motor 
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relationships how these negatives outcomes can be avoided and offers learning outcomes for 
more effective managerial interventions both in ongoing processes and in tenns of lessons learnt 
for future process control and coordination. 
Isolating the value and contribution of individual inputs in a complex alignment process is made 
easier by the deconstruction of the process in all its parallel and intertwined nature. Counter-
factual analyses can enable therefore not just more effective learning opponunities but also 
facilitate more coherent and equitable perfonnance management and cause-effect analyses. 
undertakings typically problematic in understanding complex change (Ambrose. 1987). The 
academic value of the visual process maps is as follows. The analyses of the visual process maps 
in this research were driven solely by process theory (reflecting the research question and 
objectives). However, it would be possible to utilise different theoretical frames to enhance the 
analyses undenaken and broaden the research conclusions. As the identification of generative 
mechanisms and motors is fundamental to analyses, restricting that which can be identified to 
process theory specific mechanisms and motors is by definition restrictive. (Note: many process 
theories (e.g. evolutionary) are adopted from other disciplines and hence by definition less 
restrictive; this point is however addressing more the generative mechanisms and motors that 
purpon to explain process inter-relationships, causes and effects]. 
Utilising theories and concepts such as threat-rigidity, high-resilience organisations. defensive 
routines, organisational power and ambidexterity (as will be discussed in Section 9.7.1). 
alternative generative mechanisms and theoretical motors could be identified. The value of these 
alternate mechanisms and motors would result from broader process event and event progression 
explanations and also the possibility of identifying different motor relationships, both at lower 
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and higher-order levels. To summarise, the research undertaken makes some clear 
methodological contributions to SIS alignment research. The detailed explication in this research 
of the steps in process research design and analyses addresses a key critique identified in the 
relevant literature and also potentially, enables repeatability for future SIS alignment process 
research. 
9.5 Practitioner contributions arising from research outcomes and observations. 
Considering the in-depth longitudinal research, the analyses undertaken and the theoretical 
contributions already discussed, it is therefore legitimate to offer some recommendations for SIS 
alignment management practice that may enable a more effective alignment process and more 
satisfactory outcomes. 
9.5.1 Initial project staffing criteria. 
An important primary recommendation is the need for managers (ideally pre-implementation) to 
identify the salient characteristics of expertise and experience required for the process delivery 
team or group. Utilising a large-scale project as a vehicle for staff development is a laudable yet 
risky approach (as highlighted by many interviewees) and as can be seen from this 
implementation, it is critical that managers balance the need to develop staff with the necessary 
expertise and experience to manage the process. Not only should the staff chosen reflect the 
required technical competencies, there should be complete engagement on their behalf in what 
the specific role constitutes. 
Some role flexibility is undoubtedly necessary and can be expected: however (as discussed in 
9.5.4), this requires the soft skill-set that can identify the time for adapting the role and provide 
the degree of role "stretch" required. Lack of role clarity and appropriate experience and 
expertise led to many important process team members on this particular implementation having 
their legitimacy questioned as a result. Recruiting for project structures that enable the views of 
users to be represented (i.e. the PRINCE2 project board) is most effective when senior 
management who are system aware and close to the particular users are chosen. Managers also 
need to undertake a training needs analysis again ideally pre-implementation to allow team 
members to attain reasonable skill levels in advance of their application. Reactive training 
whether role-specific or system-based (as was seen on this implementation) neither has currency 
for most participants and can again draw the legitimacy of the team and indeed certain 
individuals in question. 
9.5.2 Understanding organisational capability and risk consequences. 
As a related point to the initial observation on team composition and training. any strategic 
endeavour where the management of change is a substantive issue implies management must 
question the organisational capability and what that entails for the risk profile of the process 
(Balogun and Hope Hailey. 2(08) In this sense, the organisation studied wall no exception. 
Organisational capability in IS change and project management had been questioned even prior 
to this implementation, yet had never been fully discussed or resolved. These capability issues 
were systemic rather than symptomatic of particular individuals. The organisation in deciding on 
implementation without a partner in addition to not assessing organisational capability created 
critical project risks that became seriously problematic. Without the intervention of external 
actors, these risks would have been likely fatal. Open assessment of organisational capability 
also informs process team/group composition and should therefore be a formal parallel process 
to ensure more appropriate team composition and a clearer risk profile. 
9.5.3 Marketing and informing on the alignment process. 
The need to make a clear and coherent business case to the affected population is another clear 
recommendation to arise from this research for managerial practice. There can be sensible 
motives for limiting the circulation of the physical business case for reasons of confidentiality; 
however that has to be balanced by the need to justify the alignment process. Failure to engage 
the user population in terms of providing ongoing updates only reinforced the view abroad of a 
detached isolated project, intent on delivering their system without recourse to the affected users. 
Marketing and informing on the alignment process should not be limited to selling a system and 
providing progress updates; care should also be taken in informing the user population as to the 
roles and responsibilities of the delivery team/group. The reaction in this process to the 
appointment of the 81M and how it was intellectualised by different user audiences bears 
testament to this. 
9.5.4 Critical ''soft'' and "hard" alignment process skill-sets. 
Further developing the points made with regards to project member composition and 
organisational capability, clarity should also be attained with respect to the soft and hard skills 
that are required to drive the alignment process. Considering the researched process, there were 
many instances where the presence and absence of key "soft" skills had a determining effect. 
This ability contrasted sharply with missed opportunities for same that created difficulties with 
respect to role definition and managing informal networks. With respect to the "hard" skills 
required, addressing team composition and organisational capability directly should indicate the 
levels of these skills required. This was most evident in tenns of the governance of the alignment 
process where proficiency gaps led to pressure on resources from a failure to track and rcpon 
process tasks to the necessary granularity. 
9.5.5 Managing alignment phase closure. 
Although the alignment process followed had a high number of very specific defined pha\es, it 
was clear that the phases (in particular blueprinting) lacked a defined end-point. Having and 
effecting appropriate phase closure (with some form of consensual signing-off) is critical for 
multiple reasons. Imposing clear gates on stages of the alignment process removes any 
uncertainty as to whether requirements capturing is complete and limits the understandable 
tendency to roll-back on a completed design. Secondly, it promotes project and business 
engagement as consensual sign-off acts to inform the business and reciprocally gain business 
buy-in. Thirdly, it imposes an additional control discipline on process activities in enabling their 
traceability (as was seen to the research organisations' cost with respect to both configuration 
testing and data migration). 
9.5.6 Maintaining deUvery team Integration. 
It is necessary for management practices to focus on maintaining the integration of the delivery 
team. The decoupling from the delivery team of some key project roles proved panicularly 
disruptive. Participants informally reallocated their roles and responsibilities to try and manage 
this information gap, clouding their roles, creating difficulties for senior management in terms of 
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task allocation and reporting lines. Formal integration activities introduced by the external 
project management consultant, though not a panacea for disintegration should be part of how a 
process delivery team internally organises and communicates. 
9.5.7 Maximising the benefit of external actors. 
The involvement of external actors should as far as possible be pre-ordained. The decision as to 
how and when to deploy external actors should be an outcome from the capability discussions 
instigated by senior management before the process begins. The embedding of external actors 
also has to be considered more deeply from the perspective of organisational shadowing and 
support. On several occasions in the process, particularly with respect to training, failure to 
shadow an external actor led to the leaking of system knowledge that should have been retained 
within the business. 
9.5.8 Capitalising on unexpected structural changes and potential efficiency gains. 
There needs to be an openness to capitalise on unexpected process gains that arise. In the process 
researched, two event progressions with contrasting structural outcomes were captured. The 
realisation that multiple distinct accounting teams and approaches was unnecessary duplication 
led to the creation of a centralised accounting function. The approach taken by the finance 
function to enable this advantageous outcome has already been discussed. However, the formal 
and informal supports that were leveraged by management and the process delivery team proved 
critical in enabling an unexpected opportunity to be exploited. Contrasting this approach with the 
outcomes of notional billing is instructive. Although identified as a positive structural benefit, 
notional billing was "parked" due to being deemed outside of project scope. However post-
process, notional billing necessarily had to be undertaken to fulfil a new strategic initiative. The 
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failure to undertake notional billing within the process wall a missed opportunity. It would be 
beneficial to formalise how unexpected process gains are brought to senior management and how 
the process scope is questioned as a result. Senior management need to be able to see 
strategically outside the narrow scope of a process which may be relatively transient and judge a 
suggestion on the basis of long-term organisational benefit rather than in terms of process risk. 
9.6 Limitations of the research design and .. ipment process reseafthecl. 
The key limitation of the research undertaken is that it entailed a single-site ca.'ie study appmach 
(as discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.4.3.3). Inherently, there is a limit to the external validity or 
generalisibility of the research. Using proven and well-established general qualitative and more 
specific process research techniques (as discussed) it wall possible to attain a supported level of 
construct validity. Both data collection and analyses wall exclusively qualitative which naturally 
bounds external validity (albeit appropriate for an exploratory research question). Quantitative 
methods in process research, in particular in data analyses, could offer an alternative mode of 
analyses that could additionally inform research outcomes. Furthermore, the focus on using 
process theory as the sole theoretical "well" for analyses (again appropriate given the research 
question) is exclusionary. Other theoretical perspectives (ali will be discussed> have the potential 
to offer other types of generative mechanisms that could be applied to the same process data 
"substrate" so informing the motors and relationships identified. 
Although the alignment process researched offered an opportunity to research a rich and multi-
level business and IS strategy change; an instantiation of a real-time SIS alignment process, a 
research dilemma ensued for the researcher. There was a desire to maximise the depth of primary 
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and secondary data collection (internal validity of the research in other words) which posed 
substantial commitment in terms of opportunity costs in the field. In addition, the longitudinal 
nature of the research (17 months of engaged data collection) inherently restricted the scope for 
additional site access. However as will be discussed in Section 9.7.2, broadening the pool of 
alignment data and utilising quantitative analyses approaches would be important 
recommendations for the future. In addition to limitations of the research design. there are also 
limitations arising from the nature of the alignment process researched. 
Although the process offered an opportunity for rich and longitudinal access and data collection. 
certain site characteristics also acted to restraint external validity. The structural configuration of 
the organisation, in particular the parent and subsidiary relationship and history although not 
unique, was a specific strategic relationship. Not only was the structural and strategic 
relationship quite specific, the level of coupling was tight not just structurally but also in terms of 
business processes. The formal project management structures and deadline driven nature of the 
project (as clearly seen from the extent of the process's teleological characteristics) also placed a 
certain limitation on the external validity of the process studied. 
9.7 Recommendations for further research and analyses. 
Possible avenues for further research and analyses are now discussed from theoretical and 
methodological perspectives. 
9.7.1 Theoretical recommendations for analyses of current data and informing of future 
research designs. 
Reflecting on the broader management and strategy literatures, additional theoretical 
perspectives can be identified (among many other possibilities). These theories have the potential 
to enhance the analyses of collected data and also offer inform future research designs for SIS 
alignment process. By utilising additional theories, alternative generative mechanism .. and 
motors (outside those specifically defined by process theory) could be applied to the collected 
process data. Enhanced understanding and further more specific research paths could be enabled 
as a result. The theoretical recommendations that will be discussed are naturally constrained and 
not intended to be exhaustive (organisational learning for example could also be explored 
further) but reflective of possible application. 
9.7.1.1 Threat Rigidity, Organisational routines and high-resilience orpnJsatlo .... 
Threat rigidity is a management theory that considers the organisational traits and behaviours 
that prevent organisations from reacting and managing change even when necessary (Staw, 
Sundelands and Dutton, 1981). Such environmental threats rather than forcing them to change 
only makes them more rigid and less open to change; the threat i n c r e a . ~ e s s rigidity (Staw et al; 
1981) and can impact on strategic fit (Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984) and thus the level and 
degree of strategic alignment in an iterative cyclical f a . ~ h i o n . . Although the scoerative 
mechanisms identified in this research were theoretically addressed using process theories, in 
future research, the theory and frameworks of threat risidity may add explicatory value. This 
would be most likely the case in orsanisations studied that exhibit malign (even pathological) 
alignment tendencies. 
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The unfolding of the alignment process studied clearly indicated the differing reactions of the 
organisation's cohorts to the new system. There were strongly redolent senses of defensive 
routines (Argyris, 1991) on the part of the project group, business-facing roles, business cohorts, 
senior stakeholders and at the parent organisational level. Given the value of operationalising 
mutH-level process research, using the concept of defensive routines would seem to offer 
particular value as a generative mechanism but more especially a motor of alignment process. 
Indeed, the concept of routines could be used in synergy with organisational ambidexterity (as 
will be discussed) which also offers similar insights. 
The traits of high-resilience organisations (HROs) as identified by Weick and Sutcliffe (200 I), if 
applied, could also offer analyses and design value to SIS alignment process research and may 
also be particularly instructive for practicing managers. Five key traits of HROs have been 
identified, namely the tendency to track small failures, resist over simplification, exhibit 
sensitivity to operations, have a commitment (capabilities) to resilience and a strong deference to 
expertise (Weick and Sutcliffe, 200 I). Taking the alignment process researched the interjections 
and suggestions of the external QA consultants and (in particular), the external planning 
consultant indicated deference to expertise, whereas the failure to staff the project team with 
appropriate experience indicates more of an indifference to expertise. Furthermore, issues in 
terms of project tracking and reporting indicate insensitivity to operations. 
The failure to really absorb specific project risks (such as data migration) suggested over-
simplification. The recurring issues with regards to a lack of sign-off is somewhat indicative of a 
tendency to not fully track and control small failures which only escalate as the process unfolds. 
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These examples indicate the practical application of the HRO traits and could be e"tended 
further to be considered as generative mechanisms given additional longitudinal research. Such 
traits are embedded and cultural as opposed to single instances. implying that the concept of 
HROs would be more appropriately applied to the outcomes of researching different alignment 
processes in the same organisation. 
9.7.1.2 Theories or Organisational Power and Ambidexterity. 
In addition to the defensive routines evident in the reaction of different business cohorts. the use 
and acquisition of power is also evident. Given the nature of the relationship between the 
subsidiary and the parent. there is a natural hard power evident in the initial remarks of the CEO. 
the hierarchy inherent in the project board and e"ecutive. relative to the business. Within the 
project there is a lack of power eqUilibrium between the project executive and the business-
facing roles and also within the business. between the finance and engineering cohorts. These 
different examples of power reflect the alternate and intertwined vertical and horizontal 
applications of power (Pfeffer and Salancik. 2(02) and the playing of resource games 
(Mintzberg. 1983) suggesting two possible additional motors to inform analyses. The softer 
informal networking power exhibited by the business facing roles in aligning and protecting the 
business and the concerted actions of the KAMs in the blueprinting pha.'ie also offers an 
additional layer of analyses (Courpasson. 2(00). 
There are two types of organisational ambidexterity; the first is structural ambidexterity which 
uses dual structures and strategies to differentiate efforts between both exploration and 
exploitation (O'Reilly et al. 2004). The second is contextual ambidexterity which uses 
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behavioural and social means to integrate both exploration and exploitation (Gibson and 
Birkinshaw, 2004). Contextual ambidexterity driving exploration-exploitation can be seen in the 
process researched in terms of the development of the PO bureau and absent with respect to the 
decision not to engage with notional billing as part of the bounded process. According to Gibson 
and Birkinshaw (2004) senior managers facilitate the context and social base for ambidexterity 
as significant mobilisation, coordination and integration activities are required. According to 
(Jansen et aI, 2009) informal, social integration of the senior team as well as cross-function 
interfaces of the formal organisation contribute to the success of structural ambidexterity. The 
identification of disintegration and forced re-integration within the process (with respect to the 
business-facing roles in particular) has been identified and discussed, indicating a lack of 
structural ambidexterity. Concepts within organisational ambidexterity would seem to offer an 
alternate and rich lens for discussing process conflict and the informal and unexpected outcomes 
of the process and the generative mechanisms and motors therein. 
9.7.2 Methodological recommendations for research design and data analyses. 
The key methodological recommendation would be to enhance the external validity or 
"generalisibility" of the research. This could be facilitated in two ways. Firstly, broadening and 
deepening the pool of process event data by engaging in further longitudinal data collection. This 
could entail collecting data with respect to multiple implementations in a single-site over time or 
engaging in multi-site longitudinal research. The profound understanding of the broader 
organisational context obtained in single-site research enables reduced "start-up" opportunity 
costs in researching further implementations. Moving from single-site to multi-site approach 
though enhancing external validity will entail revisiting the initial research site contact criteria 
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and a close reappraisal of construct validity. Considering the tightly-coupled organjNation 
researched, purposive sampling could be undertaken to identify similar organisations or those 
with greater autonomy or more loosely-coupled structures. 
A stratified sampling approach could also be utilised to identify organisations of comparable size 
or structure and/or driven to align processes by similar regulatory or external motives. 
Considering the importance of informal process events identified in rhe research. re!'tcarching 
organisations that place less emphasis on governance and project management principles may 
provide a more fertile seam of informal process e v e n l ~ ~ and event progression. enriching the data 
collected. Secondly, although process event data collection should remain qualitative (if 
attempting to understand and explore process phenomena), there is potential. particularly in 
multi-site research, to analyse the data quantitatively. 
Analyses techniques such as temporal bounding, visual mapping and alternative templates 
utilised in this research may have a qualitative disposition but given a sufficient quantity of 
process event data, there are also strongly valid quantitative process research analyses techniques 
that could be utilised. Constructing process event data a.Ii a time-series could enable more 
mathematically derived process patterns to be identified. and using alternative templates of 
process event order, chaos and randomness to further enhance external validity (i.e. Dooley. 
2(02). The researcher views this research as an initial first step in a process research journey and 
intends to pursue the two-step approach as discussed. The researcher recognises the need to and 
value of generating a wider set of process event data. analysed with both qualitative and 
quantitative methods to further burnish both internal and (most especially) external validity. 
9.8 Final Chapter Summary. 
This final theses chapter had three key components. Firstly, the initial research question and the 
literature critiques were revisited with a view to discussing the contributions of the research from 
theoretical, methodological and practitioner perspectives. The theoretical and methodological 
contributions and conclusions were discussed from the perspective of the gaps identified in the 
original literature critique. Theoretical contributions were identified in tenns of exploring multi-
level perspectives on SIS alignment, formal and infonnal SIS alignment structures, utility and 
contlict and the socio-cultural dimensions of SIS alignment process. More general theoretical 
contributions embedded in the implications for practice were also specifically discussed. 
Methodological contributions to SIS alignment research was attributed to the detailed explication 
of the steps in process research design which addressed a key critique identified in the relevant 
literature and enables greater repeatability for future SIS alignment process research. 
The contributions to managerial practice made by the research were considered from multiple 
perspectives. With regards to managing the effects of the recent and ongoing SIS context, the 
marketing of a SIS implementation, implementation team composition, communication, 
integration and other business facing activities, implications were identified for practitioners 
managing a medium-tenn strategically significant implementation. The limitations of this 
research were then discussed from the perspective of the research design and the nature of the 
alignment process researched. Taking these limitations further, possible avenues for further 
research and analyses of existing data were then suggested and discussed. These avenues have 
the potential to firstly, enhance the external validity (or "generalisability") of the research and 
secondly (and potentially concurrent with this alternate methodological approach), offer 
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additional theoretical perspectives to further enhance data analyses (through alternate generative 
mechanisms) and the theoretical conclusions that ensued. The main body of the thesis is now 
concluded. 
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